Eubanks-Carswell v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 22

ORDER remanding the Commissioner's decision. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment for Ms. Eubanks-Carswell and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Amanda Arnold Sansone on 8/2/2019. (DMP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
ARIELLE EUBANKS-CARSWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:18-cv-1238-T-AAS

ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner,
Social Security Administration,1
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER
Arielle Eubanks-Carswell seeks judicial review of a decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying her claim for
supplemental security income (SSI) and disability insurance benefits (DIB)
under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g). After reviewing the
record, including a transcript of the proceedings before the Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ), administrative record, pleadings, and joint memorandum the
parties submitted, the Commissioner’s decision is REMANDED for further
consideration consistent with this order.

On June 17, 2019, Andrew Saul became Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration. Consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Saul is
substituted as a party in Nancy Berryhill’s place.
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I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Ms. Eubanks-Carswell applied for SSI and DIB for a disability she

claims began on November 13, 2013. (Tr. 237–46).2 Disability examiners
denied

Ms.

reconsideration.

Eubanks-Carswell’s
(Tr. 104–63).

applications

initially

and

after

Ms. Eubanks-Carswell then requested a

hearing before an ALJ, who found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell not disabled. (Tr.
27–37, 188).
The Appeals Council denied Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s request for review
of the ALJ’s decision, and the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. (Tr. 1–3). Ms. Eubanks-Carswell now seeks review of the
Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. 1).
II.

NATURE OF DISABILITY CLAIM
A.

Background

Ms. Eubanks-Carswell was twenty-six years old when she submitted her
SSI and DIB applications, and she was twenty-nine years old when the ALJ
held the hearing. (Tr. 48, 237). Ms. Eubanks-Carswell has a high school
education and some technical training as a phlebotomy technician. (Tr. 57).

Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s SSI application lists December 31, 2012, as her alleged
onset date. (Tr. 237). The ALJ, Ms. Eubanks-Carswell, and the Commissioner,
however, recognize November 13, 2013, as Ms. Eubank-Carswell’s alleged onset date
for her SSI and DIB applications. (Tr. 27; Doc. 21, p. 1).
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She has no past relevant work. (Tr. 91). Ms. Eubanks-Carswell claimed
disability because of “bipolar, anxiety, sciatic nerve damage, vertigo, vision,
[and] colon disease.” (Tr. 104).
B.

Summary of the ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a claim for disability.3
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).

First, if a claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity,4 she is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).
Second, if a claimant has no impairment or combination of impairments that
significantly limit her physical or mental ability to perform basic work
activities, then she has no severe impairment and is not disabled.

§§

404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir.
1986) (stating that step two acts as a filter and “allows only claims based on
the most trivial impairments to be rejected”).

Third, if a claimant’s

impairments fail to meet or equal an impairment included in the Listings, she
is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1.
Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from performing past
relevant work, she is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). At

If the ALJ determines that the claimant is under a disability at any step of the
sequential analysis, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
3

Substantial gainful activity is paid work that requires significant physical or
mental activity. §§ 404.1572, 416.910.
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this fourth step, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”).5 Fifth, if a claimant’s impairments (considering her RFC,
age, education, and past work) do not prevent her from performing other work
that exists in the national economy, then she is not disabled. §§ 404.1520(g),
416.920(g).
The ALJ here determined Ms. Eubanks-Carswell engaged in no
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 29). The ALJ
found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell has the following severe impairments: “status
post (s/p) right shoulder arthroscopic repair, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder,
anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).”
(citations omitted).

(Tr. 30)

Nonetheless, the ALJ found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s

impairments or combination of impairments fail to meet or medically equal the
severity of an impairment included in the Listings. (Id.).
The ALJ then found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell has the RFC to perform light
work with the following limitations:
[S]he is limited to frequent contact with the general public,
supervisors and co-workers. She is limited to routine, repetitive
tasks, and no semi-skilled or skilled work.
(Tr. 32). Based on these findings, the ALJ determined Ms. Eubanks-Carswell
could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy,

A claimant’s RFC is the level of physical and mental work she can consistently
perform despite her limitations. §§ 404.1545, 416.945(a).
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specifically a housekeeping cleaner, fast-food worker, and advertising-material
distributor. (Tr. 37). The ALJ therefore found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell not
disabled. (Id.).
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

Review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ
applied correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports his
findings.

McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988);

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Dale v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In other words, there must
be sufficient evidence for a reasonable person to accept as enough to support
the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations
omitted).
A reviewing court must affirm a decision supported by substantial
evidence “even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The court must not
make new factual determinations, reweigh evidence, or substitute its judgment
for the Commissioner’s decision. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted).
Instead, the court must view the whole record, considering evidence favorable
and unfavorable to the Commissioner’s decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see
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also Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted)
(stating that the reviewing court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
the reasonableness of the Commissioner’s factual determinations).
B.

Issues on Appeal

Ms. Eubanks-Carswell argues the court should remand the ALJ’s
decision for three reasons. (Doc. 21, pp. 17–39). First, she argues the ALJ
erred when he considered Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s statements about the
severity of her impairments. (Id. at 17–20). Second, Ms. Eubanks-Carswell
argues the ALJ’s RFC determination and hypothetical questions to the
vocational expert (VE) at the hearing are not supported by substantial
evidence. (Id. at 25–28). Third, Ms. Eubanks-Carswell argues the ALJ erred
when he found Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s impairments fail to equal an
impairment included in the Listings. (Id. at 31–35).
This order will focus on the second issue Ms. Eubanks-Carswell raises:
whether the ALJ failed to consider evidence when he determined Ms. EubanksCarswell’s RFC.
1.

