Hannah v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. et al

Filing 59

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 Motion to Dismiss; denying 44 Motion to Dismiss; granting in part and denying in part 45 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; denying 48 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. All legal claims will remain except for the following: Counts VI, IX, XVIII, XIX, and XX.Defendants shall file their Answers to the Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Signed by Judge James S. Moody, Jr on 6/28/2019. (JG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
PATRICIA HANNAH, as Plenary Legal
Guardian of Darryl Vaughn Hanna, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:19-cv-596-T-30SPF

ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH
SERVICES, INC., MANATEE COUNTY,
FLORIDA, RICK WELLS, in his official
capacity as Sheriff of the Manatee County
Sheriff’s Office, LEILA POLANCO,
CARMA OGLINE, BERNARD
MONTAYRE, PAULA SANDERS,
ELVIRA PEREZ, RONALD LAUGHLIN,
Defendants.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon four separate motions to dismiss:
Defendant Rick Wells’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 43), Defendant Ronald Laughlin’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 44), Armor Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 45), and
Defendant Manatee County’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48). The Court has carefully
reviewed these motions and Plaintiff’s responses in opposition (Dkts. 46, 47, 53, and 54).
The Court has also reviewed in great detail the lengthy amended complaint (Dkt. 40). As
explained further below, the Court concludes that Defendant Rick Wells’ Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 43) is granted in part and denied in part, Defendant Ronald Laughlin’s
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 44) is denied, Armor Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.

45) is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant Manatee County’s Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 48) is denied. Specifically, all legal claims will remain except for the
following: Counts VI, IX, XVIII, XIX, and XX.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of the amended complaint (Dkt. 40) are undeniably tragic.
Plaintiff Patricia Hanna is the plenary guardian for Darryl Vaughn Hanna, Jr. (“Hanna”),
who is in a persistent vegetative state after suffering four syncopal episodes while he was
detained at the Manatee County Jail. The amended complaint alleges the following facts
that led to Hanna’s condition. The Court must assume the truth of these allegations.
The Manatee County Jail is a correctional facility intended to detain people who
are accused of violating Florida’s criminal laws within Manatee County, Florida. On or
about August 9, 2017, Hanna was arrested by the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office
(“MCSO”) and detained as a pretrial detainee in the Manatee County Jail (hereinafter
referred to as the “Jail”).
Defendant Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc. contracted with Manatee
County and MCSO to provide medical and mental health care to those detained and/or
incarcerated at the Jail. Armor’s services included performing intake, medical screening,
assessing detainees for medical issues, and providing medical treatment, medical
intervention, and referral services to those detained at the Jail.
During intake, on or about August 10, 2017, Hanna answered “No” to the
question, “Do you have any mental, physical, or developmental disabilities or limitations
that we need to know about during your incarceration?” (Dkt. 40 at ¶84). On his Intake

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Health Screening, his appearance was noted as unremarkable; he did not have any visible
signs of injuries and his behavior was alert and oriented. Hanna indicated that he was not
currently ill or injured, he had not experienced a head injury in the last seventy-two hours,
and he had not been to a hospital within the past three months. Hanna indicated that he
had active asthma and used his inhaler in 2016. From the time of his booking, through
August 22, 2017, Hanna presented and appeared to be a well-nourished, healthy, 29-yearold male.
On or about August 23, 2017, at approximately 11:58 a.m., Deputy Thomas
McGuire, who was assigned to the Jail, received a phone call informing him that Hanna
had passed out on the exercise yard. McGuire went to the exercise yard and asked Hanna
what happened. Hanna said he was playing basketball, blacked out, and his head hurt.
Hanna appeared disoriented at that time. Medical staff were called and Defendant Leila
Polanco, a nurse and Armor employee, responded. When Polanco arrived, Hanna was
seated in a chair. She was told by other residents of the Jail that Hanna had a seizure, it
was too hot outside, and another resident may have hit Hanna on the head. She took
Hanna’s vital signs: his pulse was 90 and his blood pressure was 98/80.
Hanna was conscious and able to verbally communicate. He told Polanco that he
had a right-sided headache and his pain was 7 on a scale of 1-10. Polanco concluded that
the warm temperature outside caused Hanna to faint and that he may have hit his head
during the fall and sustained a concussion. On the Urgent Care Assessment form she did
not select the box associated with “Acute Medical Condition (e.g. loss of consciousness,
seizure, etc.).” Instead, she selected the category “Unintentional (e.g. sports, fall, etc.).”

