Ivery v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (Pinellas)

Filing 8

ORDER: Mr. Ivery's petition for writ of habeas corpus 1 is DENIED. A certificate of appealability and leave to appeal in forma pauperis are DENIED. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment against Mr. Ivery and to CLOSE this case. Signed by Judge William F. Jung on 1/7/2025. (MWC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RODERICK JAMES IVERY,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 8:23-cv-2300-WFJ-TGW

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.

/
ORDER

Roderick James Ivery, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1). Respondent filed a response
opposing the petition. (Doc. 7). Although afforded the opportunity, Mr. Ivery did not file a
reply. After careful review, the petition is DENIED.
I.

Background
On August 25, 2015, Mr. Ivery raped the daughter of his “on again, off again”

girlfriend. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at 474). At the time, the victim was 18 years old, and Mr. Ivery
was 43. (Id. at 260, 463). The rape was the culmination of several years of escalating sexual
advances by Mr. Ivery toward the victim. When the victim was “15 or 16” years old, Mr.
Ivery picked her up from a job interview at a McDonald’s. (Id. at 295-96). He was supposed
to take her to school. (Id. at 296). Instead, he stopped at a park, asked her if she “had a
boyfriend” and “liked kissing,” and then “grabbed [her] face and tongue kissed [her].” (Id.
at 297).
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Sometime later, the victim was alone in her mother’s apartment, sitting on the couch
in the living room and wearing only a sports bra and shorts. (Id. at 299-300). Mr. Ivery
arrived and told her to “put on clothes” because she “was turning him on.” (Id. at 299).
When she “got up to go put on a shirt,” Mr. Ivery slapped her buttocks. (Id. at 299-300).
He then grabbed her, “put [her] in between his legs,” and kissed her. (Id. at 300-01). He
told her that “he only had a few more years,” then left the apartment. (Id. at 301).
The final incident took place approximately one year before the rape, when the
victim was 17 years old. (Id. at 301). She was taking a shower in her mother’s apartment,
which had only one bathroom. (Id. at 301-02, 323). Mr. Ivery knocked on the door and
asked to use the toilet. (Id. at 302). She said, “Okay.” (Id.) After flushing the toilet, Mr.
Ivery pulled back the shower curtain, put two fingers in his mouth, and then inserted them
into her vagina. (Id.) He put his fingers back in his mouth and “said [that] he couldn’t wait
to taste [her].” (Id. at 302-03).
On the evening before the rape, Mr. Ivery had sex with the victim’s mother at her
apartment. (Id. at 239-41). The two had sex again the next morning. (Id. at 241). The
victim’s mother then left for work. (Id. at 241-42). By that time, the victim had also left
the apartment to drive her brother to a doctor’s appointment. (Id. at 242, 275-76). Later
that day, Mr. Ivery texted the victim and told her to “come on home” because “he was
cooking breakfast.” (Id. at 277). She responded, “Eww. I don’t care. Hurry up and leave
my house.” (Id. at 501). Mr. Ivery texted back, “I’m not going to do anything to you.
Promise you that. Your moms wore me out last night.” (Id. at 501-02). He then asked, “Can

