Thomas et al v. Carrington's Caring Angels, LLC et al
Filing
48
ORDER: Defendants Carrington's Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie Carrington's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 44 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 1/18/2018. (KAK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
AGATHA THOMAS, MARIE EDWARD, and
ANGEL DANCIL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 8:17-cv-1586-T-33MAP
CARRINGTON’S CARING ANGELS, LLC,
STEPHANIE CARRINGTON, RONSHAI
DAVIS, and AAJA LOVE CARE, INC.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants
Carrington’s Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie Carrington’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 44), which was filed on
December 10, 2017.
Plaintiffs Agatha Thomas, Marie Edward,
and Angel Dancil filed a response in opposition (Doc. # 46) on
December 21, 2017.
For the reasons that follow, the Court
denies the Motion.
Discussion
Three Plaintiff home healthcare workers (Agatha Thomas,
Marie Edward, and Angel Dancil) sue four separate Defendants
(Carrington’s
Caring
Angels,
LLC,
Stephanie
Carrington,
Ronshai Davis, and AAJA Love Care, Inc.) in this FLSA action.
(Doc. # 1).
Two Defendants, Davis and AAJA Love Care, Inc.,
are in default and have not participated in the proceedings.
(Doc. ## 25, 26).
The two active Defendants, Carrington’s
Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie Carrington, have filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. # 44). The Carrington
Defendants argue: (1) they are not an “enterprise” covered by
the FLSA; (2) they had no involvement with Thomas and Dancil;
and (3) Edward worked as an independent contractor for only
three weeks and was not an employee.
Carrington
Defendants
have
not
As explained below, the
met
their
burden
of
establishing that they are entitled to relief as a matter of
law on these issues.
The Court accordingly denies the Motion
for Summary Judgment.
A.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude a
grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.
Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)).
A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.
2
Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc. 357 F.3d 1256,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004)(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its
burden,
the
non-moving
party
must
then
‘go
beyond
the
pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995)(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to be
true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d
1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d
1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). (citing Augusta Iron & Steel
Works, Inc. v. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 835 F.2d 855, 856 (11th
3
Cir. 1988)).
nothing
But, if the non-movant’s response consists of
“more
allegations,”
than
a
summary
repetition
judgment
is
of
his
conclusional
not
only
proper,
but
required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034 (11th Cir.
1981).
B.
FLSA Coverage and the Home Care Final Rule
The Complaint alleges that the Carrington Defendants “are
an enterprise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
FLSA.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 17).
Generally speaking, “the FLSA
covers a company if the company’s gross receipts equal or
exceed $500,000 and if the company employs any person who
either engages in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce or handles, sells, or otherwise works on goods or
materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce.”
Clements v. Randolph Hotel, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-3395-T-23TBM,
2017
U.S.
Dist.
LEXIS
76261,
at
2017)(internal citation omitted).
assert
they
have
not
grossed
*1
(M.D.
Fla.
May
19,
The Carrington Defendants
$500,000,
and
therefore,
enterprise coverage does not exist. “Carrington’s Caring
Angels, LLC is just an up and coming business and does not
make anywhere close to $500,000 per year.” (Carrington Aff.
Doc. # 45 at ¶ 6).
Plaintiffs do not weigh in on whether the Carrington
Defendants meet the $500,000 gross income requirement for FLSA
4
enterprise
coverage.
Instead,
they
contend
that
recent
legislation, the Home Care Final Rule, mandates Plaintiffs be
paid FLSA overtime: “Regardless of the gross earning of the
Employer, the change in the law effective January 1, 2015, in
essence,
makes
an
agency
providing
home
care
services
obligated to pay minimum wages and overtime pay.” (Doc. # 46
at 18).
Plaintiffs explain that, prior to October 13, 2015, the
FLSA exempted domestic service employees from minimum wage and
maximum hour requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15).
But,
on October 1, 2013, the Department of Labor issued the Home
Care Final Rule. 29 C.F.R. § 552.
The Home Care Final Rule
became effective on October 13, 2015, after various appellate
proceedings took place. See Alves v. Affiliated Home Care of
Putnam, Inc., No. 16-cv-1593 (KMK), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17893, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2017)(describing application of
the Home Care Final Rule).
Plaintiffs submit that, under the Home Care Final Rule,
direct care workers are deemed covered under the FLSA and are
entitled to overtime pay if any of the following apply:
1.
2.
3.
If they are employed by an agency or another
employer other than the person being assisted
or that person’s family or household;
If the duties include medically related
services;
If more than 20% of the work time is spent
helping the person assisted with activities of
daily
living
(ADL’s)
and
instrumental
5
activities of daily living (IADL’s);
If they perform duties that primarily benefit
members of the household other than the person
being assisted.