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Polanco requested to view any available video surveillance of Hanna’s incident in
the exercise yard. Deputy McGuire notified Defendant Sergeant Ronald Laughlin and
informed him of Hanna’s incident, Polanco’s observations and evaluations, and her desire
to view any available video. Sgt. Laughlin permitted Polanco to view a color video
recording of the incident on a computer. There was no audio. Sgt. Laughlin watched it
too. The video showed Hanna and other residents playing basketball outside in the
exercise yard when, all of a sudden, Hanna collapsed and hit his head on the ground. Sgt.
Laughlin’s notes from viewing the video indicated that at 11:55:19 Hanna collapsed and
he remained on the ground until 11:56:00—a duration of 41 seconds.
At no point on August 23, 2017, did Nurse Polanco or Sgt. Laughlin request,
contact, initiate, or recommend emergency medical services or fire rescue to respond to
the Jail to evaluate Hanna. They also did not request that Hanna be evaluated by a
licensed physician or medical doctor employed by Armor within the Jail. They never
requested or recommended that Hanna be transported to an outside medical facility, like a
hospital or emergency room.
Hanna was not seen by any physician, physician’s assistant, or medical doctor on
August 23, 2017. He was ordered to return to housing, where he resided in a cell alone.
On or about September 8, 2017, Deputy Randy Geis of MCSO observed Hanna on
the floor of his cell. Deputy Geis asked if he was okay and Hanna stood up and told
Deputy Geis that he felt light headed. Then, Hanna fainted. When Hanna fell, he hit his
head on a wall within the cell. Deputy Geis called a “med stat” over the radio and
Defendant Nurse Carma Ogline and Defendant Nurse Bernard Montayre, both Armor

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employees, responded, along with a number of MCSO Deputies and Sergeants. Nurse
Montayre attempted to take Hanna’s blood pressure, but could not get a reading. Nurse
Ogline took it using a manual cuff and stethoscope. No other vital signs were obtained or
attempted to be obtained by them.
Nurse Ogline questioned Hanna to determine what happened. Hanna complained
of left finger pain and told her he “passed out, I think.” Id. at ¶113. Hanna was
transported to the infirmary unit within the Jail where he was ordered to be monitored for
two hours and then returned to his cell if he became stable. During those two hours in the
infirmary unit, Hanna was never seen or evaluated by a doctor, physician, or physician’s
assistant.
At no point on September 8, 2017, did Nurse Montayre or Nurse Ogline request,
contact, initiate, or recommend emergency medical services or request fire rescue to
respond to the Jail to evaluate Hanna. They also did not recommend or request that
Hanna be transported to an outside medical facility. Further, they did not request that an
Armor physician or doctor see Hanna.
At no time on September 8, 2017, did any Armor employee perform any
diagnostic, radiological, or other study of Hanna’s heart, pulmonary, or neurological
systems. Later that same day, Hanna was permitted to return to his cell without any
required follow-up or observation of his medical condition.
The next day, Deputy Michael Braune of MCSO was assigned to the area of the
Jail where Hanna was housed.

At approximately 5:28 a.m., Deputy Braune passed

Hanna’s cell and observed Hanna lying face up on the floor underneath the toilet. He

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entered the cell to check on Hanna, who was breathing, but unresponsive to verbal or
tactile stimulation. Deputy Braune called a “med stat” and Nurse Ogline and Nurse
Grether responded. Nurse Ogline recorded a blood pressure of 80/62 and an unreadable
oxygen level. She observed that Hanna moaned at times, his hands were cold, his
respirations were deep and course (almost snore-like), and his pupils were fixed.
Sgt. Carr of MCSO had master control activate emergency medical services, which
arrived at approximately 5:58 a.m., and North River Fire Rescue arrived at approximately
6:10 a.m. In the meantime, Deputies from the MCSO attempted to perform CPR on
Hanna. Hanna, EMS, and North River Fire Rescue exited the Jail at approximately 6:28
a.m. and Hanna was transported to a nearby hospital.