2

you come home?” (Id. at 502). The victim said, “No. I’ll be there when you leave. I don’t
know how many times I have to tell you I’m engaged. Don’t text me.” (Id. at 503).
The victim returned to the apartment, “went straight to [her] room,” and “closed
[the] door.” (Id. at 279). Mr. Ivery knocked on the door and asked whether she “was mad
at him.” (Id.) The victim did not respond. (Id.) Two or three minutes later, Mr. Ivery
knocked on the door again. (Id. at 338). This time, she told him to “leave [her] alone.” (Id.)
Sometime later, Mr. Ivery walked into the room without knocking. (Id. at 279, 339). He sat
on her bed; she “asked him to move.” (Id. at 284). He “sniff[ed]” her and tried to kiss her
arm, prompting her to “back up toward the wall.” (Id. at 285). He then pinned her down on
the bed with his “body weight” and sniffed her “vagina area.” (Id. at 285-86). At this point,
he asked whether she wanted a “massage.” (Id. at 339). She “shook [her] head no.” (Id.)
He began to massage her shoulders, and she unsuccessfully tried to “nudge” him off. (Id.
at 288). As she “lay[ ] there crying,” he licked her ears and kissed her neck. (Id. at 288,
290).
Mr. Ivery got up and began to massage the victim’s neck and buttocks. (Id. at 28889). He eventually lifted her dress, pushed aside her underwear, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. (Id. at 289). He noticed that she was crying and said, “So you really don’t want
this?” (Id.) Mr. Ivery asked whether “he could finish,” then left the room. (Id. at 291). The
victim called her “best friend” and said that her “mother’s boyfriend had just raped [her].”
(Id. at 291-92). As she left the apartment, she saw Mr. Ivery “rubbing” his penis “in the
hallway.” (Id. at 292). She went downstairs to her car and called 911. (Id.) When police
arrived, she was “crying” and “shaking.” (Id. at 363).
3

Later that day, law enforcement interviewed Mr. Ivery. (Id. at 463). He said that
nobody had told him why he was being questioned. (Id. at 492). He believed, however, that
“[t]his got to do with some kind of sex crime because that’s the only reason you get
questioned like this.” (Id. at 493). Mr. Ivery denied any sexual contact with the victim and
claimed that his DNA would not be found on her body. (Id. at 496-98). Subsequent analysis
revealed his DNA on the victim’s neck and ears, as well as the “crotch area” of her
underwear. (Id. at 622-24, 627, 634-37).
Mr. Ivery was arrested and charged with one count of sexual battery for the August
25, 2015 rape. (Id., Ex. 2). Following a three-day trial, the jury found him guilty as charged.
(Id., Ex. 6, at 784). He was sentenced to 40 years in prison as a violent career criminal. 1
(Id., Ex. 8). After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Mr. Ivery moved for postconviction relief
under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Id., Exs. 14, 16). The postconviction
court rejected his claims, and the appellate court affirmed the denial of relief. (Id., Exs. 18,
20, 24). This federal habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1; Doc. 1-1).
II.

Standards of Review
A.

AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this
proceeding. Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief
can be granted only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal

Mr. Ivery had prior convictions for burglary, robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm. (Doc. 7-2, Ex.
7, at 7).

1

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habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless
the state court’s adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if
the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves
an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.
AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and to ensure that statecourt convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application
of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable
application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court,
a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in
federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).
5

The appellate court affirmed Mr. Ivery’s conviction and sentence, as well as the
denial of postconviction relief, without discussion. These decisions warrant deference
under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen
the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When
a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through’
the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant
rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.”
Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
B.

Exhaustion of State Remedies; Procedural Default

A federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his claims in state court before presenting
them in his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act
on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.”). The
exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the petitioner fairly presents his claim in each
appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. Picard v.
Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971).
The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[i]f the petitioner has failed to
exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which
will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception is established.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th
Cir. 2001). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case where a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually
6

innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880,
892 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish cause for a procedural default, a petitioner “must
demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise
the claim properly in state court.” Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999).
A petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing that “there is at least a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different” absent the
constitutional violation. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
C.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Ivery alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and
resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the
circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of
professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed
to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.” Id.
Mr. Ivery must show that counsel’s alleged error prejudiced the defense because
“[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside
the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at
691. To demonstrate prejudice, Mr. Ivery must show “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

7

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
Id. at 694.
III.

Discussion
A.

