Bayuk v. Prisiajniouk
Filing
54
ORDER denying 37 Plaintiff's Motion for summary judgment; granting 40 Defendant's Motion for summary judgment; denying 52 Defendant's Motion to Strike. Signed by Magistrate Judge Sean P. Flynn on 9/26/2019. (NCR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
KATERYNA BAYUK,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:18-cv-00163-T-SPF
JOANNA PRISIAJNIOUK,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court upon Kateryna Bayuk’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for
Summary Judgment on Count II of the Complaint (“Plaintiff’s Motion”) (Doc. 37),
Joanna Prisiajniouk’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I, II, and
III of the Complaint (“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment”) (Doc. 40), and
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaim (“Motion to
Strike”) (Doc. 52). 1 Upon consideration, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to Strike is
DENIED.
1
Defendant seeks to strike Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 49) to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 40), rather than—as its title suggests—Plaintiff’s response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaim (Doc. 48).
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a family dispute between Plaintiff (stepmother) and
Defendant (stepdaughter) over a Certificate of Deposit issued by the Discover Bank (the
“Discover CD”), a Delaware bank, and funded by Orest Bayuk (“Bayuk”), Plaintiff’s
spouse and Defendant’s father. On August 19, 2016, Bayuk renewed the Discover CD
Account ending in 4133 with a balance of $164,696.99 (Doc. 37 at 9). The Discover Bank
operates as an online bank with its only branch office located in Delaware (Doc. 23 at 6).
At some point in October 2016, Bayuk added both Plaintiff and Defendant as joint owners
to the Discover CD, but neither Plaintiff nor Defendant contributed anything to the
account (Doc. 39 at 10–11) (Doc. 37 at 1–2). Defendant disputes the fact that Plaintiff
was properly added as a joint owner to the Discover CD because, according to Defendant,
there is no evidence that Plaintiff signed the account agreement (Doc. 39 at 11). However,
in October 2016, Discover Bank issued a letter to Bayuk confirming that he had
successfully updated the account to add Plaintiff as a joint owner (Doc. 11-8).
It is undisputed that the terms and conditions of the Discover CD were governed
by the Deposit Account Agreement (the “Discover CD Agreement”) (Doc. 37 at 27–49).
The Discover CD Agreement is governed by Delaware law (Id. at 28). As to the nature
and rights of the joint tenants over the CD account, Section 6(b) of the Discover CD
Agreement provides in relevant part:
•
•
A Joint Account is an Account held by more than one natural person. All
Joint Accounts are established as joint tenancy with right of survivorship
only.
Any funds deposited to a Joint Account by any of its owners shall be owned
by all joint owners.
2
•
•
•
•
Each owner of a Joint Account may . . . make withdrawals . . . with respect
to the Joint Account without notice to or consent from any of the other
owners of the Joint Account.
The Joint Account may be closed by either joint owner. However, a joint
owner may not remove another joint owner from the Joint Account.
Any action of one owner of a Joint Account shall be binding upon all
owners of a Joint Account.
[The Bank] may act upon the direction of one or more owners of the Joint
Account without notice to or consent from any of the other owners of the
Joint Account.
Id. at 31–32. On January 15, 2017, shortly after Plaintiff and Defendant were added to
the CD account, Bayuk was involved in an accident and died (Doc. 37 at 2). On February
2, 2017, Defendant withdrew the entire balance of the Discover CD without Plaintiff’s
authorization (Id.).
On October 27, 2017, Plaintiff sued Defendant for civil theft,
conversion, and unjust enrichment in state court (Doc. 2).
On January 19, 2018,
Defendant removed the case to this Court and filed an answer to the Complaint and a
Counterclaim against Plaintiff (Docs. 1 & 25). The parties then filed cross-motions for
summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Docs. 37 & 40). The parties’ motions are
ripe for consideration of the Court.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate if all the pleadings, discovery, affidavits, and
disclosure materials on file show that there is no genuine disputed issue of material fact,
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and
(c). The existence of some factual disputes between the litigants will not defeat an
otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion; “the requirement is that there
be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48
3
(1986) (emphasis in original). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A
dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could decide an issue of material fact for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
In determining whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the court must read the
evidence and draw all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and must resolve any reasonable doubts in the non-movant's favor. Skop v. City of
Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007).
The non-moving party, however, “must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, the non-movant must go beyond the
pleadings and “identify affirmative evidence” which creates a genuine dispute of material
fact. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998).
