AIX Specialty Insurance Company v. Sombreros, LLC et al
Filing
108
ORDER granting 94 Motion for Summary Judgment and directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, to terminate any pending motions/deadlines, and to CLOSE the case in accord with the attached order. Signed by Judge Richard A. Lazzara on 4/5/2018. (CCB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
AIX SPECIALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 8:17-cv-843-T-26TBM
SOMBREROS, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment,
Statement of Undisputed Facts, affidavits, depositions, and other submissions (Dkts. 9195), Defendants Sharicka A. Adams and Joelle W. Numan’s Memorandum in Opposition
and their Statement of Disputed Facts (Dkts. 98 and 99), Defendants Sombreros, LLC,
Ashland 2 Partners, LLC, Michael Plechy and David Scalisi’s Memorandum in
Opposition and their Statement of Disputed Facts (Dkts. 100 and 101), Defendants Cedric
Lamarr Booth, Sr., Timeka McCullough, Quinteria Cherise Crumedy, Felicia Yvette
Brown, and Cierra Latrell Jones’ Memorandum in Opposition and their Statement of
Disputed Facts and other submissions (Dkt. 102-104), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Dkt. 107).1
After careful consideration of the motion, the submissions of the parties, and the
applicable law, the Court concludes the motion is due to be granted as to both the duty to
defend and indemnify.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, as the commercial liability insurers of Defendants Sombreros, LLC,
Ashland 2 Partners, LLC, Michael Plechy, and David Scalisi (the owners), seeks a
declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify with respect to an incident at The
Hall, a nightclub in Palmetto, Florida. David Scalisi was present that night at the bar, as
well as the sixteen other named individual Defendants.2 Three of these patrons were shot
with a gun, and the others were trampled in the confusion that ensued. All of the patrons
have either filed actions in state court or, if not, have filed pre-suit notices.
The state-court action filed by Cedric Lamarr Booth, Sr., a shooting victim, alleges
that on July 1, 2016, “an unknown patron of The Hall nightclub . . . fired gun shots inside
The Hall nightclub as patrons were exiting for the night.” See docket 94-2, page 2, ¶¶ 910. He alleges that when he attempted to leave The Hall, he was shot by the unknown
1
Defendants Novell Chestnut, Earlie Cheaves, and Otis Johnson, Brittany
McCullough, and Alfred Morgan, who filed answers to the complaint, have failed to
respond to the motion for summary judgment. See dockets 42, 43, 44, 50 and 68.
2
Four of the sixteen have not responded to this lawsuit: Marcellas Davis, Aubrey
Harper, Candi Cotton, and Dwight Roberts. Clerk’s defaults have been entered against
them. See dockets 62, 73, 74 and 80.
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patron. See docket 94-2, page 2, ¶ 11.3 Booth seeks damages for personal injuries based
on the negligence of the owner for undertaking various duties to provide adequate
protocols and training for sufficient security and for breaching those duties by failing to
warn of the dangerous condition, failing to provide proper lighting, and failing to hire,
retain, and train enough security personnel to provide a safe venue for patrons. Two other
patrons were shot that night, Novell Chestnut and Otis Johnson, but they have not filed
suit yet. See docket 94-3, page 2, ¶ 7.
The state-court complaints of Sharicka Adams and Joelle Numan, Brittany
McCullough, and Alfred Morgan seek damages for personal injuries suffered at The Hall
in the aftermath, relying on basically the same theories of negligence as Booth. The
complaint filed by Sharicka Adams and Joelle Numan alleges that “on or about July 2,
2016, gunshots were fired inside the subject premises, The Hall, which resulted in club
patrons panicking and running around inside the premises.” See docket 94-2, page 8, ¶ 5.
“[A] a result of the incident described in this Complaint, [Adams and Numan were]
knocked down and trampled by other patrons, business invitees, and/or guests of The
Hall.” See docket 94-2, pages 10 & 11, ¶¶ 11 & 15). Brittany McCullough’s complaint
alleges that on July 2, 2016, she “was severely injured as a result of being knocked down
and trampled by club patrons who panicked after gun shots were fired inside The Hall.”
3
“When Plaintiff, Cedric Lamarr Booth Sr., attempted to leave The Hall, which
premises he was properly and lawfully on, he was shot by the unknown patron of The
Hall nightclub, causing Plaintiff to suffer serious injuries.”