Ground One—Introduction of Collateral-Act Evidence

Mr. Ivery contends that the trial court violated his federal right to due process by
admitting evidence of “uncharged collateral crimes.” (Doc. 1 at 1; see also Doc. 1-1 at 25). The charged conduct in this case was limited to the rape that took place on August 25,
2015. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 2). But the jury also heard about Mr. Ivery’s escalating sexual
advances toward the victim in the years leading up to the rape. Before trial, the prosecution
had filed a notice of its intent to introduce this collateral-act evidence. (Id., Ex. 3). The
court held a hearing and took testimony from the victim. (Id., Ex. 5). It ultimately found
the evidence admissible under Fla. Stat. § 90.404(2)(c)1, which provides that “[i]n a
criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a sexual offense, evidence of the
defendant’s commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts involving a sexual offense is
admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”
(Id. at 38-39). The court explained that the collateral-act evidence showed Mr. Ivery’s
“grooming” of the victim and provided “context” for the rape. (Id. at 38). Specifically, the
evidence “rebut[ted] the idea” that the rape was “a onetime thing, never any problems
before, and then lo and behold he just forces sex on her.” (Id. at 39).
Mr. Ivery now contends that the admission of collateral-act evidence violated his
right to due process because (1) the victim “was not an inherently credible witness,” (2)

8

her description of the incidents was “nothing more than an attempt to cast [him] in a bad
light,” and (3) the prior bad acts were “unsubstantiated.” (Doc. 1-1 at 2-5).
Respondent maintains that this claim is procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 7 at 14). The
Court need not decide that issue because, even assuming Mr. Ivery properly exhausted his
state-court remedies, he cannot show that the rejection of Ground One was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Cook v. McNeil,
266 F. App’x 843, 846 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of habeas petition because,
“[e]ven if [petitioner] exhausted his due process claim,” he could not “establish either that
the state courts applied a standard contrary to federal law or that they applied that precedent
in an unreasonable manner”); Acosta v. Artuz, 575 F.3d 177, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even
if we were to assume that [petitioner] adequately exhausted state remedies on the precise
challenge to the admission of his confession that he now raises in his habeas petition, we
would agree with the district court that no relief is warranted because [he] has not
demonstrated that the state court’s rejection of his claim on the merits was an objectively
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.”).
“‘[C]learly established Federal law’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) includes only the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions.” White v. Woodall,
572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned lower courts
against framing its decisions at “a high level of generality.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S.
505, 512 (2013); see also Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 136 (2022) (noting that
“holdings that speak only at a high level of generality” “cannot supply a ground for relief”
9

under AEDPA). Accordingly, “it is not ‘an unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly
established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has
not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 122 (2009); see also Reese v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 675 F.3d 1277, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has reiterated, time and again, that, in the absence of a
clear answer—that is, a holding by the Supreme Court—about an issue of federal law, we
cannot say that a decision of a state court about that unsettled issue was an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.”).
The Supreme Court has never “squarely established” any constitutional limits on
the admission of collateral-act evidence. Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122. To the contrary, the
Court expressly declined to determine “whether a state law would violate the Due Process
Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a
charged crime.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). Thus, as several lower
courts have recognized, “[t]here is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent which
holds that a state violates due process by permitting . . . other bad acts evidence.” Bugh v.
Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Coningford v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d
478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding no “clearly established Supreme Court case law speaking
directly to the admission of prior bad acts evidence”); Flores v. Adams, 319 F. App’x 514
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he admission of propensity evidence did not entitle [ ] petitioner to
habeas relief because there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that
the admission of such evidence is a violation of due process.”). The absence of on-point
precedent from the Supreme Court is fatal to Mr. Ivery’s claim. See Loggins v. Thomas,
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654 F.3d 1204, 1222 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Because implications are not actual holdings, the
implications of Supreme Court decisions cannot clearly establish federal law for §
2254(d)(1) purposes any more than dicta can.”).
Even apart from the absence of clearly established federal law, Mr. Ivery cannot
show that the admission of collateral-act evidence “failed the due process test of
fundamental fairness.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). The “category
of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’” is “very narrow[ ],” and Mr. Ivery cannot
show that the trial court unreasonably applied this general principle by admitting collateralact evidence in his case. Id. In a sexual-battery prosecution, collateral-act evidence “may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” Fla. Stat. §
90.404(2)(c)1. Here, the collateral-act evidence showed that in the years leading up to the
rape, Mr. Ivery made a series of escalating sexual advances toward the victim. This course
of conduct made it more likely that he engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim on
August 25, 2015—one of the elements of the charged offense. 2 In these circumstances, a
reasonable jurist could conclude that the introduction of collateral-act evidence was not “so
extremely unfair that its admission violate[d] ‘fundamental conceptions of justice.’”
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352 (citation omitted); see also Lutz v. Palmer, No. 3:11-cv-334LAC-EMT, 2012 WL 4660685, at *16 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2012) (petitioner “not entitled
to relief” because he “failed to identify a Supreme Court case holding that the admission

2

As noted above, Mr. Ivery denied any sexual contact with the victim.