Hanna has not regained

consciousness and remains in a persistent vegetative state.
The amended complaint avers that at some time after September 9, 2017, Hanna
returned to the Jail, where he was cared for at the Jail’s infirmary, despite his persistent
vegetative state. The allegations state that Hanna should have been transferred to an
outside facility, such as a nursing facility, for total care and housing, but never was
because the County, MCSO, and Armor wanted to save money.
The 134-page amended complaint delineates in great detail Armor’s policies. It
also avers in great detail prior Armor “incidents” involving poor medical care due to
Armor focusing on cost savings, rather than the administration of proper medical care.
For example, paragraphs 192-209 outline a parade of terribles—example after example of
prior incidents—most of which resulted in the death of the prisoner/detainee because the
medical care they received was grossly inadequate. The amended complaint includes that

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the County and MCSO knew or should have known of the described incidents, especially
in light of their contractual relationship with Armor, which began in 2012. The amended
complaint describes in painstaking detail (see paragraphs 16-29) factual allegations
related to the Jail’s overpopulation, failure to employ adequate staffing, and deficiencies
related to adequate medical care. Related to these allegations, there are facts imputing the
County, MCSO, and Armor with knowledge of these problems.
The crux of the amended complaint is that Defendants were medically negligent
and deliberately indifferent to Hanna’s medical needs. Related to this, there are a number
of negligent hiring and supervision claims against certain Defendants, and negligence
claims related to the overcrowding of the Jail.
In sum, the amended complaint names nine Defendants—Rick Wells, in his
official capacity as the Sheriff of Manatee County, Sgt. Laughlin, Armor, several Armor
nurses and one Armor physician, and Manatee County—includes twenty-three legal
claims (Counts I-XXIII), and contains 792 paragraphs. Rather than list each count, the
Court will discuss the legal claim during its analysis of Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Because it is clear on the face of the amended complaint that most of the claims
are properly pled and provide Defendants with ample notice of the facts supporting each
claim, the Court will begin with an analysis of the federal claims and then will briefly
discuss why the majority of the state law claims survive at this juncture.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint
when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When reviewing a motion

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to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation omitted). It must also
construe those factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hunt v.
Aimco Properties, L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pleadings that offer
only “labels and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action,” will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
DISCUSSION
I.

Federal Section 1983 Claims for Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs
A.

The Elements of the Claim

“‘[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ which is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.” Harris v. Leder, 519 Fed. Appx. 590, 595 (11th Cir. May 24, 2013) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Not
every claim of inadequate medical attention rises to the level of a constitutional violation.
To show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
a prisoner must establish three elements. First, he must satisfy the objective component
by showing that he had a serious medical need. Second, he must satisfy the subjective

8

component by showing that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference. Third, as
with any tort claim, the prisoner must show that the injury was caused by the defendant’s
wrongful conduct. See Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007).
To establish the subjective component, a prisoner must prove three things: (1)
subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct
that is more than [gross] negligence. See Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th
Cir. 2005); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley,
182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999); Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700,
704 (11th Cir. 1985).
A delay in providing medical treatment can sustain a “deliberate indifference”
claim, where the delay has exacerbated the prisoner’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged
the inmate’s pain. See Harper v Lawrence Cnty., Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.
2010). In this type of case, the nature of the medical need, the reason for the delay, and
the effect of the delay on the prisoner’s medical condition are all relevant factors in
determining whether the delay has reached constitutionally intolerable proportions. See
Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1327. When the need for medical treatment is obvious, medical care
that is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all may constitute deliberate
indifference. See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704.
B.

