Monroe v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC

Filing 59

ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 33 is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 35 is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Defendant Rocket Mortgage and against Plaintiff Ryan Monroe. The Clerk is further directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines and CLOSE this case. Signed by Senior Judge Charlene Edwards Honeywell on 9/25/2024. (JDE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RYAN MONROE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 8:22-cv-1834-CEH-NHA

ROCKET MORTGAGE, LLC,
Defendant.
___________________________________/

ORDER
In this employment discrimination action, Plaintiff Ryan Monroe sues his
former employer Defendant Rocket Mortgage, LLC, under the Family Medical Leave
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12112, et seq (“ADA”); and the Florida’s Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. § 760, et
seq. (“FCRA”). Doc. 1. Before the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary
judgment (Docs. 33, 35), responses in opposition (Docs. 45, 48), Rocket Mortgage’s
reply (Doc. 49), and the parties’ Stipulation of Agreed Material Facts (Doc. 47).
Additionally, the parties filed deposition transcripts, email communications,
declarations, medical records, and other documents in support of their respective
motions. See Docs. 33-1–33-17; 34-1–34-10; 36; 36-1–9; 37; 38-1; 39-1–3; 40; 41-1–4111; 46. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his FMLA interference claim and his
failure to accommodate claims under the ADA and FCRA. Defendant seeks judgment
in its favor on all of Plaintiff’s claims. After careful consideration of the parties’

submissions, including deposition transcripts, affidavits, memoranda of counsel and
accompanying exhibits, and for the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) will be denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 35) will be granted.
I.

BACKGROUND1
A.

Undisputed Facts2

Plaintiff Ryan Monroe (“Plaintiff” or “Monroe”) began his employment with
Defendant Rocket Mortgage, LLC (“Defendant” or “Rocket Mortgage”) on May 16,
2005. Doc. 47 ¶ 1. Monroe’s employment with Rocket Mortgage ended on August 1,
2021. Id. ¶ 2. On that date, Monroe sent a resignation email to his Team Leader, Cady
Oesterreich stating:
Hi Cady. Thank you so much for all the info. Well since my
doctor note3 does not want me working more than 30 hours
The Court has determined the facts, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, based on
the parties’ submissions, including declarations and exhibits, as well as the parties’ Joint
Stipulation of Agreed Material Facts (Doc. 47). For purposes of summary judgment, the
Court presents the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party as required by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
2
Unless otherwise indicated, these facts are taken from the parties’ Stipulation of Agreed
Material Facts (Doc. 47).
3
In his deposition, Monroe testified that he gave a July 2015 doctor’s note to Oesterreich.
Doc. 41-1 at 70, 74-75, 87-88, 99-100. The note, authored by Monroe’s Michigan doctor, Dr.
Daniel Kaul, and dated July 15, 2021, states that the patient [Monroe] is asking that his
schedule return to 30 hours per week in order to attend in-person medical appointments. Doc.
41-7. Dr. Kaul’s records reveal that Monroe contacted Dr. Kaul’s nurse, Mark, on July 15,
2021, requesting an updated work letter that states that “now that Covid vaccine is out Ryan
is able to start going to his appointments again so please allow him back to the 30 hours per
week requirement so he can make all his appointments.” Doc. 39-3 at 2-3. It appears that Dr.
Kaul signed this letter, which was dated July 15, 2021, at Monroe’s request without evaluating
Monroe. Monroe’s response argues that whether Plaintiff provided the note to Rocket
Mortgage is immaterial. Doc. 48 at 11. Similarly, Monroe’s motion does not argue that the
note was ever delivered to Rocket Mortgage. Doc. 33 at 9. Rather, he cites to his August 1,
1

2

this is forcing me to quit. The messed up thing was when I
was on the 30 hours and agreed to help out more during
Covid both HR and my leadership said if it ever becomes
too much you can go back on the 30 hours any time. And
even you said a couple weeks ago you thought it would be
no problem because you knew those were the circumstances
so whoever made this new random decision to not allow it
now even during a slow time is a real piece of work.
Anyway I am happy that I can leave here with my [head]
held high that I did a great job for 16 years and never did
anything but help this company grow. I do want to say that
you have been an amazing team leader and I appreciate
you. Today august (sic) 1st will be my last day with the
company[.] And as of august (sic) second I will not be with
the company.
Doc. 36-9.
Prior to the end of his employment with Rocket Mortgage, Monroe held the
position of underwriter in the Company’s Client Experience Operations business
(“CEOps”). Doc. 47 ¶ 3. He was a hard-working employee who received aboveaverage performance reviews with no disciplinary conduct. Doc. 41-1 at 102–03.
During his tenure with Rocket Mortgage, Monroe applied for leave pursuant to the
FMLA and for an accommodation pursuant to the ADA. Doc. 47 ¶¶ 4, 5.

