Thornton v. Chronister et al
ORDER: Defendant the Florida State Fair Authority's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 13 ) is GRANTED. Count III is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the State Fair Authority is terminated as a party to this action. Defendant Sheriff Chad Chronister 9;s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 17 ) is GRANTED. Count I, for negligence, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Count VIII under, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant Deputies Henry Echenique, Mark Clark, Stephen Jones, and Adrian C hester's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 16 ) is GRANTED. Counts IV to VII, for negligence, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Counts IX to XII, under § 1983, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff Yvonne Thornton may file an amended complaint by April 25, 2018. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 4/10/2018. (DMD)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
YVONNE THORNTON, as Guardian
and Natural Parent of C.T.,
Case No.: 8:18-cv-260-T-33MAP
CHAD CHRONISTER, in his
official capacity as Sheriff
of Hillsborough County, Florida,
Dismiss (Doc. # 13), Sheriff Chad Chronister’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. # 17), and Deputies Henry Echenique, Mark Clark,
Stephen Jones, and Adrian Chester’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
# 16), filed on February 23 and March 6, 2018. Plaintiff
Yvonne Thornton, as guardian and natural parent of C.T., a
minor, responded on March 30, 2018. (Doc. ## 45-46, 48). The
Motions are granted as set forth herein.
For many years, “students of Hillsborough County schools
have been given a day off from school and provided with free
admission to an event current[ly] known as ‘Student Day’ at
the Florida State Fairgrounds.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 17). On
February 7, 2014, C.T., the minor son of Thornton, attended
Student Day with his friend Andrew Joseph III. (Id. at ¶ 42).
security for Student Day. (Id. at ¶ 19). Sheriff Chronister
was “aware based on the large number of juveniles expected to
attend, that specific definitions and standards of conduct
needed to be established so that deputies and other security
prohibited.” (Id. at ¶ 23). He “was further aware and on
notice due to the large numbers of juveniles expected to
attend and due to  past experiences in previous years’
Student Day events, that specific, uniform procedures needed
to be established for the 2014 Student Day for the deputies
to employ in the process of conducting arrests, detentions,
ejectments and trespasses of juveniles.” (Id. at ¶ 24).
Despite that knowledge, deputies were simply advised “to
be alert for ‘unruly’ behavior” and “that they had the option,
at their discretion, to eject or trespass students if the
deputies felt it was warranted in his or her individual
Around eight that night, C.T. “was detained and placed in
custody by [Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office] deputies
justification.” (Id. at ¶ 43). “At the time of his de facto
arrest, C.T.  was not disorderly, was in violation of no
law, and was not smoking or drinking alcohol or using any
other intoxicant.” (Id. at ¶ 44).
C.T. “was then taken into custody and was then taken or
transported by deputies to the processing area.” (Id. at ¶
46). At no point during his detention, transport, or ejection
were C.T.’s parents notified and C.T. “was given no assistance
Unfortunately, C.T. had been relying on Andrew’s cell phone,
which was either taken away or broken. (Id. at ¶ 46). And,
“[o]nce  student detainees [like C.T.] had been transported
to the processing area by whatever means, they were dropped
off there and the deputies returned to the Fairgrounds.” (Id.
at ¶ 36). “Deputies who escorted students to the temporary
release” — instead deputies were free to leave after filling
out paperwork for their detainees. (Id. at ¶ 37). Furthermore,
“the temporary processing area was understaffed and unable to
efficiently process the student detainees brought there by
deputies from the event.” (Id. at ¶ 39).
Like other minors to be ejected but not arrested, C.T.
and Andrew were transported after processing to Gate 4 where
they were “simply shown to the door and told to exit the
facility.” (Id. at ¶¶ 47-48). Gate 4 is a gate adjacent to
the busy Interstate 4, and was not the gate at which C.T. and
Andrew had been dropped off or were scheduled to be picked
up. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-28, 49). “[B]ecause of fencing and other
barriers on and around the Fairgrounds, there was no clear
path or area that could be safely traversed on foot from
outside Gate 4 back to the US [Highway] 301 side” — where
C.T. and Andrew, like most other attendees, had been dropped
off and entered the fair. (Id. at ¶ 28). “The only direct
route, as well as the safest route to return to the parking
lots and adjacent entrance Gates from outside Gate 4 was to
return into the Fair through Gate 4 and walk east back through
the Fair itself.” (Id.). Making matters worse, “[v]ehicular
access from outside the Fairgrounds to that portion of the
prohibited that night,” so the boys could not be picked up at
Gate 4. (Id. at ¶ 50).