Municipal and Supervisor Liability under Section 1983

Any plaintiff bringing a section 1983 claim against a municipality based on the
acts of one of its employees/agents must prove two things. First, the plaintiff must
sufficiently allege a constitutional violation. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.

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796, 799 (1986). Second, the “plaintiff suing a municipality under § 1983 must show that
the municipality itself injured the plaintiff by having in place a policy or custom which
violated the plaintiff’s rights.” Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 451 (11th Cir. 1997)
(citing Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Under
Monell, the municipal “policy” or “custom” must be the moving force behind the
constitutional violation and “[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ or
‘conscious’ choice by the municipality can the failure be properly thought of as an
actionable city ‘policy.’” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989).
Here, although Armor is a private entity, it is considered a municipality for
purposes of section 1983 liability because the County and MCSO contracted with Armor
to provide medical care within the Manatee County jail system. In other words, Armor
performed traditional public functions. See Fields v. Corizon Health, Inc., 490 Fed.
Appx. 174, 181-82 (11th Cir. Sep. 6, 2012) (noting that: “Although Prison Health is not a
governmental entity, ‘[w]here a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state (or here, county) is performed by a private entity,’ that private entity, like a
municipality, may be held liable under § 1983") (quoting Ancata, 769 F.2d at 703).
Finally, supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under section 1983 for the
actions of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S.
at 691; Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir. 1990). In order to impose liability
on a supervisor, Plaintiff must allege that the supervisor either personally participated in
the acts comprising the alleged constitutional violation or instigated or adopted a policy
that violated Whidden’s constitutional rights. See Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544

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(11th Cir. 1995).
With respect to a failure to train, “a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation
premised on a failure to train must demonstrate that the supervisor had ‘actual or
constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes [his or her]
employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights,’ and that armed with that knowledge
the supervisor chose to retain that training program.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749
F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011)).
Having explained the legal standards, the Court turns to Defendants’ motions to
dismiss. The Court begins with a discussion of the claims asserted against the individual
Defendants. The Court will then turn to the municipal and supervisor claims asserted
against Armor, MCSO, and Manatee County.
C.

The Individual Defendants

Upon careful review of the amended complaint, the Court concludes that all of the
claims are sufficiently pled against the individual Defendants, except for Defendants
Paula Sanders and Elvira Perez. So the deliberate indifference claims against Polanco,
Ogline, Montayre, and Sgt. Laughlin will not be dismissed.1 As Plaintiff points out in his
responses, these individuals were all placed on notice of Hanna’s syncopal episodes but
took no action. The amended complaint alleges their (1) subjective knowledge of a risk
1

The facts discussed in this section are also sufficient to state medical negligence claims
against Polanco, Ogline, and Montayre. So Armor’s motion to dismiss is also denied with respect
to these claims. With respect to Sgt. Laughlin, the allegations related to his participation are also
sufficient to state a claim of vicarious liability for his negligence. So MCSO’s motion is denied with
respect to that claim.

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of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than [gross]
negligence. Notably, none of these Defendants ever requested that a physician located in
the Jail evaluate Hanna.
Plaintiff directs the Court to another deliberate indifference case, involving Armor,
which is persuasive. In Davies v. Israel, the court denied all of the defendants’ motions
to dismiss. 342 F. Supp. 3d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2018). In denying the motions to dismiss, the
court noted: “Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant played a different role in tending to
Plaintiff when he was unconscious and bleeding but nonetheless disregarded that serious
risk by failing to facilitate Plaintiff’s immediate emergency transfer to a hospital by, for
example, calling 911. In this way, Defendants each participated in delaying necessary
treatment for no apparent medical reason, which may constitute deliberate indifference.”
Id. at 1308 (citing Rutledge v. Ala., 724 F. App’x 713, 735 (11th Cir. 2018), Hill v.
Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Similarly, Defendants Polanco, Ogline, Montayre, and Sgt. Laughlin ignored
Hanna’s obvious need for (at the very least) a doctor’s evaluation. At intake, he was a
healthy, 29-year-old male. He suddenly passed out while playing basketball, hit his head,
remained passed out for 41 seconds, and appeared disoriented upon waking. He was
ordered to return to his housing, where he resided alone. Hanna was never seen or
evaluated by a licensed medical doctor, physician, or physician’s assistant. Follow-up
care was not required or recommended.
Hanna then passed out two more times. During the two hours that he stayed in the
Jail’s infirmary unit, he was never seen or evaluated by a doctor, physician, or physician’s

