Rahman v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

Filing 44

ORDER dismissing Rahman's 1 petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time barred. A certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment against Rahman and CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge Mary S. Scriven on 1/30/2024. (JT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ROCKFORD J. RAHMAN,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 8:17-cv-2464-MSS-SPF

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Rahman petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges
his state court convictions for attempted sexual battery and lewd and lascivious battery (Doc.
1), the Respondent asserts that the amended petition is untimely (Doc. 25), and Rahman
replies that his actual innocence excuses the time bar. (Doc. 21 at 4) The parties submitted
supplemental briefs addressing actual innocence. (Docs. 39 and 40) After reviewing the
pleadings and the relevant state court record (Docs. 25-1, 39-2, and 40-1), the Court
DISMISSES the petition as time barred.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Rahman pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sexual battery and two counts of
lewd and lascivious battery, and the trial court sentenced him to two concurrent terms of
twenty-five years for the sexual battery convictions and two concurrent terms of fifteen years
for the lewd and lascivious battery convictions. (Doc. 25-1 at 8–13) Rahman did not appeal.
Rahman moved for post-conviction relief (Doc. 25-1 at 20–28), the post-conviction
court denied relief (Doc. 25-1 at 32–36), and Rahman did not appeal. Rahman filed a second

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motion for post-conviction relief (Doc. 25-1 at 49–55), the post-conviction court denied relief
(Doc. 25-1 at 80–89), Rahman appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 25-1 at
111) Rahman sought post-conviction relief in the state supreme court (Doc. 25-1 at 115–29),
and the state supreme court denied relief. (Doc. 25-1 at 131)
Rahman’s federal petition followed. In his federal petition, Rahman asserts
(1) a detective violated his federal rights by arresting him without probable cause, (2) the trial
court violated his federal right to due process by permitting the detective who arrested him to
set bail, (3) the prosecutor violated his federal rights by not dismissing the criminal case after
learning that the detective unlawfully arrested him, and (4) the state court violated his federal
rights by permitting him to plead guilty even though the detective unlawfully arrested him
and set bail. (Doc. 1 at 5–6) In a supplemental pleading, Rahman further asserts that his
sentence of twenty-five years in prison for attempted sexual battery exceeds the statutory
maximum sentence. (Doc. 21 at 3–4)
ANALYSIS
A one-year statute of limitation applies to a federal habeas petition challenging a state
court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The limitation period begins to run “the date on
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). On June 20, 2012, the judgment in
Rahman’s criminal case entered (Doc. 25-1 at 8–14, 17), Rahman did not appeal, and the
time to appeal expired thirty days later — July 23, 2012. Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b)(3); Fla. R.
Jud. Admin. 2.514(a)(1)(C). The limitation period started to run the next day. Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(a)(1)(A). Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011).

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“[A] properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review”
tolls the limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitation period ran for 324 days until
June 13, 2013, when Rahman placed in the hands of prison officials for mailing a motion for
post-conviction relief. (Doc. 25-1 at 20–28) On January 9, 2014, the post-conviction court
denied the motion. (Doc. 25-1 at 32–36) Rahman did not appeal, and the time to appeal
expired thirty days later — February 10, 2014. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) and 9.141(b)(1). The
limitation period started to run the next day and continued to run until it expired forty-one
days later — March 24, 2014. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Rahman placed in the hands of prison officials for mailing his federal petition on
October 16, 2017 (Doc. 1 at 1) and his supplemental petition on March 19, 2018. (Doc. 21 at
6) Consequently, the claims in the petition and the supplemental petition are untimely.
On May 30, 2016, Rahman placed in the hands of prison officials for mailing a second
motion for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 25-1 at 49–55) Also, on August 4, 2017, he placed in
the hands of prison officials for mailing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 25-1 at
115–29) Because Rahman filed the motion and the petition after the limitation period expired,
neither tolled the limitation period. Sibley v. Culliver, 377 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[O]nce a deadline has expired, there is nothing left to toll. A state court filing after the federal
habeas filing deadline does not revive it.”).
Rahman contends that the victim falsely accused him of the crimes, that physical
evidence did not support the accusations, and that DNA evidence exonerated him. (Doc. 21
at 4) “[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may
pass . . . [the] expiration of the statute of limitations.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383,
386 (2013). “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not

