Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. CIRSCO, Commercial Industrial Roof Services Company

Filing 47

ORDER: The Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 36, 37) are DENIED. Signed by Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle on 3/5/2025. (BTM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S, LONDON a/s/o RESTORATION
HARDWARE, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 8:23-cv-2149-KKM-LSG

CIRSCO, COMMERICAL INDUSTRIAL ROOF
SERVICES COMPANY,
Defendant.
___________________________________

ORDER

The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment in this negligence action
arising out of the flooding of a furniture store. (Docs. 36, 37). For the below reasons, I
deny both motions.
I.

BACKGROUND
Restoration Hardware leased commercial space from Brown-19, LLC. Joint

Statement of Undisputed Facts (JSUF) (Doc. 39) ¶ 1. Brown-19 contracted with
CIRSCO to perform roofing work and related construction services at the leased property.

Id. ¶ 2. On August 2, 2022, CIRSCO opened the roof directly above the store. Id. ¶¶ 3–

4. After CIRSCO removed a section of the roof, rain began to fall, and rainwater flooded
the store that Restoration Hardware leased. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (Lloyd’s), Restoration Hardware’s insurer,
initiated this negligence action against CIRSCO after allegedly paying Restoration
Hardware for the damages caused by the rainwater. Compl. (Doc. 1); Am. Compl. (Doc.
20). Lloyd’s alleges that CIRSCO was negligent for failing to tarp the roof in advance of
opening it and for failing to prevent the entry of rainwater. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20, 23, 27,
32, 35. Lloyd’s seeks judgment in the amount of $800,000.00. Id. at 7. Both parties move
for summary judgment. (Docs. 36, 37).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact
is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The movant always bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate an absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608
(11th Cir. 1991). When that burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present
evidentiary materials (e.g., affidavits, depositions, exhibits, etc.) demonstrating that there
2

is a genuine issue of material fact, which precludes summary judgment. Id. A moving party
is entitled to summary judgment if the nonmoving party “fail[s] to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of
proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
I review the record evidence as identified by the parties and draw all legitimate
inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. See Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1262
(11th Cir. 2020); Reese v. Hebert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, to the
extent that the record is disputed or capable of multiple inferences, I draw them in favor of
the non-movant.
III.

ANALYSIS
“The tort of negligence includes the four elements of duty, breach, causation, and

damages.” Bing v. Alachua County, 392 So. 3d 266, 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024). Lloyd’s
argues that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that all four elements are met.
Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s MSJ) (Doc. 36) at 4. CIRSCO challenges the first three
elements—duty, breach, and causation. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Def.’s MSJ) (Doc. 37)
at 3–11. CIRSCO also argues that the negligence claim is based on “impermissible
inference stacking.” Id. at 7–9. Neither party is entitled to summary judgment.

3

A. Lloyd’s Motion
Lloyd’s argues that no genuine issues of material fact remain as to CIRSCO’s
negligence. Pl.’s MSJ at 4. Because CIRSCO left the store exposed on the date of the
incident, Lloyd’s says, CIRSCO is fully responsible for the damage to the store as the result
of the rain. Id.
Although some general version of that factual predicate appears true, the legal
conclusion does not necessarily follow. First, reviewing the record in the light most
favorable to CIRSCO, Lloyd’s has failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
it is entitled to sue as Restoration Hardware’s subrogee. See Resp. to Pl.’s Mot for Summ.
J. (Def.’s Resp.) (Doc. 41) at 5–8. Florida law recognizes both conventional subrogation
and equitable subrogation. “Conventional subrogation arises or flows from a contract
between the parties establishing an agreement that the party paying the debt will have the
rights and remedies of the original creditor.” Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station

WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 646 (Fla. 1999). “Equitable subrogation is generally appropriate
where: (1) the subrogee made the payment to protect his or her own interest, (2) the
subrogee did not act as a volunteer, (3) the subrogee was not primarily liable for the debt,
(4) the subrogee paid off the entire debt, and (5) subrogation would not work any injustice
to the rights of a third party.” Id. When seeking to sue under equitable subrogation, the
subrogee, here allegedly Lloyd’s, is required to establish all five elements. Villa Maria
4

Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. S. Broward Hosp. Dist., 8 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2009).
In the amended complaint, Lloyd’s alleges that it “paid its insured for the damages
caused to the extent it was insured by [Lloyd’s],” meaning that Lloyd’s is “subrogated by
its insured to bring this action on its own behalf and on behalf of its insured and all parties
affected by the loss for the damage caused by [CIRSCO].” Am. Compl. ¶ 31. But Lloyd’s
does not supply any evidence demonstrating this assertion. Lloyd’s identifies no contract
with Restoration Hardware “establishing an agreement that the party paying the debt will
have the rights and remedies of the original creditor.” WQBA, 731 So. 2d at 646. Lloyd’s
also fails to identify evidence that it paid the entire amount of Restoration Hardware’s
damages. See Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 225 So. 3d 780, 786 (Fla.
2017) (“[A] claim of equitable subrogation requires payment of the entire debt.”). 1
Although Lloyd’s contends that subrogation is warranted because Lloyd’s insured
and indemnified Restoration Hardware after the loss occurred, Pl.’s Reply (Doc. 46) at 5,
“[s]tatements by counsel in briefs are not evidence,” Travaglio v. Am. Exp. Co., 735 F.3d
This rule has a specific application in the insurance context. “Generally, where the insurer has paid the
full amount required by the insurance contract, but the insured’s actual loss exceeds the total amount
recovered from the insurer and the tort-feasor, the insurer’s subrogation rights cannot be enforced because
the insured has not been made whole.” Collins v. Wilcott, 578 So. 2d 742, 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). “An
exception to this general principle occurs when the insured and the insurer enter into a settlement agreement
providing otherwise.” Id.; see 16 JORDAN R. PLITT, ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 223:22 (3d ed.
Dec. 2024 update) (“When an insurer has paid only part of the amount that it is required to pay to the
insured, it has been held that the insurer is not entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured, at least
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.” (footnotes omitted)).
1

5

1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Skyline Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 613 F.2d 1328, 1337
(5th Cir. 1980)). Even though the record provides some evidence that Lloyd’s insured
Restoration Hardware and includes mention of a possibility of subrogation, see (Doc. 36)
at 21–26, Lloyd’s fails to set forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it may bring this
action as a subrogee. Of course, CIRSCO did not move for summary judgment on this
basis. If Lloyd’s fails to put on sufficient evidence to support its subrogation argument at
trial, CIRSCO would be entitled to a directed verdict.
Beyond standing as a subrogee, Lloyd’s second problem is that it fails to point to
undisputed evidence as to what transpired on August 2, 2022. Lloyd’s has therefore failed
to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark, 929 F.2d at 608.
From CIRSCO’s correspondence with its insurer, for example, two different
descriptions emerge as to what occurred. First, according to CIRSCO’s insurer, CIRSCO
represented that “it had removed a portion of the roof when a sudden rainstorm popped
up,” and that, although “[t]he crew then attempted to cover the open portion of the roof
with tarp,” “there was simply too much rain, and the amount of water overwhelmed the
tarp.” (Doc. 36) at 13. In a subsequent letter, though, a CIRSCO employee represented
that, when the storm approached, CIRSCO employees were in the process of “fastening
the tarp to the deck and sealing the edges with caulk in accordance with standard protocol
as recommended by the National Roofing Contractors Association for such a situation.”
6

Id. at 11. The “rain moved upon [the employees] too fast” and the employees “did not have
time to finish the fastening.” Id.
Lloyd’s motion for summary judgment assumes that CIRSCO employees left the
roof open when the rain began, but there is no conclusive evidence—such as a video of the
roof on the date in question—to resolve the question. Presumably Lloyd’s will rely at trial
on some version of the statements by Restoration Hardware employee Mario Leverette—
which formed the basis for Lloyd’s expert report by H. Howard Piper. Levertte apparently
told Piper that CIRSCO’s workers removed a portion of the existing roof that measured 3
feet wide by 200 feet long and that the rain began before the workmen were able to install
tarps. Id. at 31. Even if admissible, these hearsay statements do not conclusively resolve the
facts in Lloyd’s favor.
Third, the Lloyd’s fails to acknowledge the disputes of material fact as to breach.
Lloyd’s expert and CIRSCO’s expert offer different opinions as to whether it would have
been prudent for CIRSCO employees to have taken certain steps to prevent water entry in
the event of a rainstorm. Compare (Doc. 36) at 32 (recommending installation of a “tarp
with a water hose connector” below the roof deck), with (Doc. 37) at 16 (disagreeing with
this recommendation). Summary judgment is not proper in such circumstances.
Finally, for many of the same reasons, Lloyd’s has failed to demonstrate a lack of
genuine issue as to causation, particularly as to proximate cause. Without presenting a clear
7

and unimpeachable picture of what occurred on August 2, 2022, and what was foreseeable,
Lloyd’s is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A jury is ordinarily tasked with
deciding both breach and causation, and this case is not an outlier. Walt Disney World