4.
Plaintiffs rely on 29 C.F.R. § 552, 78 FR 60454-01, and
detailed reports, guidance, and fact-sheets posted on the
United
States
Department
of
Labor’s
website:
www.dol.gov/whd/homecare/workers.htm.
The Carrington Defendants do not address any of these
factors and do not discuss the application of the Home Care
Final Rule.
In addition, although Plaintiffs bring the Home
Care Final Rule to the Court’s attention, Plaintiffs do not
address the four factors head-on, or explain the manner in
which the Rule specifically applies in this case.
The Court
accordingly denies the Carrington Defendants’ Motion for
Summary
Judgment
to
the
extent
it
seeks
to
avoid
FLSA
coverage.
C.
Who Worked for the Carrington Defendants?
Edward and Thomas are Certified Nursing Assistants and
Dancil is a home health aide/medical technician. (Doc. # 46 at
7). Thomas, Edward, and Dancil claim that they worked for the
Carrington Defendants and provided home health care to an
individual named Laura Johnson.
cerebral
palsy,
but
has
not
Johnson, who suffers from
been
declared
mentally
incompetent, states that she hired Carrington’s Caring Angels
for home health care and Carrington’s Caring Angels provided
6
Thomas, Edward, and Dancil, among others. (Johnson Aff. Doc.
# 46-4 at ¶¶ 3-6).
Johnson understood that Thomas, Edward,
and Dancil “were employed by Carrington’s Caring Angels.” (Id.
at ¶ 7). Johnson also believed that defaulted Defendant Davis
“was an agent for Carrington’s Caring Angels and was billing
care through Carrington’s Caring Angels’ guidelines.” (Id. at
¶ 9).
Thomas, Edward, and Dancil each filed an affidavit in
support of their position that they were employed by the
Carrington Defendants.
Among other statements, Dancil claims
she “accepted a position with Carrington’s Caring Angels, LLC”
and “worked from April 20, 2017 through May 9, 2017.” (Dancil
Aff. Doc. # 46-2 at ¶ 1). Dancil explains she submitted an
employment application and other “necessary certificates” for
employment with Carrington’s Caring Angels and that she was
advised
that
Carrington’s
Caring
Angels
would
provide
continuing education courses to Dancil. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-4).
Similarly,
“employment
Edward
indicates
application,
that
employment
she
provided
references,
an
[and]
licensure” information to the Carrington Defendants and was
hired to care for Johnson. (Edward Aff. Doc. # 46-3 at ¶¶ 1,
3).
Edward states that Carrington set her pay at $10.25 per
hour and that she worked from February 24, 2017, through April
19, 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-2).
7
Thomas avers that she also cared for Johnson (from March
20, 2017, through April 25, 2017), and that Davis contacted
her and hired her. (Thomas Aff. Doc. # 46-1 at ¶ 1).
Thomas
explains that it is her belief that Davis was an agent of the
Carrington Defendants and that Davis hired Thomas to work for
the Carrington Defendants:
Ronshai Davis indicated that I was to be paid
$10.00 per hour, a rate that was selected by Davis
for this job.
I provided all documentation
provided to me by Davis on Carrington’s Caring
Angels
letterhead,
including,
an
employment
application, employment references, licensure and
online certificates at ADP. I provided medical home
health services to Laura Johnson and filled out
timesheets for Carrington’s Caring Angels, LLC
being their letterhead, along with my notes of my
activity within Laura Johnson’s home.
I was
provided a check for my work, although I did not
receive monies for all of the time that I had spent
caring for Laura Johnson.
It is my belief that
Ronshai Davis was an employee and agent of
Stephanie Carrington and Carrington’s Caring
Angels, LLC and spoke on their behalf. I attempted
to contact Ronshai Davis
to determine what I
should do to receive my pay, but she never
contacted me or returned my phone calls. After not
being paid, I contacted Stephanie Carrington to
determine where my pay was coming from. At that
time, I was advised that she would have Davis call
me, which she did. Davis told me she did not have
time to deal with me, and hung up.
(Id. at ¶¶ 2-8).
Stephanie Carrington filed a competing affidavit in which
she states that “the Plaintiffs Agatha Thomas and Angel Dancil
have not had any dealings with myself or Carrington’s Caring
Angels, LLC and I did not even know who they were prior to
8
this lawsuit being filed.” (Carrington Aff. Doc. # 45 at ¶ 3).
Carrington acknowledges Edward’s existence, but characterizes
her an independent contractor, rather than an employee. (Id.
at ¶ 4).
