Bey v. American Honda Financial Services Corporation

Filing 64

ORDER: Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 48 ) is GRANTED to the extent the claims against Experian are dismissed. Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 49 ) is GRANTED to the extent the claims against Equifax are dismissed. Bey's "Motion to Strike, Dismiss Defendants, Defenses and Counterclaims for Failure to State a Claim, Demand for Judgm ent on the Pleadings" (Doc. # 62 ) is DENIED. Counts II, III, V, and VI of the Fourth Amended Complaint are DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to terminate Experian and Equifax as parties in this action. The case remains pending as to the claims against Defendant Trans Union LLC. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/26/2017. (DMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ALI TAJ BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-759-T-33MAP

AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE CORP.,
et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 48) and Defendant
Equifax Information Services LLC’s Motion to Dismiss the
Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 49), both filed on September
5, 2017. Pro se Plaintiff Ali Taj Bey filed a “Motion to
Strike, Dismiss Defendants, Defenses and Counterclaims for
Failure

to

State

a

Claim,

Demand

for

Judgment

on

the

Pleadings” on October 12, 2017, which the Court also construes
as Bey’s response in opposition to Defendants’ Motions. (Doc.
# 62). Equifax, Experian, and Defendant Trans Union, LLC
responded to Bey’s Motion. (Doc. # 63). For the reasons that
follow, Defendants’ Motions are granted and Bey’s Motion is
denied.
1

I.

Background
Bey initiated this action on March 30, 2017, by filing

his Complaint against Defendant American Honda Financial
Services Corporation. (Doc. # 1). Bey then filed an Amended
Complaint on April 25, 2017, which the Court dismissed on
April 27, 2017. (Doc. ## 5, 8). Bey then filed a Second
Amended

Complaint,

asserting

various

claims

including

violation of the National Bank Act and breach of contract
against American Honda, based on American Honda’s failure to
acknowledge that Bey paid off his debt. (Doc. # 18). The Court
dismissed the Second Amended Complaint on May 25, 2017, noting
that the National Bank Act did not create a private cause of
action and directing Bey to clarify the citizenships of the
parties involved. (Doc. # 25).
Then, on July 3, 2017, Bey filed his Third Amended
Complaint asserting Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., claims against American Honda Finance
Corp. and three other Defendants, Equifax, Trans Union, and
Experian. (Doc. # 28). After Equifax filed a motion to
dismiss, Bey filed his Fourth Amended Complaint on August 18,
2017, again alleging FCRA claims against American Honda,
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union. (Doc. # 43).

2

In the Fourth Amended Complaint, Bey alleges he “made
written requests” to American Honda, his creditor, “to verify
the information they were reporting as correct.” (Id. at 8).
But American Honda “failed to respond to [his] FCRA dispute”
and failed “to promptly delete this information and cease
reporting to all (3) major consumer reporting agencies.”
(Id.). Additionally, he “generally dispute[d] any information
on my report simultaneously with all 3 major credit reporting
agencies, Experian [], Equifax [], [and Trans Union], to
assure the completeness and accuracy of all reports.” (Id. at
3). “All allegations made with respect to defendants range
from failure to make required disclosures with all notices,
which should include the summary of consumer rights, for
failure to remove disputed accounts or provide certifications
from

furnishers,

or

delete

incomplete,

inaccurate

or

unverified information within 30 days of the request.” (Id.).
At the time of this Order, American Honda Finance Corp.
has been dismissed as a party and Trans Union has filed its
Answer. (Doc. ## 46; 59). Equifax and Experian moved for
dismissal of the Fourth Amended Complaint as to the claims
against them on September 5, 2017. (Doc. ## 48, 49). Bey filed
his

“Motion

Counterclaims

to

Strike,

for

Dismiss

Failure

to
3

Defendants,

State

a

Defenses

Claim,

Demand

and
for

Judgment on the Pleadings” on October 12, 2017, which the
Court

construes

pleadings

and

as

Bey’s

both

a

motion

response

to

to

strike

Defendants’

Defendants’
Motions

to

Dismiss. (Doc. # 62). Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union
responded to Bey’s Motion on October 26, 2017. (Doc. # 63).
II.

Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all

the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
this

Court

favors

the

plaintiff

with

all

reasonable

inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990)(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the]
complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken
as true.”). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
4

a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he scope
of

review

must

be

limited

to

the

four

corners

of

the

complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337
(11th Cir. 2002).
The Court construes pro se pleadings liberally and holds
them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir.
2003). But, “a pro se litigant is still required to conform
to procedural rules, and a district judge is not required to
rewrite a deficient pleading.” McFarlin v. Douglas Cty., 587
F. App’x 593, 595 (11th Cir. 2014).
III. Analysis
Bey

alleges

Equifax

and

Experian

each

violated

two

sections of the FCRA: 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g and 1681i.
A.

Claims against Equifax

Equifax argues the FCRA claims against it should be
dismissed because Bey is attempting to collaterally attack
the

validity

of

the

debt

he

owes

American

Honda,

and,

furthermore, Bey has failed to state claims under the FCRA.
(Doc. # 29 at 3). The Court agrees. The Fourth Amended
Complaint’s vague allegations are insufficient to state a

5

claim under the FCRA. The Court will address each count
separately.
1.
In

Count II

Count

II,

labelled

“Plaintiff

Alleges

Equifax

Information Solutions Failed to Make Required Disclosures and
Enclose Consumers’ Summary of Rights,” Bey appears to assert
claims under both § 1681g and § 1681i.
Section 1681g sets out the procedures that consumer
reporting agencies must follow when they receive a request
for information from a consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (“Every
consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, . . . clearly
and accurately disclose to the consumer: (1) All information
in the consumer’s file at the time of the request . . . (2)
The sources of the information . . .”). Additionally, “[a]
consumer reporting agency shall provide to a consumer, with
each written disclosure by the agency to the consumer under
this section — (A) the summary of rights prepared by the
Bureau under paragraph (1) . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2).
According to Bey, “[o]n January 24, 2017 & May 16, 2017,
Equifax [] failed to make the required disclosures and enclose
consumers’ summary of rights.” (Doc. # 43 at 10). Equifax
argues this allegation is insufficient to state a claim under
§ 1681g(a)

because Bey “does not set forth any details
6

regarding a request for a disclosure or the sources of
information he claims were not disclosed to him.” (Doc. # 49
at 7). Equifax also complains that Bey “has not alleged any
actual damages as a result of” the purported § 1681g(a)
violation, which would be required to state a claim for
negligent

noncompliance.

(Id.);

see

Taylor

v.

Screening

Reports, Inc., 294 F.R.D. 680, 686 (N.D. Ga. 2013)(“Defendant
moves

to

dismiss

Plaintiff's

claim

that

SRI

negligently

violated § 1681g. To prove a case of negligent noncompliance,
Plaintiff must produce some evidence of actual damages caused
by the violation.”).
The Court agrees. Although Bey provides two dates, he
does

not

elaborate

on

the

content

of

his

requests

for

disclosure. Bey does not elaborate on whether Equifax failed
to disclose all information in his file and all sources of
information

or

whether

it

partially

disclosed

some

information and sources. And Bey does not explain whether no
summary

of

consumer

rights

was

included,

or

whether

an

insufficient summary was included. If the summary of rights
was deficient, Bey does not explain how. Therefore, Bey has
not plausibly stated a claim under § 1681g(a) by Equifax and
has failed to put Equifax on notice of how it allegedly
violated the FCRA.
7

Bey also asserts that Equifax failed to notify him and
the furnisher of information when it deleted two “FED LOANS
SERVICING” accounts from his report. (Doc. # 43 at 11).
Additionally, Equifax “failed to remove all (6) ‘FED LOANS
SERVICING

ACCOUNTS’

inaccurate,

outdated

if
or

it

was

determined

unverified.”

(Id.).

they
As

were
these

allegations relate to Equifax’s duty to reinvestigate when
disputes are made, they fall under § 1681i. Section 1681i
“requires

a

consumer

reporting

agency

to

reinvestigate

disputed information in a consumer’s file if the consumer
notifies

the

agency

that

the

information

is

disputed.”