“[M]ere conclusions and
unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald
Mtn. Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 836 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir.1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere
‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must
be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v.
Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).
4
I.
Choice of Law
It is first necessary to determine the applicable law to Plaintiff’s claims. As here,
when a court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship (Docs. 7 and 18), the court
“must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state to determine which substantive law
governs the action.” Perez v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 587 F. App’x. 603, 606 (11th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation omitted). Under Florida law, a court makes a separate choice
of law determination as to each claim under consideration. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has
articulated the following step-by-step analysis for choice of law issues:
The first step in [a] choice of law analysis is to ascertain the nature of the
problem involved, i.e., is the specific issue at hand a problem of law of
contracts, torts, property, etc. The second step is to determine what choice of
law rule the state . . . applies to that type of legal issue. The third step is to
apply the proper choice of law rule to the instant facts and thereby conclude
which [jurisdiction’s] substantive law applies.
Garcia v. Public Health Trust, 841 F.2d 1062, 1064 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Acme Circus
Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1983)). Plaintiff’s Complaint
alleges three causes of action against Defendant—civil theft, conversion, and unjust
enrichment. Plaintiff’s first two causes of action involve tort claims. The third cause of
action sounds in contract.
A. Tort Claims
Florida law utilizes the “most significant relationship” test to resolve choice of law
questions for tort claims. Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d
1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Florida follows the approach set forth in
Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Id. (citing Garcia, 841 F.2d
at 1064–65 (11th Cir.1988)). According to the Restatement, “[t]he rights and liability of
5
the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state
which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties.” Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). Contacts to be
taken into account include: “(a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship,
if any, between the parties is centered.” Id.
At the center of Plaintiff’s claims for conversion and civil theft is her claim that she
was deprived of her property rights over fifty percent of the proceeds of the Discover CD
jointly held with Defendant. In other words, Plaintiff is alleging a pecuniary injury. A
pecuniary injury occurs in the place where its effects are felt. See Innovative Strategic
Commun., LLC v. Viropharma, Inc., No. 8:11-CV-1838-T-33TBM, 2012 WL 3156587, at *4
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2012) (citing Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 145, cmt. F and
Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Comm. Grp., Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir.2007)).
Plaintiff is domiciled in Florida, therefore, the place where the alleged injury occurred is
Florida. Normally, the state where the injury occurred is the “decisive consideration in
determining the applicable choice of law.” Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999,
1001 (Fla. 1980). However, “when the injury is purely financial,” as in this case, the place
of injury “is not due dispositive weight.” Valentino v. Bond, No. 3:06CV504/MCR, 2008
WL 3889603, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2008).
In this case, the other factors combine to outweigh the place of injury. See Brown
v. Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc., 707 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The state where the
6
injury occurred may have little actual significance for the cause of action” because “[o]ther
factors may combine to outweigh the place of injury as a controlling consideration”). The
conduct that led to the injury—closing the account and withdrawing the funds—occurred
in Delaware where the funds were located (Doc. 37 at 28). Therefore, the second factor
weighs in favor of Delaware. The third factor, however, is neutral because Defendant is
a resident of Illinois and Plaintiff a resident of Florida. Further, and more important in
the Court’s view, the parties’ relationship centered around Delaware.
The parties’
relationship was created by the Discover CD Agreement, which was governed by
Delaware law (Doc. 37 at 28). The Discover CD Agreement lists only one Discover
branch office in Delaware, which leads to the conclusion that the Discover CD was
located in Delaware. 2 After balancing the factors to be considered, the Court concludes
that Delaware is the state with the most significant relationship to Plaintiff’s claims.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s tort claims will be analyzed under the applicable Delaware law.
B. Quasi-Contract Claim
Plaintiff’s Complaint also involves an alternative count for unjust enrichment. “A
claim for unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract, not tort.” ThunderWave, Inc. v.
Carnival Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1562, 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Florida law applies the lex loci
Plaintiff alleged that she and Bayuk visited a Discover branch located in Florida to open
the account; however, Plaintiff fails to support her allegation with any affirmative
evidence, and the documental evidence contradicts such statement. See Crawford-El, 523
U.S. at 600 (holding that the non-movant must “identify affirmative evidence” which
creates a genuine dispute of material fact). Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that the funds
were deposited in a Discover branch in Florida is an unsupported factual allegation that
is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326
(holding that “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally
insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion”).
