Hebden v. Anderson

Filing 26

ORDER: Defendant Ronald Anderson's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 19 ) is DENIED. Anderson's Answer is due fourteen days from the date of this Order. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 8/20/2018. (DMD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
AMANDA HEBDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 8:18-cv-1063-T-33AAS

RONALD ANDERSON,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Ronald Anderson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 19), filed on
July 20, 2018. Plaintiff Amanda Hebden responded on August 3,
2018. (Doc. # 24). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is
denied.
I.

Background
Anderson owns a six-unit rental property in Treasure

Island, Florida. (Doc. # 1 at ¶ 8). In 2012, Hebden — a white
woman — and her roommate Karen Wessel — another white woman
— moved into one of Anderson’s rental units. (Id. at ¶ 11).
Typically, “potential tenants are required to fill out an
application for lease” and Anderson would “do a background
check via the internet.” (Id. at ¶ 10). Yet, while Hebden and
Wessel filled out an application, Anderson told them no

1

background check was done. (Id. at ¶ 12). Hebden and Anderson
made a verbal modification to the lease to allow Hebden to
pay her rent on the third day of the month, rather than the
first. (Id. at ¶ 14).
After the one-year lease agreement ended, Wessel moved
out, but Hebden stayed in the unit under a month-to-month
tenancy. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21). Then, Jeff Perro — a white man —
moved into the unit as Hebden’s new roommate in April of 2014.
(Id.

at

¶

22).

Perro

was

not

required

to

fill

out

an

application or undergo a background check. (Id. at ¶ 23).
Similarly, when Hebden’s upstairs neighborhood got a new
roommate — a white woman — no application was required and no
background check was run. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-26).
During this time, the “relationship between Hebden and
Anderson began to deteriorate . . . due to differing opinions,
and occasional arguments, surrounding the events that led to
the deaths of Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown.” (Id. at ¶
28). “Hebden was also consistently offended by Anderson’s
disparaging remarks regarding African Americans and repeated
use of racial slurs.” (Id. at ¶ 31). “Hebden requested that
Anderson not [] use the ‘N-word’ in her presence, and that he
also not return to her unit.” (Id. at ¶ 32).

2

Eventually,

Perro

moved

out.

Hebden

acquired

a

new

roommate Michael Peart — a Jamaican-American man — on June 4,
2015. (Id. at ¶ 39). Peart moored his boat at the property’s
dock and began parking in the property’s parking lot. (Id. at
¶ 40).
According to the Complaint, Anderson reacted poorly to
Peart’s arrival. Anderson began to demand Hebden pay the rent
on the first day of the month, instead of on the third as
Anderson and Hebden had previously agreed. (Id. at ¶ 42).
Additionally, in late July and early August 2015, Anderson
twice

“left

letters

sealed

inside

zip-lock

baggies

on

Roommate Peart’s car during the overnight hours for him to
find the next morning — ‘KKK style.’” (Id. at ¶¶ 43-48). In
those letters, Anderson requested Peart “fill out an enclosed
application for residency (no signature necessary), and to
contact Anderson regarding Roommate Peart’s boat that was
moored to the dock . . . as well as to address the issue of
‘some confusion as to assigned parking spaces.’” (Id. at ¶¶
45, 48).
Peart did not respond to the letters and “did not fill
out the application for residency because he thought the only
reason it was being required of him was due to Anderson being
a former police officer” and that Anderson would use Peart’s
3

information “for some sort of vendetta or agenda.” (Id. at ¶¶
47, 50). But Peart did remove his boat from the dock on August
17, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 54).
Then, on August 18, 2015, “Hebden received a notice of
non-renewal addressed to both herself and Roommate Peart from
Anderson, providing that both were to vacate the property by
September 30, 2015.” (Id. at ¶ 55). So, on September 21, 2015,
“Hebden filed a housing discrimination complaint with the
Pinellas County Office of Human Rights (‘PCOHR’) alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) and (b).” (Id. at ¶ 58).
After that, Anderson initiated eviction proceedings against
Hebden on October 9, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 59).
Meanwhile, the PCOHR’s investigation continued. Then, on
May 3, 2016, the PCOHR “issued a Determination of Reasonable
Cause and Charge of Discrimination (‘Charge’), pursuant to
Pinellas County Code §§ 70-140 and 70-141, charging Anderson
with engaging in unlawful housing discrimination on the basis
of race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act.” (Id. at ¶
63). “On January 22, 2018, Hebden elected to commence a civil
action

for

Anderson’s

discriminatory

housing

practice

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).” (Id. at ¶ 64).
Hebden

then

asserting claims

initiated

this

action

for race discrimination
4

on

May

1,

2018,

and retaliation

under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3617,
Florida’s Fair Housing Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 760.23 and 760.37,
and the Pinellas County Code, §§ 70-176 and 70-183. (Doc. # 1).
Anderson moved to dismiss on July 20, 2018 (Doc. # 19), and
Hebden has responded. (Doc. # 24). The Motion is ripe for
review.
II.

Legal Standard
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all

the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. Bellsouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004). Further,
this

Court

favors

the

plaintiff

with

all

reasonable

inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th
Cir. 1990). But,
[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(internal
citations omitted). Courts are not “bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan
5

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). “The scope of review
must be limited to the four corners of the complaint” and
attached exhibits. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d
1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).
III. Analysis
Anderson raises two arguments for dismissal: first, that
the statute of limitations has passed and, second, that the
Complaint fails to state a claim for any count. The Court
will address these arguments separately.
Additionally, the parties agree that the federal Fair
Housing Act, the Florida Fair Housing Act, and the Pinellas
County Code mirror one another, so the same legal arguments
apply to all counts of the Complaint. (Doc. # 19 at 1-2; Doc.
# 24 at 4); see also Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1299 n.
9 (11th Cir. 2002)(“The Florida Fair Housing Act contains
statutory provisions that are substantively identical to the
federal Fair Housing Act.”).
A.