RFC Determination

Ms. Eubanks-Carswell argues the ALJ failed to state how much weight
he gave to testimony from Findley-Hawthorne, Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s
licensed clinical social worker. (Doc. 21, pp. 33–34). Ms. Eubanks-Carswell
points out that Findley-Hawthorne testified Ms. Eubanks-Carswell could not
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keep a full-time job because of poor memory and attendance problems. (Doc.
21, pp. 26, 34). Ms. Eubanks-Carswell argues Findley-Hawthorne testified
that Ms. Eubanks-Carswell has significant social anxiety, which causes
difficulty in retaining employment (even with vocational services). (Id). Ms.
Eubanks-Carswell further argues the ALJ would arrive at a more limited
RFC—and more restrictive hypothetical to the VE—had he considered
Findley-Hawthorne’s testimony. (Id. at 27).
The Commissioner argues Ms. Eubanks-Carswell fails to prove she
cannot sustain full-time employment. (Id. at 29). The Commissioner first
argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Ms. EubanksCarswell could maintain frequent interactions with others because she can
participate in social and volunteering activities. (Id.) The Commissioner also
points to the fact that Ms. Eubanks-Carswell could maintain a consistent
schedule during stressful times, like her last pregnancy. (Id.)

The

Commissioner next argues Ms. Eubanks-Carswell failed to cite evidence that
shows she would have attendance problems that would prevent her from
working. (Id.) Last, the Commissioner argues Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s mental
condition is treatable with medication. (Id. at 29–30).
At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines the
claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). A claimant’s RFC is the
most she can perform in a work setting despite her impairments. §§ 404.1545,
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416.945(a); Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238. The ALJ must determine the claimant’s
RFC using all relevant medical and other evidence. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238.
Substantial evidence must support the ALJ’s RFC determination. Crawford v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004); Moore v. Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005).
The ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different
opinions, including opinions from counselors, and his reasons for doing so.
Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987); Ryan v. Heckler, 762
F.2d 939, 941–42 (11th Cir. 1985). The ALJ may reject any opinion if evidence
supports a contrary finding, but he must still articulate reasons for assigning
little weight. Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 880 (11th Cir. 1986). Provided
his decision does not broadly reject a claim for Social Security benefits, the ALJ
need not refer to every piece of evidence. Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 771
F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). Although it is unnecessary to refer to every
piece of evidence, the ALJ must consider all available evidence and articulate
the weight given to probative evidence. Id.; Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731,
735 (11th Cir. 1981).
Here, the ALJ failed to state how much weight he gave to FindleyHawthorne’s testimony. Although the ALJ discusses Findley-Hawthorne’s
statements with respect to Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s social anxiety, memory,
and concentration problems, the ALJ fails to assign weight to Findley8

Hawthorne’s statements. (Tr. 32). The ALJ’s failure to assign weight to this
testimony requires remand because Findley-Hawthorne’s opinion is probative
evidence.
Findley-Hawthorne’s testimony is probative evidence because it directly
concerns Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s residual functional capacity to retain
employment. (Tr. 81–89). Findley-Hawthorne interacts with Ms. EubanksCarswell at least three times a week, during which time she observes Ms.
Eubanks-Carswell’s mental state and helps her retain employment. (Tr. 81–
82).

Findley-Hawthorne keeps track of all Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s

appointments and drives her to work. (Tr. 82). Findley-Hawthorne further
testified Ms. Eubanks-Carswell suffers from delusions about seeing a name on
license plates, which causes her great anxiety. (Tr. 82–83).
Findley-Hawthorne also testified Ms. Eubanks-Carswell has trouble
maintaining conversations and will often move to a new conversation without
notice. (Tr. 84).

Findley-Hawthorne testified that Ms. Eubanks-Carswell

cannot perform much household work and Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s mother
supports most of the household. (Tr. 83). Considering Ms. Eubanks-Carswell
claims that her mental impairments prevent her from working, the ALJ must
articulate with particularity how much weight he gave to Findley-Hawthorne’s
testimony. The ALJ’s failure to state how much weight he gave to Findley-

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Hawthorne’s testimony, which is probative of Ms. Eubanks-Carswell’s alleged
mental impairments, requires remand.
2.

Remaining Issues

Courts review an ALJ’s decision to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the Commissioner’s final decision. Crawford v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Without clearly articulating
reasons for rejecting opinions, a court cannot determine whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 631
F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing ALJ’s failure to state how much
weight was assigned to medical opinions).
Here, the court cannot determine whether substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s decision with respect to other issues Ms. Eubanks-Carswell raises
on appeal because the ALJ failed to state how much weight he gave to FindleyHawthorne’s testimony. Therefore, the court need not address those issues
because the ALJ’s analysis of Findley-Hawthorne’s statements could
materially affect them.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The ALJ failed to articulate how much weight he gave to Findley-

Hawthorne’s testimony. The Commissioner’s decision is REMANDED for
further consideration consistent with this order, and the case is DISMISSED.
The Clerk of Court must enter final judgment for Ms. Eubanks-Carswell
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consistent with 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g).
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 2, 2019.

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