11

of similar fact or collateral crime evidence in circumstances such as the instant case was
unconstitutional”), adopted by 2012 WL 4660981 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2012).
B.

Ground Two—Exclusion of Evidence Concerning Victim’s “Bias”

Mr. Ivery argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a “full
and fair defense” by excluding evidence of the victim’s “bias” against him. (Doc. 1-1 at 75-8). Specifically, the victim told law enforcement that at some point before the rape, she
had “texted Mr. Ivery to come over to set him up so [her] boyfriend could beat him up.”
(Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at 563). The court excluded this evidence, reasoning that (1) the victim
“already [had] an acknowledged bias or interest against” Mr. Ivery, 3 and (2) any testimony
about the “set up” would serve only to “further tar” the victim. (Id. at 573).
Respondent correctly contends that Ground Two is unexhausted and procedurally
defaulted. (Doc. 7 at 17-19). Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to “make the state
court aware that the claims asserted present federal constitutional issues.” Jimenez v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007). “A litigant wishing to raise a federal
issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief,
for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he
relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim
‘federal.’” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). On direct appeal, Mr. Ivery claimed
that the trial court “abused its discretion” under Florida law by excluding evidence of the
victim’s “attempt to have [him] beaten up.” (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 11, at 29). But he did not argue

The victim testified that she disliked Mr. Ivery for several reasons beyond his sexual abuse, including that
he was unfaithful to her mother and did not financially support her family. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at 348-49).
3

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that this evidentiary ruling violated any provision of the federal constitution. (Id. at 29-32).
Accordingly, Mr. Ivery failed “to afford the state court[ ] a meaningful opportunity to
consider” his federal constitutional claim. McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2005).
Mr. Ivery did raise the federal component of his claim in his Rule 3.850 motion,
arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by excluding evidence of the
“set up.” (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 16, at 34). But the postconviction court rejected this claim as
procedurally barred. It explained that the evidentiary issue “should have been raised on
direct appeal and [was] not cognizable in [a] motion[ ] for postconviction relief.” (Id., Ex.
18, at 2, 4). Because “the procedural requirements of Florida’s Rule 3.850 constitute
independent and adequate state grounds”—and because Mr. Ivery did not properly exhaust
his claim on direct appeal—Ground Two is procedurally defaulted. LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n.25 (11th Cir. 2005).
To overcome the default, Mr. Ivery must show either cause and prejudice or a
miscarriage of justice. See Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1135 (11th Cir. 2000) (“It is
well-settled that federal habeas courts may not consider claims that have been defaulted in
state court . . . unless the petitioner can show ‘cause’ for the default and resulting
‘prejudice,’ or ‘a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’”). Mr. Ivery fails to make the
required showing. Accordingly, Ground Two is barred from federal habeas review.
C.

Ground Three—Sufficiency of the Evidence

Mr. Ivery contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal. (Doc. 1 at 8). According to him, the prosecution failed to
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prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim “did not want to have [a] sexual
encounter.” (Id.) The trial court rejected this argument, and the appellate court affirmed in
an unexplained decision. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at 681; Doc. 7-2, Ex. 14).
Mr. Ivery’s sufficiency challenge is meritless. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979), a court reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must
evaluate whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The Jackson standard must be applied “with explicit reference to the
substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Id. at 324 n.16. Under
Jackson, the prosecution does not have “an affirmative duty to rule out every hypothesis
except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 326. If the record contains facts
supporting conflicting inferences, the jury is presumed to have “resolved any such conflicts
in favor of the prosecution.” Id.
Consistent with AEDPA, “a federal court may not overturn a state court decision
rejecting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge simply because the federal court disagrees
with the state court. The federal court instead may do so only if the state court decision was
‘objectively unreasonable.’” Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (quoting Renico v.
Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010)).
Mr. Ivery fails to show that the rejection of his sufficiency challenge was
“objectively unreasonable.” Id. As noted above, Mr. Ivery was charged with sexual battery,
which requires proof that sexual contact “occurred without consent.” Statler v. State, 349
So. 3d 873, 880 (Fla. 2022). “Consent” means “intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent
14

