Blough v. Silberman et al

Filing 27

ORDER: Defendants Morris Silberman, Marva Crenshaw, and Daniel H. Sleet's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 23 ) is GRANTED. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this action. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 4/25/2017. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MELVIN E. BLOUGH,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-371-T-33TBM

MORRIS SILBERMAN, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendants Morris Silberman, Marva Crenshaw, and Daniel H.
Sleet’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 23), filed on April 3, 2017.
Plaintiff Melvin E. Blough, who is proceeding pro se, filed
his response on April 20, 2017. (Doc. # 26). For the reasons
below, the Motion is granted and the action is dismissed.
Discussion
In 2016, a state court entered a final judgment of
dissolution of marriage in an action brought by Blough against
his then-wife, Marie B. Blough. (Doc. # 1-1 at 3-28). The
state

court

ordered

Blough

to

pay

$2,500

per

month

in

permanent alimony. (Id. at 18). Blough appealed the final
judgment

to

the

Second

District

Court

of

Appeal,

which

affirmed the trial court’s judgment on February 1, 2017. (Id.

at 31, 114). Approximately two weeks later, on February 14,
2017, Blough filed the instant action against the Defendants
in both their individual and official capacities. (Doc. # 1).
Blough amended his Complaint on February 27, 2017. (Doc. #
17). And on April 3, 2017, Defendants moved to dismiss. (Doc.
# 23).
Defendants first argue this Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The RookerFeldman

doctrine

bars

federal

district

courts

from

‘review[ing] final judgments of a state court . . . .’” Berene
v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 16-13939, 2017 WL 1420809, at
* 1, --- Fed. Appx. --- (11th Cir. Apr. 20, 2017) (citation
omitted). A state-court judgment is final for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman

if

the

appeals

process

ended

before

the

federal action commenced. Cf. Ware v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 394 Fed. Appx. 606, 608 (11th Cir. 2010) (“‘[S]tate
proceedings have not ended for purposes of Rooker–Feldman
when an appeal from the state court judgment remains pending
at the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action
. . . .’”) (citation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he doctrine is
[a] ‘narrow’” one. Berene, 2017 WL 1420809, at *1 (citation
omitted). It applies only in “cases brought by state-court
losers

complaining

of

injuries

2 

caused

by

state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of
those judgments.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this action, the Amended Complaint alleges “[t]he
February 1, 2017 Opinion by the Florida Second District Court
of Appeals in Case No. 2D16-3146 will be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court via a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus . .
. .” (Doc. # 17 at 3). For their part, Defendants are unsure
of whether an appeal was actually taken. (Doc. # 23 at 7-8)
(“Plaintiff alleges that he intends to appeal . . . but the
posture of any such appeal, if any, is unclear.”). The
uncertainty with respect to finality produced by the parties’
briefing is made all the more stark by the fact that nothing
in the record demonstrates one way or the other whether an
appeal was taken. Given the lack of certainty and dearth of
information in the record, the Court declines to apply the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Nevertheless, dismissal is still appropriate. Blough
seeks to impose liability upon each Defendant to the tune of
$2 million and bases those damages on Defendants’ act of
affirming a judgment entered by a state trial court. (Doc. #
17). But,

3 

[j]udges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity
from damages for those acts taken while they are
acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted
in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. . . .
This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts
are in error, malicious, or were in excess of his
or her jurisdiction. . . . Whether a judge’s actions
were made while acting in his judicial capacity
depends on whether: (1) the act complained of
constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the
events occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open
court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending
before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose
immediately out of a visit to the judge in his
judicial capacity.
Sibley

v.

Lando,

437

F.3d

1067,

1070

(11th

Cir.

2005)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A

review

of

the

Amended

Complaint

demonstrates

the

Defendants were acting in their judicial capacity when they
issued an opinion affirming a trial-court order that had been
appealed. Because immunity protects Defendants from suit and
amendment would be futile, this action is dismissed with
prejudice.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Defendants Morris Silberman, Marva Crenshaw, and Daniel
H. Sleet’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 23) is GRANTED.

(2)

This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is
directed to CLOSE this action.

4 

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
25th day of April, 2017.

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