Rodriguez v. River Strand Golf & Country Club, Inc.

Filing 56

ORDER: The Court defers ruling on the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of FLSA Settlement and Dismissal with Prejudice (Doc. # 55 ). The parties are directed to file their settlement agreement by November 2, 2018. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 10/26/2018. (KAK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
FREDDY RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:18-cv-1130-T-33AEP

ICON MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court pursuant to the parties’
Joint Motion for Approval of FLSA Settlement and Dismissal
with Prejudice (Doc. # 55), filed on October 22, 2018. For
the following reasons, the Court defers ruling on the Motion
until the parties have filed the settlement agreement.

That

agreement must be filed by November 2, 2018.
I.

Background
On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff Freddy Rodriguez filed this

action

against

River

Strand

Golf

&

Country

Club,

Inc.,

alleging claims for failure to pay overtime in violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. (Doc. # 1). On May 24, 2018,
the Court entered its FLSA Scheduling Order. (Doc. # 10).
River Strand filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses on June

1

21, 2018. (Doc. # 15).

Therein, River Strand asserted that

it was not Rodriguez’s employer. (Id. at 4).
On June 29, 2018, Rodriguez filed a Motion for Leave to
Amend the Complaint to add two new parties as Defendants:
Icon

Management

Services,

Inc.

and

Heritage

Harbour

Management, Inc. (Doc. # 19).

On the same day, Rodriguez

filed

Interrogatories,

Answers

to

the

Court’s

answers were vastly incomplete. (Doc. # 20).

but

those

Specifically,

Rodriguez failed to state the amount of wages he claimed, and
he did not provide a calculation of the attorney’s fees
incurred. (Id.).

At the Court’s direction, Rodriguez filed

updated answers to the Court’s Interrogatories on July 13,
2018. (Doc. # 27). In the second round of answers to the
Court’s Interrogatories, Rodriguez claimed that he was owed
“$39,960.00

(unliquidated)”

and

that

his

attorney

had

incurred $7,700.00 in fees and costs. (Id.).
Subsequently, the Court authorized Rodriguez to amend
the Complaint. (Doc. ## 29, 30). The Court dismissed River
Strand after the parties stipulated that it was not a proper
party to the action. (Doc. ## 46, 47). Icon Management and
Heritage Harbour filed a Verified Summary of Hours Worked by
Plaintiff and Wages Paid to Plaintiff on August 23, 2018.
2

(Doc. # 48).

The very next day, Rodriguez once again amended

his

to

answers

the

Court’s

Interrogatories,

drastically

reducing the amount he claimed to be owed to only $419.58, an
amount which included liquidated damages. (Doc. # 49). The
third

round

of

answers

to

the

Court’s

Interrogatories

maintained that Rodriguez’s counsel had incurred $7,700.00 in
attorney’s fees and costs. (Id.).
The parties were scheduled to mediate on October 8, 2018.
(Doc. # 51).

However, the mediator reported that the parties

settled prior to the mediation conference. (Doc. # 52).

The

Court accordingly directed the parties to file a Motion for
Court Approval of the Settlement including “the amount to be
paid to Plaintiff (including liquidated damages), the payment
of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, and whether the issue of
attorney’s fees was negotiated separately from the amount to
be paid to Plaintiff for alleged FLSA violations.” (Id.).
At this juncture, the parties have filed a Joint Motion
for Approval of FLSA Settlement and Dismissal with Prejudice
(Doc. # 55).

However, their Motion contains a glaring

defect: it does not disclose the amount that Rodriguez’s
counsel will receive under the settlement.

The parties state

that the Court need not concern itself with the amount of
3

attorney’s fees or the substance of the settlement agreement
because Rodriguez is being paid the full amount he requested.
In the alternative, the parties state that if the Court would
like access to this information, they agree to file the
settlement agreement in camera.
II.

Lynn’s Food Commandment to the Court
A district court in the Eleventh Circuit must review the

settlement of an FLSA claim. Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v.
United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982). The
parties cite to a variety of cases for the position that this
Court

need

attorney’s

not

inquire

into

the

fees

because

Rodriguez

matter

of

received

Rodriguez’s
all

amounts

claimed. The parties specifically state: “When, as here, a
plaintiff receives full compensation in settlement for his
FLSA claim, the Court need not scrutinize the settlement for
fairness.” (Doc. # 55 at 3).

In support of this position,

the parties rely on Bonetti v. Embarq Management Co., 715 F.
Supp. 2d 1222, 1226 (M.D. Fla. 2009), and Su v. Electronic
Arts, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-131-Orl-28JGG, 2006 WL 4792780 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 29, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, 2007
WL 2780899 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2006).

Interestingly, both

Bonetti and Su entailed the full disclosure of attorney’s
4

fees.
Specifically,

in

Bonetti,

the

court

approved

a

settlement where the plaintiff received $3,000.00 and his
attorney received $2,500.00.