2021 resignation email to Oesterreich referencing a doctor’s note. Id. Plaintiff argues that
Swift should have inquired further about the doctor’s note after Oesterreich forwarded the
August 1 email to Swift and Swift became aware that there was a doctor’s note. Id. August
1st was a Sunday. Oesterreich forwarded Monroe’s August 1 email to Swift and others on
Monday August 2, 2021, which would have been after Monroe had already resigned. Doc.
33-1 at 1–2. Oesterreich testifies she never received the note. Doc. 41-5 at 35. Additionally,
Rocket Mortgage submits the declaration of Amy Courtney, a Principal Data Analyst at
Rocket Mortgage, who attests that she conducted a thorough search of Rocket Mortgage’s
network for any documents, e-mails, instant messages or other communication from Monroe
or his healthcare provider containing a doctor’s note dated July 15, 2021, and no such
document exists. Doc. 37 ¶¶ 6, 7, 8.
3

On January 28, 2020, Monroe requested an accommodation in the form of a
reduced 30-hour work week due to health-related issues. Id. ¶ 6. On January 30, 2020,
Rocket Mortgage provided Monroe with a “Reasonable Accommodation Packet,”
which included documents for both Monroe and his healthcare provider to complete.
Id. ¶ 7. The Reasonable Accommodation Packet was completed and returned to
Rocket Mortgage. Id. ¶ 8.
On February 17, 2020, Rocket Mortgage granted Plaintiff’s request for an
accommodation for a period of six months up to and until August 17, 2020. Id. ¶ 9.
Monroe did not request to extend the 30-hour work week accommodation in 2020, so
the accommodation expired on August 17, 2020, as originally planned. Id. ¶ 10. From
May 4, 2021 through August 4, 2021, Plaintiff was on an approved, unpaid personal
leave of absence. Id. ¶ 11.
On July 8, 2021, prior to the expiration of his personal leave, Monroe contacted
his Team Relations Specialist (“TRS”), LaMont Swift, via email, and requested an
extension of his unpaid personal leave. Id. ¶ 12. Monroe stated that if there was an
issue with extending his personal leave, he would get his doctors involved to request
FMLA. Id. ¶ 13. Swift advised Monroe that personal leaves are only permitted for up
to 90 days under Company policy, and if Monroe would like to extend his leave
beyond August 2021 for medical reasons, he would need to have his healthcare
provider complete the “Leave Request Form,” which was attached to Swift’s email,
and return it. Id. ¶ 14; Doc. 36-8. The Leave Request Form was never returned to
Rocket Mortgage. Doc. 47 ¶ 15.
4

On July 13, 2021, Monroe contacted Oesterreich and told her he was exploring
ways to either extend his sabbatical or reduce his working hours to 30 hours per week.
Id. ¶ 16. Monroe told Oesterreich that he was seeking to reduce his working hours to
attend therapy and workshop appointments for his mental health.4 Id. ¶ 17. Oesterreich
testified that she understood that Plaintiff was seeking a “business accommodation”
from the operations-side of the Company, while also speaking with Swift about an
ADA accommodation. Id. ¶ 18. Following her conversation with Monroe, Oesterreich
contacted her senior leadership team to discuss Monroe’s request. Id. ¶ 19. The senior
leadership team for CEOps, which included Vice President LaShandra Sartor,
ultimately made the decision to deny what they understood to be Monroe’s request for
a business accommodation. Id. ¶ 20. On August 1, 2021, Plaintiff emailed Oesterreich
stating, among other things, that August 1, 2021, would be his last day with the
Company. Id. ¶ 21; Doc. 36-9.
B.

Procedural Background

Monroe initiated this action against his former employer Rocket Mortgage on
June 7, 2022. Doc. 1. The Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based
on the federal claims under the FMLA and ADA, and supplemental jurisdiction of the

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he has been diagnosed and suffers from Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), depression, and anxiety. Doc. 1 ¶ 12. Monroe further alleges
that his HIV, depression and/or anxiety substantially limit one or more major life activities
and/or one or more major bodily functions. Id. ¶¶ 50, 60, 70, 80. In his response to Rocket
Mortgage’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Monroe concedes any ADA and FCRA claims
related to his HIV status. Doc. 48 at 2 n.2. Thus, the Court does not consider Monroe’s HIV
status for purposes of Plaintiff’s ADA and FCRA claims.
4

5

state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In his seven-count complaint, Monroe sues
Rocket Mortgage for alleged interference under the FMLA, discrimination and failure
to accommodate under the ADA, disability discrimination and failure to
accommodate under the FCRA; and retaliation under the ADA and FCRA. Doc. 1.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) in
which he seeks judgment in his favor on liability for his claims in Counts I (FMLA
interference), IV (ADA failure to accommodate), and V (FCRA failure to
accommodate) of the Complaint. Doc. 33. Rocket Mortgage opposes the motion. Doc.
45.
On November 13, 2024, Rocket Mortgage filed its motion for summary
judgment on all claims of the complaint. Doc. 35. Monroe responded in partial
opposition5 (Doc. 48), and Rocket Mortgage replied (Doc. 49).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of stating the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of
material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256,

Plaintiff conceded his claims for retaliation and any claim based on his HIV status. See Doc.
48 at 2 n.1, 14.
5

6

1259–60 (11th Cir. 2004). That burden can be discharged if the moving party can show
the court that there is “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
When the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must
then designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
at 324. Issues of fact are “genuine only if a reasonable jury, considering the evidence
present, could find for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is “material” if it may affect
the outcome of the suit under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248–49 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the
court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. However, a party cannot defeat summary judgment by
relying upon conclusory allegations. See Hill v. Oil Dri Corp. of Ga., 198 F. App’x 852,
858 (11th Cir. 2006).
The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ
from the standard applied when only one-party files a motion, but simply requires a
determination of whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on
the facts that are not disputed. Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328,
1331 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court must consider each motion on its own merits,
resolving all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under
consideration. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has explained that “[c]ross-motions for
summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary
judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts
7

that are not genuinely disputed.” United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir.
1984). Cross-motions may, however, be probative of the absence of a factual dispute
where they reflect general agreement by the parties as to the controlling legal theories
and material facts. Id. at 1555–56.
III.

