Winsey v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Filing 40

ORDER: Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey's "2nd Notice of Void Order" (Doc. # 38 ) and letter dated July 5, 2017 (Doc. # 39 ) are DENIED insofar as they seek reconsideration of or relief from the Court's June 29, 2017, and July 10,2017, orders. Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey's "2nd Notice of Void Order" (Doc. # 38 ) is DENIED to the extent it seeks an order of recusal. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/12/2017. (DRW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CHRISTINE WINSEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-979-T-33AEP

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey’s “2nd Notice of Void Order”
(Doc. # 38) and letter dated July 5, 2017 (Doc. # 39), both
of

which

were

filed

on

July

11,

2017.

The

Court

first

addresses the letter and then will turn to the second notice.
Discussion
In her July 5, 2017, letter, Winsey states she is
returning the Court’s June 29, 2017, order granting Defendant
Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 39).
Included as an attachment to her letter is a copy of the
Court’s June 29, 2017, order with the phrase “i [sic] Do Not
Consent Cancelled for Cause” handwritten on each page. (Doc.
# 39-1). To the extent Winsey’s letter attempts to seek relief
from or reconsideration of the Court’s June 29, 2017, order,

such relief is denied for the reasons stated in the Court’s
July 10, 2017, order (Doc. # 37).
As for her second notice, the filing’s caption reads:
“THIS IS NOT A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.” (Doc. # 38 at 1).
But, the second notice, as with the first notice, quotes
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (Doc. ## 36 at 2; 38
at 4). Thus, to the extent the second notice can be construed
as a motion for reconsideration, it is denied for the reasons
stated in the Court’s July 20, 2017, order (Doc. # 37).
The second notice further states the undersigned “must
recuse herself.” (Doc. # 38 at 4). The Court therefore
construes the second notice to also be a motion for recusal.
Sections 144 and 455 of Title 28 of the United States
Code set forth the conditions under which a judge should
recuse herself. Under § 455, a judge must recuse herself “in
any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The test is an objective
one, under which the Court must ask “whether an objective,
disinterested,

lay

observer

fully

informed

of

the

facts

underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would
entertain

a

significant

doubt

about

the

judge’s

impartiality.” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674,

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678 (11th Cir. 1990)). To justify recusal, “[t]he allegation
of bias must show that the bias is personal as distinguished
from judicial in nature.” Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239 (quotation
omitted). Because of this, “[j]udicial rulings standing alone
rarely constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
motion.” Stringer v. Doe, 503 Fed. Appx. 888, 890 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F. 3d 1270, 1279 (11th
Cir. 2004)).
Additionally, § 144 permits a party to request a judge
recuse herself on the basis of personal bias or prejudice.
Specifically, § 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district
court makes and files a timely and sufficient
affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is
pending has a personal bias or prejudice either
against him or in favor of any adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 144. “To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving
party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable
person that bias actually exists.” Christo v. Padgett, 223
F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). As with recusal under §
455, the decision to recuse under § 144 should “be made on
the

basis

of

conduct

extra-judicial

in

nature

as

distinguished from conduct within a judicial context.” Davis,
517 F.2d at 1052.

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Winsey’s construed motion for recusal is based entirely
on the Court’s order dismissing her Complaint and the Court’s
order denying her first construed motion for reconsideration.
Furthermore, Winsey did not submit a sufficient affidavit —
or an affidavit of any kind for that matter — and so § 144
does not provide a basis for recusal. In short, no reasonable,
objective lay observer would entertain a significant doubt
about the undersigned’s impartiality. The construed motion
for recusal is therefore denied.
Finally,

the

Court

takes

the

opportunity

to

dispel

Winsey’s contention that “[t]his [C]ourt does NOT have [in]
personam

jurisdiction

and

has

now

lost

subject

matter

jurisdiction unless [the undersigned] recuses herself.” (Doc.
# 38 at 2). In personam jurisdiction is the Court’s power
over a party. Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). Here, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Winsey
because she voluntarily and intentionally filed suit in this
Court. With respect to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court
has such jurisdiction pursuant to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution of the United States and 28 U.S.C. § 1331
because Winsey brought an action under 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et
seq.
Accordingly, it is

4 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey’s “2nd Notice of Void
Order” (Doc. # 38) and letter dated July 5, 2017 (Doc.
# 39) are DENIED insofar as they seek reconsideration of
or relief from the Court’s June 29, 2017, and July 10,
2017, orders.

(2)

Pro se Plaintiff Christine Winsey’s “2nd Notice of Void
Order” (Doc. # 38) is DENIED to the extent it seeks an
order of recusal.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

12th day of July, 2017.

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