Allen v. United States of America

Filing 22

ORDER: (1)Marquese Jerrodda Allen's pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 124) is DENIED. (2) Mr. Allen's Motion for Issuance of a Show Cause Order (Civ. Doc. # 21) is DENIED as moot. (3) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the United States of America and to close this case. Signed by Judge Virginia M. Hernandez Covington on 3/10/2025. (RAS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARQUESE JERRODDA ALLEN,
v.

Case No. 8:18-cr-526-VMC-TGW
8:22-cv-909-VMC-NHA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
_______________________________/
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Marquese Jerrodda
Allen’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,
or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 124), filed
on April 19, 2022. The United States of America responded on
August 1, 2022. (Civ. Doc. # 10). Mr. Allen filed a motion to
amend and supplement his Motion on August 5, 2022. (Civ. Doc.
# 11), and the United States filed two responses to the
supplement on August 22, 2022, and August 11, 2023. (Civ.
Doc. ## 13, 18). For the reasons that follow, the Motion is
denied.
I.

Background
On November 21, 2019, a grand jury returned a superseding

indictment charging Mr. Allen with one count of possession of
a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. (Crim. Doc. #
68). Following a bench trial on December 2, 2019, in which
1

the parties stipulated to the facts, the Court found Mr. Allen
guilty. (Crim. Doc. # 79).
As stipulated by the parties, “[o]n July 14, 2018, a
woman phoned authorities stating that a man had just pulled
a silver-and-black pistol on her and threatened her life.”
(Crim. Doc. # 72 at 1). Police officers responded to the motel
where this had taken place and arrested Mr. Allen. (Id. at 12). Then, a maid entered Mr. Allen’s room and “found a silver
and black pistol and alerted an officer, who was standing
inside the room.” (Id. at 2). While this was occurring, Mr.
Allen was handcuffed in the back of a police car, and “made
a spontaneous statement: He denied ever pointing his gun at
the victim, but admitted to moving his gun while speaking
with the victim in his room.” (Id.) Finally, “[a]t the time
that the defendant possessed the above-noted firearm and
ammunition on July 19, 2018, he knew that he was a convicted
felon.” (Id. at 3).
Prior to trial, Mr. Allen’s counsel, Bryant Scriven,
filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the
government’s search of the motel room. (Crim. Doc. # 39). In
the motion, Mr. Allen argued that the police officer who
accompanied the maid into the motel room, Officer Corinna
Branley, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by doing so
2

because he had a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the
room and Officer Branley entered without a warrant or exigent
circumstances. (Id. at 5). Mr. Allen also argued that the
maid’s search of his bag that contained the firearm was a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. at 9-10).
In an affidavit attached to the government’s response to
this

Motion,

Mr.

Scriven

avers

that

he

had

“lengthy

discussions” with Mr. Allen regarding the suppression hearing
and “discussed how the maid could possibly add value to our
case or undermine it.” (Civ. Doc. # 10-1 at 3). He claims
further that “[m]y office as well as the public defender’s
office (prior to my appointment), attempted to locate this
witness to speak with her but was unsuccessful.” (Id.). As
such, Mr. Scriven notes that he “explained to Mr. Allen that
the information we had about the maid’s involvement, (through
deposition of Ofc. Branley), was neutral to our position and
he agreed to proceed with the [suppression] hearing.” (Id.).
On August 27, 2019, Magistrate Judge Thomas G. Wilson
held an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion. (Crim.
Doc. # 117). Officer Branley testified that she interacted
with the maid as the maid was about to enter Mr. Allen’s motel
room to clean the room and remove his items (Id. at 62:1663:7). She testified that the maid “was nervous” and that she
3

offered to accompany the maid into the room, to which the
maid said “yes, I would like you stand in the room.” (Id. at
63:1-7). Officer Branley testified that she did not search
anything while in the room, nor did she tell the maid to
search for anything. (Id. at 66:8-67:12). She then described
how she observed the maid go into his bag, locate the gun,
and then alert her about the gun. (Id. at 67:21-68:8). Officer
Branley then told the maid “not to touch it, and then [she]
called for a crime scene technician to come and take a picture
of the gun and process it.” (Id. at 68:4-13).
On October 7, 2019, Magistrate Judge Wilson issued a
report and recommendation recommending that the motion to
suppress be denied. (Crim Doc. # 59). Magistrate Judge Wilson
found that the motel owner’s decision to evict Mr. Allen from
the motel following his arrest terminated whatever reasonable
expectation of privacy Mr. Allen possessed as to the room.
(Id. at 12-13). Magistrate Judge Wilson also determined that
the maid was not acting as a government agent when she found
the firearm so that the seizure of the firearm was not a
Fourth Amendment violation. (Id. at 20). Mr. Allen filed an
objection to the report and recommendation. (Crim. Doc. #
63). This Court overruled the objection, and accepted and

4

adopted the report and recommendation on November 7, 2019.
(Crim. Doc. # 65).
After

Mr.