DISCUSSION
Monroe sues Rocket Mortgage under state and federal laws, alleging he was

forced to resign when Rocket Mortgage interfered with his rights under the FMLA and
failed to provide him FMLA leave; discriminated against him because of his disability
in violation of the ADA and FCRA; failed to accommodate him under the ADA and
FCRA; and retaliated against him in violation of the ADA and FCRA.
A.

FMLA - Interference

In Count I of Monroe’s Complaint, he sues Rocket Mortgage for FMLA
interference. He alleges that he is a qualified individual under the FMLA who suffered
from a serious health condition. He claims Rocket Mortgage’s actions interfered with
the exercise of his FMLA rights when Rocket Mortgage failed to provide Monroe with
block or intermittent leave under the FMLA for which he asserts he was qualified.
Doc. 1 ¶¶ 39–46.
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act “to entitle employees to
take reasonable leave for medical reasons . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). To that end,
the FMLA provides eligible employees with the right to a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period “[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes
the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” Id. §
8

2612(a)(1)(D). Leave that is taken for the reason articulated in subparagraph (a)(1)(D)
“may be taken intermittently or on a reduced leave schedule when medically
necessary.” Id. § 2612(b)(1). Additionally, an employer may require that a request for
leave taken under this subsection “be supported by a certification issued by the health
care provider of the eligible employee[.]” Id. § 2613(a).
Under the FMLA, it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain,
or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” by the Act. Id. §
2615(a)(1). “An [FMLA] interference claim has two elements: (1) the employee was
entitled to a benefit under the FMLA, and (2) [his] employer denied that benefit.”
White v. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d 1188, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015). To
succeed on such a claim, the employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that he was entitled to an FMLA benefit that was denied. Batson v.
Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018). The Department of Labor has
clarified that interfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights “include[s], for
example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging any employee
from using such leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b); see Corbin v. Med. Ctr., Navicent Health,
No. 5:15-cv-153(CAR), 2017 WL 1241430, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2017)
(explaining that the FMLA does not define “interference,” but the regulations provide
that “interference” includes discouraging an employee from using leave). The
employer’s motives are irrelevant to an interference claim. Batson, 897 F.3d at 1331.
Additionally, a plaintiff seeking to prove FMLA interference must demonstrate that
the violation prejudiced him in some way. Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288,
9

1295 (11th Cir. 2014). Thus, “a technical FMLA violation is not enough.” Ramji v.
Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021). To prove that an
FMLA violation prejudiced him, a plaintiff “need only demonstrate some harm
remediable by either damages or equitable relief.” Evans, 762 F.3d at 1296 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Monroe seeks summary judgment in his favor on his FMLA interference claim,
arguing that he is an eligible employee because he was employed by Rocket Mortgage
for at least 12 months and worked at least 1,250 hours during the previous 12-month
period. Doc. 33 at 19-24. Rocket Mortgage does not contest that Monroe may have
been eligible for FMLA leave. Doc. 45 at 15. He further contends that he told his Team
Leader Oesterreich that he wanted a 30-hour reduced work schedule in order to attend
therapy appointments.
For purposes of its motion, Rocket Mortgage acknowledges that Monroe may
have been eligible for FMLA due to a triggering event, but it argues that Monroe
cannot prevail on his claim because he failed to comply with the notice requirements
and to timely return the physician’s certification supporting the leave request. Doc. 35
at 23–25. The Court agrees.
The Regulations require that notice be given. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a). Notice
must satisfy two criteria: timing and content. Beltram Edge Tool Supply, 789 F.3d at
1195. The timing is tied to whether notice was foreseeable or unforeseeable. If an
employee’s need for leave is foreseeable, he must give his employer at least 30 days’
advance notice, or if 30 days is not practicable, then as soon as practicable. See 29
10

C.F.R. § 825.302(a). If notice is unforeseeable, as Monroe contends, however, then
notice must be given “as soon as practicable given the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.” See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a).
In general, an employee need not expressly mention the FMLA to satisfy the
notice requirement. See id. §§ 825.302(c); 825.303(b) (“When an employee seeks leave
for the first time for a FMLA–qualifying reason, the employee need not expressly
assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA.”); see also Cruz v. Publix
Super Mkts., Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1383 (11th Cir. 2005) (“An employee is not required
to assert expressly her right to take leave under the FMLA.”). However, “[w]hen an
employee seeks leave due to an FMLA–qualifying reason, for which the employer has
previously provided FMLA–protected leave, the employee must specifically reference
the qualifying reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c);
see also id. § 825.303(b). It is undisputed that Monroe previously sought FMLAprotected leave during his employment.
Here, Monroe claims that notice was unforeseeable. Accepting this fact as true,
then he was required to provide Rocket Mortgage with “sufficient information for
[Rocket Mortgage] to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave
request.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). He did not do so. Significant here, “[w]hen the need
for leave is not foreseeable, an employee must comply with the employer’s usual and

