United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Favorite Farms, Inc.

Filing 35

ORDER denying 28 motion to dismiss: Counts V and VI of Intervenor-Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are not dismissed. Count VIII of the Intervenor-Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its and her own costs and fees, pursuant to the parties' Joint Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal 34 . Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 1/4/2018. (JG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
AND
EULALIA SALAZAR-SANTIAGO,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:17-cv-1292-T-30AAS

FAVORITE FARMS, INC.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/

ORDER
This cause came on for consideration upon Defendant Favorite Farms, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss Counts V, VI and VIII of Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 28)
and Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition (Dkt. 33). Upon consideration of the
motion, response, and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Court concludes that the
motion should be denied.
BACKGROUND
On May 31, 2017, Plaintiff United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) filed this lawsuit against Defendant Favorite Farms, Inc. under Title

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VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Dkt. 1). The
claims are premised on a hostile work environment based on sex and retaliation by
Intervenor-Plaintiff Eulalia Salazar-Santiago’s direct supervisor and Favorite Farms’
employee, Hector Cruz. The complaint seeks to “provide appropriate relief to Charging
Party [Salazar-Santiago] who was adversely affected by such practices.” Id. The complaint
alleges that Cruz subjected Salazar-Santiago to “unwelcome sexual comments, forcible
physical contact, and rape.” Id.
On November 7, 2017, the Court entered an Order granting Salazar-Santiago’s motion
to intervene (Dkt. 18). Salazar-Santiago’s amended complaint alleges, in relevant part,
claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against
Favorite Farms (Counts V, VI, and VIII respectively) (Dkt. 23).1
With respect to the claims of battery and assault, Salazar-Santiago alleges the
following facts: during the relevant time, Salazar-Santiago was working for Favorite Farms
as a “seasonal worker” conducting field labor; Salazar-Santiago resided with her two children
in housing that Favorite Farms provided and leased to her during her employment; Cruz, who
was Salazar-Santiago’s supervisor, worked as Favorite Farms’ crew leader; Cruz’s duties
included assigning the field laborers to apartments in housing units provided by Favorite
Farms; Cruz visited Salazar-Santiago’s apartment and stated that he needed to inspect it to

1

Salazar-Santiago subsequently filed a joint stipulation for voluntary dismissal of the
IIED claim (Dkt. 34). This Order focuses on whether she has sufficiently pled claims of battery
and assault against Favorite Farms.
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determine whether there was room to move two additional people into the apartment; during
the inspection, Cruz pushed Salazar-Santiago into a bedroom and raped her; Salazar-Santiago
reported the rape to Favorite Farms’ management but, to her knowledge, Favorite Farms took
no disciplinary action against Cruz and Cruz continued to serve as crew leader.
Favorite Farms moves to dismiss the claims of battery and assault under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Favorite Farms argues that the allegations are
insufficient to establish its liability for the intentional torts that Cruz allegedly committed
against Salazar-Santiago. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that these claims
are adequately pled because Salazar-Santiago has alleged facts that Cruz accomplished the
torts by virtue of his employer/employee relationship with Favorite Farms.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion to
dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true, and
view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93-94 (2007).

However, unlike factual allegations, conclusions in a pleading “are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). On the
contrary, legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. Indeed,
“conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading
as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 326 F.3d 1183, 1185
(11th Cir. 2003).
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DISCUSSION
Favorite Farms argues that it cannot be vicariously liable for Cruz’s actions because
Cruz acted outside of the scope of employment when he raped Salazar-Santiago. Although,
generally speaking, a sexual assault typically falls outside the scope of an employee’s service
to the employer, the inquiry is fact-intensive and Florida recognizes an exception to the
general rule if the employee/tortfeasor accomplished the tort by virtue of the
employer/employee relationship. See, e.g., Doe v. St. John’s Episcopal Par. Day Sch., Inc.,
997 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288-89 (M.D. Fla. 2014); DK v. School Bd. Of Manatee Cnty, Fla.,
No. 8:14-cv-2329-T-33TBM, 2014 WL 5473578, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2014).
In Doe, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s employee, who was both a teacher
and a priest, used his position of authority to manipulate and sexually abuse the plaintiff, who
was a student. Id. at 1289. The court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, which had
argued that the employer could not be vicariously liable for the employee’s intentional torts.
The court relied on Florida’s exception to the general rule that applies when the tort arises
from the employment/employee relationship. The court noted that the allegations reflected
that the teacher used his position as an employee of the employer as a pathway to abuse the
plaintiff. See id.
Similarly, in DK, the employee used his position of authority as a “Parent Liaison”
of the defendant employer as a means to sexually assault the plaintiff. 2014 WL 5473578,
at *2. The court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss because the allegations sufficiently

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alleged an exception to the general rule that employers are not vicariously liable for sexual
assaults/batteries committed by their employees.
Based on the allegations in the amended complaint and, because the issue of vicarious
liability is a fact-intensive inquiry, the arguments raised in Favorite Farms’ motion to dismiss
are more appropriately addressed at the summary judgment stage. Salazar-Santiago has
adequately pled that Cruz used his position of authority as Favorite Farms’ crew leader to
rape Salazar-Santiago during a purported inspection of her apartment, which Favorite Farms
had leased to her. Accordingly, the battery and assault claims will not be dismissed.
It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:
1.

Defendant Favorite Farms, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 28) is denied.

2.

Count VIII of the Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with
prejudice, with each party to bear its and her own costs and attorney’s fees,
pursuant to the parties’ Joint Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal (Dkt. 34).

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on January 4, 2018.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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