Ramirez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 24

ORDER re 18 Plaintiff's Social Security Brief. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in the Defendant's favor, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Natalie Hirt Adams on 9/24/2024.(CJF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
NEY RAMIREZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 8:23-cv-1373-NHA

COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

/
ORDER

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse a December 8, 2022 decision finding
that he was not disabled and denying his claim for supplemental security
income. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
erred by (1) finding that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work,
notwithstanding his inability to stand for more than six hours per work shift;
(2) failing to include in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) certain
limitations recommended by state agency consultants Yamir Laboy, Psy. D.
and Candice Mihm, Ph.D.; (3) failing to properly consider and incorporate into
the RFC greater limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to maintain concentration,
persistence, and pace; (4) improperly discounting the opinion of Alicia Carden,
APRN; (5) failing to consider evidence in Plaintiff’s 2018 application for social
security; and (6) wrongly concluding on the basis of the alleged errors in the

previous steps that Plaintiff was able perform medium work and was,
therefore, not disabled. Doc. 18. Having reviewed the parties’ briefing and the
record below, I find the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence and
employed proper legal standards. I affirm.
I.

Background
Plaintiff, who was born in 1967, has an 8th grade education, and has

previously worked cleaning recreational vehicles (RVs) and busses. R. 54, 57–
58, 291. He initially alleged his bipolar disorder, depression, and sleeping
disorder rendered him unable to work. R. 288. He later claimed that
neuropathy in his feet contributed to his disability. R. 131. In all, Plaintiff
asserted that he could not work because he was depressed, angry, anxious,
forgetful, and had difficulty standing. R. 309, 311.
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance and supplemental security
income on January 30, 2018. R. 33. An ALJ denied those claims on January 24,
2020. Id.
On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed another application for supplemental
security income. R. 247–68. While he initially alleged an earlier onset date,
Plaintiff ultimately alleged he became disabled on January 30, 2020. 1 R. 56.

This date was selected at Plaintiff’s hearing, by Plaintiff’s
representative, expressly because it followed the prior ALJ decision that
Plaintiff not disabled. R. 56.
1

2

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claims at the initial level (R. 109)
and upon reconsideration (R. 121). Plaintiff then requested an administrative
hearing. R. 164. The ALJ conducted a hearing on October 18, 2022, at which
both Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. R. 49–92.
a. Evidence Relating to Physical Limitations
In applying for disability benefits, Plaintiff and his representative
reported that he was able to independently shop for groceries, use public
transportation, and care for his mother, including by preparing meals and
doing laundry. R. 312, 353, 355, 370. But Plaintiff indicated he had difficulty
standing and could only walk a block before needing to rest. R. 320.
Plaintiff reported to the SSA that he saw a foot doctor from November
2020 to January 2021. R. 325. Indeed, Plaintiff sought treatment for foot pain
at the Good Samaritan Free Clinic during this time. R. 594. But the clinician’s
notes do not indicate any abnormalities with his feet, only that he was referred
to a podiatrist. R. 597, 602, 654. Plaintiff saw a podiatrist in February 2021,
who found problems with Plaintiff’s toenail, but noted that Plaintiff had
positive sensation. R. 599. In June 2021, Plaintiff denied issues with
numbness. R. 691. In February 2022, although Plaintiff complained of
worsening neuropathy, an examination showed that Plaintiff walked normally
and had normal sensitivity in his feet. R. 762–63. A consultative examiner
opined that Plaintiff did not have any significant findings that would prevent
3

him from doing regular work. R. 764. In January 2022, Plaintiff reported he
had no problems walking or climbing stairs. R. 769. Moreover, his therapist
regularly noted that he walked independently. See, e.g., R. 462, 487, 716, 739,
750, 785.
And, while Plaintiff later testified that his arthritis made it difficult to
grip objects (R. 62), the consultative examiner found Plaintiff had no issues
with his hands. R. 763 (5/5 grip strength and normal range of motion in hands).
b. Evidence of Mental Health Limitations
Plaintiff’s mental health records date back to 2017 and show that
Plaintiff suffered from substance and alcohol abuse, bipolar disorder,
adjustment disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and depression. R. 449,
454, 467–68.
Plaintiff reported that his ability to concentrate “depends on [the] day.”
R. 373. His therapist frequently found his concentration, memory, and
cognition to be within normal limits. R. 449, 454, 463, 468, 471, 474, 477, 486,
493, 499, 510, 513, 555, 563, 576, 740, 751, 755, 778, 786, 789, 800. Although
Plaintiff sometimes displayed impaired concentration, it usually correlated
with substance abuse or noncompliance with medication. See R. 505 (impaired
concentration when out of medication); 582 (impaired concentration when
seeking substance abuse treatment); 717 (limited concentration when noncompliant with medication). In his most recent medical records, in June 2022,
4

Plaintiff himself reported that he was only having occasional trouble
concentrating. R. 802.
Plaintiff also reported being easily angered. R. 451; 467 (Baker Acted
after an altercation in 2017). But at his appointments with his therapist,
Plaintiff often had normal demeanor and behavior. R. 449, 463, 471, 477, 493,
498, 513, 555, 576, 740, 755, 778; but see R. 454 (dramatic demeanor).
Moreover, although Plaintiff reported being easily angered (see, e.g., R. 755),
his providers rated his limitations in the category of “danger to others” as being
either “no problem” or “less than slight problem” R. 735, 753, 780.
To the extent Plaintiff suffered from declines in mental health, these
corresponded to times when he was non-compliant with treatment or using
drugs. See R. 470 (reporting in September 2017 that he was calmer on
medication); R. 484 (“I have not been snapping out on people.”); R. 517 (In
February 2020, after being off medication and failing to seek mental health
treatment for nearly six months, Plaintiff was Baker Acted); R. 716 (In
February 2021, Plaintiff angry after being without medication). Plaintiff
seemed to recognize this, once admitting, “I was doing good until I ran out of
medication.” R. 577. And, the most recent treatment notes in the record show
that Plaintiff was compliant with his medication. R. 788, 799.