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meet the threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the
new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at 386 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329
(1995)). “To be credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his allegations of
constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific
evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not
presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
Rahman submits the following documents to prove his actual innocence
(Doc. 40-1): (1) a transcript of a 911 call by his wife, (2) a written statement by Rahman’s
wife, (3) excerpts of police reports, (4) an excerpt of a transcript of an interrogation of
Rahman, (5) an excerpt of a police report summarizing Rahman’s confession, (6) the arrest
affidavit, (7) the information, (8) the judgment and sentence, (9) the change of plea form,
(10) two evidence receipts, (11) reports of DNA testing, (12) an excerpt of a transcript of a
deposition of a neighbor, and (13) reports by Child Protective Services.
Rahman contends that these documents demonstrate his actual innocence (Doc. 40
at 3): “Rahman is claiming actual innocence based on the State’s own documented evidence
such as, medical reports, investigative reports from Child Protective Services, the alleged
victim’s own testimony, the State’s witnesses’ deposition testimony, and physical and
scientific findings from FDLE’s biology lab in its DNA testing.”
Rahman fails to demonstrate that these documents constitute “new” evidence.
Rahman could have obtained with reasonable diligence the information, the change of plea
form, the judgment and sentence, the police and Child Protective Service reports, the arrest
affidavit, the transcript of the 911 call, the written statement, the transcript of the

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interrogation, the evidence receipts, and the deposition transcript. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324
(describing a credible claim of actual innocence as supported by “new reliable evidence . . .
that was not presented at trial”); Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 920 (8th Cir. 2005)
(“Evidence is only ‘new’ if it was ‘not available at trial and could not have been discovered
earlier through the exercise of due diligence.’”) (citation omitted).
The post-conviction court further determined that the prosecutor disclosed the DNA
reports to the defense before trial (Doc. 39-2 at 45–46) (italics in original):
The Defendant compounds the contradictory nature of his
claim by acknowledging that in 2013, he requested and received
copies of his discovery from his attorney. He acknowledges that
included in this discovery were the FDLE lab results he now
categorizes as newly discovered evidence, yet he fails to explain
why it took him until “June of 2014,” to discover the
significance of the FDLE reports he received, when, by his own
admission, he received this information in 2013. The Court
again notes that regardless of how recently a defendant has
discovered the evidence, “[a] claim of newly discovered
evidence must be filed within two years from the date the
evidence could have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence.” Burns, 110 So. 3d at 96. Even assuming, arguendo,
that the Court finds credence in the Defendant’s claim that he
did not truly discover the significance of the FDLE reports until
June 2014, the Defendant should note that by his own
admission, he actually received this information from his
attorney in 2013. Therefore, he “could have discovered” this
information in 2013, when the documentation was originally
sent to him by counsel, and his motion alleging newly
discovered evidence should have been filed two years from that
time. Notwithstanding the Defendant’s specious claim on this
point, he also overlooks the fact that the information he
repeatedly refers to as “newly discovered evidence,” was a part
of discovery. Simply put, the Defendant’s claim does not
amount to newly discovered evidence. This is so, because given
the fact this information was provided to the defense during
discovery, the Defendant cannot claim it is newly discovered
evidence. To that end, the record reflects that the State filed
three “Additional Witness List and Acknowledgment of
Tangible Evidence” filings in reference to the very same FDLE
report (i.e., FDLE #20110303480) that the Defendant has

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included in his instant motion. Additionally, the record reflects
that the State filed an “Acknowledgment of Tangible Evidence”
in reference to a report made by the Pasco County Child
Protective Team, a report that the Defendant has also included
with his instant motion. The Defendant cannot claim that
counsel was not aware of this information, because the record
refutes any such claim. Specifically, the record reflects that on
March 14, 2012, the defense filed a “Supplemental DNA
Discovery Motion Regarding Conventional Serology Testing
and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) Typing,” seeking to compel
the State to turn over “[c]opies of the serology case file
including all reports, memoranda, notes, phone logs,
contamination records and data relating to the testing
performed in this case,” a motion this Court ultimately granted.
Thereafter, the State filed a fourth “Additional Witness List and
Acknowledgement of Tangible Evidence,” filing in reference to
the FDLE results. The Defendant would do well to again take
note that the aforementioned information that was provided to
the defense as a part of discovery was available to him at the
time of trial and he could have discovered it through the use of
due diligence. Although the Defendant claims that he was
unaware of this documentation until recently, again, as noted
above, the record reflects that his counsel was aware of this
documentation. Because counsel was aware of the FDLE
results, this information is not newly discovered.
Documents attached the post-conviction court’s order substantiate the determination
that the DNA reports are not “new” evidence. (Doc. 39-2 at 52–59) Rahman fails to rebut
that determination with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Even if the documents constitute “new” evidence, Rahman must demonstrate “that
it is more likely than not that ‘no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the
new evidence.’” Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t Corrs., 672 F.3d 1000, 1017 (11th Cir. 2012)
(quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006)). “‘[T]he habeas court must consider all the
evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would
necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.’” Rozzelle,
672 F.3d at 1017 (quoting House, 547 U.S. at 538).