Allen

was

found

guilty,

a

Presentence

Investigation Report was created. (Crim. Doc. # 88). In the
report, Mr. Allen received a four-level enhancement because
he possessed the firearm in connection with another offense
— the aggravated assault of the victim. (Id. at 6). The report
additionally concluded that Mr. Allen qualified as an armed
career criminal and was subject to an enhanced sentence under
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because he had at least
three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug
offense. (Id.). The report identified four such offenses:
Sale of Cocaine on December 20, 1994; Sale of Cocaine on
September 11, 1998; Sale of Cocaine on September 22, 2004;
and Sale or Delivery of Cocaine (two counts) on February 4,
2013. (Id. at 6-7). Mr. Allen objected to both the enhancement
and the ACCA designation. (Id. at 34-36). As to the ACCA
designation, Mr. Allen argued that a then-upcoming decision
in Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020), could impact
whether the sale or possession of controlled substances could
serve as predicate offenses under ACCA. (Id. at 46).
By the time of sentencing, the Supreme Court had issued
its decision in Shular, and Mr. Scriven acknowledged that Mr.
5

Allen’s prior drug offenses still qualified as predicate
offenses under ACCA after Shular. (Crim. Doc. # 155 at 6:1015). Yet, Mr. Allen still maintained his objection to the
ACCA designation, as well as to the four-level enhancement.
(Id. at 5:24-6:15). The Court overruled both objections. (Id.
at 44:21-45:9). The Court sentenced Mr. Allen to 200 months
of incarceration. (Crim. Doc. # 104).
Mr. Allen appealed his conviction, arguing that the
Court erred in denying his suppression motion. (Crim. Doc. #
122). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction,

holding

that

Mr.

Allen

lacked

a

reasonable

expectation of privacy in the motel room, and that the maid
was not acting as a government agent. (Id. at 9, 11).
On April 19, 2022, Mr. Allen filed his pro se 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ.
Doc. # 1; Crim. Doc. # 124). The government responded on
August 1, 2022. (Civ. Doc. # 10). On August 5, 2022, Mr. Allen
filed a motion to amend and supplement his 2255 Motion. (Civ.
Doc. # 11). The government responded to the motion to amend
and supplement on August 22, 2022, requesting that the Court
hold Mr. Allen’s 2255 Motion in abeyance pending the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846
(11th Cir. 2022). (Civ. Doc. # 13). On December 27, 2022, Mr.
6

Allen filed a motion to hold his 2255 Motion in abeyance,
pending the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jackson. (Civ.
Doc. # 14). On February 27, 2023, the government filed a
status

report,

indicating

that

the

Eleventh

Circuit

had

issued its decision in Jackson. (Civ. Doc. # 15). On June 29,
2023, the Court ordered Mr. Allen to file an amended motion
addressing the effect of Jackson on his underlying conviction
within thirty days. (Civ. Doc. # 16). Mr. Allen never filed
an amended motion, but the government, after Mr. Allen’s
filing deadline had passed, filed a supplemental response
addressing the effect of Jackson on Mr. Allen’s underlying
conviction. (Civ. Doc. # 18). Accordingly, the Motion is now
ripe for review.
II.

Legal Standard
Mr. Allen bears the burden of proving that he is entitled

to relief under Section 2255. See LeCroy v. United States,
739 F.3d 1297, 1321 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[O]n a § 2255 petition,
[the burden of proof] belongs to the petitioner.”). “Under
the

procedural

default

rule,

a

defendant

generally

must

advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or
sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred
from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” Lynn v.
United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2004). A
7

petitioner “can avoid a procedural bar only by establishing
one of the two exceptions to the procedural default rule.
Under the first exception, a defendant must show cause for
not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual
prejudice from the alleged error.” Id. “Under the second
exception, a court may allow a defendant to proceed with a §
2255 motion despite his failure to show cause for procedural
default if a constitutional violation has probably resulted
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Id.
(internal

quotations

and

citations

omitted).