11

customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting leave, absent unusual
circumstances.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c).6
To support that adequate notice was properly given, Monroe submits that he
“informed his chain-of-command and Team Relations/HR that he desired time off of
work and that it was due to his need to attend therapy and workshops.” Doc. 33 at 20.
Monroe’s statement was to his Team Leader, Cady Oesterreich. Oesterreich testified
that Monroe contacted her about a business accommodation for a 30-hour workweek,
while he was also exploring other options to extend his sabbatical with the team
relations specialist (“TRS”), LaMont Swift. Doc. 41-5 at 24–25. Oesterreich knew that
Monroe was attempting to “reduce his working hours in order to be able to attend
therapy and workshop appointments.” Id. at 26. Although they did not discuss the
appointments in any greater depth, Oesterreich understood that he was attending
therapy sessions for his mental health issues. Id. Even accepting that these facts put
Oesterreich on notice as to a potential FMLA-qualifying reason, she understood that
Monroe was working with TRS Swift as it related to a medical request or

Monroe argues that Rocket Mortgage did not comply with its own procedures because it did
not give him the same Accommodation Packet previously provided and instead gave him a
leave request form. But he has no evidence that the Leave Request Form provided to him by
Swift was not part of Rocket Mortgage’s standard procedures. Rocket Mortgage has
submitted the Declaration of Ashley Attaway, who manages and oversees the company’s
Team Relations Department, and she attests that “[o]nce a Team Member contacts their TRS
regarding their need for leave or an accommodation, the TRS then provides the Team
[Member] with the appropriate paperwork to complete in order to begin the accommodation
process, typically in the form of a Request for Leave or a Reasonable Accommodation
Packet.” Doc. 36 ¶ 17. There is no evidence that the request form provided by Swift was an
incorrect form or inconsistent with Rocket Mortgage’s own procedures.
6

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accommodation. Doc. 41-5 at 28. As Monroe’s Team Leader, Oesterreich did not have
the ability or authority to process ADA or FMLA leave requests. Id. Those requests
were handled by team relations specialists. Id. at 31. Monroe submits that Oesterreich’s
email with the subject line “ADA accommodation” demonstrated notice, but
Oesterreich clarified in her deposition that this was a reference to Monroe’s dealings
with Swift regarding obtaining the documentation he needed to process any request
with Team Relations.
It is undisputed that Monroe was familiar with, had previously applied, and was
approved for FMLA leave and/or accommodations for reduced hours in 2014, 2015,
and 2020 while employed with Rocket Mortgage. Doc. 47 ¶ 4; Doc. 41-1 at 27–29;
Doc. 33-5. When he sought leave in 2021, Monroe testified he did not want to go
through the doctor’s notes and answering questions. See Doc. 41-1 at 63 (Monroe
testified, “that's why I took it unpaid, because I didn't want to deal with talking to them
about my medical issues.”). He did not request FMLA leave for this time. Doc. 41-1
at 90. Monroe knew that his personal leave time in 2021 was capped at 90 days.7 As
the end of the 90-day period was approaching, Monroe hoped that the company would
be willing to extend his personal leave another six months. Doc. 41-1 at 68 (Monroe

When Monroe took his 90-day personal leave of absence in May through August, 2021, it
was unpaid. He testified that he did not want to go through having to send documentation
every day. Doc. 41-1 at 59-60. He was approved for the 90 days of personal leave beginning
May 4, 2021. Id. at 60. He received communication from Linda Villarosa, leave of absence
specialist, advising that personal leaves are 90 calendar days. Id. His request was made in
March 2021, and he used his PTO from the end of March, through the month of April, until
beginning his personal leave on May 4, so he actually had four-and-a-half months off from
the end of March to the beginning of August. Id. at 62.
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testified, “Yes, I know they told me 90 days and I agreed, but then I was just very
nicely asking if I could extend it. I figured with them slowing down and they wouldn't
have to pay me, it would be no skin off their back.”). Monroe emailed Swift stating
that if it is going to be a problem, he will get his doctors involved to request FMLA.
Doc. 47 ¶ 13. Swift specifically advised Monroe that if he was seeking leave beyond
August 2021 for health/medical issues that he should have his doctor complete and
return the “Leave Request Form.” Doc. 36-8. Swift provided the form to Monroe in
the email. Doc. 36-8 at 4. Monroe did not communicate with Swift any further after
this. Doc. 41-1 at 72. It is undisputed that neither Monroe, nor his doctor, returned the
completed leave request form to Rocket Mortgage.8 Doc. 47 ¶ 15. Monroe’s failure to
respond with any medical support for his request for a reduced work schedule wholly
undermines his claim of FMLA interference.
“An employee has the right to take FMLA leave only if [he] suffers from a
‘serious health condition’ that makes [him] ‘unable to perform the functions of his
position.’” Beltram Edge Tool Supply, Inc., 789 F.3d at 1194 (quoting Hurley v. Kent of
Naples, Inc., 746 F.3d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 2014)). The Regulations define a “serious
health condition” as “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition
that involves, . . . continuing treatment by a health care provider.” 29 U.S.C. §
2611(11)(B). “The employee cannot merely demand leave; he must give the employer

In his deposition, Monroe testified that he did not know if he returned the completed form.
Doc. 41-1 at 72. Since Monroe’s deposition, the parties have stipulated that the form was
never returned to Rocket Mortgage. Doc. 47 ¶ 15.
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14

a reason to believe that he is entitled to it.” Cruz, 428 F.3d at 1385. Here, Monroe
made the statement to Swift that he may have to get his doctors involved for FMLA
but then failed to complete the Leave Request form.9 As previously indicated, an
employer may require an employee to support his need for leave due to a “serious
health condition that makes the employee unable to perform one or more of the
essential functions of the employee’s position, . . . by a certification issued by the health
care provider of the employee.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a). Monroe’s failure to comply
with Rocket Mortgage’s procedure by not returning the leave request form is fatal to
his interference claim.
In his motion, Monroe additionally argues that Rocket Mortgage failed to
provide him with statutory notice regarding his FMLA eligibility. As Rocket
Mortgage’s response points out, Monroe’s argument that Rocket Mortgage did not
provide Monroe with proper notice under the FMLA was never a theory raised in the
Complaint. Accordingly, the Court will not now consider a theory of recovery raised
by Monroe for the first time on summary judgment because “plaintiffs may not raise
new claims at the summary judgment stage.” Beltram Edge Tool Supply, 789 F.3d at
1200 (finding no error in district court’s refusal to consider theory regarding