-3-
See docket 94-2, page 14, ¶ 8. Alfred Morgan’s complaint simply alleges that he “was
trampled and sustained numerous serious injuries” while at The Hall on July 1, 2016. See
docket 94-2, page 17, ¶ 6.4
Plaintiff is providing the insureds a defense in the underlying actions and the presuit notice matters subject to a reservation of rights. See docket 25, ¶ 36. It now requests
a determination of no coverage, and therefore no duty to defend or indemnify, under the
operative commercial general liability based on two policy exclusions: assault and battery
and firearms. The insureds and the patrons contest such a finding and argue that the
terms of both exclusions are ambiguous. The insureds also contend there are disputed,
material facts.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is properly granted where there is no genuine dispute
regarding a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must review the record, and all
of its factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Summary
judgment is a particularly appropriate vehicle to determine insurance coverage because
the interpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the court. See Technical
4
Plaintiff has included in its submissions the pre-suit notices filed by Defendants
Quinteria Cherise Crumedy, Felicia Yvette Brown, Cierra Latrell Jones, Timeka
McCullough, Dwight Roberts, Novell Chestnut, Earlie Cheaves, Otis Johnson, Aubery
Harper, Candi Cotton, and Marcellas T. Davis. See docket 94-2, pages 21-30, 33, 34 &
36.
-4-
Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar., Co., 157 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. Cir. 1998);
DEC Elec., Inc. v. Raphael Constr. Corp., 558 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 1990).
Sitting in this diversity case, the substantive law of Florida, as the forum state,
applies. Sphinx Int’l, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 412 F.3d 1224,
1227 (11th Cir. 2005). A declaratory judgment is an appropriate method for the court to
determine coverage issues, including the duty to defend or indemnify. Higgins v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 So.2d 5, 9 (Fla. 2004). A contract ambiguity is a question of
law to be decided by the court. Gulf Tampa Drydock Co. v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 757 F.2d
1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 So.2d
193, 194 (Fla. 1970)).
DUTY TO DEFEND
Under Florida law, the duty to defend is generally determined from the allegations
of the complaints of the underlying cases. Addison Ins. Co. v. 4000 Island Boulevard
Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 2017 WL 6616690, at *6 (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2017) (unpublished)
(citing Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 749 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2014), and
discussing Jones v. Fla. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Inc., 908 So.2d 435 (Fla. 2005) and Higgins);
Meridian Constr. & Dev., LLC v. Admiral Ins. Co., 105 F.Supp.3d 1331, 1338 (M.D. Fla.
2013) (citing Wellcare of Fla., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 16 So.3d 904,
906 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2009), but noting exceptions may exist). The complaint triggers
the duty when its allegations assert facts that could bring the injury within coverage.
-5-
Attain Specialty Ins. Co. v. Miami Drywall & Stucco, Inc., 2012 WL 3043002, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Jul. 25, 2012) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226,
1230 (11th Cir. 2004), which cites Florida law). A duty to defend the entire suit arises
even if the complaint alleges facts “partially within and partially outside the scope of
coverage.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Elite Homes, Inc., 676 F.App’x 951, 954 (11th Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (citation omitted); Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Ill. Nat’l Ins. Co., 657 F.3d
1135, 1141-42 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The duty to defend is broader than the
duty to indemnify because the duty to indemnify is determined by the actual underlying
facts as opposed to the allegations of the complaint. Selective Ins. Co. of the Southeast v.
William P. White Racing Stables, Inc., — F.App’x—, 2017 WL 6368843, at *2 (11th Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (citation omitted); RSUI Indemn. Co. v. Desai, 2014 WL 12621215,
at *3 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (citing Jones, 908 So.2d at 442-43).
Under the circumstances here, if Plaintiff is absolved of the duty to defend, there is
no duty to indemnify either. See, e.g., RSUI Indemn. Co., (discussing considerations in
determining whether to stay a separate count seeking to declare duty to indemnify);
Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Lormejuste, 2012 WL 1986881, at *8 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (citing
WellCare of Fla., Inc.).5 None of the parties contest that both duties should be resolved at
this time. Although the parties disagree that material facts are in dispute, this Court will
5
See also Geovera Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hutchins, 831 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1311-12
(M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing WellCare of Fla., Inc.), aff’d, 504 F.App’x 851 (11th Cir. 2013);
O’Rear v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 2010 WL 4867527 (M.D. Fla. 2010).
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examine whether those disputed facts are truly material in view of the allegations of the
complaint and the language of the policy.6 The parties agree that a shooting took place on
July 2, 2016, at The Hall, and patrons were either shot or injured. They do not agree
whether the gun shots or trampling was the proximate, legal cause of their injuries.