Allmond v. Bank of Am., No. 3:07–cv–186–J–33JRK, 2008 WL
205320, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2008)(citing 15 U.S.C. §
1681i). And,
If, after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1)
of any information disputed by a consumer, an item
of the information is found to be inaccurate or
incomplete or cannot be verified, the consumer
reporting agency shall-(i) promptly delete that item of information
from the file of the consumer, or modify that item
of information, as appropriate, based on the
results of the reinvestigation; and
(ii) promptly notify the furnisher of that
information that the information has been modified
or deleted from the file of the consumer.
15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).

8

First, Bey’s allegation that Equifax failed to notify
him when it deleted disputed accounts from his credit report
cannot form the basis of a § 1681i(a)(5)(A) claim. Section
1681i(a)(5)(A), regarding the treatment of inaccurate or
unverifiable information, does not require a credit reporting
agency to notify a consumer after it has deleted the item of
information disputed by the consumer from the consumer’s
credit report. In contrast, under § 1681i(a)(5)(B)(ii), a
consumer reporting agency is required to notify a consumer if
it

reinserts

previously

deleted

information

back

into

a

consumer’s report — an allegation that Bey does not make. Nor
does Bey allege Equifax failed to provide him a notice of the
results of its reinvestigation, as required by § 1681i(a)(6).
So, even construing the Fourth Amended Complaint liberally in
light of Bey’s pro se status, Bey has not stated a claim under
the FCRA for Equifax’s alleged failure to notify him that
certain disputed information was deleted from his report.
And, while Equifax would be required to notify the
furnisher of information for the deleted accounts that the
information had been deleted under § 1681i(a)(5)(ii), Bey
provides nothing but a conclusory allegation that Equifax did
not notify the furnisher of information for the account. (Doc.
# 43 at 11). Bey does not even explicitly identify the
9

furnisher of information. With only such vague allegations,
Bey has not plausibly stated a claim that Equifax violated §
1681i(a)(5).
Regarding Bey’s allegation that Equifax failed to delete
6 disputed accounts, this allegation is insufficient to state
a cause of action under the FCRA. Bey claims Equifax “failed
to remove all (6) ‘FED LOANS SERVICING ACCOUNTS’ if it was
determined they were inaccurate, outdated or unverified.”
(Id. at 11). But, Bey does not allege that Equifax found the
6

accounts

inaccurate

or

unverified

following

its

reinvestigation, yet failed to remove those items from his
credit report. Nor does Bey explain why he disputed these
accounts to Experian — i.e. why Bey believed the 6 accounts
were inaccurate. Cf. Green v. Chase Bankcard Servs., Inc.,
No. 8:16-cv-3252-T-33AAS, 2017 WL 1135314, at *7 (M.D. Fla.
Mar.

25,

2017)(dismissing

§

1681i

claim

because

the

plaintiff’s “vague reference to mathematical errors [did] not
provide sufficient factual support for her allegation that
Defendants violated the FCRA”). Therefore, Bey’s allegation
regarding the 6 accounts that were not deleted does not state
a claim under § 1681i.

10

2.
In

Count III

Count

III,

labelled

“Plaintiff

Alleges

Equifax

Information Solutions Failed to Verify the Information in My
File and the Procedure in Which It Verified the Accuracy of
the Information,” Bey attempts to assert a claim under §
1681i. As the Court explained for Count II, § 1681i “requires
a

consumer

reporting

agency

to

reinvestigate

disputed

information in a consumer’s file if the consumer notifies the
agency that the information is disputed.” Allmond, 2008 WL
205320, at *3.
Bey alleges that on numerous dates in 2016 and 2017 he
“requested that Equifax verify the sources of information in
[his] file” but Equifax “concluded that the information on
file was verified, without providing any of the requested
documentation or procedure(s) used to verify the accounts.”
(Doc. # 43 at 12). According to Bey, credit reporting agencies
“SHALL

furnish

a

copy

of

the

original,

signed

consumer

application for the credit that they have in their files,”
and Equifax failed to do so. (Id.).
First, Equifax argues that § 1681i does not require
credit reporting agencies to furnish a copy of the original,
signed consumer application for credit, as Bey insists. (Doc.
# 49 at 8). Indeed, a review of § 1681i shows that no provision
11

requires a credit reporting agency to obtain a copy of the
original credit agreement between a furnisher of information
and consumer, nor requires a credit reporting agency to
provide a copy of such a signed agreement to a consumer upon
the consumer’s request. Therefore, a failure to provide a
copy of the original, signed credit application or agreement
between Bey and his creditor does not create a claim against
Equifax.
Additionally,
documentation

he

Bey

has

requested,

failed
besides

to
the

allege
original

what
signed

agreement. Nor does Bey allege what information in his file
he requested Equifax to verify, why Equifax’s verification of
the disputed debt was incorrect, and why that disputed debt
should have been deleted. Therefore, Bey has not plausibly
alleged Equifax improperly reinvestigated his account.
Finally,