and does not include coerced submission.” Fla. Stat. § 794.011(1)(a). Moreover, consent
“shall not be deemed or construed to mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical
resistance to the offender.” Id. Consent “is a relative term to be viewed under the
circumstances of each case,” and it “is essentially a question for the jury.” Hufham v. State,
400 So. 2d 133, 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Here, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ivery
“did not have a willing partner.” Statler, 349 So. 3d at 880. At the time of the incident, Mr.
Ivery was engaged in a sexual relationship with the victim’s mother. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at
239-41). He was 43 years old; the victim was 18. (Id. at 260, 463). The morning of the
incident, Mr. Ivery urged the victim via text message to “come on home” because “he was
cooking breakfast.” (Id. at 277). She responded, “Eww. I don’t care. Hurry up and leave
my house.” (Id. at 501). Mr. Ivery texted back, “I’m not going to do anything to you.
Promise you that. Your moms wore me out last night.” (Id. at 501-02). He then asked, “Can
you come home?” (Id. at 502). The victim said, “No. I’ll be there when you leave. I don’t
know how many times I have to tell you I’m engaged. Don’t text me.” (Id. at 503).
When the victim returned to the apartment, she “went straight to [her] room” and
“closed [the] door.” (Id. at 279). Mr. Ivery knocked on the door twice, and the victim told
him to “leave [her] alone.” (Id. at 338). He ignored this instruction, entered the room
without knocking, and sat on the bed. (Id. at 279, 284, 339). She rebuffed his attempt to
kiss her by “back[ing] up toward the wall.” (Id. at 285). He then pinned her down and asked
whether she wanted a “massage.” (Id. at 339). She “shook [her] head no” and tried to
“nudge” him off when he began to massage her shoulders. (Id. at 288, 339). She started to
15

cry; he got up, lifted her dress, and inserted his penis into her vagina. (Id. at 288-89). At
trial, the victim testified that she did not “consent to” this sexual contact, and that her lack
of consent was “obvious.” (Id. at 291).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence was collectively
sufficient to show that the victim “was not a willing partner.” Statler, 349 So. 3d at 880;
see also Hubbard v. Sec’y, DOC, No. 2:08-cv-215-CEH-DNF, 2011 WL 554078, at *14
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2011) (rejecting sufficiency challenge to sexual-battery conviction
where “[t]he victim testified that she did not consent to have sex with the [p]etitioner”).
Accordingly, the state court reasonably rejected Mr. Ivery’s sufficiency challenge.
D.
Ground Four—Failure to Properly Advise Mr. Ivery about Testifying at
Trial
Finally, Mr. Ivery contends that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not
to testify at trial “unless [he was] willing to concede that sex occurred.” (Doc. 1 at 10).
According to Mr. Ivery, he consistently told counsel that “he was innocent and [the victim]
was . . . trying to set him up,” that he “[n]ever” did “anything sexual toward [her] whether
she was an adult or while she was underage,” and that she “manually transferred his DNA
onto her without his knowledge.” (Doc. 1-1 at 11). Mr. Ivery alleges that during trial he
told counsel he “wanted to testify.” (Id. at 12). In response, counsel allegedly said that Mr.
Ivery “needed . . . to . . . testify the two had sex but that it was consensual.” (Id.) According
to Mr. Ivery, counsel “specifically told him not to testify that [the victim] was trying to set
him up.” (Id.) Mr. Ivery ultimately chose not to testify in his defense. (Doc. 7-2, Ex. 6, at
688-89). He now contends that counsel’s advice was “patently unreasonable” because it
16