ANALYSIS
Defendants oppose the application of the two policy exclusions on the basis that
both are ambiguous. They also contend that there are genuine issues of material fact
including whether the discharge of the firearm or an assault or battery was the proximate
cause of the injuries to the patrons and whether the injury to the patrons was caused from
trampling and/or directly or indirectly from the discharge of the firearm. Defendants
argue that even if the firearm or assault and battery provision applies to exclude coverage
of some claims, there should be coverage for the other non-related claims alleged in their
complaints. The patrons contend such non-related claims include negligence in failing to
properly hire or train security, maintain the premises to avoid entry of a gun, and provide
a reasonably safe environment.
Assault and Battery Exclusion
The Court looks to the eight corners of the complaint and policy to assess whether
Plaintiff’s duty to defend was triggered in these cases. “[T]he trial court is restricted to
the allegations of the complaint, regardless of what the defendant and others say actually
6
The duty to defend is actually determined from the eight corners of the complaint
and the policy. Addison Ins. Co., — F.App’x —, 2017 WL 6616690, at *6.
-7-
happened.” Marr Inv., Inc. v. Greco, 621 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993)
(citation omitted). The policy’s assault and battery exclusion provides:
B. The following is added to COMMERCIAL GENERAL
LIABILITY COVERAGE PART, SECTION I –
COVERAGE A, Paragraph 2. Exclusions and LIQUOR
LIABILITY COVERAGE PART, SECTION I – LIQUOR
LIABILITY COVERAGE, Paragraph 2. Exclusions:
This insurance does not apply to:
Assault, Battery Or Other Physical Alteration
“Bodily injury” or “property damage”:
(1) Arising in whole or in part out of any “assault” or
“battery” committed or attempted by any person; or
(2) Arising in whole or in part out of any attempt by any
person to avoid, prevent, suppress or halt any actual or
threatened “assault” or “battery”; or
(3) Arising in whole or in part out of any actual or threatened
verbal or physical confrontation or altercation committed or
attempted by any person, or any attempt by any person to
avoid, prevent, suppress or halt any actual or threatened
verbal or physical confrontation or altercation.
This exclusion applies to all acts or omissions and all theories
of liability (direct or vicarious) asserted against any insured,
including but not limited to all theories of negligence, gross
negligence, recklessness or intentional tort and shall not be
subject to any severability or separation of insureds provision
in the policy.
See docket 94-3, page 28. The policy does not define the terms assault or battery, which
is not atypical. See Evanston Ins. Co. v. S & Q Prop. Inv., LLC, 2012 WL 4855537, at *2
-8-
(S.D. Fla. 2012).7 “The mere failure to provide a definition of a term involving coverage
does not render the term ambiguous.” Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v.
Karma Korner, LLC, 2011 WL 1150466, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citation omitted).8.
When the policy does not define a term, the plain and generally accepted meaning should
be applied. Evanston, 2012 WL 4855537, at *2 (citation omitted); Karma Korner, 2011
WL 1150466, at *2.
Under Florida law, the tort of battery “consists of the infliction of a harmful or
offensive contact upon another with the intent to cause such contact or the apprehension
that such contact is imminent.” Evanston, 2012 WL 4855537, at *2 (citing Quilling v.
Price, 894 So.2d 1061, 1063 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2005)); Founders Ins. Co. v. CortesGarcia, 2012 WL 2505917, at *6 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (same); Geovera Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Hutchins, 831 F.Supp.2d 1306, 1312 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (same), aff’d, 504 F.App’x 851
(11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Karma Korner, 2011 WL 1150566, at *3 (same). The
criminal definition of battery in Florida is either when someone “1. Actually and
intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or 2.
Intentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” § 784.03(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; Evanston,
2012 WL 4855537, at *2 (citing the Florida statute); Karma Korner, 2011 WL 1150566,
7
See also Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Karma Korner, LLC,
2011 WL 1150466, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Geovera, 831 F.Supp.2d at 1312.
8
See also Century Surety Co. v. Five Star, Inc., 2013 WL 12085503, at * (S.D.
Fla. 2013) (citing Geovera).
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at *3 (same). Using a weapon merely elevates a simple battery to an aggravated battery.
§ 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; Evanston, 2012 WL 4855537, at *2 (citing the Florida statute);
Karma Korner, 2011 WL 1150566, at *3 (same).
In Florida, criminal assault is defined as “an intentional, unlawful threat by word
or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so,
and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such
violence is imminent.” § 784.011, Fla. Stat.; Cortes-Garcia, 2012 WL 2505917, at *6
(citing Wilson v. State, 265 So.2d 411, 413 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1972)); Geovera, 831
F.Supp.2d at 1312 (same and also citing Campbell v. State, 37 So.3d 948
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2010)). A civil assault does not always involve a subjective intent to do
harm. Geovera, 831 F.Supp.2d at 1312 (citing Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla.