Co. v. Goode, 501 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Considering the little evidence
in the record in the light most favorable to CIRSCO, Lloyd’s is incorrect that no genuine
issue of material fact remains.
B. CIRSCO’s Motion
CIRSCO argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Lloyd’s has failed
to establish the elements of duty, breach, and causation. Def.’s MSJ at 4–7, 9–11. CIRSCO
also argues that Lloyd’s relies on impermissible inference stacking to meet its burden. Id.
at 7–9.
1. Duty
CIRSCO first contends that Lloyd’s claim relies on a misstated duty of care. See
Def.’s MSJ at 6. “The element of duty is ordinarily a question of law for the trial court to
decide rather than a question of fact.” Bing, 392 So. 3d at 269. The duty element “focuses
on whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader ‘zone of risk’ that poses
a general threat of harm to others.” McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla.
1992); see Smith v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 857 So. 2d 224, 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)
(“Under the framework set forth by the supreme court, the zone of risk created by a
8

defendant defines the scope of the defendant’s legal duty and the scope of the zone of risk
is in turn determined by the foreseeability of a risk of harm to others.”). In applying this
test, the Florida Supreme Court “has focused on the likelihood that a defendant’s conduct
will result in the type of injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Palm Beach-Broward Med.

Imaging Ctr., Inc. v. Cont’l Grain Co., 715 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). “Where
a defendant’s conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, the law generally will recognize a
duty placed upon defendant either to lessen the risk or see that sufficient precautions are
taken to protect others from the harm that the risk poses.” Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 732,
735 (Fla. 1989).
According to CIRSCO, the claim here relies on a conception of the duty of care
that goes beyond the “foreseeable zone of risk.” Def.’s MSJ at 6. CIRSCO argues that,
under the duty of care recited in the amended complaint, “all contractors would have a legal
duty to keep all personal property of a tenant safe from all damage at all times, not just for
those risks that are reasonably foreseeable.” Id.
Although removing foreseeability from the duty inquiry would contradict Florida
law and CIRSCO certainly did not owe Restoration Hardware an “absolute duty” to
protect all property, Def.’s MSJ at 9, the undisputed record shows that CIRSCO owed
some duty to Restoration Hardware. Although CIRSCO argues that Lloyd’s fails to
produce any evidence indicating that the rainstorm that caused the damage was foreseeable,
9

see, e.g., id. at 9, CIRSCO does not plausibly argue that water damage from a rainstorm
in Florida during the summer is not a “foreseeable risk” of roofing work. Cf. Knight v.

Waltman, 774 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“Clearly, the existence of the covered
hole in the roof created a foreseeable ‘zone of risk’ that posed a general risk of harm to
others.”). CIRSCO’s argument as to duty therefore does not present a basis for granting
its motion for summary judgment.
2. Standard of Care and Breach
After establishing the existence of a duty, a plaintiff must establish “a breach of that
duty by allowing conduct to fall below the applicable standard of care.” Torres v. Sarasota

Cnty. Pub. Hosp. Bd., 961 So. 2d 340, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). The jury is tasked with
determining the relevant standard of care and whether the defendant breached it. Johnson

v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 389 So. 3d 705, 711 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024); Sanderson v.
Eckerd Corp., 780 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). CIRSCO argues that the record
lacks specific facts establishing CIRSCO’s deviation from the reasonable standard of care.
Def.’s MSJ at 6. CIRSCO is incorrect.
The Eleventh Circuit has held that judgment as a matter of law is warranted when
the plaintiff fails “to put forth some evidence of the standard of care in the roofing
industry.” Ins. Co. of the W. v. Island Dream Homes, Inc., 679 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th

10

Cir. 2012). 2 Although compliance or noncompliance with the industry standard is not
necessarily dispositive, id. at 1299, Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1282
(11th Cir. 2015), a plaintiff remains obligated to “present some kind of evidence from
which a jury could conclude that the roofers’ actions were contrary to custom or the relevant
standard of care,” Island Dream Homes, Inc., 679 F.3d at 1300. This evidence may come
in the form of “expert testimony” or “testimony of roofing custom.” Id. at 1298. When “the
subject matter is beyond the understanding of the average juror,” expert testimony is
ordinarily required. Id.; see AMH Appraisal Consultants, Inc. v. Argov Gavish P’ship, 919
So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (“[A] jury could not have determined that the agent
was negligent in the absence of an opinion of an expert. This was simply too esoteric to be
understood by the average layperson.”).
According to Lloyd’s, “CIRSCO acted negligently in failing to tarp the open roof
in advance of its opening of the roof and for failing to protect the store below by preventing
the entry of water into the premises below.” Am. Compl. ¶ 23; see id. ¶ 32 (“CIRSCO
was negligent and is fully responsible for its failure to act in advance of opening up the roof
to act to protect and prevent the entry of rain and water including from the scuppers into
the subject premises on August 2, 2022.”). For this this argument to succeed, Lloyd’s must