And in Su, a collective action,

the court approved a settlement in which the individual
workers received $482,320.00, the named plaintiff Su, who
initiated

the

action,

received

an

incentive

fee

of

$100,000.00, and plaintiffs’ counsel received $120,000.00.
Id. at *2.
However, the Court is aware of a number of judicial
opinions, even a case decided by the Undersigned, declining
to evaluate attorney’s fees when a plaintiff receives full
compensation under the FLSA. See, e.g., Duncan v. Jim Fralin
Construction, Inc., No. 8:08-cv-779-T-33TBM, 2009 WL 910689,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2009)(“Where the employer offers the
plaintiff full compensation on his FLSA claim, no compromise
is involved and judicial approval is not required.”).
The Court takes this opportunity to explain its change
in position.

After deciding Duncan, the Court has been

presented with hundreds of FLSA settlements, and the Court
has come to understand that judicial review of attorney’s
fees is a vital component of ensuring the administration of
5

justice in FLSA cases. This is especially so in cases where
the attorneys are hoping to receive a fee that is double,
triple, or even quadruple the amount the unpaid worker will
receive in FLSA wages.

More to the point, the Court finds

that is impossible to evaluate a FLSA settlement for fairness
without knowing the amount of attorney’s fees the plaintiff’s
attorney will receive under the settlement. See also Turner
v. Interline Brands, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-646-J-39PDB, 2016 WL
7973120, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2016)(“[T]he presence of
counsel on both sides does nothing to alter the need for
judicial oversight of FLSA settlement agreements.”).
Thus, while some courts do not require judicial review
in “full compensation” cases, other courts have noted the
“obvious

problem”

with

FLSA

settlements

absent

judicial

review. See Turner, 2016 WL 7973120, at *3 (“Absent judicial
review of a settlement agreement it is impossible to ensure
that the employer has not improperly exercised the marked
advantage it enjoys over its employees in terms of bargaining
power.”).

For

example,

litigators

may

manipulate

the

settlement to effect an end-run around the policy concerns
articulated in both the FLSA and Lynn’s Food Stores. See Dees
v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1247 (M.D. Fla. 2010)
6

(“[T]he district court should not become complicit in any
scheme or mechanism designed to confine or frustrate every
employee’s

knowledge

and

realization

of

FLSA

rights.”);

Boasci v. Imperial Spa & Salon, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1520-Orl40KRS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122300, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan.
12,

2015)

(“[T]he

overwhelming

position

in

the

Eleventh

Circuit [is] that the FLSA charges district courts with the
duty to ensure the fairness of any resolution of a claim
arising under the statute.”).
The Court agrees that judicial review of the settlement
agreement, including the amount to be paid to Rodriguez’s
counsel

is

required

to

effectuate

articulated in Lynn’s Food Stores.

the

policy

concerns

And, as explained below,

the Court will not allow the parties to file the settlement
agreement in camera.
In sum, without more information, the Court cannot yet
determine

whether

the

parties

have

reached

“a

fair

and

reasonable resolution” of Rodriguez’s FLSA claims. Lynn’s
Food Stores, 679 F.2d at 1355. The parties are directed to
file

the

settlement

agreement

by

November

2,

2018.

Thereafter, the Court will undertake an analysis of the
settlement of this case.
7

III. In Camera Review Violates Public Policy
As

explained

by

the

Eleventh

Circuit

in

Brown

v.

Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992),
"Once a matter is brought before a court for resolution, it
is no longer solely the parties' case, but is also the
public's case."

American courts recognize a general right

"to inspect and copy public records and documents, including
judicial records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Comms.,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
The Eleventh Circuit has noted, "The operation of the
courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of
utmost public concern and the common-law right of access to
judicial proceedings, an essential component of our system of
justice, is instrumental in securing the integrity of the
process." Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1245 (11th
Cir. 2007)(internal citations omitted).

The court further

explained, "This right of access includes the right to inspect
and copy public records and documents.
is not absolute, however.

This right of access

The right of access does not apply

to discovery and, where it does apply, may be overcome by a
showing of good cause." Id.

8

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
also

provides

proceedings,

a

qualified

although

this

right
right

of
"has

access
a

to

more

trial
limited

application in the civil context than it does in the criminal
[context]." Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001).

“Where this

constitutional right of access applies, any denial of access
requires a showing that it is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id.
The document at issue -- a settlement agreement in a
FLSA case -- does not fall into one of the categories, like
protecting minors, that are generally shielded from public
exposure. There is no suggestion, much less a showing, that
either party could suffer any harm if the public were to have
access to the terms of the settlement.
case

where

it

is

necessary

or

This is simply not a

appropriate

to

file

the

settlement documents in camera, and the parties have not shown
good cause to override the common law and First Amendment
rights of the public to review court documents. See Dees, 706
F. Supp. 2d at 1246-47 (“If presented in an FLSA action with
. . . a stipulation for dismissal . . . or the like, the
9