5

c. Opinions of state agency psychological consultants Drs. Laboy and
Mihm
Plaintiff’s case record contained the assessments of the State agency
psychological consultants Yamir Laboy, Psy.D., and Candace Mihm, Ph.D.
Both Drs. Laboy and Mihm remarked that the claimant had moderate
limitations in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended
periods, his ability to complete a normal workday without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms, his ability to interact appropriately with the
general public, and his ability to accept and respond appropriately to criticism
from supervisors. R. 103–06; 120–21. Ultimately, Dr. Laboy opined that
Plaintiff could comprehend/memorize brief, straightforward job-related
instructions, execute short, simple instructions, communicate about routine
employment matters, accept periodic, instructive supervisory input, and adjust
to modifications in his work duties, but could not work collaboratively with
others or interact with the public in a customer service position. R. 106–07.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mihm opined that Plaintiff could understand and remember
simple and detailed instructions, perform simple tasks, maintain the
concentration, persistence, and pace for simple tasks with ordinary
supervision, adapt to changes in the workplace, and interact adequately with
others as needed (but would perform best in a low social demand setting). R.
120.
6

d. Opinion of treating therapist APRN Carden
Also in the record was the assessment of Plaintiff’s treating therapist,
Alicia Carden, APRN. APRN Carden completed part of a “Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment” in which she checked boxes indicating that
Plaintiff had marked limitations in his ability to remember locations and worklike procedures, understand and remember both short and detailed
instructions, maintain appropriate behavior, work with others, respond to
change, and maintain attention and concentration. R. 793–95 (underlying
opinion). Ms. Carden did not complete the portion of the assessment titled
“Functional Capacity Assessment,” which asked her to explain her conclusions
in narrative form and to clarify any limitations or functions. R. 795.
e. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to
work due to arthritis, neuropathy in his feet, back pain, knee pain, and mental
impairments. R. 60–62. He testified his physical conditions made it difficult to
grip objects (R. 62), stand for more than five minutes (id.), lift more than five
to ten pounds (R. 64), and walk more than a block (R. 63). And, as to his mental
health, Plaintiff said that he was forgetful, had trouble concentrating, and
suffered from anxiety. R. 65, 68–69. Plaintiff also testified that he suffered
from anger issues. R. 65, 68. As an example of his anger, Plaintiff recounted a
7

story of once chasing down the owner at his place of employment with a brick.
R. 68.
Plaintiff testified that he lived with his mother, who woke him and
reminded him to shower, but also acknowledged that he assisted greatly in her
care. R. 71–72, 75.
Plaintiff testified about his prior work cleaning busses in 2007, which
entailed driving busses through bus carwashes and then cleaning the bus
interiors by vacuuming and cleaning seats. R. 57. He testified he held a similar
job from 2010 to 2014 cleaning the interior of recreational vehicles (“RVs”). R.
58. Although prior to the hearing, in applying for disability benefits, Plaintiff
indicated that his prior work required him to stand and walk for 8 hours each
shift (R. 291), at the hearing Plaintiff explained that, in these jobs, he stood in
approximately one-hour intervals, for a total of three to four hours in an eighthour shift. R. 62; see also R. 63 (does not recall standing for more than four
hours in that job).
f. Testimony of the Vocational Expert
After Plaintiff’s testimony, the vocational expert (“VE”) testified that
Plaintiff’s past work was a composite job, comprised of the jobs of automatic
washer and of detailer, which both generally required a “medium” exertional
level, but that Plaintiff performed his job at a “light” exertional level, and as
unskilled work. R. 85. The VE testified that someone who was able to lift, carry,
8

push or pull 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; stand and/or
walk six hours in an eight hour workday; sit six hours in an eight hour
workday; understand, remember, and apply simple instructions; interact with
supervisors but only occasionally with coworkers; concentrate, persist, and
maintain pace for two hours at a time; and adapt to gradual changes in the
workplace; but could not interact with the general public or perform tandem
tasks, could perform the composite job of jobs of automatic washer/detailer as
Plaintiff actually performed the job. R. 86–87.
g. The ALJ’s Decision
Following the hearing, and after review of the record, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff was not disabled and denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits. R. 33–43.
First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since he applied for SSI. R. 35. Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
did have severe impairments, specifically, peripheral neuropathy, obesity, and
bipolar disorder. R. 35. Third, notwithstanding the noted impairments, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 36.
In making the latter determination, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s mental
impairments using the Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”). 20 C.F.R. §
416.920a. In the PRT, the ALJ rates the severity of a claimant’s ability to:
9

understand,

remember,

or

apply

information;

interact

with

others;

concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and adapt or manage oneself. Id. §
416.920a(c)(3). Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild limitations in
understanding, remembering, or applying information and in his ability to
adapt or manage himself, and had moderate limitations in his ability to
interact with others and to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. R. 36–37. In
finding he had moderate limitations in his ability to concentrate, persist, or
maintain pace, the ALJ noted that the claimant was “able to prepare meals,
watch TV, read, and use the internet” and that “the record fails to show an
inability to complete testing that assesses concentration and attention.” R. 37.
Fourth, the ALJ identified Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity―that
is, the most that Plaintiff could do despite his impairments. The ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff could perform medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c) 2
except: Plaintiff was limited to understanding, remembering, and applying
only simple instructions; he could interact appropriately with supervisors, but
only occasionally with co-workers in jobs that did not require tandem tasks; he
could not interact with the general public; he could concentrate, persist, and

“Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R.
416.967(c). A full range of medium work requires standing or walking, off and
on, for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. SSR 83-10.
2