The Leave Request form requires the physician to identify the employee’s anticipated
restricted dates and the employee’s impairment. Doc. 36-8 at 4. Although Monroe argues this
was not the correct form for his situation where he was not looking to be out on leave
completely but rather wanted a 30-hour workweek accommodation, this form allowed a
physician to identify alternative accommodations that would allow the employee to perform
his job. See id.
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defendant’s failure to give proper notice under the FMLA where that cause of action
was not stated in plaintiff’s complaint).
Because the undisputed facts show that Rocket Mortgage did not interfere with
Monroe’s exercise of FMLA benefits, Rocket Mortgage is entitled to summary
judgment on this claim. Monroe was familiar with and had applied for FMLA leave
in the past. When he indicated to Swift that he may be getting his doctor involved for
purposes of FMLA benefits, Swift provided Monroe with the appropriate form, which
neither Monroe nor his doctor returned to anyone at Rocket Mortgage. Monroe failed
to comply with Rocket Mortgage’s usual and customary notice requirements and
failed to timely return the physician’s certification form as required by 29 C.F.R. §
852.305(b). Even accepting that Monroe’s statement to Oesterreich that he wanted a
30-hour workweek to attend therapy appointments or his August 1 resignation email
referencing a doctor’s note made Oesterreich aware of a potential FMLA-qualifying
event, Monroe still failed to comply with Rocket Mortgage’s procedures and provide
a doctor’s certification.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the employee bears the responsibility to
furnish a complete and sufficient certification to allow the employer to assess the
request, or to provide his healthcare provider with the necessary authorization so that
his healthcare provider can “release a complete and sufficient certification to the
employer to support the employee’s FMLA request.” Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
No. 21-11267, 2022 WL 10083816, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 17, 2022) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.305(d)). “If the employee never produces the certification, the leave is not FMLA
16

leave.” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.313(b)). And there can be no FMLA interference
where Plaintiff has not established he is entitled to FMLA leave. Rocket Mortgage’s
motion for summary judgment on this claim is due to be granted.
B.

ADA and FCRA – Discrimination10

In his Complaint, Monroe sues Rocket Mortgage for disability discrimination
in violation of the ADA (Count II) and the FCRA (Count III). Doc. 1 ¶¶ 47–66.
Monroe alleges that he is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning
of the ADA and the FCRA due to HIV, depression and/or anxiety. 11 Id. ¶¶ 50, 60. In
his motion, Plaintiff asserts that he is disabled due to stress, anxiety, and insomnia.
Doc. 33 at 3; Doc. 33-4 at 2. Monroe alleges he was forced to resign because Rocket
Mortgage would not honor his doctor’s recommended accommodations for his
disabilities. Doc. 1 ¶ 37.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment “against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “To establish a prima facie
case of employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that at the
time of the adverse employment action, [he] (1) had a disability, (2) was a qualified
individual, and (3) was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of [his]
disability.” Batson, 897 F.3d at 1326.

“Claims raised under the Florida law [FCRA] are analyzed under the same framework as
the ADA.” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecommc’ns, Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2007)
(citing Chanda v. Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2000)).
11
As previously noted, although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged disability due to HIV,
depression, and/or anxiety (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 50, 60), Monroe concedes any claim related to his HIV
status. Doc. 48 at 2, n.1.
10

17

Where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial rather than direct evidence of
discrimination, as Monroe does here, courts apply the McDonnell-Douglas burdenshifting framework. Todd v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1215 (11th Cir.
2021); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). If the employee
is successful in making a prima facie case by establishing the three elements above, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Todd, 998 F.3d at 1216. The employer’s burden
is “exceedingly light.” Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir.
1983). The burden then shifts back to the employee to present sufficient evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s reason is pretext for
discrimination. Todd, 998 F.3d at 1216.
The ADA defines “disability” to include: “(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B)
a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). For the ADA, a qualified
individual is one “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions” of her employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
Rocket Mortgage moves for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff cannot
prevail on his discrimination claims because he cannot establish he was subjected to
an adverse employment action or that the decision maker had knowledge of his
disability.

