Knepfle v. J-Tech Corporation et al

Filing 248

ORDER granting 186 motion for summary judgment; denying as moot 187 motion for summary judgment; denying as moot 235 motion for extension of time. The Clerk is directed to (1) enter judgment for the HJC Corporation, LeMans Corporation, and J&P Cycles, LLC, against Knepfle on all counts, (2) to terminate all pending motions, and (3) to close the case. Signed by Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle on 5/7/2021. (DMP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SHEILA KNEPFLE,
v.

Plaintiff,

Case No. 8:18-cv-543-T-KKM-CPT

J&P CYCLES, LLC, et al.
Defendants.
_______________________________________/
ORDER
Defendants J&P Cycles, LeMans Corporation, and HJC move for summary
judgment on all of Plaintiff Sheila Knepfle’s claims. (Doc. 186). Knepfle opposes the
defendants’ motion. (Doc. 193).
In a separate order, the Court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude
Knepfle’s proffered expert John Lloyd. (Doc. 247). Now, in their motion for summary
judgment, the defendants argue that Knepfle cannot establish a genuine issue of
material fact on defect and causation without an expert to opine on those elements.
(Doc. 186 at 3–4). As a result, the defendants conclude that the Court should grant
summary judgment in their favor.
In a one-page response—unaccompanied by a legal memorandum—to the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Knepfle argues that summary judgment is
inappropriate because “there is no basis to strike Dr. Lloyd’s opinions.” (Doc. 193).
Because she put forth no other argument about why the Court should not grant

summary judgment in the defendants’ favor if the Court excludes Lloyd’s opinion,
Knepfle waived any other argument. See Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corp., 478 F. Supp. 3d
1347, 1354 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 2020) (Ross, J.) (finding an argument put forth in a motion
for summary judgment conceded because the opposing party never responded to that
argument). Perhaps more telling, at the Daubert hearing on Lloyd’s proffered expert
testimony, Knepfle’s counsel conceded that, without his testimony on the alleged defect
in the Nomad helmet’s double D-rings system, her case is effectively over.
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The moving party can show that no genuine dispute of material fact exists by showing
“that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). To overcome summary judgment, the
opposing party must point to evidence in the record showing that a genuine issue for
trial exists. Id. at 323.
In this products-liability action, Knepfle brings claims against the defendants for
strict liability, negligence, and “negligent performance of voluntarily undertaken postsale duty to warn.” (Doc. 46, ¶¶35–103). Each of her claims relies on establishing an
alleged design defect in the Nomad helmet, specifically its retention system (including
its straps and the double D-rings clasp). See id.
To succeed in a design defect claim under Florida law, the plaintiff must show
that “(1) a defect existed in the product, (2) the defect caused the injury, and (3) the
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defect in the product existed at the time the product left the possession of the
manufacturer.” See Cooper v. Old Williamsburg Candle Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1223
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (Covington, J.). Whether under a negligence or strict liability theory, a
plaintiff must “provide expert testimony [opining] that the product was defective and
evidence that the product caused the injury of which she complains.” Blinn v. Smith &
Nephew Richards, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1361 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (Kovachevich, J.); see
also Savage v. Danek Medical, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (Lazzara, J.)
(“A defect must be proven by expert testimony.”); Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d
676, 685 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[E]xpert testimony is often required to establish
defective design of a product.”).
The Court excluded Lloyd’s proffered testimony because his methodology for
arriving at his opinion about the alleged design defect in the Nomad helmet is
unreliable. (Doc. 247). And Knepfle points to no other expert who will testify about
the alleged defect in the Nomad helmet. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[T]he nonmoving
party [must] make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect
to which she has the burden of proof.”). As a result, the defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Knepfle’s claims. See also Payne v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 606 F. App’x
940, 944–45 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment where the district court
excluded the plaintiff’s only proffered expert who would have testified about product’s
alleged defect.).
The following is ORDERED:
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1.

The defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 186) is
GRANTED.

2.

HJC’s motion for summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction
(Doc. 187) and Knepfle’s motion for extension of time to file a response
to that motion (Doc. 235) are DENIED as moot.

3.

The Clerk is directed to (1) enter judgment for the HJC Corporation,
LeMans Corporation, and J&P Cycles, LLC, against Knepfle on all counts,
(2) to terminate all pending motions, and (3) to close the case.

DONE in Tampa, Florida, on May 7, 2021.

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