2
7
contractus rule when determining the governing law applicable to unjust enrichment
claims. Trumpet Vine Invs., N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d 1110, 1119 (11th
Cir. 1996); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Weaver Aggregate Transport, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1317,
1324 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The lex loci contractus rule looks to the place the contract was
executed. Lanoue v. Rizk, 987 So.2d 724, 727 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). However, if a contract
contains a choice of law provision, which does not violative Florida public policy, the
Court must give deference to the parties’ choice of law. Gillen v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n,
300 So.2d 3, 6–7 (Fla. 1974); Muniz v. GCA Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 3:05-cv-172-J-33MMH,
2006 WL 2130735, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 28, 2006).
As previously discussed, the Discover CD is governed by the Discover CD
Agreement. The Discover CD Agreement provides in relevant part, “[e]xcept where
noted your Account and this Agreement are governed by Delaware and Federal law. If
Delaware and Federal law are inconsistent, or if Delaware law is preempted by Federal
law then Federal law governs.” (Doc. 39-6 at 3). Neither party asserts that the choice of
law clause in the Discover CD Agreement violates Florida public policy. Therefore, the
Court must look to the choice of law clause in deciding what law to apply to Plaintiff’s
unjust enrichment claim.
Plaintiff argues that federal common law, not Delaware law, governs the Discover
CD agreement. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court decision in U.S. v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002), is the controlling law in this case (Doc. 49 at 5). 3 In Craft, the
3
The Court notes that Plaintiff’s argument was raised for the first time in her
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
which was filed three months after the filing deadline (See Docs. 49 and 40). On June 28,
8
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Internal Revenue Service could attach
a lien over real property owned by a husband and his wife by the entireties in Michigan.
Craft, 535 U.S. at 276. In reaching its decision that the husband’s interest in the property
constituted property for purpose of the federal tax lien statute, the Supreme Court first
looked to state law to determine the property rights of the husband, and then to federal
law to determine whether the husband’s “state-delineated rights qualify as ‘property’ or
‘right to property’ within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation.” Id. at 278. In
other words, the Supreme Court did not create federal common law over property rights
as suggested by Plaintiff. Because the Court finds no support for the Plaintiff’s claim that
federal common law, rather than Delaware law, governs the Discover CD Agreement,
Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim will be analyzed under Delaware law.
II.
Conversion and Civil Theft Claims
Under Delaware law, “[c]onversion is an act of dominion wrongfully exerted over
the property of another, in denial of his right, or inconsistent with it.” Arnold v. Society for
Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 536 (Del. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). 4 It is
undisputed that Defendant took the proceeds of the Discover CD despite Plaintiff’s claim
over half of the proceeds. Plaintiff’s conversion claim turns on whether Plaintiff retained
ownership of the Discover CD proceeds. See Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, L.L.C., 971 A.2d
2019, Defendant filed her Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s response (Doc. 52). In light of the
Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s response in reaching its summary judgment decision,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike is denied.
4
Plaintiff fails to establish that Delaware recognizes a cause of action for civil theft that
is in addition to, and materially different from, a claim for conversion.
9
872, 890 (Del. Ch. 2009) (stating that to establish a claim for conversion a plaintiff must
show she had a right to the claimed property).
Plaintiff argues that once the account was closed, she was entitled to fifty percent
of the Discover CD proceeds. To establish her ownership over half of the Discover CD
proceeds, Plaintiff relies on Banks v. Banks, 135 A.3d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 2016), for the
proposition that under Delaware law a joint tenant owned an undivided proportional
interest over the property for purposes of “alienation and forfeiture” (Doc. 37 at 5). In
Banks, the court was confronted with the issue of whether the language in a deed
conveying property to two brothers “as joint tenants with right of survivorship” was
sufficient to create a joint tenancy under the Delaware statutory provisions regulating joint
tenancy in land. Banks, 135 A.3d at 317. In reaching its decision, the court provided a
historical analysis of the development of the presumption against the creation of joint
tenancies in real property and the enactment of the statute containing the presumption.
The court stated that “under a joint tenancy [with right of survivorship], property is held
jointly by two or more persons, each ‘regarded as the tenant of the whole for purposes of
tenure and survivorship, while for purposes of alienation and forfeiture each has an
undivided share only.” Id. Relying on this section of the court’s opinion, Plaintiff argues
that by withdrawing and disposing of the Discover CD proceeds, Defendant alienated the
account, and consequently, both parties were entitled to fifty percent of the Discover CD
proceeds. Plaintiff’s reliance on Banks is misplaced. Banks addressed the rights of joint
tenants over real property rather than bank accounts. In fact, the court’s analysis focused
on the interpretation of Title 25, Section 701 of the Delaware Code, which specifically
10
regulates the creation of a joint tenancy, “in lands, tenements or hereditaments,” not bank
accounts. Del. Code Ann. tit. 25, § 701.