10

maintain pace for 2 hours at a time; and he could manage himself and adapt
to gradual changes in the workplace. R. 38.
In reaching his conclusion as to Plaintiff’s physical limitations, the ALJ
noted that, although Plaintiff alleged disabling pain from his peripheral
neuropathy, he was not being treated for the condition, and objective findings
on physical examinations (e.g., that he had normal gait, normal strength,
normal range of motion) did not support Plaintiff’s claimed limitations. R. 39.
In reaching his conclusion as to Plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ
noted that Plaintiff “has engaged in a somewhat normal level of daily activity,”
including by going out alone, using public transportation, managing his own
finances, and shopping in stores. R. 40. The ALJ found that the physical and
mental capabilities, as well as social interactions, required for those tasks
“replicate those necessary for obtaining and maintaining employment within
the parameters of the residual functional capacity described in this decision.”
Id.
In forming the RFC, the ALJ also considered the opinions of the State
agency psychological consultants Yamir Laboy, Psy.D., and Candace Mihm,
Ph.D. R. 41. The ALJ found both opinions “generally persuasive” but
distinguished Dr. Mihm’s opinion as “more persuasive, as it is more consistent
with the medical evidence of record, which shows that during periods of
sobriety and medication compliance, the claimant’s recent memory was intact,
11

his thought process was organized, abstract reasoning was intact, and his
intelligence appeared average.” Id.
And, the ALJ considered the opinion of Alicia Carden, APRN, who had
opined that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were marked. R. 41; see also R. 793–
95 (underlying opinion). The ALJ determined the opinion to be “unpersuasive,
as it is inconsistent with the medical evidence of record . . . which shows that
the claimant has no more than mild to moderate limitations when compliant
with prescribed medications.” R. 41.
After considering the evidence presented in the record and at the
hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work
as an automatic washer/detailer, both as generally performed and as Plaintiff
actually performed it. R. 42. Accordingly, based on Plaintiff’s work experience,
his RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
disabled. Id.
Following the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff requested review from the
Appeals Council, which denied it. R. 30–32. Plaintiff then filed a Complaint
with this Court. Doc. 1. He filed a brief opposing the Commissioner’s decision
(Doc. 18), and the Commissioner responded (Doc. 22). Plaintiff did not file a
reply. The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

12

II.

Standard of Review
The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision with deference to its factual

findings, but no deference to its legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); Lewis
v. Barnhart, 285 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to the
Commissioner’s legal conclusions, . . . our review is de novo.”). The Court must
uphold a determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled if
the determination is supported by substantial evidence and comports with
applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). “And whatever
the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such
evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154
(2019). Substantial evidence is merely “more than a scintilla and is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir.
2004) (per curium)); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971);
Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). In other words, the Court
is not permitted to reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for
that of the ALJ even if the Court finds the evidence preponderates against the
ALJ’s decision. See Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.
1983).
13

That said, the ALJ must state the grounds for his decision with enough
clarity to enable the Court to conduct meaningful review of the standards he
employs. See Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066 (we must reverse when the ALJ has failed
to “provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that
the proper legal analysis has been conducted”); Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d
1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984).
In making its decision, the Court must review the entire record. Id.;
Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Bridges v. Bowen,
815 F.2d 622 (11th Cir. 1987)).
III.

Analysis

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) finding Plaintiff
could perform his past relevant work even though he could stand for only six
hours per shift; (2) failing to include in Plaintiff’s RFC certain limitations
recommended by state agency consultants, Yamir Laboy, Psy. D. and Candice
Mihm, Ph.D.; (3) improperly calibrating Plaintiff’s limitations in his ability to
maintain concentration, persistence, and pace; (4) improperly evaluating the
opinion of Alicia Carden, APRN; (5) failing to consider evidence in Plaintiff’s
2018 application for social security; and (6) concluding that Plaintiff was not
disabled based on the aforementioned errors. Doc. 18.

14

a. The ALJ did not err in finding that Plaintiff could perform his past
relevant work, as he actually performed it.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff could perform his
past relevant work as a washer/detailer. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18) at pp. 3–7. Plaintiff
alleges two errors comprise the ALJ’s finding. First, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ committed legal error in finding that “the claimant is able to perform his
past work as an automatic washer/detailer as . . . generally performed” (R. 42);
Plaintiff explains that, because Plaintiff’s past work as a washer/detailer was
a composite job (meaning that it consisted of a combination of two different
jobs described in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles), the ALJ was permitted
to consider only how the work was actually performed by Plaintiff, not how is
was generally performed in the national economy. Second, Plaintiff argues that
the ALJ erroneously found that Plaintiff could perform his work as an
automatic washer/detailer as he actually performed it, because Plaintiff
initially reported as part of his disability application that this past work
required standing and/or walking for up to eight hours, in contrast to the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff could stand and/or walk for only up to six hours.
Defendant appears to concede that the ALJ erred in considering whether
Plaintiff could perform his past work, a composite job, as it was generally
performed. See Def. Br. (Doc. 22), pp. 5–7; See also Jones v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
564 F. App’x. 432, 434 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A] party’s failure to respond to any
15

portion or claim in a motion indicates such portion, claim or defense is
unopposed.”). But Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s ability to perform his work
as an automatic washer/detailer as Plaintiff actually performed it is supported
by substantial evidence―indeed, by Plaintiff’s own testimony. Def. Br. (Doc.
22), p. 6.
1. Applicable Law
The ALJ must determine whether a claimant has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work; if so, he is not disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). The RFC is the most an individual can still do
despite any limitations caused by his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). In
determining the RFC, the ALJ must take into account “all relevant evidence,”
including the medical evidence, the claimant’s own testimony, and the
observations of others. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). Then, the ALJ must compare
the RFC to the demands of past relevant work to determine whether the
claimant is still capable of performing that kind of work.
Past relevant work is defined as work that a claimant had done within
the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful activity, and lasted long enough
for the claimant to learn to do it. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(1). The claimant has
the burden of showing that his impairments prevent him from performing his
past relevant work. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).
However, the Commissioner has a duty to develop a full and fair record,
16

