Owens-Benniefield v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Filing 14

ORDER: Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC's Motion for More Definite Statement and/or to Dismiss (Doc. # 6 ) is granted. Plaintiff Vickie Owens-Benniefield may file an amended complaint by May 19, 2017, failing which the case will be dismissed without further notice. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 4/21/2017. (DMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
VICKIE OWENS-BENNIEFIELD,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 8:17-cv-540-T-33TGW

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s Motion for More Definite Statement
and/or to Dismiss (Doc. # 6), filed on March 30, 2017.
Nationstar

requests

a

more

definite

statement

of

Owens-

Benniefield’s claims on the grounds that the Complaint is a
shotgun

pleading.

Alternatively,

Nationstar

requests

dismissal, arguing that the Complaint also fails to state
claims upon which relief can be granted. Pro se Plaintiff
Vickie Owens-Benniefield has not filed a response, and the
time to do so has expired. As such, the Court treats the
Motion as unopposed.
Discussion
The Court agrees the Complaint is a shotgun pleading and
a more definite statement of Owens-Benniefield’s claims is

1

necessary. The Court construes pro se pleadings liberally and
holds them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
2003). But, “a pro se litigant is still required to conform
to procedural rules, and a district judge is not required to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” McFarlin v. Douglas Cty., 587
F. App’x 593, 595 (11th Cir. 2014).
Pursuant to Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., a pleading that
states a claim must contain, among other things, “a short
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Additionally, Rule 10(b) provides that

“[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered
paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single
set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Taken together,
these

rules

“require

the

pleader

to

present

his

claims

discretely and succinctly.” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d
1079, 1082 (11th Cir. 1996)(citation omitted).
Complaints that fail to plead discretely and succinctly
are

often

described

shotgun
four

complaints.

varieties

of

The

Eleventh

shotgun

Circuit

complaints:

(1)

has
“a

complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts
the allegations of all preceding counts”; (2) a complaint
that is “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
2

not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”;
(3) a complaint that does “not separat[e] into a different
count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4) a
complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are
responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the
defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (11th
Cir. 2015). “The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to . . . give the
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
In such cases, it is “virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s)
for relief.” Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty.
Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). A defendant faced
with such a complaint is not expected to frame a responsive
pleading.
pertinent
management,

Id.

“The

precedent,
and

Federal

Rules

sound

fairness

to

of

Civil

principles
the

opposing

of

Procedure,
litigation

party

almost

uniformly commend requiring a litigant to submit a complaint
that is not a ‘shotgun pleading’ and that otherwise complies
with the salutary rules of pleading.” Stevens v. Barringer,
3

No. 2:11-cv-697-UA-SPC, 2013 WL 24272, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
2, 2013).
Here, the Complaint does not give Nationstar adequate
notice of the claims against it. First, a major problem with
Owens-Benniefield’s Complaint is that she includes a section
outlining nine causes of action, followed by another section
listing sixteen counts. (Doc. # 1 at 4-13). It is unclear
whether

Owens-Benniefield

is

attempting

to

bring

claims

through the various causes of action as well as the listed
counts, which are not identical. In her amended complaint,
Owens-Benniefield should include only a list of counts so
that Nationstar and the Court can clearly identify her claims.
Owens-Benniefield’s Complaint is also a shotgun pleading
because it contains “multiple counts where each count adopts
the allegations of all preceding counts.” Weiland, at 1322.
Each of the nine causes of action states “The allegations of
the preceding paragraphs are re-alleged and incorporated by
reference as if set forth fully here.” (Doc. # 1 at 4-8). As
a result, each cause of action incorporates by reference all
of the allegations of the previous causes of action. This is
impermissible. In her amended complaint, Owens-Benniefield
must incorporate only the factual allegations relevant to
each separate count.
4

Some claims also mix references to different statutes.
For example, in Counts 2 and 3 — FCRA and FDCPA claims —
Owens-Benniefield asserts she is entitled to “an award of
costs of litigation and reasonable fees pursuant to Fla. Stat.
§

559.77.”

statutes,

(Id.
not

at

9).

subject

The
to

FCRA

and

Florida

FDCPA

statutes

are

federal

concerning

attorney’s fees. And, in the “Second Cause of Action,” labeled
as a FCRA claim, Owens-Benniefield references the FCCPA and
phone calls she received to her cellphone from Nationstar
attempting to collect the debt. (Id. at 4-5). In her amended
complaint, Owens-Benniefield should not assert claims under
more than one statute in the same count and should avoid
referencing other statutes in her claims.
As the Court has determined that repleader is necessary,
the Court declines to address Nationstar’s alternate argument
that various counts fail to state claims upon which relief
can be granted. Cf. Bennett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, No. CV
15-00165-KD-C, 2015 WL 5294321, at *13 n.15 (S.D. Ala. Sept.
8, 2015)(“The Defendants advance several arguments to dismiss
the breach of contract and FDCPA claims, but the undersigned
declines to address those arguments until these claims are
repleaded.”).

5

Accordingly, the Motion

for More Definite Statement

and/or to Dismiss is granted to the extent Owens-Benniefield
may file an amended complaint by May 19, 2017. If OwensBenniefield
familiarize

wishes

to

herself

proceed
with

the

in

this

Federal

action,
Rules

she
of

must
Civil

Procedure, as well as the Local Rules of the Middle District
of

Florida.

The

Middle

District

of

Florida’s

website

maintains a “Proceeding without a Lawyer” page, which is a
valuable resource regarding the litigation process to which
Owens-Benniefield may refer, but on which she should not
exclusively rely.
If Owens-Benniefield has questions about the meaning of
the Court’s Order, she may consult with a lawyer for free on
a limited basis at the Legal Information Program operated by
the Tampa Chapter of the Federal Bar Association on Tuesdays
from 11:00 AM to 12:30 PM in the Sam M. Gibbons United States
Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33602.
Appointments, which are recommended but not required, can be
made by calling [phone].
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

6

(1)

Defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC’s Motion for More
Definite Statement and/or to Dismiss (Doc. # 6) is
GRANTED.

(2)

Plaintiff Vickie Owens-Benniefield may file an amended
complaint by May 19, 2017, failing which the case will
be dismissed without further notice.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

21st day of April, 2017.

7