Bruce et al v. U.S. Bank National Association et al

Filing 38

ORDER: Plaintiffs Roy Bruce and Alice Bruce's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case (Doc. # 33 ) is DENIED.Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 2/6/2018. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ROY W. BRUCE and ALICE BRUCE,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-2023-T-33JSS

U.S. BANK, NA., AS TRUSTEE
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO BANK OF
AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS
TRUSTEE, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO
LASALLE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
AS TRUSTEE FOR STRUCTURED ASSET
SECURITIES CORPORATION MORTGAGE
PASS-THROUGH and ALBERTELLI LAW,
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to pro se
Plaintiffs

Roy

Bruce

and

Alice

Bruce’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case (Doc. # 33), which
was filed on December 26, 2017.

Plaintiffs submitted their

arguments in support of the Motion for Reconsideration in a
separate

document

(Doc.

#

35),

filed

on

the

same

day.

Defendant U.S. Bank, N.A., as Trustee Successor in Interest to
Bank of America, National Association, as Trustee, Successor
by Merger to Lasalle Bank, National Association, As Trustee
for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Passthrough (“the Trust”) filed a Response in Opposition to the
Motion on January 9, 2018. (Doc. # 36).
Motion as follows.

The Court denies the

I.

Legal Standard
The Bruces’ Motion, seeking reconsideration and relief

from the Court’s Order, will be decided under Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed within 28 days of entry of the
Order.

Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:03-cv-

2378-T-17-MAP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37718, at *6 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 30, 2005).
As stated in

Florida College of Osteopathic Medicine,

Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308
(M.D.

Fla.

1998),

“A

motion

for

reconsideration

must

demonstrate why the court should reconsider its past decision
and set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to
induce the court to reverse its prior decision.” Further, “in
the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial
resources, reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be
employed sparingly.” Lamar Adver. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of
Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480, 489 (M.D. Fla. 1999).
This

Court

recognizes

three

grounds

to

justify

reconsideration of a prior order under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e): “(1) an intervening change in controlling
law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to
correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Fla. Coll. of
2

Osteopathic Med., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.

Further, as

explained in Ludwig, “This Court will not reconsider its
judgment when the motion for reconsideration fails to raise
new issues but, instead, relitigates that which the Court
previously found lacking.” 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37718, at *910.

In addition, “a motion for reconsideration is not the

proper forum for the party to vent dissatisfaction with the
Court’s reasoning.” Id. at *11. (citation omitted).
II.

Analysis
The Bruces filed a three-count Complaint on August 24,

2017, seeking (1) injunctive relief, (2) damages under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and (3) damages under the
Florida

Consumer

Defendants,

the

Collection
Trust

and

Practices
Albertelli

Act.
Law,

(Doc.
filed

#

1).

motions

seeking dismissal of the action under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. ## 8, 27). Among other
arguments, the Trust argued that the FDCPA claim was time
barred.
After carefully considering the parties’ submissions, the
Court dismissed the action. (Doc. # 32).

The only federal

count in the Complaint was brought under the FDCPA. The Court
found

that

the

Complaint

and

the

attached

exhibits

demonstrated that the FDCPA claim was time barred by the
3

FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 6).

The

Court also found that the Bruces failed to show that they were
consumers protected by the FDCPA. (Id. at 8). Because the
Court dismissed the only federal count, the Court declined to
exercise

subject

matter

jurisdiction

over

the

state

law

claims. (Id.).
At this juncture, the Bruces move for reconsideration,
request oral argument, and seek the opportunity to file an
Amended Complaint.

They do not claim that there has been a

change in controlling law.

Nor do they assert that new

evidence exists, which warrants a different result.
they

Instead,

claim that the Court held them to the same standard as

attorneys, even though they are pro se litigants. However,
they do not present a single convincing argument in support of
the proposition that the sole federal claim is timely.

This

Court is obligated to dismiss time-barred claims regardless of
whether

they

are

brought

by

attorneys

or

non-attorneys.

Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds under Rule 12 is
appropriate

when

“it

is

apparent

from

the

face

of

the

complaint that the claim is time-bared.” La Grasta v. First
Union Sec. Inc., 358 F.3d 840,845 (11th Cir. 2004).
In analyzing the Bruces’ claims, the Court recognized:
Even though complaints by pro se plaintiffs are
4

liberally construed, “a pro se litigant is not
relieved of his obligation to allege sufficient
facts to support a cognizable legal claim and the
court may not rewrite a deficient pleading.” Osahar
v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863,
864 (11th Cir. 2008); Muhammad v. Bethel, 430 F.
App’x 750, 752 (11th Cir. 2011)(“a court may not
serve as de facto counsel for a party or rewrite an
otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.”).
(Doc. # 32 at 8).

Here, the Court did not hold the pro se

Plaintiffs to the same standard as attorneys, but rather,
liberally construed the Complaint and found that the sole
federal

count

was

subject

to

dismissal.

The

Bruces

acknowledge that courts are not required to provide leave to
amend where it is apparent that the complaint could not be
saved by amendment. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307,
1310 (11th Cir. 2007).

Granting leave to amend would be

futile if the complaint, as amended, would still be subject to
dismissal. Id.
nor

in

the

Neither in response to the motions to dismiss

Motion

for

Reconsideration

have

the

Bruces

explained how amendment of the Complaint could save the timebarred and legally deficient FDCPA claim. The Court therefore
denies the Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Plaintiffs

Roy

Bruce

and

5

Alice

Bruce’s

Motion

for

Reconsideration of Order Dismissing Case (Doc. # 33) is
DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 6th
day of February, 2018.

6