At first, C.T. and Andrew waited around the area outside
of Gate 4, but “a deputy in a patrol car drove up and told
the boys that they could not stay where they were.” (Id. at
¶ 51). In the hope of getting back to the gate at which they
would be picked up, C.T. and Andrew asked the deputy at Gate
4 to let them travel back through the fair or to give them a
ride to the gate they needed. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53). The deputy
refused the request, but gave C.T. and Andrew directions on
how to walk back to the gate they needed on the other side of
the fairgrounds. (Id. at ¶¶ 52-53, 54). The route the deputy
described would cover 2 to 3 miles and required the boys to
cross Interstate 4, “then walk in an easterly direction
generally following the direction of I-4 until they reached
U.S. [Hihgway] 301, at which point they could head south
following 301 back to the entrance area of the Fairgrounds.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 54-55).
Feeling out of options, C.T. and Andrew took the deputy’s
advice. They crossed Interstate 4 and walked towards the
entrance gates of the Fairgrounds. (Id. at ¶ 56). When C.T.
and Andrew attempted to cross
Fairgrounds, “Andrew was struck and killed by a passing
motorist,” as twelve-year-old C.T. watched. (Id. at ¶ 57). As
a result, Thornton alleges C.T. suffered the “infliction of
emotional distress” as well as “pain and suffering.” (Id. at
January 31, 2018, asserting negligence claims against the
Hillsborough County School Board, the Florida State Fair
Authority, Sheriff Chronister, and four Defendant Deputies,
as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Defendant
Deputies and Sheriff Chronister. (Doc. # 1). Thornton alleges
insufficient policies or lack thereof regarding the detention
and ejectment of minors, C.T. was “improperly detained, taken
into custody and transported off the Fairgrounds property to
a location in the immediate vicinity of Interstate 4,” where
C.T. watched his friend be struck and killed by a motorist.
(Id. at ¶ 138).
Each Defendant moved to dismiss. (Doc. ## 13-14, 16-17).
against the Hillsborough County School Board. (Doc. # 47).
Thornton responded in opposition to the Motions from the State
Defendants. (Doc. ## 45-46, 48). The Motions are ripe for
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this
Court accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint
plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,
plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). The Court must limit its
consideration to well-pleaded factual allegations, documents
judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358
F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Court will address each Defendant’s arguments in
The State Fair Authority
The State Fair Authority argues that the sole claim
against it, Count III for negligence, should be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to give the statutorily-required
notice of intent to sue. (Doc. # 13).
[Florida’s waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims], a
claimant must provide written notice of any claim before
filing suit.” Doe v. G-Star Sch. of the Arts, Inc., No. 16CV-80446, 2016 WL 4625625, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2016).
Section 768.28(6)(a) states:
An action may not be instituted on a claim against
the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions
unless the claimant presents the claim in writing
to the appropriate agency, and also, except as to
any claim against a municipality, county, or the
Florida Space Authority, presents such claim in
writing to the Department of Financial Services,
within 3 years after such claim accrues and the
Department of Financial Services or the appropriate
agency denies the claim in writing; except that,
1. Such claim is for contribution pursuant to
s. 768.31, it must be so presented within 6 months
after the judgment against the tortfeasor seeking
contribution has become final by lapse of time for
appeal or after appellate review or, if there is no
such judgment, within 6 months after the tortfeasor
seeking contribution has either discharged the
common liability by payment or agreed, while the
action is pending against her or him, to discharge
the common liability; or
2. Such action is for wrongful death, the
claimant must present the claim in writing to the
Department of Financial Services within 2 years
after the claim accrues.
Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a)(emphasis added). Furthermore, these
statutorily-required notices are “conditions precedent to
maintaining an action.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(b). Strict
compliance with Section 768.28(6) is required. Rumler v.
Dep’t of Corrs., 546 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
Here, the negligence claim accrued on February 7, 2014—
the day C.T. attended Student Day. The State Fair Authority
notes that Thornton did not send it a notice of intent to sue
until January 22, 2018 — after the three-year deadline. (Doc.