1972)).
The policy does not cover bodily injury “arising in whole or in part out of” any
assault or battery. The term “arising out of” under Florida law is unambiguous. CortesGarcia, 2012 WL 2505917, at *6 (citing Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S.Fid. & Guar. Co.,
913 So.2d 528 (Fla. 2005)). “Arising out of” means something broader than pure
causation. Burlington Ins. Co., Inc. v. Normandy Gen. Partners, 580 F.App’x 844, 848
(11th Cir. 2014) (citing Taurus) (quotation marks omitted) (unpublished). Florida courts
generally preclude coverage under the assault and battery exclusion where the negligence
arose from the assault and battery. Cortes-Garcia, 2012 WL 2505917, at *6 (citation
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omitted). “[T]he courts hew closely to the language of the policy exclusions and
determine the exclusions extend to negligence arising out of the assault and battery.” Doe
v. Hudson Specialty Ins. Co., 2017 WL 979263, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (citing Essex Ins.
Co. v. Big Top of Tampa, Inc., 53 So.3d 1220, 1223 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2011) and other
Florida cases).9
Cases involving the interpretation of assault or battery exclusions are abundant and
not necessarily easily reconciled. Defendants rely on the case of Colony Ins. Co. v.
Barnes, 410 F.Supp.2d 1137 (N.D. Fla. 2005), aff,d, 189 F.App’x 941 (11th Cir. 2006)
(unpublished), and Plaintiff relies on cases such as Evanston, Karma Korner, Geovera,
and Cortes-Garcia. In applying these cases, and others located by independent research,
to the instant case, the allegations of the underlying complaints and policy language are
key to resolving whether the duty to defend exists.
In Barnes, as in this case, the policy did not define assault and battery. The
underlying complaint in Barnes did not allege an assault and battery in the wrongful death
action, but referenced that the deceased, a patron of a nightclub, was hit by a “stray”
bullet in the parking lot and died. The complaint did not allege that the shooter “intended
to create a well-founded fear of imminent peril[,]” or that the shooter intended to hit
anyone. Barnes, 189 F.App’x at 943. “[T]he shooter may have discharged the gun
9
See also Arch Specialty Ins. Co. v. Maya, 2015 WL 2070449, at *3 (S.D. Fla.
2015).
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intending not to make anyone apprehensive and intending not to hit anyone.” Barnes, 189
F.App’x at 943.
Another case that followed Barnes and found that a duty to defend existed is
Burlington Ins. Co. v. Coa-Dal Sec. Agency, Inc., 2008 WL 11333513 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
The underlying complaint in Coa-Dal alleged that the plaintiff, Mr. Fernandez, was shot
during an armed robbery in an apartment complex. The court found that the complaint
failed to allege intent and reasoned that it was “possible that Fernandez, like the plaintiff
in Barnes, was struck by a stray bullet, among other potential scenarios, and his injuries
were not the result of an assault and battery.” Coa-Dal, 2008 WL 11333513, at *4. The
court also distinguished other cases based on the particular wording of the exclusion to
include “harmful or offense contact . . . between or among two or more persons.” The
exclusion in Coa-Dal did not include that language, nor does the policy in this case.
Beginning with Evanston, relied on by Plaintiff, the underlying complaint alleged
that the plaintiff was shot and killed in an attack by a trespassing criminal. The policy in
Evanston did not define assault and battery, but the court found that the allegations fell
squarely within the legal definition of battery. Evanston did not discuss the failure to
allege the intent of the criminal assailant, but apparently the underlying complaint clearly
alleged an attack. In the only case citing Evanston, the underlying complaints alleged that
patrons of a nightclub were “assaulted and shot” and sought damages for negligence in
failing to provide adequate security and failing to warn patrons regarding the numerous
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criminal incidents that had previously occurred at the nightclub. Seneca Specialty Ins.
Co. v. 845 North, Inc., 2015 WL 3400415, at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2015). The policy in Seneca
defined assault and battery, and the court found that a shooting constituted a battery,
relying on Evanston, and determined there was no duty to defend.