Statute of Limitations

Anderson argues that the statute of limitations has run
on Hebden’s claims. (Doc. # 19 at 3-4). He emphasizes that
Hebden’s

“Intake

Questionnaire”

for

her

administrative

housing discrimination complaint states that the last act of

6

discrimination occurred on August 18, 2015. (Id. at 3; Doc.
# 1-12 at 6).
The statute of limitations for Fair Housing Act claims
is two years. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (“An aggrieved
person may commence a civil action in an appropriate United
States district court or State court not later than 2 years
after

the

occurrence

or

the

termination

of

an

alleged

discriminatory housing practice.”). But, in calculating the
statute of limitations for housing discrimination claims,
courts

do

not

count

the

days

in

which

administrative

proceedings were pending. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B) (“The
computation of such 2-year period shall not include any time
during

which

an

administrative

proceeding

under

this

subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge
under this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing
practice.”). Here, the administrative proceeding lasted 226
days. Therefore, by Anderson’s calculation, the statute of
limitations ran on March 31, 2018 – before Hebden initiated
this action on May 1, 2018. (Doc. # 19 at 4).
But

Hebden

discrimination
Specifically,

points
that

she

out

that

occurred

highlights

her

after
that

Complaint
August

Anderson

18,

alleges
2015.

initiated

an

eviction proceeding against her on October 9, 2015. (Doc. #
7

24 at 1-2). And she notes that her actual administrative
housing

discrimination

complaint

specified

that

the

discriminatory conduct had last occurred on “September 3,
2015, and is continuing.” (Id. at 2; Doc. # 1-12 at 3).
Because the housing discrimination complaint specified that
the discrimination was continuing and the Complaint in this
case pleads a discriminatory event on October 9, 2015, Hebden
insists that the statute of limitations began to run on
October 9, 2015. (Doc. # 24 at 2).
Thus, Hebden argues – and the Court agrees — the twoyear statute of limitations would have run on October 9, 2017,
but for the administrative proceeding. Adding the 226 days
during which the administrative proceeding was pending, the
statute of limitations ran on May 23, 2018. (Id. at 3).
Because Hebden initiated this action on May 1, 2018, her
claims are not time-barred.
B.

Failure to State a Claim

Under the Fair Housing Act, it is unlawful to “refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of
race” or to “discriminate against any person in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or
8

in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith,

because

of

race.”

42

U.S.C.

§

3604(a)-(b).

Additionally, Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act provides
that “[i]t shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten,
or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of,
or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any
right” protected under the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
Anderson argues the Complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim of housing discrimination because
Hebden “fails to set forth facts which establish that her
roommate was discriminated against because of race, that she
was discriminated against because of her roommate’s race, and
therefore [Hebden] is not an ‘aggrieved person’ and is not
entitled to relief as to any of her claims.” (Doc. # 19 at
5). He emphasizes that he required Hebden to fill out a rental
application before she moved into the apartment, just as he
requested Peart submit an application. (Id. at 6). Therefore,
Anderson reasons, the Complaint does not plead facts to
support that Peart’s race was the motivation to have Peart
submit an application. (Id.).
Furthermore,

Anderson

argues

that

Hebden’s

“own

allegations instead establish a claim that [Hebden] and her
roommate

failed

to

comply

with
9

the

rental

policies

of

Anderson, and that is why they were asked to leave the
property

in

August

2015.”

(Id.).

According

to

Anderson,

Hebden “was given a Notice of Non-Renewal of Lease on August
18,

2015”

because

“her

roommate

[Peart]

refused

on

two

occasions to complete a rental application as requested by
Anderson, and failed to contact Anderson regarding the boat
that was moored at Anderson’s dock.” (Id. at 8). Therefore,
Anderson contends that Hebden has failed to plead a claim for
either discrimination or retaliation based on the notice of
non-renewal and subsequent eviction.
The

Court

Complaint’s

disagrees

allegations

with
as

Anderson.

true,

Hebden

Taking

all

has

stated

the
a

plausible claim that Anderson discriminated and retaliated
against her. Although Hebden had filled out an application
when she moved in in 2012, she alleged that two other white
individuals moved into other apartments on the property but
were

not

required

to

apply

or

did

not

have

to

undergo

background checks in 2014. (Doc. # 1 at ¶¶ 23, 25-26). Yet,
Anderson required an application from Peart in 2015. (Id. at
¶¶ 45, 48). Additionally, she has alleged that Anderson moved
up the due date of Hebden’s rental payments in retaliation
for Hebden’s opposition to Anderson’s alleged racist comments
and for Hebden’s choosing Peart as her roommate. (Id. at ¶¶
10

32, 39, 42). Finally, she alleges Anderson initiated eviction
proceedings against her in retaliation for Hebden’s filing an
administrative housing discrimination complaint. (Id. at ¶¶
58-59).
Taking these allegations as true and favoring Hebden
with all reasonable inferences, the Court finds that Hebden
has

stated

claims

for

discrimination

and

retaliation.

Therefore, Anderson’s Motion is denied.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
Defendant Ronald Anderson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #
19) is DENIED. Anderson’s Answer is due fourteen days from
the date of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
20th day of August, 2018.

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