Shaffer v. Bank of New York Mellon et al
Filing
3
ORDER: Plaintiff Linda Shaffer's Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Declaratory Relief (Doc. # 2 ) is DENIED insofar as it seeks a temporary restraining order. To the extent the Motion requests a preliminary injunction, it is referred to the Honorable Christopher P. Tuite, United States Magistrate Judge, for a report and recommendation. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 6/9/2018. (AHG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
LINDA SHAFFER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 8:18-cv-1382-T-33CPT
THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A
THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE
FOR THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF
CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN
TRUST 2006-OA16, MORTGAGE PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES
2006-OA16; THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS
OF CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN
PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES
2006-0A-16; and THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
FLORIDA IN AND FOR MANATEE COUNTY,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of
Plaintiff
Linda
Shaffer’s
Application
for
Temporary
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Declaratory
Relief, (Doc. # 2), filed on June 8, 2018. For the reasons
stated below, the Motion is denied insofar as it requests a
temporary restraining order.
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Discussion
On June 8, 2018, Shaffer filed a Complaint against
Defendants Bank of New York Mellon, the Certificateholders of
CWALT, Inc., and the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial
Circuit
of
Florida
seeking
injunctive
relief
and
a
declaratory judgment to stay the foreclosure sale of her
property. (Doc. # 1). Shaffer argues the Circuit Court’s order
denying her motion to vacate the foreclosure sale violates
the “Full Faith and Credit” provision of the U.S. Constitution
because the Circuit Court “refused to grant ‘Full Faith and
Credit’ to the provisions included within and mandated by the
Court Approved Settlement by the Certificateholders of CWALT
. . . for any and all claims against borrowers, such as Linda
Shaffer,” a settlement which was approved in New York state
court. (Id. at ¶ 1). Shaffer tersely contends the AntiInjunction Act does not preclude her request for injunctive
relief because “this fact pattern is an exception to the AntiInjunction Act.” (Id. at ¶ 55).
Shaffer
then
filed
the
pending
Motion
seeking
a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Doc.
# 2). The Motion contains twelve pages of rambling facts as
to the various Defendants and ends with a request to stay the
sale of Shaffer’s property, until “a hearing on the order to
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show cause why Defendants should not be enjoined.” (Id. at
14). The clearest statement of relief sought is found in the
introductory paragraph and reads:
Plaintiff Shaffer requests this Court to issue a
Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Preliminary and
Permanent Injunctive Relief against Defendant
Circuit Court of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in
and for Manatee County, Florida from engaging in
further violations of the “Full Faith and Credit”
provisions of the U.S. Constitution and the Florida
State Constitution.
(Id. at 4). The Court therefore construes this motion as
seeking a temporary restraining order to enjoin a state court
foreclosure sale in Manatee County, Florida.
A request for a temporary restraining order “to prevent
a foreclosure sale from occurring falls squarely within the
bounds of the Anti-Injunction Act.” Dyer v. The Bank of N.Y.
Mellon, No. 5:17-cv-130-Oc-30PRL, 2017 WL 1165552, at *2
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2017). “Under the Anti–Injunction Act, a
district court may not enjoin state proceedings ‘except as
expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgments.’” Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569 F. App’x
669, 678 (11th Cir. 2014)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2283)). Shaffer
has “cited no Act of Congress that would allow for injunctive
relief.” Id. Therefore, the first exception does not apply.
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“The second exception, or ‘necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction’ exception, applies in two narrow circumstances:
(1) the federal court gains jurisdiction over res in an in
rem proceeding before a party brings a subsequent state court
action; or (2) the federal court is presented with a similar
context, such as the need to protect an earlier injunction.”
Id. (quoting Burr & Forman v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1028–29
(11th Cir. 2006)). Shaffer is not pursuing an in rem action
in this Court. See In re Rothstein, Rosenfeldt, Adler, P.A.,
717 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir. 2013)(noting that an in rem
action
exists
when
the
district
court
is
exercising
jurisdiction over property). Shaffer has “also not implicated
the second basis, which applies when the district court must
protect
a
pre-existing
federal
judgment
or
injunction.”
Arthur, 569 F. App’x at 678. Therefore, the second exception
does not appear to apply.
Finally,
relitigation
the
third
exception[,]
exception,
is
known
applicable
where
as
“[t]he
subsequent
state law claims ‘would be precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata.’” Id. (quoting Burr & Forman, 470 F.3d at 1029–30).
“In addition to the existence of a federal judgment, ‘the
party
seeking
the
injunction
must
make
a
strong
and
unequivocal showing of relitigation.’” Arthur, 569 F. App’x
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at 678–79 (quoting Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Rests.,
Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 586 (11th Cir. 1983)). This appears to be
the exception Shaffer alludes to in her Complaint. (Doc. # 1
¶ 44). However, Shaffer does not “point to a federal judgment
that has been issued in [her] favor.” Arthur, 569 F. App’x at
679.
The
“Court
Approved
Settlement”
Shaffer
mentions
involves a New York state court proceeding, so no federal
judgment is implicated.
Based on the limited record before the Court, Shaffer’s
request for a temporary restraining order is denied. See Dyer,
2017 WL 1165552, at *2 (denying plaintiff’s request for an
injunction to prevent foreclosure under the Anti-Injunction
Act); Littlejohn v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-194-J34JRK, 2015 WL 789131, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2015) (same).
To the extent the Motion requests a preliminary injunction,
it is referred to the Honorable Christopher P. Tuite, United
States Magistrate Judge, for a report and recommendation.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)
Plaintiff
Linda
Restraining
Shaffer’s
Order,
Application
Preliminary
for
Temporary
Injunction,
and
Declaratory Relief (Doc. # 2) is DENIED insofar as it
seeks a temporary restraining order.
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(2)
To
the
extent
the
Motion
requests
a
preliminary
injunction, it is referred to the Honorable Christopher
P. Tuite, United States Magistrate Judge, for a report
and recommendation.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 9th
day of June, 2018.
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