In addition, Carrington submits that Edward only
provided her services for three weeks, while Edward claims to
have worked for the Carrington Defendants from February 24,
2017, through April 19, 2017. (Carrington Aff. Doc. # 45 at ¶
4; Edward Aff. Doc. # 46-3 at ¶ 1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, credibility
determinations and the weighing of the evidence are jury
functions, not those of a judge. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at
255. The parties’ irreconcilable versions of the facts specifically whether Thomas and Dancil were affiliated in any
way with the Carrington Defendants - preclude the entry of
summary judgment with respect to the status of Thomas and
Dancil.
D.
Employee vs. Independent Contractor
The Carrington Defendants and Edward do agree that Edward
performed
duties
for
the
Carrington
Defendants.
The
Carrington Defendants seek summary judgment based on the
argument that Edward was an independent contractor, rather
than an employee.
The FLSA’s overtime provisions apply to employees, but
not independent contractors. Perdomo v. Ask 4 Realty & Mgmt.,
9
Inc., 298 F. App’x 820, 821 (11th Cir. 2008). “A determination
of employment status under the FLSA . . . is a question of
law.”
Id.
In
determining
whether
an
individual
is
an
employee, instead of an independent contractor, courts apply
the “economic realities” test.
Scantland v. Jeffry Knight,
Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2013).
This test
requires the Court to “look past the labels the parties apply
to their relationship, and to examine both whether Plaintiff’s
relationship to Defendant is that of a traditional employee
and to what extent Plaintiff is economically dependent upon
Defendants.” Castro v. Sevilla Props., LLC, No. 13-cv-22466,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181210, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2013).
In the Eleventh Circuit, courts consider the following
factors in determining an individual’s employment status:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
the nature and degree of the alleged
employer’s control as to the manner in which
the work is to be performed;
the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit
or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
the alleged employee’s investment in equipment
or materials required for his task, or his
employment of workers;
whether the service rendered requires a
special skill;
the degree of permanency and duration of the
working relationship; and
the extent to which the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer’s
business.
Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1312.
No one factor is outcome
determinative, nor is the list exhaustive. Id. “Ultimately, in
10
considering economic dependence, the court focuses on whether
an individual is ‘in business for himself’ or is ‘dependent
upon finding employment in the business of others.’” Id.
(citing Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 301-02
(5th Cir. 1975)).
The Court denies the Motion for Summary Judgment because
the Carrington Defendants have not met their burden of showing
that Edwards was an independent contractor.
Among other
problems, the Carrington Defendants only address two of the
six factors.
control
And, of the two factors addressed (degree of
exercised
over
the
worker
and
duration
of
relationship), the Carrington Defendants mostly present the
arguments of counsel and incorporate little, if any, record
evidence into such arguments.
For example, the Defendants
generally assert: “Here, it is readily apparent that the
Plaintiffs were independent contractors; and therefore, the
FLSA does not apply.” (Doc. # 44 at 6).
The closest the Carrington Defendants come to relying on
admissible record evidence to support their arguments is when
such
Defendants
point
to
statements
in
the
“Independent
Contractor’s Agreement” signed by Edward on February 24, 2017.
(Doc. # 44-1).
In that Agreement, Edward agreed: “I will be
acting as an independent contractor and not an employee to CCA
(The Company). I understand that CAA does not and will not
11
control the time I report to work, the time actually spent on
any job, and the time I leave the job.” (Id. at 8).
Edward
also acknowledged in the Agreement that Carrington “does not
and will not control in any respect the manner and means in
which I perform my duties.” Id. But the labels and statements
contained in such an agreement do not control in the context
of
determining
employment
status
in
a
FLSA
action.
See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1311 (the relevant inquiry “is not
governed by the ‘label’ put on the relationship by the parties
or the contract controlling that relationship, but rather
focuses on whether ‘the work done, in its essence, follows the
usual path of an employee.’”(citing Rutherford Food Corp. v.
McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947))).
And, “putting on an
‘independent contractor’ label does not take the worker from
the protection of the [FLSA].”
Id.
As stated in Usery v.
Pilgrim Equipment Co., 527 F. 2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1976),
“It is not significant how one ‘could have’ acted under the
contract
terms.
The
controlling
economic
realities
are
reflected by the way one actually acts.”
The Carrington Defendants fall woefully short of meeting
their burden of establishing that Edward was an independent
contractor.
Among
other
considerations,
the
Carrington
Defendants do not discuss Edward’s opportunity for profit and
loss depending upon managerial skill, Edward’s investment in
12
tools necessary for the job or the relative investments of the
parties, whether the services Edward performed required a
special skill, or the extent to which Edward’s services were
an integral part of the Carrington Defendants’ business.
The
scant information provided does not justify a finding that
Edward was an independent contractor.
The Court accordingly
denies the Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendants Carrington’s Caring Angels, LLC and Stephanie
Carrington’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 44) is
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this
18th day of January, 2018.
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