including inquiring into the specific requirements and demands of a claimant’s
past relevant work. Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2015) (per curiam). To make this determination, an ALJ will ask a
claimant for information about the nature of his prior work. 20 C.F.R. §
416.960(b)(2). A claimant is the primary source for such information, and a
claimant’s statements regarding the manner in which he performed his past
work are “generally sufficient for determining the skill level and physical and
mental demands of such work.” SSR 24-2p.
The ALJ, often using the assistance of a VE, then classifies the past
relevant work into an occupation listed in the Dictionary of Occupation Titles
(“DOT”). If the past relevant work does not fall neatly within the one of the
occupations listed in the DOT, it is then considered a “composite job,” meaning
it has elements of two or more occupations listed in the DOT. See Smith v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 743 F. App’x 951, 954 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Generally, after classifying a claimant’s past relevant work, the ALJ
must determine whether the claimant can perform the functional demands and
duties of his past job as he actually performed it and, if not, whether the
claimant can perform the functional demands and duties of the occupation as
generally required by employers throughout the national economy. See SSR 242p; Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] claimant
must demonstrate an inability to return to the previous type of work he was
17

engaged in.”). However, this analysis differs for “composite jobs.” With those,
the ALJ may not consider whether a claimant can perform his past work “as
generally performed in the national economy” at Step Four, but instead must
determine at that step of the analysis only if the claimant “can perform all
parts of the job” as the claimant actually performed it. See Smith, 743 F. App’x
at 954 (“When the claimant’s previous work qualifies as a composite job, the
ALJ must consider the particular facts of the individual case to consider
whether the claimant can perform his previous work as actually performed.”
This is because composite jobs have “significant elements of two or more
occupations and, as such, ha[ve] no counterpart in the DOT.”).
Ultimately, if a claimant can still do the kind of work he previously
performed as he performed it, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(f). On the other hand, if an ALJ determines that the claimant cannot
perform his past relevant work as he previously performed it, the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to prove at Step Five that the claimant is capable of
performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.
Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989).

18

2. The Record and ALJ’s Decision as to Plaintiff’s Prior Work
On materials related to his disability application, Plaintiff indicated that
he had one job in the last fifteen years—at RV World as a detailer. 3 R. 290.
When applying for disability benefits, Plaintiff indicated that, in his prior
work, he had to stand and walk for 8 hours each shift. R. 291. In contrast, at
the hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified under oath (R. 54) that the job
required him to stand only in one-hour intervals, for a total of just three to four
hours in an eight-hour shift (R. 62). When specifically asked “Did you ever
stand longer than four hours [in that job]?” he responded that he did not recall
doing so. R. 63.
After hearing Plaintiff’s testimony, the VE testified that Plaintiff’s past
work was a composite job, comprised of the jobs listed in the DOT as an
automatic washer and a detailer, both jobs generally requiring “medium”
exertional levels, but that Plaintiff performed the job at a “light” exertional
level, and as unskilled work. R. 85. The VE testified that someone with who
was able to lift, carry, push, or pull 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds
frequently, stand and/or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit six
hours in an eight-hour workday, could perform the composite job as actually
Plaintiff actually performed the job. R. 86–87.

Although Plaintiff later testified that he had also had a job cleaning
busses (R. 57), he did not list this work in his written job history. See R. 290.
3

19

Following the hearing, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform medium work. R. 38. Of import, the Social Security Regulations
specify that medium work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total
of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. SSR 83-10. The ALJ further
determined that, because Plaintiff could perform medium work, he could
“perform his past relevant work as an automatic washer/detailer as actually
and generally performed.” R. 42.
3. Analysis
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s past work was a composite job. R. 42. The
question at Step Four, therefore, was whether Plaintiff could perform his past
work as he actually performed it. See Smith, 743 F. App’x at 954. The ALJ
found that Plaintiff had the RFC to stand and/or walk for up to six hours in an
eight-hour work day 4 (R. 38) and that Plaintiff could perform his work as an
automatic washer/detailer as Plaintiff previously performed it (R. 42). Plaintiff
avers these two findings are inconsistent, pointing only to a form on which
Plaintiff stated that he stood and/or walked for 8 hours in each shift in his prior
employment (R. 291). But Plaintiff ignores other evidence in the record:
Plaintiff’s testimony under oath that Plaintiff stood only in one-hour intervals

Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform medium work,
which requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6
hours in an 8-hour workday. SSR 83-10.
4

20

during his prior work, for a total of no more than four hours each shift (R. 62–
63). This sworn testimony amounts to substantial evidence that someone with
Plaintiff’s RFC (able to stand and/or walk for up to six hours a shift) could
perform Plaintiff’s past work as he performed it. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154
(describing a low threshold for evidentiary sufficiency).
And while the ALJ additionally determined that Plaintiff could perform
his past work as it was generally performed (see R. 42), that finding was
superfluous―and, therefore, harmless―given that the ALJ properly found that
Plaintiff could perform his past work as Plaintiff actually performed it.
Accordingly, I find no reversible error in the ALJ’s finding at Step Four
that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work.
b. The ALJ’s opinion that that Plaintiff was limited to “understanding,
remembering, and applying simple instructions” is consistent with
Drs. Laboy’s and Dr. Mihm’s opinions. And the ALJ did not err in
rejecting Dr. Laboy’s opinion that Plaintiff was limited in his ability
to interact with supervisors. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding as to Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors.
Plaintiff next argues that ALJ erred by failing to include in Plaintiff’s
RFC the limitations recommended by state agency consultants, Yamir Laboy,
Psy. D. and Candice Mihm, Ph.D. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18), at pp. 7–12. Plaintiff points
out that Drs. Laboy and Mihm opined that Plaintiff was limited in his ability
to carry out detailed instructions and to interact appropriately with
supervisors by responding appropriately to criticism. R. 103–06; 120–21. The
21