The Delaware statutes regulating banking, on the other hand, state that “[w]hen a
deposit in any bank, trust company, savings bank or other banking institution in this State,
is made in the name of 2 or more persons, deliverable or payable to either, or to their
survivor or survivors, the deposit, or any part thereof, of the increase thereof, may be
delivered or paid to either of the persons, or to the survivor or survivors, in due course of
business.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 923. Moreover, it is generally understood that under
Delaware law the terms of a bank account agreement control the disposition of funds if
the agreement language is clear and unambiguous. See In re Barnes, No. 107338, 1998 WL
326674, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 18, 1998) (“where the instrument creating the joint [bank]
account clearly reflects the intent of the parties with respect to the disposition of the
proceeds upon the death of one . . . courts have no discretion to inquire further to show
whether the language ought to have been different or should be interpreted to mean
something other than what it actually says.”). Therefore, Banks is not applicable to this
case.
Unlike Banks, the Delaware Chancery Court in Mack v. Mack, addressed the rights
of joint tenants over bank account proceeds. No. CV 4240VCN, 2013 WL 3286245, at *1
(Del. Ch. Jun. 28, 2013) (“Mack I”). In Mack I, a mother brought a claim for conversion
and unjust enrichment against her daughter, arguing that her daughter improperly
converted the funds held in a joint bank account titled under both their names. The
mother argued that the account was created for her benefit and that the daughter’s name
11
was added to the account just in case of emergencies. The daughter, on the other hand,
argued that as a joint tenant and under the terms of the signature card agreement she was
fully entitled to make withdrawals from the account.
The court denied the daughter’s motion for summary judgment noting that even if
the daughter had legal title to the funds, a question of fact remained as to whether the
daughter was able to use the funds. Id. at *3. The court stated that when an account
agreement is silent as to post-withdrawal ownership rights, the question of legal titled is
left to the law. The court then identified two approaches to the issue of post-withdrawal
ownership rights. Under the first one, “the drawer on a joint account becomes the sole
owner of the funds,” under the second, and due to the “unique nature of joint bank
accounts, . . . [the] ownership of the funds is . . . determined by the parties’ intent,
notwithstanding the creation of a joint tenancy.” Id. at *2. Applying the latter approach,
the court found that despite the daughter’s entitlement to the property, the mother had
proffered enough evidence to show that she told her daughter that her name was on the
account for emergency purposes only. In other words, the daughter was on the account
solely for the mother’s convenience. Therefore, the court concluded that the mother had
raised a question of fact as to whether a supervening understanding or agreement existed
regarding the disposition of the funds. Id. at *3.
After a non-jury trial, the court issued a second opinion in the case. Mack v. Mack,
No. CV 4240VCN, 2014 WL 6734856, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 28, 2014) (“Mack II”). In this
opinion, the court clarified that in the absence of an express agreement limiting the
daughter’s use of the funds, the daughter’s right to the withdrawn funds was governed by
12
the signature card agreement. Id. at *2. 5 Because the signature card agreement permitted
either joint tenant to withdraw the funds, the court concluded that, although morally
reproachable, the daughter was entitled to retain the funds. Id. In reaching its conclusion,
the court identified the result of the case as one of the risks associated with the use of a
joint account without an express agreement regulating the disposition of the funds
between the parties. Id. at *3. The mother moved for reargument and the court issued a
third opinion denying the mother’s motion. The court stated:
It is the nature of a joint account that either party can acquire the whole
account either by withdrawing it during the lifetime of the co-owners or by
survivorship . . . . With the right to withdraw comes the right to use the funds unless
there is some other limitation. It is not Daughter’s responsibility to prove that she
was entitled to use the funds; it is the Mother’s burden to prove that there were
enforceable restrictions on Daughter’s ability to use the funds, and such
limitations were not proven.
Mack v. Mack, No. CV 4240-VCN, 2015 WL 1607797, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2015)
(internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added) (“Mack III”).
