Winsey v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Filing 37

ORDER: Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey's Notice of Void Order filed on July 9, 2017, (Doc. # 36 ), which the Court construes as a motion for reconsideration, is denied. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/10/2017. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHRISTINE WINSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-979-T-33AEP

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey’s Notice of Void Order filed
on July 9, 2017, (Doc. # 36), which the Court construes as a
motion for reconsideration. Although the time for filing a
response has not yet passed, the Court determines a response
is not needed. For the reasons below, the construed motion
for reconsideration is denied.
I.

Background
Winsey filed her Complaint on April 26, 2017. (Doc. #

1). On May 16, 2017, Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC moved
to dismiss the Complaint. (Doc. # 17). After being granted an
extension of time, Winsey responded in opposition on June 25,
2017. (Doc. ## 29, 33). After being fully briefed, the Court
granted the motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 35). Importantly, the

Court granted Winsey leave to amend with respect to her FDCPA
claim. (Id.). As of this Order, Winsey has not filed an
amended complaint; rather, Winsey seeks reconsideration of
the Court’s June 29, 2017, order. (Doc. # 36).
II.

Legal Standard
“A ‘[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose.’” Perez v.

Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citation

omitted

and

alteration

in

original);

see

also

Wright v. Preferred Research, Inc., 891 F.2d 886, 889 (11th
Cir. 1990) (stating that court looks at relief requested,
rather than label, when determining applicable rule). So,
although Winsey’s construed motion is titled “Notice of Void
Order,”

the

essence

of

her

filing

is

a

motion

for

reconsideration. To be sure, Winsey herself cites to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.
But, when a motion for reconsideration is filed within
28 days of an order, Rule 59 applies. Beach Terrace Condo.
Ass’n, Inc. v. Goldring Inves., No. 8:15-cv-1117-T-33TBM,
2015 WL 4548721, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2015). Because
Winsey’s

construed

motion

for

reconsideration

was

filed

within 28 days of the Court’s order dismissing her Complaint,
Rule 59 governs.

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“The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are
newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.”
Anderson v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 567 Fed. Appx. 679,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335,
1343 (11th Cir. 2007)) (quotation marks omitted). Granting
relief under Rule 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy to be
employed

sparingly

in

the

interests

of

finality

and

conservation of scarce judicial resources.” United States v.
DeRochemont, No. 8:10-cr-287-T-24MAP, 2012 WL 13510, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, “a
Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters,
raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised
prior to the entry of judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill.
of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. Analysis
To begin, the Court addresses Winsey’s contention that
sui juris is mutually exclusive with pro se. The term sui
juris is a Latin term and translates as “of one’s own right;
independent.” Sui juris, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
In the legal field, sui juris is used to signify someone who
has reached the age of majority or someone who possesses full
civil

rights.

Id.

Pro

se

is

also

a

Latin

term

and

it

translates as “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf.” Pro se,

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BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In the legal field, pro
se is used to indicate a litigant who is proceeding without
the assistance of a lawyer. Id. By their plain meanings, the
two terms convey different ideas and have no effect on each
other.

Winsey’s

denigrated

her

argument
by

noting

that
she

the
is

Court

proceeding

has
pro

somehow
se

is

meritless.
Winsey also complains the Court “bas[ed] [its] judgment
solely on the ‘four corners of the complaint.’” (Doc. # 36 at
7). That the Court limited its review at the motion to dismiss
stage is not grounds for reconsideration, vacatur, or voiding
the Court’s order in any other way. Indeed, controlling
precedent is clear: the Court cannot consider additional
evidence, such as an affidavit, at the motion to dismiss stage
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. Boyd v. Peet, 249 Fed. Appx. 155, 157 (11th
Cir. 2007) (“[A]t the motion to dismiss stage, the scope of
a court’s review must be limited to the four corners of the
complaint.” (citing St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d
1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002))); Hayes v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
649 Fed. Appx. 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2016) (“In evaluating
whether a complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim, ‘[a] court is generally limited

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to

reviewing

what

is

within

the

four

corners

of

the

complaint.’” (quoting Bickley v. Caremark RX, Inc., 461 F.3d
1325, 1329 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006)); Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d
1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005) (A “district court generally
must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.”);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Winsey’s arguments on this
point are meritless.
The remainder of Winsey’s construed motion consists of
a

hodgepodge

of

meritless

arguments

and

widely-rejected

claims. In short, the construed motion presents no valid basis
for reconsideration.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey’s Notice of Void Order
filed on July 9, 2017, (Doc. # 36), which the Court construes
as a motion for reconsideration, is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
10th day of July, 2017.

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