Bonilla-Melgar v. Quilan et al

Filing 14

ORDER dismissing 11 second amended complaint without prejudice. The clerk must enter a judgment against Bonilla-Melger and close this case. Signed by Judge Steven D. Merryday on 8/28/2024. (RO)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

CHRISTIAN JOSUE
BONILLA-MELGER,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 8:23-cv-2009-SDM-AAS

SERGEANT ROBERT QUILAN, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
In his initial civil rights complaint (Doc. 1) Bonilla-Melgar alleged that the
defendants violated his civil rights when, using excessive force, they injured his eye.
An earlier order (Doc. 8) dismisses the complaint with leave to amend and advises
Bonilla-Melger (1) that the complaint must contain well-pleaded facts showing the
direct involvement of each named defendant and (2) that he cannot pursue a civil
rights action based on respondeat superior. In his first amended complaint (Doc. 9)
Bonilla-Melgar corrected some of the noted deficiencies. An earlier order (Doc. 10)
determines the necessity for further amendment and specifically explains the
difference between the need for a defendant to act “under color of law” to support a
civil rights action and the two types of capacities in which a defendant may be sued.
The order goes into great detail about the differences between individual capacity

and official capacity and explains that, “[b]ecause the amended complaint contains
facts showing the direct involvement of each named defendant, Bonilla-Melger’s civil
rights claim is an individual –– not official –– capacity claim.” (Doc. 10 at 3)
Bonilla-Melger was ordered to amend again.
In his second amended complaint (Doc. 11) Bonilla-Melger has ignored the
earlier instructions and persists in pursuing his claims against the defendants in only
their official capacity. As Bonilla-Melger was advised, “a claim against a defendant
in his official capacity requires proof that an official policy or custom caused the
alleged injury” and “[t]o establish the liability of a governmental entity, the official
policy or custom must be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” (Doc. 10
at 3) Because Bonilla-Melger asserts no basis for a claim against the defendants in
their official capacity, the second amended complaint fails to state a claim upon
which can be granted and is ripe for a dismissal under Section 1915(e), as explained
in the earlier orders.
The second amended complaint (Doc. 11) is DISMISSED. The clerk must
enter a judgment against Bonilla-Melger and close this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 28, 2024.

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