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assistant. Testing was not performed. Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) was not
requested. Hanna was sent to his cell and no follow-up, or supplemental observation was
required.
It was not until after Hanna’s fourth syncopal episode that EMS was called. By
that time, Hanna had lost consciousness and remains in a persistent vegetative state.
These facts plausibly show a need for medical treatment that was obvious and medical
care that was so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.
Notably, only Defendant Sgt. Laughlin argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity (assuming a constitutional violation occurred). This argument is denied at this
stage. The Eleventh Circuit has held that it is “clearly established … that an official acts
with deliberate indifference when he intentionally delays providing … access to medical
treatment, knowing that the [arrestee] has a life-threatening condition or an urgent
medical condition that would be exacerbated by delay.” Valderrama v. Rousseau, 780
F.3d 1108, 1121 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lancaster v. Monroe Cty., Ala., 116 F.3d 1419,
1425 (11th Cir. 1997)). The allegations as to Sgt. Laughlin plead that he was on notice
that Hanna had an urgent medical condition that escalated to being in a persistent
vegetative state because Sgt. Laughlin took no steps to activate EMS after Hanna had
been passed out for 41 seconds and appeared disoriented. Sgt. Laughlin may reargue his
entitlement to qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage once the record is
further developed.
The Court concludes that the claims against Sanders and Perez must be dismissed.
Indeed, the first 211 paragraphs of the amended complaint, which are the common

13

allegations, do not even reference Sanders and Perez. They are not referenced until much
later in the amended complaint where Plaintiff broadly alleges that Sanders and Perez
were deliberately indifferent to Hanna’s medical needs. But it is completely unclear what
role, if any, they played. Accordingly, Armor’s motion will be granted with respect to
Sanders and Perez.2
D.

Municipal and Supervisor Claims
Armor

The deliberate indifference claims against Armor are adequately pled. Contrary to
Armor’s arguments, the amended complaint provides numerous examples of Armor’s
custom and policy of habitually delaying taking inmates, who require emergency medical
care, to the hospital for treatment, thus causing serious injury and death. Plaintiff then
alleges facts about Armor’s decision to return and keep Hanna in the Jail once he was
finally hospitalized, knowing that it was inadequately staffed and without necessary
equipment to treat his serious medical condition of being in a persistent vegetative state.
Accordingly, Armor’s motion is denied with respect to the deliberate indifference claims.
MCSO
The deliberate indifference claim against MCSO is adequately pled. The amended
complaint alleges that Sheriff Wells and MCSO had a policy or custom to allow
overcrowding of the Jail, particularly the infirmary/medical unit. It was this “policy” or
“custom” that was a moving force behind the constitutional violation. Plaintiff also avers
that MCSO habitually failed (i.e., had a custom of failing) to supervise and evaluate
2

For these same reasons, the medical negligence claim against Sanders will be dismissed.

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Armor’s performance under the contract to provide health care services in the Jail, despite
having actual or constructive knowledge of Armor’s widespread and longstanding
practices of violating pretrial detainees’ constitutional rights. MCSO neglected to ensure
that Armor complied with its contractual obligations about its performance under the
contract, like the requirement to timely provide emergency, ambulatory, or specialty care.
At this motion to dismiss stage, these allegations are sufficient to plead MCSO’s liability.
Manatee County
The deliberate indifference claim against Manatee County is adequately pled.
Plaintiff has alleged that the County’s decisionmakers (i.e., its Board of County
Commissioners) consistently knew that the Jail and its infirmary were overcrowded and
made comments that foreshadowed that these issues would likely cause problems in the
future. According to the amended complaint, the County was on actual notice that Sheriff
Wells thought the Jail was “understaffed,” id. at ¶¶24, 29, lacked updated technology,
such as electronic medical records, id. at ¶27, and felt as though Armor was both under
staffing and having difficulty recruiting adequate talent for positions, id. at ¶ 29.
Despite contracting the services of Armor to provide medical care to people like
Hanna in the Jail, the Board repeatedly (over a span of years) complained and expressed
negative feelings about the actual cost of providing care to pretrial detainees in the Jail.
The Board also specifically discussed the medical needs of Hanna—care at an outside
nursing facility in contrast to the cost of actually providing those services in the Jail—and
made a conscious choice not to provide outside care because it was too expensive.