# 13 at 4, 7-10). Thus, the State Fair Authority argues Count
III must be dismissed with prejudice because Thornton cannot
cure the late notice. (Doc. # 13 at 4).
notice of intent to sue was given to the State Fair Authority
in December of 2014. (Doc. # 46 at 2). Yet, a review of the
notice attached to Thornton’s response reveals that it was
not sent by Thornton regarding Thornton’s claims. (Doc. # 461). Rather, the notice was sent by the friend Andrew Joseph’s
estate to the State Fair Authority. Although the notice
generally says it is notifying the State Fair Authority of
“any and all other available causes of action arising from
the death of Andrew Joseph III,” the notice states that it is
alerting the State Fair Authority “of the intent of the Estate
of Andrew Joseph, III, to file a tort claims action.” (Id.).
Thornton is not mentioned as a claimant, nor are her specific
claims related to C.T. Section 768.28(6)(a) requires that
appropriate state agency. Thus, Thornton was required to
present her claim to the State Fair Authority. She cannot
piggy-back on the timely notice sent by a different claimant
regarding different claims.
Next, Thornton argues that the three-year time limit to
give notice does not apply to her claim. Rather, she argues
the exception for contribution claims applies because she is
suing multiple Defendants as joint tortfeasors. (Doc. # 46 at
3-4). Thornton misunderstands the statute. There is a sixmonth deadline for a joint tortfeasor to bring a claim for
contribution against the state agency tortfeasor “after the
judgement against the tortfeasor seeking contribution has
become final.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6)(a). Here, there is no
contribution from the State Fair Authority. Rather, Thornton
is a claimant seeking damages for negligence from the State
Fair Authority — a fact unchanged by the existence of multiple
other Defendants. Thus, she had to give notice of her intent
to sue to the State Fair Authority and the Florida Department
of Financial Services within three years after the accrual of
the claim. The negligence claim accrued on February 7, 2014,
so Thornton had until February 8, 2017, to give notice. She
failed to do so.
Authority that Thornton’s negligence claim against it must be
dismissed. See Tozier v. City of Temple Terrace, No. 8:10cv-2750-T-33EAJ, 2011 WL 3961816, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 8,
2011)(“As Tozier failed to comply within the statutorily
prescribed noticing period, which is a condition precedent to
trespass/invasion, and assault/battery against Defendant City
of Temple Terrace, Tozier is precluded from filing this suit
as to these state torts against the City of Temple Terrace or
any of the officers in their official capacities.”).
“Generally, an action pursued without first satisfying
the statutory notice provision must be dismissed without
prejudice, so that plaintiff may amend his complaint to comply
with the requirement.” Doe, 2016 WL 4625625, at *4. “However,
where the time for notice has expired and it is evident that
the plaintiff cannot fulfill the requirement, a dismissal
with prejudice is warranted.” Id.; see also Levine v. Dade
Cty. Sch. Bd., 442 So. 2d 210, 213 (Fla. 1983)(“Where the
time for such notice has expired so that it is apparent that
the plaintiff cannot fulfill the requirement, the trial court
prejudice.”). Here, the time to give notice has expired such
Therefore, Count III is dismissed with prejudice.
Thornton asserts a claim for negligence and a claim under
§ 1983 against Sheriff Chronister. Sheriff Chronister argues
that Count I for negligence should be dismissed with prejudice
for lack of notice. (Doc. # 17 at 4-7). Just as she did for
the State Fair Authority, Thornton sent Sheriff Chronister
the Section 768.28 notice on January 22, 2018. (Doc. # 171). Thus, Thornton sent the notice over three years after the
negligence claim accrued on February 7, 2014. Accordingly,
Count I for negligence is dismissed with prejudice. See Doe,
2016 WL 4625625, at *4 (“[W]here the time for notice has
expired and it is evident that the plaintiff cannot fulfill
the requirement, a dismissal with prejudice is warranted.”).
Next, Sheriff Chronister argues that the § 1983 claim
against him, Count VIII, should be dismissed. (Doc. # 17 at
18). Although the Court has determined that Thornton has
failed to give pre-suit notice, “Section 768 does not apply
to § 1983 claims.” Gregory v. City of Tarpon Springs, No.
8:16-cv-237-T-33AEP, 2016 WL 7157554, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
8, 2016)(citing Majette v. O’Connor, 811 F.2d 1416, 1418 (11th
6887300 (11th Cir. Feb. 14, 2017).
