Sloben v. Hillsborough County State Attorney's Office et al
ORDER denying 6 Motion to Remand to State Court; granting 9 Motion to Dismiss. This case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions and CLOSE the case. Signed by Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle on 6/5/2021. (NPC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
JAY ANDREW SLOBEN,
Case No: 8:21-cv-0672-KKM-JSS
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY STATE
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, JUDGE
FRANCES M. PERRONE, JOHN
ROCCO PACE, and ANTHONY
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) and Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9). Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, so this Court will treat the motion as unopposed. See Local Rule
3.01(c). The Court denies the motion to remand and grants the motion to dismiss.
This action appears to originate from a series of domestic relations actions in
Hillsborough County Circuit Court involving Plaintiff. 1 (Doc. 9 at 5). Plaintiff
challenges the actions of Judge Perrone, who presided over a case and entered a stalking
When considering a factual attack in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings. See Garcia v. Copenhaver,
Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997).
injunction against Plaintiff; the State Attorney’s office for prosecuting several cases
against him; Officer John Rocco Pace, who uncovered a recording device belonging to
Plaintiff and sought a stalking injunction against Plaintiff; and Anthony Letourneau,
who petitioned for a stalking injunction against Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 9 at 5). There
are also three pending criminal cases against Plaintiff for violating the injunction and
cyberstalking. (Doc. 9 at 5). Plaintiff filed the instant action in small claims court alleging
intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, cyberstalking, and
deprivation of rights under color of law. (Doc. 1-1). Defendants’ timely removed the
action under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because Plaintiff’s complaint contains allegations of
deprivation of federal civil rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed a paper challenging removal,
and Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure
to state a claim. (Docs. 6 & 9).
As an initial matter, the Court construes Plaintiff’s March 29, 2021 filing as a
motion to remand the action to state court. Although titled as “Defendants Motion for
Removal and Motion to Enlarge Time is Therefore Denied,” the Plaintiff seeks to
remand the action to state court and gives reasons to reject the Defendants’ notice of
removal. (Doc. 6). All of Plaintiff’s reasons boil down to the fact that he would rather
litigate in state court than federal court, which is insufficient to warrant remand.
Further, Plaintiff’s claim is due to be dismissed for a number of reasons. First,
Judge Perrone enjoys absolute judicial immunity for her actions. See, e.g., McCree v.
Griffin, 2020 WL 2632329 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020); McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,
1331 (11th Cir. 2018); Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2018). A judge
is subject to liability only in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. That is not the case
Second, it appears that all of Plaintiff’s complaints stem from a series of judicial
decisions in state court and pending criminal charges, which this Court is not at liberty
to review. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court lacks jurisdiction to review a
final state court decision and must dismiss cases “complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 293 (2005). Federal district courts may not exercise
jurisdiction to decide federal issues which are inextricably intertwined with a state
court’s judgment,” unless the plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity to raise the federal
claim in state proceedings. Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, it
appears the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to complain of his injuries in the state court
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is challenging his currently pending criminal
prosecutions, the Court is not permitted to enjoin the state action. See Younger v. Harris,
401 US. 37, 43–45 (1971); Old Republic Union Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., 124 F.3d 1258,
1261 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Under Younger v. Harris and its progeny, federal district courts
must refrain from enjoining pending state court proceedings except under special
circumstances.”). While the precise relief sought by Plaintiff is unclear, his complaint
essentially asks this Court to stop the prosecutions and restraining orders, which it
cannot do. Accordingly, the following is ordered:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (Doc. 6) is DENIED.
2. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED. This case is
DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending
motions and close the case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 5, 2021.
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