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Plaintiff also alleges that the County was concerned with getting: “the best bang
for [its] buck.” Id. at ¶77. The County referred to a small class of detainees that included
Hanna as making up “the bulk of the problem,” and expressed financial concerns related
to the cost associated with a need for emergency transport to outside services. Id. at ¶79.
According to the amended complaint, at all material times, Hanna should have
been transported to an outside facility and the County was deliberately indifferent to this
medical need because the County wanted to save money. Id. at ¶83. Plaintiff alleges that
it was the County’s refusal to take action due to cost-saving concerns that caused a
violation of Hanna’s constitutional rights to receive adequate medical care. This was part
of a longstanding and widespread practice and custom. Id. at ¶¶458-484.
In sum, Manatee County’s motion to dismiss with respect to the deliberate
indifference claim will be denied because Plaintiff alleges Manatee County itself injured
Hanna by having in place a policy or custom that violated Hanna’s constitutional rights.
II.

Related Florida Claims
A.

Armor

The Court concludes that the following negligence claims against Armor are
adequately pled: Count I - negligent hiring of Nurse Polanco; Count II - negligent training
& supervision; and Count IV vicarious liability for employees’ medical negligence.
The amended complaint includes factual details related to Armor failing to
reasonably investigate Polanco before it hired her.

Polanco had been previously

terminated from a similar position by Corizon Correctional Healthcare, the company that
handled health services for the Jail, immediately prior to Armor’s contract with MCSO

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and Manatee County. Polanco was unfit for the job and Hanna was within the zone of
foreseeable risk created by her employment because she failed to correctly diagnose his
medical condition on or about August 23, 2017, and failed to render (or recommend)
adequate care.
The negligent training and supervision claim delineates in great detail Armor’s
policies regarding Armor’s duty to train and supervise its employees and outlines how
these policies were violated. Id. at ¶235. This claim also alleges that it was this failure to
adequately train and supervise that caused Hanna’s serious medical condition.
With respect to the vicarious liability for employees’ medical negligence claim, the
Court will permit Plaintiff to plead this claim in the alternative. Specifically, the claims
of negligent hiring and negligent training and supervision purport to bring direct
negligence claims against Armor. To the extent that these claims relate to the Armor
employees’ employment, i.e., actions that took place during the course and scope of their
employment, there is no need to also allege a vicarious liability claim because the claims
will become duplicative. Since Rule 8 permits alternative pleading, the Court will not
further address Armor’s argument that the claims are “duplicative” and “unnecessary.”
The Court grants Armor’s motion with respect to the negligent overcrowding of
the Jail claim. As Armor points out, it has no ability (and, as such, no duty) to change the
size of the Jail, change the size of the infirmary, or unilaterally propose county
construction projects to make more space. Also, the Court notes that, to the extent this
claim relates to Armor’s employees’ failure to adequately operate the Jail infirmary, any
such claim would be subsumed in the claim for negligent training and supervision. So the

17

negligent overcrowding claim will be dismissed.
B.

MCSO

MCSO moves to dismiss all of the Florida tort claims: negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention of Armor; negligent retention of MCSO employees; negligent
overcrowding of jail; and vicarious liability for Sgt. Laughlin’s negligence.3 Upon review
of these claims, the Court concludes they are adequately pled, except for the claim of
negligent retention of MCSO employees.
As explained above in the context of the deliberate indifference claim against
MCSO, Plaintiff avers that MCSO habitually failed (i.e., had a custom of failing) to
supervise and evaluate Armor’s performance under the contract to provide health care
services in the Jail, despite having actual or constructive knowledge of Armor’s
widespread and longstanding practices of violating pretrial detainees’ constitutional
rights. MCSO neglected to ensure that Armor complied with its contractual obligations
about its performance under the contract, like the requirement to timely provide
emergency, ambulatory, or specialty care.