“[A] municipality may not be held liable under § 1983
solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs
of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Rather, to
recover damages from a local governmental entity under § 1983,
a plaintiff must show: “(1) that [his] constitutional rights
were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or
constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused
the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2004)(citation omitted).
municipality under § 1983 must identify a particular policy
or custom that caused the constitutional injury. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 403.
A policy is a decision that is officially adopted
by the municipality, or created by an official of
such rank that he or she could be said to be acting
on behalf of the municipality. . . . A custom is a
practice that is so settled and permanent that it
takes on the force of law.
Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th Cir. 1999)(citation
omitted); see also Griffin v. City of Opa–Locka, 261 F.3d
1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001).
“In order for a plaintiff to demonstrate a policy or
custom, it is ‘generally necessary to show a persistent and
omitted). “[T]he practice must be extensive enough to allow
actual or constructive knowledge of such customs or policies
to be attributed to the governing body of the municipality.
Normally random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient
to establish a custom or policy.” Daniel v. Hancock Cty. Sch.
Dist., 626 Fed. Appx. 825, 832 (11th Cir. 2015)(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiff must
additionally show the policy or custom was the moving force
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 1999); Young v. City of
Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1171 (11th Cir. 1995).
According to Sheriff Chronister, Count VIII fails to
state a claim under § 1983 because Thornton does not identify
violated or the policy or practice that was the moving force
behind that violation. (Doc. # 17 at 18-20).
constitutional rights were violated. Nor does the Complaint
Chronister’s. Rather, the apparent basis for this claim is
Sheriff Chronister’s “failure  to develop, implement, and
administer such policies and procedures as set forth” in the
Complaint regarding how minors should be detained and ejected
from the fair on Student Day. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 138). As a result
of this failure, C.T. “was improperly detained, taken into
custody and transported off the Fairgrounds property to a
location in the immediate vicinity of Interstate 4.” (Id.).
Thornton argues that there is no “outright requirement
that Plaintiff plead exactly what constitutional right was
violated.” (Doc. # 48 at 8-9). Still, she highlights the
allegations that C.T. was improperly detained, a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 9). Also, Thornton notes her
allegation that the failure to adopt specific policies and
procedures to deal with detaining or ejecting minors from
Student Day constituted “a deliberate indifference to the
safety of the children in the custody of the [Hillsborough
County Sheriff’s Office] deputies and security personnel and
a deliberate indifference to their constitutional rights.”
(Doc. # 48 at 11)(quoting (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 137)). Specifically,
“specific policies and procedures . . . to govern the taking
of children into custody by deputies providing security” at
Student Day, “specific policies, procedures and safeguards .
. . governing the transport, release and ejection of children
who had been taken into custody for the purposes of arrest,
temporary detention, trespass or eviction,” and a “parental
notification policy and procedure.” (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 135-36).
According to Thornton, there was an “obvious need to implement
appropriate policies and procedures to address the likelihood
and foreseeability of danger to children” at Student Day,
which the Sheriff’s Office ignored. (Id. at ¶ 137).
These allegations fail to state a claim against Sheriff
allegations that there was an “obvious need” for certain
constituted “deliberate indifference” (Id.), the Court is not
bound to accept those allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;
Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. No other similar incidents at past
Student Days have been alleged, nor have facts been alleged
to support that such danger was obvious.
As they stand, the well-pled allegations show only —
albeit unfortunately — that two minor friends were wrongly
detained and ejected from the fair for disorderly conduct,
were refused a ride (or other passage through the fair) back
to the gate through which they had entered, and instead were
they could walk to the desired
crossing a busy interstate, during which crossing one minor
was struck and killed by a passing motorist. See McDowell,
392 F.3d at 1290–91 (“While McDowell’s case is tragic, he
contributed to or exacerbated an inmate’s medical condition.
Simply put, this isolated incident, however unfortunate, does
not demonstrate evidence of the County’s ‘persistent’ or
‘widespread’ policy of understaffing the Jail so as to delay
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1986).
Finally, Sheriff Chronister argues that Thornton is
damages under Florida’s “impact rule.” (Doc. # 17 at 21-25).
But he cites no case law applying the “impact rule” to a §
1983 claim. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded that the
impact rule limits the damages Thornton may seek in Count
Count VIII is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
But the Court grants Thornton one opportunity to amend this
§ 1983 claim.
negligence against each of the Defendant Deputies in his
individual capacity. (Doc. # 1 at 25-33). The Defendant
Deputies contend they are entitled to sovereign immunity for
the negligence claims under Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). (Doc.
