Brown v. Wischer et al

Filing 3

ORDER dismissing 1 --complaint without prejudice to Brown's filing a new action if he succeeds in vacating his conviction; directing the clerk to ENTER JUDGMENT of dismissal against Brown and to CLOSE the case. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 12/8/2017. (BK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ANTWUAN BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:17-cv-2906-T-23MAP

SHERIFF DAVID GEE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
Brown’s complaint alleges that the defendants violated his civil rights “through
coercion of a confession based on the false promised benefits of leniency.” (Doc. 1 at
5) Brown neither moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis nor paid the full $400
filing fee. Nevertheless, under either 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (if proceeding in forma
pauperis) or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (if the full filing fee is paid), a district court is required
both to review the complaint and to dismiss the complaint if frivolous, malicious, or
failing to state a claim upon “which relief may be granted.” Although the complaint
is entitled to a generous interpretation, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per
curiam), this pro se complaint lacks merit under this standard.
Brown represents that November 14, 2013, he was arrested and charged with
three counts of sexual battery on a child over twelve but under eighteen.* Brown

*

Brown dated his complaint November 13, 2017, which is one day before the four-year
statute of limitation expired.

alleges that the defendant police officers promised him a four-part deal if he would
confess:
To overcome the Plaintiff’s free will the defendants promised
the Plaintiff Antwaun Brown a four part deal which was (1) the
deal not to prosecute him and release him if he admitted to the
sexual assault of the child and enroll into a sexual abuse
treatment center. (2) To enroll into a alcohol treatment
program. (3) To call the victim’s mother and confess to having
an affair with her daughter and submit to a DNA test. (4) To
have no contact with the victim and no other minors without
their parents being present.

Brown alleges that he fulfilled his part of the agreement but, after he confessed to the
victim’s mother, the defendants nevertheless arrested and charged him for the sexual
batteries.
According to the website for the Florida Department of Corrections, Brown is
imprisoned under the three sexual battery convictions. Brown’s allegations directly
challenge the voluntariness of his confession and, as a consequence, the validity of
the convictions. Under Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973), if a state
prisoner challenges the fact or duration of confinement, a writ of habeas corpus is the
exclusive federal remedy. Additionally, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87
(1994), precludes Brown from challenging the validity of either the conviction or the
sentence (including a fine or penalty) by a civil rights action instead of an application
for the writ of habeas corpus:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for [an] allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
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tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state
prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already
been invalidated.

Heck requires dismissal of a civil rights complaint if a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor
questions the validity of the conviction or sentence. Brown has no Section 1983
claim unless he prevails on habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages
attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the
conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 489–90.
Consequently, Brown fails to state a claim for relief that he can pursue in a
civil rights action because the complaint fails to allege that the conviction was
“reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487.
As a consequence, Brown fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Amendment of the action would prove futile because Brown can state no
valid Section 1983 claim for relief. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th
Cir. 2001) (“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment (1) where there
has been undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, or repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed; (2) where allowing amendment
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would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party; or (3) where amendment would
be futile.”).
Accordingly, the civil rights complaint is DISMISSED. This dismissal is
without prejudice to Brown’s filing a new Section 1983 action if he succeeds in
vacating the conviction. The clerk must enter a judgment of dismissal against Brown
and close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on December 8, 2017.

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