However,

“failure to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought in
a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255.” Massaro v.
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 509 (2003).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel,

a

petitioner

must

show

that

(1)

his

counsel’s

performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, Mr.
Allen must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
“that particular and identified acts or omissions of counsel
were

outside

the

wide

range

of

professionally

competent

assistance.” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314
8

(11th Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
In other words, Mr. Allen must show that “no competent counsel
would have taken the action that [his] counsel did take.” Id.
at 1315. In deciding whether an attorney’s performance was
deficient, courts are “highly deferential” and “indulge [the]
strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable
and

that

counsel

made

all

significant

decisions

in

the

exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 1314
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To satisfy Strickland’s second prong — prejudice — Mr.
Allen must show that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
“[C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing
or not pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a
nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for
counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense
thoroughly.” Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1060 (11th
Cir.

2002)

(citation

omitted).

“The

decision

whether

to

present a line of defense, or even to investigate it, is a
matter

of

strategy

and

is

not
9

ineffective

unless

the

petitioner can prove that the chosen course, in itself, was
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Additionally, “[i]n cases where the files and records
make manifest the lack of merit of a Section 2255 claim, the
trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”
United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir.
1984).
III. Analysis
Mr. Allen organizes his claims into four grounds. (Civ.
Doc. # 1). These grounds are: his counsel was ineffective in
his challenge of Mr. Allen’s ACCA designation (Ground 1); his
counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena and call as
a witness the maid from the motel (Ground 2); his due process
rights

were

violated

because

Officer

Branley

committed

perjury in her testimony (Ground 3); and that the cumulative
errors by his counsel denied Mr. Allen’s right to a fair trial
(Ground 4). (Id.). The Court analyzes each of these grounds
in turn.
A.

Ground 1

Mr. Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge his ACCA designation on the basis that
the government failed to identify which three prior felonies
the government was basing the designation upon, and had
10

counsel forced the government to do so, he then could have
proven that the ACCA enhancement should not apply. (Id. at 48). The government responds that the ACCA designation was
properly applied to Mr. Allen, such that his counsel could
not have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless
argument. (Civ. Doc. # 10 at 11-12). The Court agrees with
the government that this claim is meritless.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), an individual is an armed
career criminal if he “violates § 922(g) of this title and
has three previous convictions by any court referred to in §
922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense.” A “serious drug offense” is “an offense under
State

law,

possessing

involving
with

intent

manufacturing,

distributing,

or

to

or

a

manufacture

distribute,

controlled substance . . . , for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
Mr. Allen was found guilty of § 922(g)(1). (Crim. Doc.
# 79). The report identified four prior offenses which applied
as serious drug offenses under § 924(e)(1): Sale of Cocaine
on December 20, 1994; Sale of Cocaine on September 11, 1998;
Sale of Cocaine on September 22, 2004; and Sale or Delivery
of Cocaine (two counts) on February 4, 2013. (Crim. Doc. # 88
11

at 6-7). Thus, the ACCA designation was properly applied to
Mr. Allen.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d sub nom. Brown
v. United States, 602 U.S. 101 (2024), does not alter this
conclusion. Jackson held that courts should “read ACCA’s
definition of a ‘serious drug offense’ under state law to
incorporate the version of the federal controlled-substances
schedules in effect when Jackson was convicted of his prior
state drug offenses.” 55 F.4th at 855. Ioflupane, a cocaine
derivate, was removed from the federal drug schedule in 2015.
See Schedules of Controlled Substances: Removal of Ioflupane
from Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, 80 Fed.
Reg. 54,715 (Sept. 11, 2015). Mr. Allen’s predicate drug
offenses for cocaine occurred in 1994, 1998, 2004, and 2013.
(Crim. Doc. # 88 at 6-7). Because each of these offenses
occurred before the 2015 removal of ioflupane from the federal
drug schedule and the Court must apply the “federal controlled
substances schedules in effect” at the time of the offenses,
each conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense. Jackson,
55 F.4th at 855.
Although neither party has raised this issue, the Court
finds it necessary to address the Supreme Court’s recent
12

decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024).
Erlinger held that the question of whether predicate offenses
occurred on separate occasions is a question of fact that
must be determined by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. 602 U.S. at 834–35. However, this Court and other
courts in this District have held that Erlinger does not apply
retroactively

in

Section

2255

proceedings.