Bey

alleges

Equifax

did

not

explain

the

“procedure(s) used to verify the accounts” in its reply to
Bey’s reinvestigation request. (Doc. # 43 at 12). True, under
§ 1681i(a)(6)(B)(iii), a credit reporting agency’s written
notice of the results of its reinvestigation must include “a
notice that, if requested by the consumer, a description of
the procedure used to determine the accuracy and completeness
of the information shall be provided to the consumer by the
12

agency . . .” Thus, in its responses to Bey’s reinvestigation
requests, Equifax was required to notify Bey that he could
request a description of the procedure Equifax used in its
reinvestigation.
But Bey does not allege that Equifax’s responses to his
reinvestigation

requests

failed

to

include

the

required

notice. Nor does Bey allege that he sent a request for a
description of Equifax’s procedures after receiving Equifax’s
responses indicating the results of its reinvestigation. Bey
only alleges that Equifax’s responses did not describe the
procedures used to reinvestigate. This does not state a claim
for violation of § 1681(a)(6)(B)(iii). Therefore, Bey is not
entitled to relief against Equifax for either Count II or
III.
B.

Claims against Experian

The Fourth Amended Complaint contains two counts, Counts
V and VI, against Experian. Experian argues Bey has not
plausibly stated claims under the FCRA in either count.
1.
Count

Count V
V,

labelled

“[Plaintiff]

Alleges

Experian

Information Solutions Failed to Make Required Summary of
Rights Disclosures,” is brought under § 1681g(c)(2) of the
FCRA. That section provides:
13

A consumer reporting agency shall provide to a
consumer, with each written disclosure by the
agency to the consumer under this section —
(A) the summary of rights prepared by the Bureau
under paragraph (1);
(B) in the case of a consumer reporting agency
described in section 1681a(p) of this title, a
toll-free telephone number established by the
agency, at which personnel are accessible to
consumers during normal business hours;
(C) a list of all Federal agencies responsible for
enforcing any provision of this subchapter, and the
address and any appropriate phone number of each
such agency, in a form that will assist the consumer
in selecting the appropriate agency;
(D) a statement that the consumer
additional rights under State law, and
consumer may wish to contact a State
consumer protection agency or a State
general (or the equivalent thereof) to
those rights; and

may have
that the
or local
attorney
learn of

(E) a statement that a consumer reporting agency is
not
required
to
remove
accurate
derogatory
information from the file of a consumer, unless the
information is outdated under section 1681c of this
title or cannot be verified.
15 U.S.C. § 1681g(c)(2)(emphasis added).
Bey alleges that, “upon written request for verification
or reinvestigation, Experian [] responded in writing” but
“failed to make required Summary of Rights disclosures.”
(Doc. # 43 at 15). In response, Experian argues that the
exhibits to the Fourth Amended Complaint, which are excerpts
from correspondence from Experian to Bey, “plainly contradict
[Bey’s] claims.” (Doc. # 48 at 3). Experian does not identify

14

which exhibits include all the required summary of rights
information. Nevertheless, it asserts “[t]his compilation
shows that Experian made a variety of extensive disclosures
to [Bey] about his rights under the FCRA during several
different contacts.” (Id.).
Furthermore, the Court notes that some of the exhibits
attached to the Fourth Amended Complaint are notices from
Experian

reporting

the

results

of

the

various

reinvestigations requested by Bey. (Doc. # 43-1 at 32, 35).
Bey alleges that Experian’s responses to his requests for
reinvestigation