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Arrest Affidavit and Change of Plea Form
When Rahman pleaded guilty, he agreed that “the judge may rely upon any probable
cause statement . . . in the court file for a factual basis to justify the acceptance of [his] plea
[ ].” (Doc. 25-1 at 38) The arrest affidavit summarized the facts that supported the guilty
plea as follows (Doc. 39-2 at 2):
The defendant, Rockford Rahman, entered his daughter’s
bedroom, who is an eleven-year-old female. The victim woke
up to her father on her; [her father] had pulled her top down
and licked her breasts. The victim pushed suspect off of her and
immediately told her mother. The victim informed your affiant
that, approximately two months after her tenth birthday, her
father began sexual contact with her. The victim stated [that],
during this time period, her father had licked her vagina [and]
penetrated her vagina with his finger, and [the victim] has held
her father’s penis. Post-Miranda, [the] defendant confessed to
licking the victim’s breasts, licking her vagina, and touching her
vagina.
Information and Guilty Plea
The information charged Rahman with two counts of sexual battery for placing his
mouth “in union with the sexual organ of [the victim]” and by penetrating the vagina of the
victim with his finger. (Doc. 25-1 at 5) The information further charged Rahman with two
counts of lewd and lascivious molestation for intentionally touching the victim’s breasts or
clothing covering her breasts and for intentionally forcing or enticing the victim to touch his
penis or clothing covering his penis. (Doc. 25-1 at 6) Rahman pleaded guilty to two counts
of attempted sexual battery, a lesser offense, and two counts of lewd and lascivious battery,
also a lesser offense. (Doc. 25-1 at 38, 42)
Transcript of 911 call and Written Statement by Rahman’s Wife
Rahman contends that a transcript of the 911 call contradicts the written statement
by his wife to police. (Doc. 40 at 15) However, the 911 report does not contain a transcript

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of the 911 call and instead contains a summary of a statement by Rahman’s wife to the 911
operator. (Doc. 40-1 at 1) The operator reported that Rahman’s wife stated that she
discovered Rahman “in her [eleven-year-old] daughter’s room on top of her touching her
inappropriately.” (Doc. 40-1 at 2) In the written statement to police, Rahman’s wife stated
that she heard her daughter crying in the middle of the night and asked her what was wrong,
and her daughter reported that Rahman touched her inappropriately. (Doc. 40-1 at 4)
Excerpts of Police Reports and Transcript of Interrogation
Rahman contends that police coerced his confession by detaining him and
transporting him to the police station, interrogating him for three hours, and advising him
of his constitutional rights only after the interrogation. (Doc. 40 at 4) He contends that he
suffered from sleep deprivation, felt distraught, and confessed under duress. (Doc. 40
at 4–5)
The police report states that sheriff’s deputies met with Rahman at work and that
Rahman “voluntarily went back to the Pasco Sheriff’s District Office and wanted to
cooperate in [the] investigation.” (Doc. 40-1 at 7) The two-page excerpt of the transcript of
the interrogation shows that a detective confronted Rahman with the victim’s accusations,
Rahman denied the accusations, and the detective informed Rahman that he was not free
to leave and was under arrest, advised Rahman of his constitutional rights, and concluded
the interview. (Doc. 40-1 at 9–10)
An excerpt of a police report stated that Rahman appeared distraught after he learned
that the sheriff’s deputy would arrest him (Doc. 40-1 at 12):
Mr. Rahman appeared to be emotionally distraught. I told him
it is always best to be honest with himself and to others and this
would be the best time to be honest and put things behind him
and start fresh. I stated if he felt he needed any kind of help, he

