Lipinski v. Jones

Filing 5

ORDER: This case is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE THE CASE. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/30/2017. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
IRENE ELIZABETH LIPINSKI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-2031-T-33TGW

A. BRAD JONES,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court sua sponte. The Court
determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter

and

thus

dismisses

this

action

pursuant

to

Rule

12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.

Background
On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff Irene Elizabeth Lipinski

filed a pro se “Petition to Compel Arbitration” against
Defendant A. Brad Jones. (Doc. # 1).
Pete

Beach,

Florida

address

for

Lipinski provides a St.
herself

and

identifies

Defendant Jones as the President of Paradigm Construction,
LLC, located in Largo, Florida. (Id. at 1-2).
acknowledges
citizenship

that

the

Court

jurisdiction

and

does

not

submits

have
that

Lipinski

diversity
the

Court

of
has

federal question jurisdiction. (Id. at 3). Specifically, she
indicates that the federal statute at issue is the “Federal
Arbitration Act Title 9 U.S. Code § 4- Failure to Arbitrate.”

(Id.).
Lipinski further explains in her “Statement of Claim”
that “On 6-16-16 parties signed a contract with a written
provision to arbitrate disputes.

A dispute has arisen.

Defendant has declined to participate in mediation and is
unresponsive to attempts for arbitration.” (Id. at 4). In the
“Relief” section of the Complaint, Lipinski “requests a Motion
to

Compel

Arbitration

-

as

called

for

in

the

written

contract.” (Id.).
Lipinski
Complaint.

attaches

the

Construction

Contract

to

the

The subject of the Contract is the “Lipinski

Rental Remodel” real property located in Tampa, Florida. (Id.
at

6).

Lipinski

has

made

handwritten

comments

on

the

Construction Contract, suggesting that Paradigm did not uphold
certain aspects of the bargain.
entitled

to

$58,442.11

Lipinski submits that she is

based

on

Paradigm’s

alleged

deficiencies, which include “cost of materials, cost of labor,
cost

of

supervision,

cost

of

contractor

with

no

active

license, cost of wasted supplies for non-professional work,
[and] cost of inefficient work and lost rental income [for]
three months.” (Id. at 25).

The Court surmises that Lipinski

contends that Paradigm breached the Construction Contract.

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II.

Jurisdictional Discussion
“A federal court not only has the power but also the

obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever
the possibility that jurisdiction does not exist arises.”
Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251
(11th Cir. 1985); Hallandale Prof'l Fire Fighters Local 2238
v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d 756, 759 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“[E]very

federal

court

operates

under

an

independent

obligation to ensure it is presented with the kind of concrete
controversy upon which its constitutional grant of authority
is based.”).
Moreover,
jurisdiction.
Cir. 1994).

federal

courts

are

courts

of

limited

Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th

And “because a federal court is powerless to act

beyond its statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a
court must zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a
case, and should itself raise the question of subject matter
jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt
about jurisdiction arises.”

Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d

1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Complaint’s jurisdictional allegations demonstrate to
the

Court

that

jurisdiction.

there

is

a

palpable

lack

of

federal

The requirements of complete diversity of
3

jurisdiction are not met.

A Florida Plaintiff sues a Florida

Defendant and the amount at issue, $58,442.11, is less than
the jurisdictional threshold amount.
And, while Plaintiff mentions a Federal Statute - the
Federal Arbitration Act, that Act, in and of itself, does not
supply the Court with federal subject matter jurisdiction. In
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
460

U.S.

1,

25-16

(1983),

the

Court

explained:

“The

Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly in the field of
federal-court jurisdiction.

It creates a body of federal

substantive law establishing and regulating the duty to honor
an

agreement

to

arbitrate,

yet

it

does

independent federal-question jurisdiction.”1

not

create

any

This reasoning

was echoed in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 291 (1995), where the Court clarified:
[C]ourts have jurisdiction to enforce arbitration
agreements
only
when
they
would
have
had
jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. See 9

1

The mere mention of a federal statute in a complaint
does not create federal question jurisdiction. Hill v.
Marston, 13 F.3d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1994). Rather, federal
question jurisdiction requires that a party assert a
substantial federal claim. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536
(1976); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199
(1962)(holding that if jurisdiction is based on a federal
question, the plaintiff must show that he has alleged a claim
under federal law that is not frivolous).

4

U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 8. In other words, the FAA treats
arbitration simply as one means of resolving
disputes that lie within the jurisdiction of the
federal courts; it makes clear that the breach of a
covered arbitration agreement does not itself
provide
any
independent
basis
for
such
jurisdiction.
Id.; see also Frank v. Am. Gen. Fin. Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1346
(S.D. Ala. 1998)(“There must . . . be diversity of citizenship
or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction
before an order compelling arbitration can issue.”).
Although the Court has construed the Complaint broadly
due to Lipinski’s pro se status, the Court comes to the
ultimate conclusion that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over this case.

The Complaint demands an Order requiring

arbitration, but the Court lacks a jurisdictional basis to
require the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration.
Lipinski does not contend that the requirements of complete
diversity of citizenship are satisfied, and the Court is
convinced that the requirements of complete diversity are not
met.

In addition, Lipinski’s stated jurisdictional basis -

the Federal Arbitration Act - is not an appropriate foundation
for the Court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. “As
courts have long held, the FAA . . . does not confer subject
matter jurisdiction on federal courts [but] instead, federal
courts

must

have

an

independent
5

jurisdictional

basis

to

entertain cases arising under the FAA.” Baltin v. Alaron
Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).

The

Court thus dismisses the case.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

This

case

is

DISMISSED

for

lack

of

subject

matter

jurisdiction.
(2)

The Clerk is directed to CLOSE THE CASE.
DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 30th day of

August, 2017.

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