ALJ found both opinions “generally persuasive” (R. 41) but then, according to
Plaintiff, did not incorporate corresponding limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC (see
R. 38). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing either to include the
limitations in the RFC or to explain why such limitations were not included.
Defendant responds that, contrary to what Plaintiff argues, the ALJ’s RFC
finding is entirely consistent with Drs. Laboy and Mihm’s opinions, meaning
that he adopted their opinions. Def. Br. (Doc. 22), pp. 8–11.
1. Applicable Law
The RFC is the most that a claimant “can still do despite his limitations.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). An ALJ must assess the RFC based on “all the
relevant evidence in the [] record,” including the medical evidence, and must
consider all the claimant’s impairments, both severe and non-severe. Id. §
416.945(a)(1)–(3). The ALJ considers medical opinions, among other things, in
making the RFC assessment. Id. § 416.945(a)(3).
The ALJ need not assign specific evidentiary weight to any medical
opinion. Id. § 416.920c(a). The ALJ must, however, consider five factors in
evaluating

the

persuasiveness

of

a

medical

opinion:

supportability,

consistency, the provider’s relationship with the claimant, the provider’s
specialization, and other factors. Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)–(5).
Moreover, the ALJ must articulate how he considered the supportability
and consistency factors, which the regulations deem the most important. Id. §
22

416.920c(b)(2). As to supportability, the more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations from the medical source, the more
persuasive the medical opinion will be. Id. § 416.920c(c)(1). As to consistency,
the more consistent a medical opinion is with the evidence from other sources,
the more persuasive the medical opinion will be. Id. § 416.920c(c)(2).
Ultimately, the RFC is within the exclusive province of the ALJ, so the
ALJ need not match the RFC to any medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.946(c); see also 416.920c(a) (stating the ALJ will not give controlling
weight to any medical opinion). But the ALJ’s decision must identify
sufficiently for this Court’s review the basis on which he chose to omit from the
RFC a portion of an opinion he otherwise found persuasive. A court cannot
affirm simply because some unstated rationale would have supported the
ALJ’s decision. Owens, 748 F.2d at 1516.
2. The ALJ’s Discussion of Dr. Laboy’s and Dr. Mihm’s Opinions
Drs. Laboy and Mihm served as state agency psychological consultants,
meaning that they did not treat or examine Plaintiff but, rather, reviewed
Plaintiff’s medical records and formed an opinion as to his limitations. Both
Drs. Laboy and Mihm determined that the claimant had moderate limitations
in his ability to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, his
ability

to

complete

a

normal

workday

without

interruptions

from

psychologically based symptoms, his ability to interact appropriately with the
23

general public, and his ability to accept and respond appropriately to criticism
from supervisors. R. 103–06; 120–21. Ultimately, Dr. Laboy opined that
Plaintiff could comprehend/memorize brief, straightforward job-related
instructions, execute short, simple instructions, communicate about routine
employment matters, accept periodic, instructive supervisory input, and adjust
to modifications in his work duties, but could not work collaboratively with
others or interact with the public in a customer service position. R. 106–07.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mihm opined that Plaintiff had the RFC to understand and
remember simple and detailed instructions, perform simple tasks, could
maintain the concentration, persistence, and pace for simple tasks with
ordinary supervision, could adapt to changes in the workplace, and could
interact adequately with others as needed (but would perform best in a low
social demand setting). R. 120. Notably, Dr. Mihm found that Plaintiff’s
moderate limitation in his ability to accept criticism did not warrant any
limitations in his RFC (R. 120 (noting “ordinary supervision”)), while Dr. Laboy
found that Plaintiff’s limitation in that area limited his RFC to “accepting
periodic, instructive supervisory input” (R. 107 (noting that Plaintiff could not
respond appropriately to critical managerial feedback)).
The ALJ found both opinions “generally persuasive” but distinguished
Dr. Mihm’s opinion “more persuasive, as it is more consistent with the medical
evidence of record, which shows that during periods of sobriety and medication
24

compliance, the claimant’s recent memory was intact, his thought process was
organized, abstract reasoning was intact, and his intelligence appeared
average.” R. 41.
Ultimately, the ALJ adopted an RFC that was generally consistent with
that opined by Drs. Laboy and Mihm. The ALJ, like Dr. Laboy, concluded that
Plaintiff was limited to understanding, remembering, and applying simple
instructions. R. 38. And, like both Drs. Laboy and Mihm, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff could only occasionally interact with co-workers and in jobs that
do not require collaborative work, and could not interact with the public. Id.
As to Plaintiff’s limitation in interacting with supervisors, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff was capable of “interacting appropriately with supervisors.” Id.;
see also R. 86 (using the same language in his hypothetical to the VE). The
Court interprets this language to mean that Plaintiff was not limited in his
ability to interact with supervisors, including by accepting feedback from them.
3. Analysis
Plaintiff complains about the ALJ’s failure to incorporate or otherwise
address Drs. Laboy’s and Mihm’s opinions that Plaintiff was limited in his
ability to carry out detailed instructions and Dr. Laboys’ opinion that Plaintiff
could not respond to criticism and, therefore, interact appropriately with
supervisors.