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should seek that help out. I asked him if he wanted to tell
Detective Christensen anything else before we prepared to
transport him to the jail. Mr. Rahman stated he did wish to
speak with her and tell her the truth of what happened.
Mr. Rahman further stated he knows he needs help for what he
has done.
I then informed Detective Christensen that Mr. Rahman
wanted to speak with her and tell her what happened. Detective
Christensen then returned to the interview room to speak with
Mr. Rahman.
An excerpt 1 of a police report by the detective summarized the interrogation (Doc.
43-2 at 6–7):
I asked [Rahman] what happened after the conversation [with
his wife] was done. [Rahman] stated he packed up some
belongings and drove to work. [Rahman] stated he is an
independent contractor and the warehouse is located at the
Pasco Industrial Park located in the area of State Road 54 and
Success Drive. [Rahman] advised he was contacted by law
enforcement by phone and met with them at the warehouse.
I informed [Rahman] the allegations that [the victim] told me.
I advised [Rahman] that [the victim] told me that tonight he
went into her room and licked her breasts. [Rahman] stated that
was not true. I informed [Rahman] that I was told by [the
victim] that he has also made her hold his penis and licked her
vagina. [Rahman] stated that was not true. I advised [Rahman]
that [the victim] also is claiming that he has penetrated her
vagina with his fingers. [Rahman] stated that was not true.
I requested from [Rahman] if he would voluntarily provide me
with a DNA sample that would consist of a saliva swab sample
and that I also wanted to swab his hands and nails. [Rahman]
stated that he guessed. I told him he would have to answer yes
or no. I advised [Rahman] that [the victim] will be taking an
examination and asked if his DNA will be on [the victim].
[Rahman] stated no. I asked [Rahman] if he will submit to a
DNA test and he advised sure. Shann Winkelmann
photographed and processed [Rahman]. I obtained a signed
consent from [Rahman] to obtain his saliva swab sample that
was later placed into property as evidence.
The excerpt of the report submitted by Rahman does not contain a summary of his
confession. (Doc. 40-1 at 15) The Respondent supplemented the record with a copy of the
entire report, including the summary of the confession. (Doc. 43-2)
1

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I questioned [Rahman] on the sleeping arrangements of his
family. [Rahman] stated [the victim] has her own room and [the
victim’s sister] has her own room. [Rahman] stated [the victim]
usually goes to bed at approximately 8:30 P.M. and this evening
she went to bed after him but [he] could not provide what time.
I asked [Rahman] from the time he went to bed until the time
he was woken up by his wife, if he ever went into [the victim’s]
bedroom. [Rahman] stated no. [Rahman] stated he did get up
to use the bathroom and confirmed he used the one in the
master bedroom. I asked [Rahman] if [the victim] is sexually
active and he advised no, she doesn’t even date. [Rahman]
advised she did have a male friend at school, but is no longer
speaking to him. I asked [Rahman] if [the victim] has ever seen
him nude and he advised no. I asked [Rahman] if he checks on
the children before he leaves work. [Rahman] advised he does
check on the kids before he leaves for work but does not wake
them, he just peeks into their bedroom.
Once I completed my interview with [Rahman], I made the
decision to place him into custody and read him his Miranda
rights and informed him he was not free to leave. I then left the
room and Sergeant Buhs and Deputy Raymond Keener stood
by with [Rahman]. I went into a separate room to write out my
probable cause affidavit when I was informed by Sergeant Buhs
that [Rahman] wanted to speak with me and to tell me the truth
of what had happened. I started a separate audio and video
recording of my contact with [Rahman]. The recordings were
later placed into property as evidence. The below interview is
not verbatim.
I again made contact with [Rahman] at approximately 8:37
A.M. in the interview room. I reminded [Rahman] of his
Miranda rights and informed him he had a right not to speak
with me without an attorney present. [Rahman] advised he
understood and was willing to speak with me. [Rahman] stated
approximately two years ago, his sexual contact started with his
daughter [ ]. [Rahman] stated it was during the time period he
had lost his job and his wife was working the midnight shift.
[Rahman] did confirm this evening he licked [the victim’s] chest
area. [Rahman] also confirmed he had touched [the victim’s]
vagina under her clothing but did not insert his fingers into her.
[Rahman] confirmed he had licked [the victim’s] vagina.
[Rahman] denied putting his penis into [the victim’s] hand and
stated that [the victim] at that time was holding his thumb.
[Rahman] stated he needed help [ ] for his behavior with his