failed

to

include

the

summary

of

rights

disclosure. But inclusion of the summary of rights is only
required for disclosures made pursuant to § 1681g(a) and
Experian sent the notices of the reinvestigation results to
Bey pursuant to § 1681i(a)(6), rather than § 1681g(a). See 15
U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(6) (“A consumer reporting agency shall
provide written notice to a consumer of the results of a
reinvestigation under this subsection . . . .”); Nunnally v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 451 F.3d 768, 774 (11th Cir.
2006)(“That Congress did not refer to section 1681g(a) in the
requirements for a report following a reinvestigation, id. §
1681i(a)(6)(B)(ii),

but

referred

to

section

1681g(a)

in

subsection (c)(1)(B)(i), is evidence that Congress did not
15

intend to require disclosure of the consumer’s complete file
as the consumer report following reinvestigation.”).
The

notices

of

reinvestigation

results

were

not

disclosures of Bey’s file under § 1681g(a) and were not
subject to the requirements imposed on disclosures under §
1681g. Thus, to the extent Bey’s claim is based on notices of
reinvestigation results sent by Experian under § 1681i(a)(6),
Bey cannot state a claim for violation of the summary of
rights requirements imposed by § 1681g(c)(2).
Regardless of the exhibits, Experian stresses this claim
should be dismissed because the Fourth Amended Complaint
“wholly fails to explain what aspects of these disclosures
are purportedly deficient.” (Doc. # 48 at 3). The Court
agrees. Bey does not identify which information required for
the

summary

of

rights

was

excluded

from

Experian’s

disclosures. It is not the responsibility of the Court and
Defendants to sift through Bey’s exhibits to deduce what
information, if any, is missing from a summary of rights. Cf.
Duo-Regen Techs., LLC v. 4463251 Canada, Inc., No. 8:13-cv2108-T-27TBM, 2014 WL 1338117, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2,
2014)(“Plaintiff cannot reasonably expect one to sift through
341 pages of exhibits to identify and piece together the
missing facts.”). Because Bey has failed to identify what
16

information was left out of the summary of rights or how the
summary was otherwise deficient, Bey has failed to plausibly
state a claim under § 1681g(c)(2).
2.
Count
Information

Count VI
VI,

labelled

Solutions

“[Plaintiff]

Failed

to

Alleges

Provide

the

Experian
Consumers

Application for the Credit Upon Request,” is brought under §
1681i of the FCRA. Bey alleges that, “upon written request
for verification or reinvestigation, Experian [] responded
failing to provide [Bey] with evidence of the consumer’s
application for the credit as required by the Act.” (Doc. #
43 at 17).
As the Court already determined for Count III, § 1681i
does not require Experian to provide Bey with his application
for the credit reported on Bey’s consumer report. The Court
agrees with Experian that “the statute requires only that
Experian conduct a reasonable reinvestigation, which may
involve contacting the subscriber and asking it to review its
records related to the consumer.” (Doc. # 48 at 4). And Bey
has not pointed out any language in the statute or case law
interpreting the statute that requires consumer reporting
agencies to maintain copies of consumers’ applications for

17

credit. Therefore, Bey has failed to state a claim under §
1681i. Both Counts V and VI against Experian are dismissed.
C.

Bey’s “Motion to Strike, Dismiss Defendants,
Defenses and Counterclaims for Failure to State a
Claim, Demand for Judgment on the Pleadings”

The

Court

has

already

construed

Bey’s

Motion

as

a

response in opposition to Experian and Equifax’s Motions.
Now, the Court addresses the other relief Bey requests in his
Motion. The Motion must be denied.
First, as to Bey’s request that Defendants’ Motions and
pleadings be stricken, Bey has not presented an adequate
reason for the Court to do so. Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a court “may strike from a pleading an
insufficient

defense

or

any

redundant,

immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
But, “[m]otions to strike on the grounds of insufficiency,
immateriality, irrelevancy, and redundancy are not favored,
often being considered ‘time wasters,’ and will usually be
denied unless the matter sought to be omitted has no possible
relationship to the controversy, may confuse the issues, or
otherwise prejudice a party.” Italiano v. Jones Chems., Inc.,
908 F. Supp. 904, 907 (M.D. Fla. 1995)(citations omitted);
see also Augustus v. Bd. of Public Instruction, Escambia Cty.,
306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962)(“The motion to strike should