In the instant case, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was not authorized to withdraw
more than fifty percent of the funds by virtue of Plaintiff’s joint ownership of the account
(Doc. 37 at 6–7). This proposition stands in direct contradiction to the terms of the
5
The terms of signature card agreement provided in relevant part as follows:
JOINT ACCOUNT–PAYABLE TO EITHER OR SURVIVOR
It is agreed and understood that any and all sums that may from time to time
stand on this account, to the credit of the undersigned depositors, shall be taken
and deemed to belong to them as joint tenants and not as tenants in common:
while both joint tenants are living, either may draw and in case of the death of
either, this Bank is hereby authorized and directed to deal with the survivor as
sole and absolute owner thereof.
Id.
13
Discover CD Agreement. As in Mack, the language of the Discover CD Agreement clearly
and unambiguously provides that either owner of a joint account may withdraw any funds
and close the account (Doc. 37 at 32).
Plaintiff argues that Mack is inapposite to her case because the terms of the
Discover CD Agreement are different from the terms of the agreement discussed in Mack.
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that according to the Discover CD Agreement, once Bayuk
died, the balance in the account passed to Plaintiff and Defendant in equal shares. In
other words, Plaintiff appears to argue that once Bayuk died, Plaintiff and Defendant
owned the account as tenants in common, rather than as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.
The Discover CD Agreement, however, provides in relevant part:
A Joint Account is an Account held by more than one natural person. All Joint
Accounts are established as joint tenancy with right of survivorship only. Joint
with right of survivorship means that if an owner of a Joint Account dies, the
balance in the Joint Account passes to the remaining owner(s) of the Joint Account. We
do not offer any other type of joint account (i.e., tenants in common or tenants
by the entirety).
(Doc. 37 at 31, Section 6(b)) (emphasis added). Nothing in the language of the Discover
CD Agreement suggests that upon the death of one of the joint tenants, the nature of the
account or the type of ownership over the account changes. To the contrary, the Discover
CD Agreement is clear that no other form of ownership—tenants in common or tenants
by the entirety—is offered by the bank. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s interpretation of
the Discover CD Agreement is contrary to its plain language.
Plaintiff also argues that summary judgment should be denied because questions
of fact remain as to the intent of the parties regarding the disposition of the CD proceeds.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that by adding Defendant as an owner to the Discover CD,
14
neither she nor Bayuk intended to create a “winner-take-all race to the bank” as proposed
by Defendant (Doc. 49 at 8). To support her argument, Plaintiff points to the denial of
summary judgment in Mack.
Unlike the plaintiff in Mack I, however, Plaintiff has
provided no evidence to raise an issue of fact as to the existence of a supervening
agreement regulating the disposition of the funds. In fact, Plaintiff was not involved in
Bayuk’s decision to add Defendant as a joint owner of the account. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
argument is unsubstantiated and insufficient to defeat summary judgment in this case. See
Ellis, 432 F.3d at 1326 (holding that “mere conclusions and unsupported factual
allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion”). In summary,
the Court finds that Defendant exercised rightful dominion over her own property.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
as to the conversion and civil theft claims is granted.
III.
Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment under Delaware Law is “the unjust retention of a benefit to the
loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice or equity and good conscience.” Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1130
(Del. 2010) (citations omitted). To establish a claim for unjust enrichment Plaintiff must
prove: (1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a relation between the enrichment
and impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification, and (5) the absence of a remedy
provided by law.” Id.
15
The undisputed facts in this case show that Defendant took the proceeds of the
Discover CD, Plaintiff is unable to dispose of the proceeds, and that Plaintiff’s inability to
the dispose of the funds is the result of Defendant’s actions. Therefore, the elements of
enrichment, impoverishment, and a relation between the enrichment and impoverishment
are established. The next element of Plaintiff’s cause of action requires the Court to
determine whether Defendant’s conduct was justified. By the terms of the Discover CD
Agreement, Defendant, as a joint tenant, was entitled to withdraw the funds from the
account and close the account. In the absence of a supervening agreement regulating
Defendant’s ability to dispose of the funds, the Court finds that Defendant was legally
justified in withdrawing the funds. Mack III, 2015 WL 1607797, at *2. As a result,
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as to the unjust enrichment claim.
CONCLUSION
Upon due consideration of the parties’ arguments and briefs, the undersigned finds
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law as to Plaintiff’s claims (Count I, II, and III). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37) is DENIED;
2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40) is GRANTED.
16
3. Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant’s
Counterclaim (Doc. 52) is DENIED.
ORDERED, in Tampa, Florida, on September 26, 2019.
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?