MCSO’s failure to adequately supervise

Armor damaged Hanna. These allegations are sufficient.
The claim related to negligent retention of MCSO employees does not sufficiently
plead causation, i.e., that any negligence on the part of MCSO’s employees was the
proximate cause of Hanna’s harm. Indeed, there are no facts alleging that any MCSO
employee, other than Sgt. Laughlin, came into sufficient contact with Hanna to have

3

As stated above, the vicarious liability claim related to Sgt. Laughlin’s negligence will not
be dismissed.

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caused him any injury. So this claim will be dismissed.
Finally, the negligent overcrowding of the Jail claim will not be dismissed.
Plaintiff avers that from 2015-2018, the average daily jail population at the Jail exceeded
its limits and the Jail was understaffed. The Sheriff knew that the Jail’s infirmary unit
was only built for 24 people but was “often over the capacity.” Id. at ¶26. Notably,
contrary to MCSO’s motion, Plaintiff’s claim is not that MCSO should build or expand
the Jail.

Rather, Plaintiff claims that, in operating the Jail day-to-day, the Sheriff

continually allowed overcrowding, which in turn led to overcrowding within the Jail’s
infirmary unit, which ultimately impacted the medical care that Hanna received at various
points in his detention. The overcrowding caused and contributed to Hanna’s inadequate
evaluations and treatments, both during the syncopal episodes, and after he was already in
a vegetative state.
As Plaintiff argues in the response, the inquiry is whether, in the operation of the
Jail with its known limitations and overcrowding, MCSO failed to reasonably send Hanna
to an outside facility, instead of leaving him in an overcrowded, understaffed, and illequipped infirmary unit. Plaintiff is not claiming that the Jail or its infirmary/medical
unit should have, from inception, been designed, planned, or constructed for a larger
capacity. As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, how a Sheriff assigns detainees in his
or her custody to particular locations “is an operational level act not protected by
sovereign immunity.” Dept. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Whaley, 574 So. 2d 100, 104
(Fla. 1991); accord Stiles v. Judd, No. 8:12-cv-2375-T-27EAJ, 2013 WL 4714402, at *10
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013). Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss this claim.

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C.

Manatee County

The only Florida claim against Manatee County is a claim for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision of Armor. This claim is very similar to the claim discussed in
the previous section against MCSO. At this stage, the Court will permit this claim to
survive because the amended complaint alleges that Manatee County was on notice that
Armor was incompetent and unfit to perform medical services at the Jail and Manatee
County elected to take no action with respect to Armor because Manatee County was
more concerned with saving costs. These facts are discussed in more detail under the
deliberate indifference claim asserted against Manatee County.
The negligence claim also alleges causation, i.e., that Manatee County’s failure to
adequately supervise Armor led to Hanna’s damages. Accordingly, the Court will not
dismiss this claim.
Having addressed all of the legal claims, the Court parts with one final thought.
Defendants asserted some arguments that were not appropriate at this motion to dismiss
stage. The Court’s failure to address them does not mean they lack merit. Rather, for the
sake of brevity in light of the twenty-three claims that were at issue here, the Court
declined to address certain arguments that are best left for summary judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
1.

Defendant Rick Wells’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 43) is granted in part and
denied in part.

2.

Defendant Ronald Laughlin’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 44) is denied.

3.

Armor Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 45) is granted in part and

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denied in part.
4.

Defendant Manatee County’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 48) is denied.

5.

All legal claims will remain except for the following: Counts VI, IX, XVIII,
XIX, and XX.

6.

Defendants shall file their Answers to the Amended Complaint within
fourteen (14) days of this Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on June 28, 2019.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel/Parties of Record

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