Stackhouse

v.

United States, 8:18-cv-772-VMC-TGW, 2024 WL 5047342, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2024); Grant v. United States, No. 8:24cv-2029-WFJ-CPT, 2024 WL 4729193, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8,
2024).

Therefore,

Erlinger

does

not

affect

the

Court’s

conclusion that the ACCA designation was properly applied to
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen also claims that the government needed to
explicitly identify which three of the four prior convictions
it was relying upon to apply the ACCA designation. He cites
no precedent to support this claim. Mr. Allen’s counsel could
not have been ineffective for failing to raise an unsupported
legal argument. See Rambaran v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 821
F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[R]easonably effective
representation cannot and does not include a requirement to
make

arguments

based

on

predictions

of

how

the

law

may

develop.” (internal quotations omitted)); Brownlee, 306 F.3d
13

at 1060 (“The decision whether to present a line of defense,
or even to investigate it, is a matter of strategy and is not
ineffective unless the petitioner can prove that the chosen
course, in itself, was unreasonable.” (internal quotation and
citation omitted)).
Therefore, this claim fails.
B.

Ground Two

Mr. Allen next argues that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to subpoena the maid from the hotel for the
suppression hearing. (Civ. Doc. # 1 at 9-15). The government
responds

that

counsel

was

not

deficient

for

failing

to

subpoena the maid, and that even if his counsel was deficient,
Mr.

Allen

cannot

establish

prejudice

because

the

maid’s

testimony would not have changed the result of the suppression
hearing. The Court agrees with each of the government’s
arguments.
Mr. Scriven’s decision not to subpoena and call the hotel
maid as a witness for the suppression hearing was reasonable.
Mr. Scriven explained his rationale for not calling the maid
to Mr. Allen and obtained his agreement to not call the maid.
See (Doc. # 10-1 at 3) (“I explained to Mr. Allen that the
information we had about the maid’s involvement . . . was
neutral to our position and he agreed to proceed with the
14

hearing on the Motion to Suppress without her.”). Thus, Mr.
Scriven’s decision not to call the maid as a witness was
strategic,

as

he

could

not

locate

the

witness

and

had

concluded that her testimony would have been “neutral” to the
success of the motion to suppress. Id. Given this wellreasoned determination, the Court finds that Mr. Scriven’s
decision not to call the maid, which Mr. Allen agreed to, did
not

constitute

deficient

performance.

See

Conklin

v.

Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Which
witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the
epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will
seldom, if ever, second guess.”); Brownlee, 306 F.3d at 1060
(“The decision whether to present a line of defense, or even
to

investigate

it,

is

a

matter

of

strategy

and

is

not

ineffective unless the petitioner can prove that the chosen
course, in itself, was unreasonable.” (internal quotation and
citation omitted)).
Even if Mr. Allen could establish that Mr. Scriven
performed deficiently by failing to call the maid, he suffered
no prejudice from this failure. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687

(requiring

petitioners

to

establish

both

deficient

performance and prejudice to prove a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel). Magistrate Judge Wilson held that
15

“[a]ny reasonable expectation of privacy the defendant had in
room 118 was eliminated when the motel owner evicted the
defendant for threatening a motel guest with a gun.” (Crim.
Doc.

#

59

at

13).

Accordingly,

Magistrate

Judge

Wilson

concluded that Mr. Allen “did not have standing to complain
about Officer Branley’s entry into the hotel room.” (Id. at
17). The Eleventh Circuit agreed with this conclusion on
appeal. (Crim. Doc. # 122 at 9). Therefore, regardless of the
maid’s testimony, Mr. Allen still would have lacked standing
to assert his claim for suppression.
Having failed to establish both deficient performance
and prejudice by his counsel, this claim fails.
C.