# 16 at 5-7). Section 768.28(9)(a) states:
No officer, employee, or agent of the state or of
any of its subdivisions shall be held personally
liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any
action for any injury or damage suffered as a result
of any act, event, or omission of action in the
scope of her or his employment or function, unless
such officer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith
or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting
wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
safety, or property.
Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). As the Defendant Deputies note,
the Complaint alleges that they were “negligent with respect
to their treatment of C.T.” and were “working within the
course and scope of their employment as law enforcement
officers.” (Doc. # 16 at 7; Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 86, 96, 98, 108,
110, 120, 122, 132).
The Complaint does not allege that Defendant Deputies
“acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights,
allegations in the § 1983 claims that each Defendant Deputy
children in their custody and those children’s constitutional
sovereign immunity for the negligence claims. (Doc. # 45 at
3). Alternatively, Thornton “is agreeable to dismissing [the
negligence counts] without prejudice should discovery later
afford [her] to establish the extent of this behavior so that
[Thornton] may move to amend the Complaint to add same.”
All the allegations against the Defendant Deputies are
conclusory. Even if Thornton had actually alleged that the
Defendant Deputies acted with malicious purpose or in a manner
exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights and
safety, the Court need not have accepted such conclusory
allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Papasan, 478 U.S. at
allegations about each Defendant Deputy’s conduct in the
factual allegations. Rather, the negligence counts merely
state (in identical language) that each Defendant Deputy
detained C.T. in custody, decided to eject C.T. from the fair,
and refused to let C.T. re-enter the fair to get to the
regular entrance or to give C.T. a ride to the regular
entrance. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 87-90, 99-102, 111-114, 123-126).
So, for example, it is unclear which Defendant Deputy actually
declined C.T.’s request to walk back through the fair or to
get a ride. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-55). Such unspecific allegations do
not support the inference that the Defendant Deputies acted
with wanton and willful disregard for C.T.’s rights and
The Court dismisses the negligence claims against the
Defendant Deputies without prejudice, so that Thornton may
amend these claims in her amended complaint if she chooses.1
The Court emphasizes that it is not validating Thornton’s
assumption that she later, at some unspecified time, will be
able to amend and add negligence claims against the Defendant
Deputies again after the benefit of discovery. The Case
Because the negligence claims must be repled, the Court need
not address whether the “impact rule” bars recovery of mental
or emotional damages based on the allegations as pled in the
Section 1983 Claims
In Counts IX to XII, Thornton asserts § 1983 claims
capacities. (Doc. # 1 at 35-43). Thornton has labelled these
counts as “Custom, Practice & Policy” claims against each
Defendant Deputy in his individual capacity. (Id.). And the
Complaint does not contain individualized allegations about
the Defendant Deputies’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Instead, the allegations under each count — largely cut-andpasted from the § 1983 claim against Sheriff Chronister —
assert that each Defendant Deputy was aware of the need for
policies and procedures for Student Day to protect students’
individual Deputies “fail[ed] and refus[ed] to implement
those practices and policies that were obviously necessary
Management and Scheduling Order has set the motions to add
parties and amend pleadings deadline as May 21, 2018. (Doc.
# 38 at 1).
for the protection and safety of children such as C.T.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 146, 153, 160, 167).
The Court agrees with Defendant Deputies that Thornton
‘individual capacities.’” (Doc. # 16 at 8). The allegations
Defendant Deputies, who are not alleged to be
practices and policies for Student Day does not state a claim.
allegations that the Defendant Deputies personally violated
C.T.’s constitutional rights.
Counts IX to XII are dismissed for failure to state a
claim. The Court will give Thornton another opportunity to
plead her claims against the Defendant Deputies, based on
their individual conduct rather than their alleged failure to
establish practices and policies for the Sheriff’s Office.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant the Florida State Fair Authority’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. # 13) is GRANTED. Count III is DISMISSED
terminated as a party to this action.
Defendant Sheriff Chad Chronister’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. # 17) is GRANTED. Count I, for negligence, is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Count VIII under, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Defendant Deputies Henry Echenique, Mark Clark, Stephen
Jones, and Adrian Chester’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #
16) is GRANTED. Counts IV to VII, for negligence, are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Counts IX to XII, under §
1983, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff Yvonne Thornton may file an amended complaint
by April 25, 2018.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
10th day of April, 2018.
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?