Roberson v. Pinellas County Sheriff's Office et al

Filing 15

ORDER dismissing the civil rights complaint; denying as moot 12 , 13 , and 14 --motions to dismiss; directing the clerk to CLOSE the case. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 4/19/2018. (BK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER ROBERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:17-cv-1380-T-23MAP

PINELLAS COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
et al.,
Defendants.
/

ORDER
Roberson’s complaint alleges that the defendants violated his civil rights when
members of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office both questioned him about a murder
and arrested him for driving with a suspended or revoked drivers license. An earlier
order (Doc. 8) grants Roberson leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Prisoner
Litigation Reform Act requires dismissal of an in forma pauperis prisoner’s case “if the
allegation of poverty is untrue” or if the case “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Although the complaint is
entitled to a generous interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per
curiam), this pro se complaint lacks merit under this standard.

Roberson alleges that he was questioned by Pinellas County Sheriff’s Detective
Miller about a murder “that I had zero knowledge of” and, allegedly because of his
lack of cooperation, Detective Miller arrested Roberson for driving while his license
was suspended or revoked. (Doc. 1 at 6)1 Roberson alleges that state prosecutors,
law enforcement officers, and law enforcement organizations violated his rights,
although the basis for a civil rights violation remains unclear. Roberson alleges that
he suffered a “mental breakdown” but identifies no physical injury. Roberson
requests “$300 million dollars for punitive damages, mental anguish, pain and
suffering, loss of property, marriage separation, mental and psychological issues, and
violating my constitutional rights.” (Doc. 1 at 7 and 9) Roberson fails to state a
claim that he can pursue in a civil rights action.
Governmental Entities:
Roberson sues “Pinellas County Jail House,” “Pinellas County Court House,”
and “Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.” First, neither the “jail house” nor the
courthouse nor the “Sheriff’s Office” is an entity susceptible to suit. Faulkner v.
Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 700S01 (11th Cir. 2013),2 explains:
Whether a party has the capacity to be sued is determined by
the law of the state in which the district court sits. Dean v.
Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214–15 (11th Cir. 1992). Florida law
has not established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities

1

According to the website for the Florida Department of Corrections, Roberson is serving
life imprisonment under a murder conviction imposed after the alleged incident with Detective
Miller.
2

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as
persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
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with the capacity to be sued. Thus, the district court did not err
by dismissing Faulkner’s claim against MCSO because MCSO
is not a legal entity with the capacity to be sued under Florida
law. See Fla. City Police Dep’t v. Corcoran, 661 So. 2d 409, 410
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the municipality, not the
police department, had the power to sue and be sued under
Florida law).

Prosecutors:
Roberson sues State Attorney Bernie McCabe and Assistant State Attorneys
Michael Marr and Mark McGarry. Although certainly unclear, Roberson’s
allegations against the prosecutors appear based on each acting in the capacity of a
prosecutor. Prosecutorial immunity precludes Roberson’s recovering either
compensatory or punitive damages, which relief Roberson requests. Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under
§ 1983.”); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]bsolute
immunity extends to a prosecutor’s <acts undertaken . . . in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role
as an advocate for the State . . . .’”) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273
(1993)). See also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 340–43 (2009), and Hart v.
Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1294–96 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 953 (2010), for
a thorough review of the breadth of prosecutorial immunity. As a consequence,
Roberson cannot pursue a claim for damages against the prosecutors.
Law Enforcement:

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Roberson sues Detectives Kenneth Miller and Richard Anderson. Roberson
asserts no act committed by Detective Anderson. Roberson asserts no act committed
by Detective Miller other than questioning and arresting him, neither of which
supports the denial of a civil right. Additionally, Roberson gains no benefit by
liberally construing the civil rights complaint to allege that Roberson was denied a
constitutional right during the state criminal proceedings because that claim would
challenge the validity of the criminal conviction. Under Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.
475, 500 (1973), if a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of confinement, a
writ of habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy, and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 486–87 (1994), precludes Roberson from challenging the validity of either the
conviction or the sentence (including a fine or penalty) by a civil rights action instead
of an application for the writ of habeas corpus.
We hold that, in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.

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Heck requires dismissal of a civil rights complaint if a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor
questions either (1) the validity of the conviction or sentence or (2) the fact or
duration of confinement. Roberson has no Section 1983 claim unless he prevails on
habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an
unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 489–90.
Damages:
Roberson requests “$300 million dollars for punitive damages, mental anguish,
pain and suffering, loss of property, marriage separation, mental and psychological
issues, and violating my constitutional rights.” (Doc. 1 at 7 and 9) But without an
actual physical injury, Roberson cannot recover damages because an actual physical
injury is required under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e),
which states, “No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . . .”
As a consequence, Roberson fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Amendment of the action would prove futile because Roberson can state no
valid Section 1983 claim for relief. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163
(11th Cir. 2001) (“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where
there has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment

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would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would
be futile.”).
Accordingly, the civil rights complaint is DISMISSED. Any pending motion
is DENIED AS MOOT. The clerk must close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on April 19, 2018.

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