Ground Three

Mr. Allen claims that Officer Branley committed perjury
in her testimony at the suppression hearing, such that his
due process rights were violated. (Civ. Doc # 1 at 16-20).
The

government

responds

that

this

claim

is

procedurally

defaulted because Mr. Allen failed to raise this claim in his
direct appeal. (Civ. Doc. # 10 at 6-9). The Court agrees.
Mr. Allen did not raise this claim in his direct appeal.
See United States v. Allen, 20-12484, at Doc. # 15 (11th Cir.
October 15, 2020). Accordingly, he has procedurally defaulted
on this claim. See Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35 (“[A] defendant
16

generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal
conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant
is

barred

from

presenting

that

claim

in

a

§

2255

proceeding.”). Mr. Allen must then satisfy one of the two
exceptions to the procedural default rule: he “must show cause
for not raising the claim of error on direct appeal and actual
prejudice from the alleged error”; or he must show that “a
constitutional

violation

has

probably

resulted

in

the

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” (Id.).
Mr. Allen claims that he failed to raise this claim in
his direct appeal because his counsel, despite having been
provided

with

the

alleged

facts

demonstrating

Officer

Branley’s perjury, “disregarded” those facts. (Civ. Doc. # 1
at 16). Mr. Allen “can establish cause by showing that a
procedural default was caused by constitutionally ineffective
assistance

of

counsel

under

Strickland.”

Fortenberry

v.

Haley, 297 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002).
However, Mr. Allen has not established a valid claim of
ineffective

assistance

of

counsel.

In

his

report

and

recommendation, Magistrate Judge Wilson held that he “fully
credit[ed] the testimony of Officer Branley. Her testimony
was

unequivocal

Officer

and

Branley’s

forthright.

demeanor

or
17

There

was

responses

nothing
that

about

suggested

deception.” (Crim. Doc. # 59 at 9). On appeal, Magistrate
Judge Wilson’s credibility determination would be entitled to
deference. See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744,
749

(11th

Cir.

2002)

(“Credibility

determinations

are

typically the province of the fact finder because the fact
finder personally observes the testimony and is thus in a
better

position

than

a

reviewing

court

to

assess

the

credibility of witnesses.”). Thus, even if Mr. Allen had
raised this argument in his direct appeal, the argument likely
would have failed. Mr. Allen’s counsel was not ineffective
for

having

failed

to

raise

the

argument

on

appeal.

Accordingly, there was no cause for Mr. Allen’s failure to
raise these arguments on appeal. See Lynn, 365 F.3d at 123435 (requiring both cause and prejudice to excuse a procedural
default).
Mr. Allen also cannot meet the second possible exception
to a procedural default that a “constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent.” Id. “[A]ctual innocence means factual innocence,
not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523
U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Mr. Allen stipulated to possessing a
firearm and ammunition and to knowing that he was a convicted
felon. (Crim. Doc. # 72 at 3). Thus, the Court does not find
18

any evidence of actual innocence in the record. Accordingly,
Mr. Allen cannot establish the second exception for his
procedural default.
Having
procedural

failed

to

default,

establish
the

Court

both

exceptions

denies

this

for

his

claim

as

procedurally defaulted.
D.

Ground Four

Mr. Allen claims that the cumulative errors of his
counsel justify a vacatur of his conviction. (Civ. Doc. # 1
at 20-22). The Court disagrees.
As analyzed above, Mr. Allen has failed to establish any
errors by his counsel. Therefore, there can be no cumulative
error. See United States v. Lozano, 711 F. App’x 934, 941
(11th Cir. 2017) (“[Defendant] cannot show cumulative error
denied him a fundamentally fair trial because . . . he has
not shown an individual error occurred.”). This claim fails.
IV.

Evidentiary Hearing
As the Court has readily concluded that the Motion lacks

merit, the Court declines to hold an evidentiary hearing on
Mr. Allen’s

2255

Motion.

See

Lagrone,

727

F.2d

at

1038

(holding that courts need not hold evidentiary hearings in §
2255 actions when the lack of merit is “manifest”).

19

V.

Certificate of Appealability and Leave to Appeal In
Forma Pauperis Denied
The

Court

appealability

declines

because

Mr.

to

issue

Allen

has

a

certificate

failed

to

make

of
a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right
as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor will the Court
authorize Mr. Allen to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
because such an appeal would not be taken in good faith. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Mr. Allen shall be required to pay
the full amount of the appellate filing fee pursuant to
Section 1915(b)(1) and (2).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1)

Marquese Jerrodda Allen’s pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion
to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Civ. Doc. #
1; Crim. Doc. # 124) is DENIED.

(2)

Mr. Allen’s Motion for Issuance of a Show Cause Order
(Civ. Doc. # 21) is DENIED as moot.

(3)

The Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the United
States of America and to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 10th

day of March, 2025.

20

21