“[T]he ‘standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law,
such that the inquiry under each is the same.’ ” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1025 n.11 (11th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)).
2

11

establish that CIRSCO’s acts or omissions violated the applicable standard of care. Because
the standard of care governing the work of a roofing contractor “is beyond the
understanding of the average juror,” expert testimony is required in most cases. Island

Dream Homes, Inc., 679 F.3d at 1298–99.
Lloyd’s relies on the report of H. Howard Piper. See (Doc. 36) at 30–41. Piper
opines that, to “prevent water entry into the building,” CIRSCO “would need to not only
seal the roof to water entry but provide a path to the scuppers to prevent accumulation of
water on the roof.” Id. at 31. Piper then provides a list of six steps that CIRSCO could
have taken to accomplish this goal. Id. Piper also opines that CIRSCO “may have been
able to better cover or control the water entry” if it had “removed a smaller portion of the
existing roofing system.” Id. at 32. CIRSCO, Piper says, also could have installed a “tarp
with a water hose connector.” Id.
Piper concludes that CIRSCO did not take “prudent action” because “[s]maller
areas of roof could have been removed which would have lessened the exposure to water
entry from a sudden rain event and improved the chances to make temporary repairs to
lessen or prevent any water entry.” Id.; see id. (“In our opinion, the roofing contractor did
not properly consider how to prevent water entry into the building should a sudden rain
event occur. . . . A better approach would have been to remove smaller areas of roof where
the area could have been covered with tarps and water draining to the area diverted to other
12

scuppers temporarily.”). Because “rain is expected every day during August,” Piper says,
roofing contractors “should take the necessary precautions to avoid allowing water into
buildings,” including keeping “tarps on hand to help control water entry into the building.”

Id. If Piper was deposed, neither party provides that transcript and Lloyd’s submits only
the report with the above opinions.
Although Piper’s report fails to directly explicate the relevant standard of care, his
report, when read in the light most favorable to Lloyd’s, provides the jury with “evidence
from which [it] could conclude that the roofers’ actions were contrary to custom or the
relevant standard of care.” Island Dream Homes, Inc., 679 F.3d at 1300. A reasonable jury
could conclude that CIRSCO’s actions fell below the industry standard of care based on
Piper’s enumeration of specific steps that CIRSCO failed to take and Piper’s opinion that
CIRSCO failed to take “prudent action.” (Doc. 36) at 31–32. At trial, of course, CIRSCO
will have the opportunity to cross-examine Piper about the standard of care in the roofing
industry, see Def.’s MSJ at 10–11 (disagreeing with Piper’s opinion); see also (Doc. 37) at
14–17 (peer review of Piper’s report), and a reasonable jury could reach a conclusion
favorable to CIRSCO based on that cross-examination and other evidence. Given that a
reasonable jury could reach either result, though, CIRSCO’s motion for summary
judgment on this basis is denied.

13

3. Causation
To meet its burden as to the causation element, Lloyd’s must prove both “cause in
fact and foreseeability.” Lindsey v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 943 So. 2d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2006); see Ruiz v. Tenet Hialeah Healthsystem, Inc., 260 So. 3d 977, 981–82 (Fla.
2018). Lloyd’s must show that CIRSCO’s negligence was a cause-in-fact of its injuries and
that the injuries were “a foreseeable consequence of the danger created by the [CIRSCO’s]
negligent act or omission.” Ruiz, 260 So. 3d at 981–82 (quoting Stahl v. Metro. Dade

Cnty., 438 So. 2d 14, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)); accord McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 (“The
proximate causation element . . . is concerned with whether and to what extent the
defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually
occurred.”). In other words, but-for and proximate causation is required.
A harm is “proximate” if “prudent human foresight would lead one to expect that
similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by the specific act or omission in question.”

McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503. An injury, though, that is “caused by a freakish and improbable
chain of events would not be ‘proximate’ precisely because it is unquestionably
unforeseeable.” Id.; see id. (“The law does not impose liability for freak injuries that were
utterly unpredictable in light of common human experience.”). The question of causation
is ordinarily for the fact-finder to resolve. “[W]here reasonable persons could differ as to
whether the facts establish proximate causation—i.e., whether the specific injury was
14

genuinely foreseeable or merely an improbable freak—then the resolution of the issue must
be left to the fact-finder.” Id. at 504. (emphasis in the original).
CIRSCO argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to causation and
that the storm, allegedly a microburst, “was neither foreseeable nor preventable.” Def.’s
MSJ at 9–11. 3 CIRSCO faults Lloyd’s for failing to present weather data demonstrating a
chance of rain on the date of the accident. Id. at 10.
A reasonable jury could conclude that CIRSCO’s conduct caused the flooding of
Restoration Hardware. First, a reasonable jury could find that CIRSCO’s conduct was a
cause-in-fact of the flood. In other words, taking the evidence in the light most favorable
to Lloyd’s, a reasonable jury could find a “natural, direct, and continuous sequence between
the negligent act and the injury,” such that “it can reasonably be said that but for the act
the injury would not have occurred.” Florida, Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. Amora, 944
So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); see, e.g., (Doc. 36) at 32 (“Smaller areas of roof
could have been removed which would have lessened the exposure to water entry from a
sudden rain event and improved the chances to make temporary repairs to lessen or prevent
any water entry.”).

“A microburst is a localized column of sinking air (downdraft) within a thunderstorm and is usually less
than or equal to 2.5 miles in diameter.” Microbursts, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://perma.cc/GSA2VPRX. CIRSCO has not established that the storm at issue was a microburst.
3

15

Second, a reasonable jury could conclude that the flooding of Restoration Hardware
was a “foreseeable consequence” of CIRSCO’s negligence. Ruiz, 260 So. 3d at 981–82
(quoting Stahl, 438 So. 2d at 21). During August in Florida, rainstorms are quite common.
As a result, a flooded store is a “genuinely foreseeable” result of negligent roofing work.

McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503. In the light of “common human experience,” the damage to
Restoration Hardware was not “utterly unpredictable.” Id. CIRSCO therefore has failed
to show that reasonable persons could not “differ as to whether the facts establish proximate
causation.” Id. at 504; cf. St. Fort ex rel. St. Fort v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, 902
So. 2d 244, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“Circumstances under which a court may resolve
proximate cause as a matter of law are extremely limited.”). It is not the case that the “only
reasonable inference is that [the] injury was factually unforeseeable.” McCain, 593 So. 2d
at 505. To the extent the parties disagree as to whether a microburst occurred, those
disputes of fact and their relevance to proximate causation are reserved to the jury.
CIRSCO’s motion for summary judgment is denied on this basis.
4. Stacking of Inferences
In Florida, if a party “to a civil action depends upon the inferences to be drawn from
circumstantial evidence as proof of one fact, it cannot construct a further inference upon
the initial inference in order to establish a further fact unless it can be found that the
original, basic inference was established to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences.”
16

Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (quoting
Cohen v. Arvin, 878 So. 2d 403, 405 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)). CIRSCO argues that Lloyd’s
“improperly attempts to improperly stack unsubstantiated inferences to establish both the
elements of breach and proximate cause.” Def.’s MSJ at 9.
In federal court, the standards fixed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 apply
when adjudicating a motion for summary judgment. Thus, the federal rule—which permits
all “reasonable” inferences—applies instead of Florida’s rule against stacking inferences.

Daniels v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, 692 F.2d 1321, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 1982).
CIRSCO does not convincingly explain how Lloyd’s case rests on unreasonable inferences.
Further, even assuming the relevance of Florida law, impermissible inferences exist under
Florida’s rule only “when no direct evidence is presented on negligence or causation and a
jury infers causation based on an inference of negligence.” Collins v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
749 F.3d 951, 959 (11th Cir. 2014). Take, for example, a case where the trial court found
negligence and proximate cause after the plaintiff was injured while climbing on a ladder
even though “there was no evidence that the ladder was defective, that its placement created
a dangerous condition, or why the ladder slipped.” Id.; see Hurst v. Astudillo, 631 So. 2d
380, 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (per curiam). This case is different considering the evidence
of negligence in the record, such as Piper’s report. Summary judgment is thus unwarranted
on this basis.
17

IV.

CONCLUSION
Neither party is entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1.

The Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 36, 37) are DENIED.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on March 5, 2025.

18