25

First, the argument that the ALJ omitted the doctors’ proposed
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to carry out detailed instructions is mistaken.
The ALJ concluded that that Plaintiff was limited to “understanding,
remembering, and applying simple instructions.” R. 38. This is consistent—or
even more limited—than Drs. Laboy’s opinion that Plaintiff could understand,
memorize and execute simple instructions (R. 106–07) and Dr. Mihm’s opinion
that Plaintiff could understand and remember simple and detailed instructions
and perform simple tasks (R. 120). Consistent with his statement that he found
both opinions “generally persuasive” (R. 41), the ALJ incorporated the state
agency consultants’ proffered limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to carry out
detailed instructions (R. 38); Plaintiff’s suggestion otherwise fails.
Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC any
limitations on his ability to interact appropriately with supervisors (i.e., by
responding appropriately to criticism), or to explain why he rejected that
portion of the opinion, also fails. Again, Dr. Mihm found that Plaintiff’s
moderate limitation in his ability to accept criticism did not warrant any
limitations in his RFC (R. 120 (noting “ordinary supervision”)), while Dr. Laboy
found that Plaintiff was limited to “accepting periodic, instructive supervisory
input” and could not respond appropriately to critical managerial feedback (R.
107). Mirroring the opinion of Dr. Mihm, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not
limited in his ability to interact with supervisors, adopting no limitations in
26

receiving criticism (R. 38). The ALJ offered this explanation for the weight he
gave these opinions: “While the undersigned finds both opinions generally
persuasive, Dr. Mihm’s opinion is more persuasive, as it is more consistent
with the medical evidence of record, which shows that during periods of
sobriety and medication compliance, the claimant’s recent memory was intact,
his thought process was organized, abstract reasoning was intact, and his
intelligence appeared average.” R. 41.
While Plaintiff narrowly interprets this reasoning, arguing it does not
specifically address why the ALJ rejected Dr. Laboy’s specific finding that
Plaintiff could not appropriately interact with supervisors in responding to
their criticism, I read the ALJ’s explanation more broadly and find it sufficient.
The ALJ expressly found that, when Plaintiff was compliant with his
medication and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, Plaintiff acted
rationally and was not greatly limited in his mental functions, including in his
ability to interact with supervisors. R. 38. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s
argument, the ALJ proffered a sufficient reason to reject Dr. Laboy’s opinion
as to Plaintiff’s interaction with supervisors.
Moreover, I find there is substantial evidence in the record to show that
Plaintiff could appropriately interact with supervisors (i.e., receive criticism).
Consistent with the ALJ’s remarks, Plaintiff did not suffer from anger issues
when he was compliant with his treatment and not using drugs. See R. 470
27

(reporting in September 2017 that he was calmer on medication); R. 484 (“I
have not been snapping out on people.”). The most recent treatment notes in
the record show that Plaintiff was compliant with his medication. R. 788, 799.
Moreover, although Plaintiff reported being easily angered (see, e.g., R. 755),
his providers rated his limitations in the category of “danger to others” as being
either “no problem” or “less than slight problem.” R. 735, 753, 780.
Accordingly, I find no error in the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Laboy’s opinion
that Plaintiff was limited in his ability to interact appropriately with
supervisors in accepting criticism, and I find that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could interact appropriately with
supervisors.
c. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings as to Plaintiff’s
ability to sustain concentration, persistence, and pace.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ erred in considering Plaintiff’s
limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18) at Issue
No. 3. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ first erred when he improperly considered
these limitations while performing the Psychiatric Review Technique during
Step Three, and asserts that the ALJ erred again at Step Four when he failed
to formulate an RFC that incorporated Plaintiff’s limitations in this area,
including his need to be off-task or absent due to his inability to sustain

28

concentration. Id., pp. 12–16. Defendant responds that Plaintiff is asking this
Court to reweigh the evidence, which it cannot do. Def. Br. (Doc. 22), p. 14.
1. Applicable Law
The ALJ must evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairments using the
Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a. The ALJ rates
the severity of a claimant’s ability to: understand, remember, or apply
information; interact with others; concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and
adapt or manage oneself. Id. § 416.920a(c)(3). The PRT is a distinct process
from the RFC determination. Id. § 416.920a(d)(3). Nonetheless, the Eleventh
Circuit has held the PRT findings should not be ignored during the RFC
analysis. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1181. Rather, the ALJ must “indicate that
medical evidence suggested [a claimant’s] ability to work was unaffected by
[the] limitation [identified in the PRT findings] or “otherwise . . . account for
the limitation in the hypothetical [to the VE].” Id.
2. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Ability to Concentrate
Using the PRT, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had mild limitations in
understanding, remembering, or applying information and in his ability to
adapt or manage himself, and moderate limitations in his ability to interact
with others and to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. R. 36–37. In finding
he had moderate limitations in his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain
pace, the ALJ noted that the claimant was “able to prepare meals, watch TV,
29

read, and use the internet” and that “the record fails to show an inability to
complete testing that assesses concentration and attention.” R. 37.
The ALJ then found in the RFC that Plaintiff was limited to work that
required understanding, remembering, and applying only simple instructions
and concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace for only 2 hours at a time.
R. 38; see also R. 86 (including these limitations in a hypothetical to the VE).
3. Analysis
Plaintiff first attacks the ALJ’s stated reasons for finding Plaintiff was
only moderately limited in his ability to maintain concentration, persistence,
and pace: that Plaintiff performed daily activities like reading, making meals,
and watching TV and that “the record fails to show an inability to complete
testing that assesses concentration and attention” (R. 37). I find that
substantial evidence—including certain evidence explicitly cited by the ALJ—
supports the finding that Plaintiff was no more than moderately limited in his
ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace.
First, Plaintiff’s therapist typically found his concentration, memory,
and cognition to be within normal limits. R. 449, 454, 463, 468, 471, 474, 477,
486, 493, 499, 510, 513, 555, 563, 576, 740, 751, 755, 778, 786, 789, 800. Second,
Plaintiff himself reported to his providers that he was having trouble
concentrating only occasionally. R. 802. And, as noted by the ALJ, Plaintiff’s
ability to read, cook meals, and watch TV (R. 370, 372) reflects and ability to
30

concentrate. Gibbs v. Barnhart, 156 F. App’x 243, 247 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming a decision in which the ALJ found that the claimant was only mildly
limited in his ability to “maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, since
Gibbs testified that he reads, watches television for several hours per day, and
drives, all of which require an elevated level of concentration.”). Thus, the
ALJ’s decision regarding this limitation was based on substantial evidence.
Plaintiff also suggests that the ALJ erred by ignoring the PRT findings
in developing Plaintiff’s RFC. But it appears the ALJ incorporated the PRT
findings into Plaintiff’s RFC. Specifically, the ALJ appeared to incorporate the
moderate limitation in Plaintiff’s concentration, persistence, and pace by
finding that Plaintiff was limited to “limited to understanding, remembering,
and applying simple instructions,” 5 and by finding that he could concentrate,
persist, and maintain pace in only two-hour increments. R. 38. Mijenes v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 687 F. App’x 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Because the
medical evidence showed that [the plaintiff] could perform simple, routine
tasks despite her limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ’s