18

An employee seeking to establish that he was discriminated against due to his
disability must establish he was subjected to an adverse employment action because of
his disability. See Batson, 897 F.3d at 1326. In Counts II and III, Monroe alleges that
he was subjected to the adverse employment actions of being forced to resign and being
denied his vested stock options. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 52, 62. Monroe has conceded the issue of
his stock options, and thus the Court turns to Rocket Mortgage’s argument that
Monroe’s resignation was not an adverse employment action.
“An employment action is considered ‘adverse’ only if it results in some
tangible, negative effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” Martin v. Eli Lilly & Co., 702
F. App’x 952, 956 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d
1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001)). “A tangible employment action constitutes a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment
with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change
in benefits.” Id. (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)); see
also Menzie v. Ann Taylor Retail Inc., 549 F. App’x 891, 894 (11th Cir. 2013) (“An
adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision, such as discharge or
failure to hire, or other conduct that alters the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment
opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee.”).
Here, Monroe contends that he was constructively discharged, specifically that
he was forced to resign because Rocket Mortgage would not honor his doctor’s
recommendation and provide him with a reduced work schedule. If established,
19

constructive discharge is an adverse employment action, but the threshold for proving
constructive discharge is high. Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1231
(11th Cir. 2001) (“The standard for proving constructive discharge is higher than the
standard for proving a hostile work environment.”). To prove constructive discharge
under the ADA, Monroe must demonstrate that his working conditions were so
intolerable that a reasonable person in his position would have been forced to resign.
Griffin v. GTE Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999). Whether an
employee’s working conditions are so intolerable is analyzed based on an objective
standard. See Phillips v. Harbor Venice Mgmt., LLC, No. 8:19-CV-2379-VMC-TGW,
2020 WL 2735201, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 26, 2020) (Covington, J.) (citing Richio v.
Miami-Dade Cty., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2001)). A constructive
discharge claim is “not a jury question unless a plaintiff presents substantial evidence
that employment conditions were intolerable.” Siudock v. Volusia Cty. Sch. Bd., 568 F.
App’x 659, 664 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144,
1155 (11th Cir. 2002)). Monroe fails to come forward with evidence that the conditions
were so intolerable a reasonable person would be forced to resign.
Monroe argues that he specifically emailed Oesterreich on August 1, 2021,
telling her that his doctor’s note did not want him working more than 30 hours, forcing
him to quit. He reminded her that he previously had a 30-hour-workweek
accommodation and that he was told by human resources that he could return to a 30hour workweek. Monroe was familiar with the procedure of requesting leave for

20

medical reasons and he chose not to comply with it. The Court finds this evidence
insufficient to establish that Monroe’s working conditions were intolerable. 12
The resignation email upon which Monroe relies states, “since my doctor note
does not want me working more than 30 hours this is forcing me to quit.” Doc. 36-9.
As an initial matter, there is no evidence the doctor’s letter was ever provided to Rocket
Mortgage before this lawsuit let alone before he resigned or within any reasonable
period of time after he resigned. Moreover, review of Dr. Kaul’s July 15, 2021, letter
and the related note in the medical records reveals that Monroe was the one who called
Dr. Kaul requesting the letter and dictating what it said. There is no evidence that Dr.
Kaul evaluated Monroe before signing off on the letter. To the contrary, the evidence
suggests otherwise as the phone call request from Monroe was the same day as the
letter was dated. Significantly, although Monroe asserts he asked for an
accommodation of a reduced work schedule, it is undisputed that he never completed
the company’s required paperwork for a medical accommodation request and never
talked to Swift again after Swift sent him the request form to be completed.

Monroe argues that the cases relied upon by Defendant are inapposite because this is not a
“typical” constructive discharge case where an employer creates an intolerable work
environment over a period of time that leads to a resignation. Instead, he submits his claim is
premised on the theory that the denial of his requested accommodation made his working
conditions intolerable forcing him to resign. Monroe cites to an out-of-circuit case which, like
the case relied upon by the defense, similarly requires a showing that working conditions were
made intolerable in order to support a finding of constructive discharge. See Floyd v. Lee, 968
F. Supp. 2d 308, 330 (D.D.C. 2013) (“A finding of constructive discharge depends on whether
the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable and drove the employee into
an involuntary quit.”) (citations omitted). In any event, Monroe’s argument is a distinction
without a difference as there still must be evidence that his working conditions were so
intolerable that he was compelled to resign, and he fails to demonstrate that on this record.
12

21

Rocket Mortgage also argues that an increase in an employee’s workload does
not rise to the intolerable level that would compel a reasonable person to resign. Doc.
35 at 13 (citing Wardell v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 786 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir.
1986)). An increase in workload may, however, support a constructive discharge claim
if the change in work conditions is so substantial and material that it alters the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, Austin v. FL HUD Rosewood LLC, 791 F.
App’x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2019). Rocket Mortgage submits that the evidence shows
that Monroe had the discretion to take advantage of incentive and bonuses by working
longer hours. See Oesterreich’s testimony at Doc. 41-5 at 20–21. In his response,
Monroe does not refute this statement. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present evidence that his
workload created an intolerable working environment or that there was a change in
his work conditions that was so substantial and material that it altered the terms,
conditions, or privileges of his employment. Rather, he reiterates that his request for a
30-hour workweek was due to his disability. But, as discussed above, Monroe never
pursued a medical accommodation because he never returned the documentation to
Swift.
Rocket Mortgage further argues that Monroe cannot establish he was
discriminated against based on his disability because he cannot show that Sartor, who
was the decisionmaker, was aware of his disability. Given that Sartor was copied on
emails that had the subject line “RE: Ryan Monroe ADA Request” (Doc. 33-11), in a
light favorable to Monroe, it is a much closer call as to whether Sartor was aware of
Monroe’s disability. Rocket Mortgage argues that Monroe’s vague references to
22

Oesterreich of his need to attend therapy sessions were too imprecise and conclusory
to put Sartor on notice of any disability under the ADA. Rocket Mortgage also
contends that neither Sartor nor anyone in Senior Leadership had a conversation with
Monroe about his specific conditions of stress and anxiety, and therefore they were
unaware of his request for reduced hours being connected to any physical or mental
impairment. Even if disputed questions of fact exist as to Sartor’s awareness, that does
not salvage Plaintiff’s claim because he does not establish a connection between being
denied a reduced workweek and his disability, particularly where he failed to comply
with the company procedures for seeking an accommodation for medical reasons. By
his own account, he did not want to have to go into all of his medicals again and it is
undisputed he never provided medical support for his request.13 Monroe’s claims of
discrimination fail because he cannot establish an adverse employment action and
cannot establish that the denial of his request for a 30-hour workweek was because of
his disability. Rocket Mortgage is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
discrimination claims in Counts II and III of the Complaint.
C.

