United States of America v. Kaniadakis

Filing 15

ORDER: Steven J. Kaniadakis's Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaim (Doc. # 11 ) is DENIED. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(a), Kaniadakis's answer to the Complaint is due July 27, 2017. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 7/13/2017. (DMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-1269-T-33TGW

STEVEN J. KANIADAKIS,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Steven J. Kaniadakis’s Motion to Dismiss and Counterclaim
(Doc. # 11), filed on June 27, 2017. Plaintiff United States
of America filed a response on July 12, 2017. (Doc. # 14).
For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.
I.

Background
According to the Complaint, Kaniadakis is indebted to

the United States in the total amount of $443,170.01 for the
principal and interest accrued for various student loans.
(Doc. # 1 at 1-2; Doc. # 1-2). “Demand has been made upon
[Kaniadakis]

for

payment

of

the

indebtedness,

and

[Kaniadakis] has neglected and refused to pay the same.” (Doc.
# 1 at 2).

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The United States initiated this default of student loan
action against Kaniadakis. (Doc. # 1). Kaniadakis, who is
proceeding pro se, then filed his Motion to Dismiss and
Counterclaim (Doc. # 11), arguing that allegations in the
Complaint

and

attachments

are

incorrect

and

that

the

Complaint fails to state a claim. Kaniadakis also attempts to
assert

a

counterclaim

for

violation

of

the

Fair

Debt

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by the United States. (Id.
at 3-5). The United States responded to the Motion on July
12, 2017. (Doc. # 14). The Motion is ripe for review.
II.

Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all

the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
this

Court

favors

the

plaintiff

with

all

reasonable

inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990)(stating “[o]n a motion to dismiss, the facts stated
in [the] complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom
are taken as true”). However:
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
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the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Furthermore, “[t]he scope
of

review

must

be

limited

to

the

four

corners

of

the

complaint.” St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337
(11th Cir. 2002).
III. Analysis
As the United States correctly notes, Kaniadakis failed
to identify whether his motion was brought under Rule 12(b)(6)
and did not include

a memorandum of legal authority as

required by Local Rule 3.01(a). See M.D. Fla. L.R. 3.01(a)(“In
a motion or other application for an order, the movant shall
include a concise statement of the precise relief requested,
a statement of the basis for the request, and a memorandum of
legal

authority

Additionally,

in

support

Kaniadakis’s

of

the

arguments

request
rely

.

.

heavily

.”).
on

allegations of conduct and correspondence that do not appear
within the four corners of the Complaint, and therefore cannot

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be considered by the Court. See St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337.
Finally, upon review, the Complaint states a cause of action
plainly and simply: Kaniadakis owes a debt to the United
States and he has defaulted on the debt. (Doc. # 1 at 1-2).
Therefore, the Motion is denied.
Regarding

the

Counterclaim

embedded

in

the

Motion,

Kaniadakis seems to raise various affirmative defenses to the
United States’ claim and asserts a violation of the FDCPA by
the United States. (Doc. # 11 at 4-5). But the proper place
to raise a counterclaim is in an answer to the Complaint, not
a motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (specifying that
a counterclaim should be pled in a pleading); Fed. R. Civ. P.
7 (drawing a distinction between pleadings, which include “an
answer to a complaint,” and motions). If Kaniadakis wishes to
assert a counterclaim, he may do in his answer.
And, because Kaniadakis is proceeding pro se, the Court
takes

this

opportunity

to

clarify

some

issues.

First,

Kaniadakis expresses concern that this action has not been
brought by the United States, but rather “just another person
trying to get unsubstantiated money owed by looking for leads
in public records,” because the United States is represented
by outside counsel. (Doc. # 11 at 1). But Kaniadakis’s concern
is unfounded. The United States frequently contracts outside
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counsel to handle certain types of cases, including student
loan default cases.
The Court also advises Kaniadakis that pro se litigants
must comply with all procedural rules of federal courts,
including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local
Rules of the Middle District of Florida. See McFarlin v.
Douglas Cty., 587 F. App’x 593, 595 (11th Cir. 2014)(“[A] pro
se litigant is still required to conform to procedural rules,
and a district judge is not required to rewrite a deficient
pleading.”).

The

Middle

District

of

Florida’s

website

maintains a “Proceeding without a Lawyer” page, which is one
valuable resource regarding the litigation process to which
Kaniadakis may refer, but on which he should not exclusively
rely.
Additionally, if

Kaniadakis

has questions about the

meaning of the Court’s Orders, he may consult with a lawyer
for free on a limited basis at the Legal Information Program
operated by the Tampa Chapter of the Federal Bar Association
on Tuesdays from 11:00 AM to 12:30 PM in the Sam M. Gibbons
United States Courthouse, 801 North Florida Avenue, Tampa,
Florida 33602. Appointments, which are recommended but not
required, can be made by calling [phone].
Accordingly, it is
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Steven

J.

Kaniadakis’s

Motion

to

Dismiss

and

Counterclaim (Doc. # 11) is DENIED. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(a), Kaniadakis’s answer to the
Complaint is due July 27, 2017.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
13th day of July, 2017.

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