This is consistent with the regulatory definition of “unskilled” work.
Unskilled work is defined as “work which needs little or no judgment to do
simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time . . . . [A]
person can usually learn to do the job in 30 days, and little specific vocational
preparation and judgment are needed.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.968(a); see also
Chambers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 662 Fed. App’x. 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2016)
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(a)) (finding “unskilled work” encompasses “simple
work”).
5

31

limiting of [the RFC] to unskilled work sufficiently accounted for her moderate
difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace”); Lee v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 551 F. App’x 539, 541 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The ALJ adequately accounted
for all of [the plaintiff’s] impairments in the hypothetical posed to the VE
because

he

implicitly

accounted

for

[the

plaintiff’s]

limitations

in

concentration, persistence, and pace when he imposed a limitation of simple
work.”).
Plaintiff finally suggests–pointing to opinions from APRN Carden (R.
794), Dr. Laboy (R. 104–05), and Dr. Mihm (R. 120) that Plaintiff was
moderately or markedly limited in his ability to complete a normal workday
and workweek without interruptions–that the ALJ should have found that
Plaintiff would have been regularly absent from work or off-task during the
workday because of his inability to sustain concentration. But the Court does
not consider whether evidence could support a different RFC finding; rather,
the Court determines whether the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213 n.6. Here, it is. The ALJ accounted for
limitations in Plaintiff’s concentration during the workday by limiting to him
to concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace in 2-hour intervals. R. 38.
The record supports a finding that these limitations were sufficient. As the
ALJ explained, Plaintiff’s ability to perform activities of daily living, including
by shopping, preparing meals, using the internet, managing finances, and
32

navigating transportation alone, evidenced that he had the “mental
capabilities . . . necessary for . . . maintaining employment . . . .” R. 40; see also
R. 37. And, as previously mentioned, the record reflects that Plaintiff’s
concentration was generally intact when he was compliant with his
medications. R. 449, 454, 463, 468, 471, 474, 477, 486, 493, 499, 510, 513, 555,
563, 576, 740, 751, 755, 778, 786, 789, 800.
Thus, the ALJ appropriately accounted for Plaintiff’s limitations in his
ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace.
d. The ALJ’s reasons for finding unpersuasive the opinion of APRN
Carden are supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff next attacks the ALJ’s consideration of the opinion of APRN
Carden, Plaintiff’s mental health provider. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18) at pp. 16–19.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her opinion, that he
improperly cherry-picked evidence to discount her opinion, and that Plaintiff’s
mental health significantly limited his ability to work. Defendant disagrees,
and points to evidence that supports the ALJ’s reasoning for discounting APRN
Carden’s opinion. Def. Br. (Doc. 22), p. 15.
1. Applicable Law
The legal standard for considering medical opinions is outlined above, in
Section III.b.1. Additionally relevant here, “[t]o the extent that [the claimant]
points to other evidence which would undermine the ALJ’s RFC determination,
33

her contentions misinterpret the narrowly circumscribed nature of our
appellate review, which precludes us from ‘re-weigh[ing] the evidence or
substitut[ing] our own judgment for that [of the Commissioner] . . . . even if the
evidence preponderates against’ the decision.” Moore, 405 F.3d at 1213.
2. APRN Carden’s Opinion and the ALJ’s Consideration of It
APRN Carden was one of Plaintiff’s mental health providers at Peace
River Center. In May 2022, she partially completed a “Mental Residual
Functional Capacity Assessment,” by checking boxes indicating that Plaintiff
had marked limitations in his ability to remember locations and work-like
procedures, to understand and remember both short and detailed instructions,
to maintain appropriate behavior, to work with others, to respond to change,
to complete a normal workday, to ask simple questions or request assistance,
to respond appropriately to changes in the work setting, to respond
appropriately to criticism, and to maintain attention and concentration for
extended periods. R. 793–95. She did not complete the portion of the
assessment seeking an explanation of these conclusions. Id.
The ALJ determined the opinion to be “unpersuasive, as it is inconsistent
with the medical evidence of record . . . which shows that the claimant has no
more than mild to moderate limitations when compliant with prescribed
medications.” R. 41. Notably, in rejecting APRN Carden’s opinion for its
inconsistency with the record, the ALJ cited, among other things, APRN
34

Carden’s own treatment notes. See R. 39–40 (referencing Carden’s treatment
notes in Exhibits B9F and B12F).
3. Analysis
Plaintiff does not explicitly argue that the ALJ failed to address the
supportability and consistency factors in evaluating APRN Carden’s opinion; 6
rather, he argues that the reasons the ALJ proffered for discounting the
opinion were not supported by substantial evidence. I find the reasons the ALJ
gave for rejecting the opinion comprise substantial evidence.
The ALJ found that APRN Carden’s opinion was inconsistent with
records demonstrating Plaintiff’s abilities while he was on his medication. And
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had the capacity
to work when he took his medication. First, Plaintiff’s own statements support
the finding, as he explained to his therapist, “I was doing good until I ran out
of medication.” R. 577. To the extent Plaintiff suffered declines in mental