ADA and FCRA – Failure to Accommodate

In Counts IV and V of Plaintiff’s Complaint, he sues Rocket Mortgage under
the ADA and FCRA for failure to accommodate. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 67–86. An employer
unlawfully discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability when the

Of note, when Monroe received an ADA accommodation in 2020 of a 30-hour workweek,
he was specifically advised that it was temporary, and that a request to extend it would require
updated documentation. Doc. 33-5.
13

23

employer fails to provide “reasonable accommodations” for the disability—unless
doing so would impose undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). An accommodation qualifies as “reasonable,” thereby making
it required by the ADA, only if it enables the employee to perform the essential
functions of the job. See LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th
Cir.1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and of
demonstrating that the accommodation allows him to perform the essential function
of his job. See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th
Cir. 1997); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 283 (11th Cir. 1997). “[T]o trigger an
employer’s duty to provide a reasonable accommodation, the employee must (1) make
a specific demand for an accommodation and (2) demonstrate that such
accommodation is reasonable.” Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student Achievement, 52 F.4th
1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Owens v. Georgia Governor’s Off. of
Student Achievement, 143 S. Ct. 2465 (2023) (citing Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249,
1255–56 (11th Cir. 2016)). Only after the employee meets these requirements will the
employer then be required to “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the
employee “to discuss the employee’s specific limitations, explore potential
accommodations, and select the most appropriate accommodation for both the
employer and the employee.” Owens, 52 F.4th at 1334 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
Monroe argues that he triggered Rocket Mortgage’s accommodation duties
when he informed Oesterreich that he wanted a 30-hour workweek so that he could
attend therapy sessions. An employee must identify his disability before an employer
24

is obligated to engage in an interactive process about accommodating that disability.
Owens, 52 F.4th at 1334; see also 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9 (“[A]n employer
would not be expected to accommodate disabilities of which it is unaware.”). Here, it
is arguable whether Monroe identified his disability. But even if a question of fact
exists as to whether he identified his disability, Monroe still had to link his disability
to the requested accommodation by explaining how the requested accommodation
could alleviate the workplace challenges posed by his specific disability. Owens, 52
F.4th at 1335. Critically, an employee must give the employer enough information to
respond effectively to an accommodation request. Id. Monroe failed to do this.
“Under the ADA, an employer will not be liable for failure to accommodate if
the employee is responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process.” D’Onofrio
v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct.
1435 (2021) (citing Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287). Monroe was responsible for the
breakdown in the process when he failed to respond to Swift by returning the
completed leave form and in failing to provide any medical documentation in support
of his request. In failing to provide any information regarding his need for a medical
accommodation, Monroe prevented Rocket Mortgage from being able to assess the
reasonableness of any accommodation.
Monroe responds that Rocket Mortgage never gave him the “appropriate
documents” to complete for an ADA accommodation and no one followed up with
him regarding his reference to having a “doctor note” in his August 1 resignation
email. He argues that the Request for Leave form from Swift did not mention the ADA
25

and was not a “Reasonable Accommodation packet” like he previously completed in
2020.14 Doc. 33 at 4. But this argument is inconsistent with his own testimony. Monroe
testified he did not want to have to go into all of his medical issues again. Doc. at 411 at 71 (“I don't want to be off and dealing with the doctors and the doctor’s note and
the short-term disability company and Stacey Morris interrogating me and all that. I
don't want to deal with that again, that makes it is (sic) worse for me, and [Swift] said
okay. I said I want to work still 30 hours. And he said: okay. Well, you have to talk to
your team leader for that, and that’s when I called Cady at that time and said I don't

As previously referenced, Rocket Mortgage submitted the Declaration of Attaway who
states that when a request or accommodation is made, the employee is provided with typically
either a request form or an accommodation packet. See, supra, n. 6; see also Doc. 36 ¶ 17. In
his response to Rocket Mortgage’s motion, Monroe vaguely argues the Court should
disregard the Attaway Declaration because it is inconsistent with her deposition testimony
and “borders” on being a sham. Doc. 48 at 10 n.10. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff never
filed a motion to strike the Attaway Declaration and his argument in a footnote is wholly
undeveloped. Monroe fails to direct the Court to any testimony he contends is inconsistent.
Under the sham affidavit rule, “[w]hen a party has given clear answers to unambiguous
questions which negate the existence of any issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter
create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously
given clear testimony.” Van T. Junkins & Assoc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th
Cir. 1984). A court may strike an affidavit as a sham when the affidavit flatly contradicts the
affiant’s previous testimony “for the transparent purpose of creating a genuine issue of fact
where none existed previously.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir.
2016). As Plaintiff has not identified the contradictory testimony, the Court will not strike the
Declaration of Attaway. And the Court does not find there to be any material inconsistency
in Attaway’s deposition testimony and her Declaration. Significantly, Attaway’s Declaration
and deposition both reflect that Plaintiff could submit either the leave request form or a
doctor’s note, see Doc. 36 ¶ 22; Doc. 41-4 at 7, but he was required to submit at least one.
Doc. 36 ¶ 23. He did neither. Further, her Declaration and deposition testimony both provide
that an employee seeking a request for leave or an accommodation are to be directed to their
Team Relations Specialist. See Doc. 41-1 at 9–10; Doc. 36 ¶ 25. Here, Oesterreich referred
Monroe to TRS Swift to address any medical request Monroe wanted to make. The evidence
reveals Monroe was not interested in going into his medicals again. Monroe’s failure to follow
through with Swift and to provide him any medical paperwork defeats Monroe’s claim that
Rocket Mortgage failed to provide him an accommodation under the ADA.
14