18

be granted only when the pleading to be stricken has no
possible relation to the controversy.”).
Bey
Motions

does

not

and

Answer

impertinent,

or

identify

any

that

material

is

scandalous.

in

redundant,

Rather,

he

Defendants’
immaterial,

states:

“After

contacting all parties to see if a settlement could be
reached, we could not in good faith come to agreement, so I
file this action to strike all pleadings by the defendants.”
(Doc. # 62 at 1). Bey
pleadings

“is

argues

warranted

that striking Defendants’

because

Defendants

failed

to

establish standing to defend suit” and “Defendants’ unsworn
statements masquerading as facts amount to hearsay, which are
inadmissible without witness statements, sworn affidavits, or
sworn statements.” (Id.). Bey goes on to cite case law for
the proposition that “an attorney’s unsworn statements of
fact do not establish a fact” and are not sufficient basis
for granting summary judgment. (Id. at 3).
Bey

misunderstands

–

the

Court

is

not

making

any

determinations of fact at this motion to dismiss stage. In
ruling on Experian and Equifax’s Motions to Dismiss, the Court
takes all the factual statements made by Bey as true, except
for bare legal conclusions that the Court is not required to
accept. See Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286 (“Courts are not ‘bound
19

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.’”). And, in making their arguments for dismissal,
Experian

and

Equifax

are

not

required

to

submit

sworn

affidavits or witness testimony. Similarly, Trans Union was
not required to submit such sworn affidavits or testimony in
support of its Answer and affirmative defenses. Bey has not
otherwise

explained

which

of

Trans

Union’s

affirmative

defenses should be stricken or why. See Suchan v. Am. Exp.
Co., No. 8:13-cv-254-T-33EAJ, 2013 WL 2382285, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. May 30, 2013)(stating that affirmative defenses are only
stricken if they are “insufficient as a matter of law,”
meaning the affirmative defense is “patently frivolous” or
“clearly invalid as a matter of law”). Therefore, Defendants’
pleadings should not be stricken.
Bey’s

request

that

the

Defendants’

defenses

and

counterclaims be dismissed for failure to state claim is
equally unavailing. (Doc. # 62 at 1). As Defendants correctly
note, they have not raised any counterclaims. (Doc. # 63 at
2). Therefore, there are no counterclaims to dismiss.
Additionally, despite labelling his Motion as including
a “Demand for Judgment on the Pleadings” and stating that
“judgment [must be] awarded for the plaintiff on all claims,”
Bey does not present any argument as to why a judgment on the
20

pleadings should be granted. (Doc. # 62 at 1, 5). Nor does he
mention the judgment on the pleadings standard under Rule
12(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)(“After the pleadings are
closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.”). Further, motions for
judgment

on

the

pleadings

are

only

available

once

the

pleadings are closed. See Lillian B. ex rel. Brown v. Gwinnett
Cty. Sch. Dist., 631 F. App’x 851, 853 (11th Cir. 2015)(“[A]
party may not move for judgment on the pleadings until
‘[a]fter the pleadings are closed.’ The pleadings are closed
only when a complaint and answer have been filed.”). While
Trans Union has filed its Answer, Experian and Equifax have
filed

Motions

to

Dismiss,

rather

than

answers.

So,

the

pleadings are not closed and Bey’s moving for judgment on the
pleadings for the claims against Experian and Equifax is
premature.
Bey has not shown that Defendants’ Motions and pleadings
should be stricken or that a judgment on the pleadings should
be granted. Therefore, Bey’s Motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 48) is
21

GRANTED to the extent the claims against Experian are
dismissed.
(2)

Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC’s Motion to
Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. # 49) is
GRANTED to the extent the claims against Equifax are
dismissed.

(3)

Bey’s “Motion to Strike, Dismiss Defendants, Defenses
and Counterclaims for Failure to State a Claim, Demand
for Judgment on the Pleadings” (Doc. # 62) is DENIED.

(4)

Counts II, III, V, and VI of the Fourth Amended Complaint
are DISMISSED.

(5)

The Clerk is directed to terminate Experian and Equifax
as parties in this action.

(6)

The

case

remains

pending

as

to

the

claims

against

Defendant Trans Union LLC.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
26th day of October, 2017.

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