In Karma Korner, cited in Evanston, the policy did not define assault and battery,
and the underlying complaint alleged that while an individual was retrieving a cap from
the top of a vehicle, an occupant of the vehicle shot him dead. The complaint described
the shooting as criminal, and the court found that no duty to defend existed because the
criminal shooting was an assault and battery. In Geovera, the policy did not define
assault and battery, but the court found no duty to defend existed when an individual,
while showing off his gun, placed the barrel against the decedent’s neck and pulled the
trigger, thereby killing her. Although the complaint alleged that the individual did not
know the gun was loaded, it was the intent to do the act and not the harm that mattered.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Lastly, in Cortes-Garcia, the policy did not define assault and battery. The
underlying complaint alleged that during an altercation in a nightclub, a patron picked up
a chair and “accidentally” threw it in the direction of Cortes-Garcia, hitting him in the
head which led to his death. The patron was found guilty of manslaughter. The court
found that the patron intentionally picked up the chair and threw it, which fulfilled the
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“objective, reasonable person standard of apprehension of harmful contact” to determine
whether an assault occurred as well as satisfying the standard for battery.10
Because Barnes cannot be unequivocally distinguished, this Court finds that the
assault and battery exclusion in the policy does not apply to deny the duty to defend. The
policy does not define assault and battery, nor does it contain a clause that negates the
element of intent with respect to assault and battery. See Barnes, 189 F.App’x at 943
(distinguishing Florida case on basis that assault and battery exclusion in that case
precluded coverage for “harmful or offense contact between two or more persons
regardless of intent” and no such language was contained in policy under review). The
allegations of the underlying complaints allege that the individuals were either shot or
trampled at The Hall in the aftermath of the gunfire. There are no allegations regarding
whether the shooter intended to shoot someone or whether the gun was fired accidentally.
10
This is not a case of a barroom or parking lot brawl where the complaint alleges
an innocent bystander was accosted and struck by an assailant and the policy does not
define assault and battery. See, e.g., Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Studio, Inc., 2009 WL 103664
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (finding assault and battery exclusion precluded coverage where the
complaint alleged that several fights took place in the club and as a patron was leaving the
club, he was approached and attacked by an individual) (citing Miami Beach
Entertainment, Inc. v. First Oak Brook Corp., 682 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1996)
and Britamco Underwriter’s, Inc. v. Zuma Corp., 576 So.2d 965, 965 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.
1991)). This is also not a case where a clear assault and battery is alleged when a bouncer
attacked a patron by striking him numerous times. See Founders Ins. Co. v. Motsinger,
2011 WL 3349095 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citing Florida cases holding that intentional conduct
alleged in the underlying complaint could not be regarded as “accidents” and therefore
assault and battery exclusion applied to preclude coverage). Finally, this is not a case
where injuries were sustained in the course of a robbery or by the type of shooting deaths
that occurred in Geovera or Karma Korner. See Century Surety Co. v. JD Five Star, Inc.,
2013 WL 12085503, at *3-4 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
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Because the trampling was set into motion as a result of the gunshots, the occurrence of
July 2, 2016, compels a duty to defend. The events as alleged when applied to the policy
language do not fall within the assault and battery exclusion.
Firearm Exclusion
The firearms exclusion is a different matter. It provides:
It is understood that no coverage is afforded by this policy for
any injury, death, claims, or actions occasioned directly or
indirectly or as an incident to the discharge of firearms by
person or persons on or about the insured premises.
See docket 94-3, page 34. Another court has already interpreted this precise clause. In
Lormejuste, the underlying complaint alleged that criminals shot and killed Roy Germinal
in the middle of a flea market. The court construed the exact firearms provision as
unambiguous and relied on Taurus. Lormejuste, 2012 WL 1986881, at *7. In Taurus, the
Florida Supreme Court held that the term “arising out of” included “incident to” and
encompassed a far broader meaning than “caused by.” Applying the dictionary meaning
of “occasioned by” to mean “bring about” or cause, the court found that Mr. Germinal’s
death was caused by the gunshot and the wrongful death action was the direct result of the
death.
Based on Lormejuste and the plain, unambiguous language of the firearm policy,
the occurrence at The Hall lands squarely within the exclusion. There is no question that
injuries were caused both directly by gunshots and indirectly by the trampling in the
melee that followed the shots. That the claim is one for negligence does not change the
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outcome. See, e.g., Seneca (finding no duty to defend negligence claim arising from
assault and shooting of nightclub patron under either the assault and battery exclusion or
the weapons exclusion). The firearm exclusion precludes coverage.11
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Final
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 94) is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor
of Plaintiff, to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and to close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on April 5, 2018.
s/Richard A. Lazzara
RICHARD A. LAZZARA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record
11
Although Alfred Morgan’s complaint does not refer to a gun being fired, he
admits paragraph 29 of the amended complaint at docket 25 that there was “a shooting
incident” at The Hall that night during which he was injured. See docket 50.
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