26

want to be off on a leave of absence. I want to work 30. I want to just get my doctor
involved so you don't make me work 70 hours again.”). But he never got his doctor
involved; it is undisputed he never provided the July 15, 2021 doctor’s note or any
other medical support for his request to Rocket Mortgage.15
Rocket Mortgage also argues that Monroe’s demand for a 30-hour workweek
was not engaging in the interactive process. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has made
clear that “an employer is not required to accommodate an employee in any manner
that

the

employee

desires—or

even

provide

that

employee’s

preferred

accommodation.” Owens, 52 F.4th at 1335 (quoting D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d at 1022).
Although Monroe received an accommodation of a 30-hour workweek in 2020,
the accommodation was temporary and only approved for six months. Doc. 41-1 at
48. At the time of that request, Monroe had his doctor complete the medical form in
support of the requested leave. Monroe was aware that the accommodation would be
reviewed on a semi-annual basis. Doc. 41-1 at 43–44. The accommodation was
approved on a temporary basis of 30 hours per week for six months after which time
the company could request updated documentation. Doc. 41-1 at 54. In June 2020,
Monroe submitted a letter from his doctor saying he can now work 40 hours per week
and more at his discretion. Id. at 55. He did not submit a medical note after that stating
otherwise. “[E]ven if an employer has voluntarily provided accommodations to the
employee historically, that employer is not obligated to continue providing them and

The last doctor’s note for Monroe received by Rocket Mortgage was in June 2020 stating
that Monroe can work 40 hours per week, or more at his discretion. Doc. 41-1 at 55–56.
15

27

can discontinue such when they exceed what is legally required under the ADA.”
D’Onofrio, 964 F.3d 1014, 1022. Thus, because Monroe received the 30-hour
workweek accommodation in the past did not mean he was entitled to demand the
same accommodation in the future without complying with the company procedures
and engaging in the interactive process. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286 (“under the ADA
a qualified individual with a disability is not entitled to the accommodation of [his]
choice, but only to a reasonable accommodation”). Monroe failed to engage in the
interactive process to allow Rocket Mortgage the opportunity to assess the
reasonableness of any requested accommodation. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prevail
on his claims of ADA violation for failure to accommodate, and Rocket Mortgage is
entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s claims in Count IV and V.
D.

ADA and FCRA - Retaliation

In Counts VI and VII, Plaintiff sues Rocket Mortgage for retaliation in violation
of the ADA and FCRA. He alleges that he was retaliated against and suffered adverse
employment actions—being forced to resign and loss of stock options—because he
requested accommodations for his disability. Title V of the ADA prohibits retaliation
against an individual for opposing any discriminatory act or practice or making a
charge of disability discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). A plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of retaliation by proving the following elements: 1. he engaged in a
statutorily protected expression; 2. he suffered an adverse employment action; and 3.
there was a causal connection between the two. Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258. In his
response to Rocket Mortgage’s motion for summary judgment, Monroe concedes any
28

claim related to his stock options.16 Doc. 48 at 2, 14. Because his remaining alleged
adverse employment action is his separation from employment, he acknowledges his
retaliation claims are subsumed in his failure to accommodate claims. Plaintiff
concedes his retaliation claims under the ADA and FCRA. Id. at 14. It follows that
Rocket Mortgage is entitled to judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims in
Counts VI and VII of the Complaint.
IV.

CONCLUSION
It is clear that Plaintiff was a faithful and hard-working employee whose work

product was valued by the company. By all accounts, he was a “fantastic team
member.” Monroe’s loyalty and commitment to Rocket Mortgage for over 16 years is
admirable. It is unfortunate that Plaintiff’s career at Rocket Mortgage ended as it did.
However, Rocket Mortgage’s conduct was not unlawful under the ADA, FMLA, or
FCRA.
Monroe has conceded his retaliation claims. The Court finds no FMLA
interference, no adverse employment action, and no violations of the ADA and FCRA
based on discrimination or a failure to accommodate. As no genuine issues of material
fact exist, Rocket Mortgage is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on Monroe’s
FMLA interference claim and on his claims of discrimination, retaliation, and failure
to accommodate under the ADA and FCRA. Accordingly, it is

Monroe did not vest in his stock options at the time of termination based on his disability
because he would have had to be deemed disabled by a long-term disability insurance program
or determined disabled by the U.S. Social Security Administration, neither of which occurred.
Docs. 41-1 at 82–84; 41-2.
16

29

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) is DENIED.

2.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) is GRANTED.

3.

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Defendant Rocket

Mortgage and against Plaintiff Ryan Monroe.
4.

The Clerk is further directed to terminate any pending motions and

deadlines and CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on September 25, 2024.

Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties, if any

30