See Williams v. Hous. Auth. of Savannah, Inc., 834 F. App’x 482, 489
(11th Cir. 2020) (The parties bear the burdens “of formulating the arguments
[they] wish[] for the court to address” and “the court [is] not required to
evaluate the evidence under a theory . . . that [a party] did not raise.”).
Moreover, had Plaintiff made the argument, it would fail. The ALJ specifically
noted that APRN Carden’s notes were inconsistent with broader medical
evidence. R. 41. He also clearly considered that APRN Carden’s opinion was
not supported by her own treatment notes. See R. 39–40 (referencing Carden’s
treatment notes in Exhibits B9F and B12F to support his findings on Plaintiff’s
mental RFC, including her notes that Plaintiff had intact concentration and
reported “I have been doing better” in May 2022).
6

35

health, these corresponded to times when he was non-compliant with
treatment or using drugs. See R. 470 (reporting in September 2017 that he was
calmer on medication); R. 484 (on medication, “I have not been snapping out
on people.”); R. 517 (after being off medication and failing to seek mental health
treatment for nearly six months, Plaintiff was Baker Acted); R. 716 (Plaintiff
angry after being without medication).
Plaintiff’s therapists typically found his concentration, memory, and
cognition to be within normal limits. R. 449, 454, 463, 468, 471, 474, 477, 486,
493, 499, 510, 513, 555, 563, 576, 740, 751, 755, 778, 786, 789, 800. Although
Plaintiff sometimes displayed impaired concentration, it usually correlated
with substance abuse or noncompliance with medication. See R. 505 and 717
(impaired concentration when non-compliant with medication); 582 (limited
concentration when seeking substance abuse treatment). At his appointments
with his therapist, Plaintiff also often had normal demeanor and behavior. R.
449, 463, 471, 477, 493, 498, 513, 555, 576, 740, 755, 778.
This all amounts to substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to
discount APRN Carden’s opinion that Plaintiff was more limited in his mental
functioning. And, although Plaintiff points to evidence in the record that would
support different RFC finding, that is outside the scope of my review.

36

e. The ALJ did not err by failing to consider evidence from Plaintiff’s
prior disability application.
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ was required to further develop the
record by incorporating all evidence from Plaintiff’s prior disability
applications. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18), pp. 19–21. Defendant correctly notes that
Plaintiff fails to identify any evidence in the prior record that would have
supported Plaintiff’s position. See Def. Br. (Doc. 22), p. 20.
1. Applicable Law
The ALJ must develop a full and fair record. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(b). The
regulations provide, “Before [the SSA] make[s] a determination that [a
claimant is] not disabled, [the SSA] will develop [the claimant’s] complete
medical history for at least the 12 months preceding the month in which [the
claimant] file[s] [his] application.” Id. § 416.912(b)(1). To discharge its duty to
develop the complete medical history, the ALJ must only make an initial
request for evidence from each of a claimant’s medical sources and then one
follow-up request if that evidence is not received within 20 days. Id.
Additionally, the regulations state that, “If you say that your disability
began less than 12 months before you filed your application, we will develop
your complete medical history beginning with the month you say your
disability began unless we have reason to believe your disability began earlier.”
Id. § 416.912(b)(1)(ii).
37

2. Record Evidence Concerning Plaintiff’s Date of Disability
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance and supplemental security
income on January 30, 2018. R. 33. An ALJ denied those claims on January 24,
2020. Id.
On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff filed another application for supplemental
security income. R. 247–68. Plaintiff alleged on that application that he became
disabled on January 1, 2016. Id. But the Social Security Administration had
already determined that he was not disabled as of January 30, 2018; thus,
Plaintiff amended the date, alleging instead that he became disabled on
January 30, 2020, shortly after the ALJ’s prior decision. R. 56.
3. Analysis
An ALJ denied Plaintiff’s initial 2018 application on January 24, 2020
(R. 33), so the evidence in that case would have been dated prior to January
24, 2020, and did not support a finding that Plaintiff was disabled. Plaintiff
filed the application for supplemental security income that relates to this
appeal on June 22, 2020. R. 247–68. For purposes of this application, he alleges
he became disabled on January 30, 2020. R. 56. The ALJ had a duty to develop
the record “beginning with the month [he said his] disability began,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.912(b)(1)(ii), which was January 2020. The ALJ’s duty to develop the
record only required that he make an initial request for evidence from each of
a claimant’s medical sources and then one follow-up request if that evidence
38

was not received within 20 days. Id. § 416.912(b)(1)(i). Plaintiff makes no
allegation that the ALJ failed to discharge this requirement; indeed, there is
evidence in the record dating back to 2017. R. 47. There is no additional
requirement that the ALJ incorporate the record evidence from other, prior
disability applications, which predate the date he now claims he became
disabled. Thus, the ALJ has not committed any legal error by failing to do so.
f. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can
perform medium work.
In his last argument, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding that he can
perform medium work is based on the ALJ’s other errors and is not supported
by substantial evidence. 7 Pl. Br. (Doc. 18), p. 21–23. Because I affirm the ALJ
on the prior issues, I address only whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported
by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff focuses in this argument on his allegations that neuropathy in
his feet prevents him from standing for more than five minutes and that
arthritis prevents him from gripping objects, thus preventing him from
performing medium work. Id.
As to Plaintiff’s alleged neuropathy and difficulty standing, the
consultative examiner found that Plaintiff walked normally and had normal

For this reason, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reverse the
ALJ’s decision and immediately award benefits to Plaintiff. Pl. Br. (Doc. 18), p.
21–23.
7

39

sensitivity in his feet. R. 762–63. In January 2022, Plaintiff reported that he
had no problems walking or climbing stairs. R. 769. And, his therapist
regularly noted that he walked independently. See e.g., R. 462, 487, 716, 739,
750, 785.
As to his ability to grip, the consultative examiner found Plaintiff had a
full range of motion in his hands and full grip strength. R. 763.
Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff
had the RFC to perform medium work, and the ALJ did not err by making this
finding.
IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, I ORDER:
(1)

The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

(2)

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in the Defendant’s favor,
terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

ORDERED on September 24, 2024.

40