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daughter, and I informed [Rahman] I could not promise him
anything but would inform the State Attorney’s Office of his
request and that he is seeking counseling for his behavior.
[Rahman] stated that he has not sexually touched his other
daughters or any other child.
Excerpt of Transcript of Deposition of Neighbor
During a deposition, a neighbor testified that he went to Rahman’s home for a
barbecue a few nights before Rahman’s wife reported the crimes and the victim “hung all
over her dad all the time” and “seemed to have the most, I guess, bond with her dad [ ].”
(Doc. 40-1 at 34) Rahman contends that a child psychologist would testify that a victim
would not act affectionately toward a sexual abuser. (Doc. 40 at 9–10)
Evidence Receipts, DNA Reports, and CPS Reports
A police report and evidence receipts show that a sheriff’s deputy collected from the
victim’s bedroom clothing, a pillowcase, a comforter, and a bedsheet. (Doc. 40-1 at 24–25)
Also, the deputy collected from Rahman an oral swab, a swab of his hands, and scrapings
from his nails. (Doc. 40-1 at 24, 26) A nurse collected from the victim swabs of her mouth,
vagina, and nipple and a cutting from her underpants. (Doc. 40-1 at 36)
A report by a nurse with Child Protective Services summarized the victim’s
accusation (Doc. 40-1 at 49):
“My dad comes into my room at night and touches me
inappropriately.” Child pretends she is asleep. He made her
touch his penis one time, but she did not see it. The incidents
occur once or twice a week and have been happening for about
one year. Most of the time he digitally penetrates her. He
fondles her breasts and genital area. He puts his mouth on her
breasts and genitals. “He put his mouth on my left breast
tonight. I don’t remember if he put his mouth ‘down there’
tonight.” (Examiner pointed to genital area, and child nodded
her head yes.) She has had no pain or bleeding during the
incidents.

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The nurse reported no physical findings. (Doc. 40-1 at 50–52)
An analyst found no semen on the swabs of the victim’s mouth, vagina, and nipple
and the cutting from her underpants. (Doc. 40-1 at 37) A DNA analyst obtained a mixed
DNA profile belonging to at least two individuals from the victim’s underpants. (Doc. 40-1
at 38, 40) The results were “insufficient for inclusion purposes” but were “suitable for
exclusionary purposes.” (Doc. 40-1 at 40) The DNA analyst attempted to compare
Rahman’s DNA with the mixed DNA profile from the victim’s underpants but concluded
(Doc. 40-1 at 42): “No determination can be made regarding the possible contribution of
Rockford Rahman to the foreign DNA results obtained from the cutting [of] the
underpants.”
“[C]onsider[ing] all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory,
without regard to whether it would necessarily be admitted under rules of admissibility that
would govern at trial,” Rahman fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found him guilty. Rozzelle, 672 F.3d at 1017 (citation and
internal quotations omitted). Even if Rahman felt distraught and deprived of sleep, he
confessed to licking the victim’s breasts, licking her vagina, and touching her vagina. (Docs.
39-2 at 2 and 43-2 at 7) Rahman’s confession corroborated the victim’s accusations. (Doc.
40-1 at 49) Rahman contends that a neighbor, who had a similar build and features as
Rahman and engaged in an affair with Rahman’s wife, committed the crimes. (Doc. 40-1 at
6–7) However, Rahman fails to support his contention with new reliable evidence. Schlup,
513 U.S. at 324.
The absence of DNA evidence does not exonerate Rahman. The victim reported that
Rahman regularly penetrated her vagina with his finger and placed his mouth on her vagina

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but did not remember whether Rahman “put his mouth ‘down there’” the evening that she
reported the crimes. (Doc. 40-1 at 49) Consequently, the absence of DNA on the swab of
the victim’s vagina does not exonerate Rahman. Also, Rahman confessed that he placed his
mouth on the victim’s chest that evening. (Doc. 43-2 at 7) Rahman presents no new evidence
that demonstrates with any certainty that his DNA would have remained on the victim after
he licked her chest. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.
The inconsistent statements by Rahman’s wife concerning her observation of
Rahman touching the victim inappropriately in the victim’s bed versus learning of the
incident from her daughter and the neighbor’s observation of the victim acting affectionately
toward Rahman do not demonstrate actual innocence. Rahman speculates that “[a]ny child
psychologist who specializes in child sex abuse will testify that [the behavior observed by
the neighbor] is not the normal behavior of a sexually abused victim.” (Doc. 40 at 9)
Rahman fails to present an affidavit by a child psychologist to substantiate this contention.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Also, a juror may believe or disbelieve a witness who suffers
impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. Pearce v. State, 880 So. 2d 561, 569 (Fla.
2004) (“[I]ntroduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness’s present
testimony is [ ] one of the main ways to attack the credibility of a witness.”). Even if the jury
disbelieved Rahman’s wife, a rational juror could rely on the victim’s testimony,
corroborated by Rahman’s detailed confession, to find Rahman guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rozzelle, 672 F.3d at 1017.
Because Rahman fails to demonstrate that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him in light of new reliable evidence, actual innocence does not excuse the time bar.

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Accordingly, Rahman’s petition (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED as time barred. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to enter a judgment against Rahman and CLOSE this case.
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Because Rahman neither makes a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right nor demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the
merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues that he seeks to raise, a certificate
of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on January 30, 2024.

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