would have required him to “lie under oath only to tell a story readily impeachable by his
prior interview with police detectives.” (Doc. 1-1 at 12-13).
Mr. Ivery correctly concedes that this claim is procedurally defaulted because he
failed to raise it in state court. (Id. at 14-17; Doc. 1 at 11). This means that he cannot obtain
relief “unless [he] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice, or that he is
actually innocent.” Gore v. Crews, 720 F.3d 811, 816 (11th Cir. 2013). Mr. Ivery seeks to
excuse the default under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). Martinez held that a
petitioner may establish cause for the default of a claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel where (1) “in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or
counsel in that proceeding was ineffective,” and (2) the defaulted claim is a “substantial
one,” meaning that it “has some merit.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14, 17. A claim is
“insubstantial” if it is “wholly without factual support.” Id. at 16.
Martinez does not excuse the default because Mr. Ivery’s ineffective-assistance
claim is not “substantial.” Id. at 14. This conclusion follows from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, which significantly restricted Martinez’s scope. 596 U.S. 366
(2022). Shinn held that, unless a petitioner satisfies § 2254(e)(2), a federal court cannot
consider evidence outside the state-court record “to assess cause and prejudice under
Martinez.” Id. at 389. Section 2254(e)(2), in turn, imposes “stringent requirements” on a
petitioner seeking to expand the state-court record. Id. It states that if a petitioner “failed to
develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings,” a federal court cannot
consider new evidence unless the claim relies on either (1) “a new rule of constitutional
law” or (2) “a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
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exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Even if a petitioner satisfies either of
these exceptions, he still must show that further factfinding would establish, “by clear and
convincing evidence,” that “no reasonable factfinder” would have convicted him of the
charged offense. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
Shinn forecloses relief on Mr. Ivery’s ineffective-assistance claim. The state-court
record contains no evidence of the advice counsel allegedly gave Mr. Ivery about testifying
at trial. (Doc. 7-2). Thus, his claim necessarily relies on evidence that was not presented in
state court. But § 2254(e)(2) bars this Court from considering any new evidence. As noted
above, § 2254(e)(2) applies to petitioners who “failed to develop the factual basis of [their]
claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). “[A] failure to develop the
factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater
fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 432 (2000). “Diligence,” as used in § 2254(e)(2), “depends upon whether the prisoner
made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate
and pursue claims in state court.” Id. at 435.
Mr. Ivery failed to diligently pursue his ineffective-assistance claim in state court.
He raised several claims in his Rule 3.850 motion. But he did not bring the claim he seeks
to pursue now—namely, that counsel gave him bad advice about testifying at trial. (Doc.
7-2, Ex. 16). Indeed, at no point in the Rule 3.850 proceedings did Mr. Ivery allege that he
had spoken to counsel about testifying in his defense. Because Mr. Ivery did not make “a
reasonable attempt to investigate and pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
state court,” that claim is subject to § 2254(e)(2). McNair, 416 F.3d at 1298; see also Will
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v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F. App’x 902, 907 (11th Cir. 2008) (petitioner “did not
sufficiently develop the factual basis of [his] claim in state court” under § 2254(e)(2)
because he never “raise[d] before the state habeas court his claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to suppress his confession on the basis that he requested, but
was refused, counsel during an unrecorded break in his interrogation”).
Mr. Ivery cannot satisfy § 2254(e)(2)’s stringent requirements. His ineffectiveassistance claim does not rely on “a new rule of constitutional law,” and the “factual
predicate” for that claim—counsel’s allegedly deficient advice about testifying at trial—
was known to him during the Rule 3.850 proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A).
Moreover, Mr. Ivery cannot show that further factfinding on his claim would establish, “by
clear and convincing evidence,” that “no reasonable factfinder” would have convicted him
of sexual battery. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
Thus, Mr. Ivery cannot prevail unless he shows that his ineffective-assistance claim
is “substantial” “considering only the state-court record.” Williams v. Superintendent
Mahanoy SCI, 45 F.4th 713, 724 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Rogers v. Mays, 69 F.4th 381,
397 (6th Cir. 2023) (noting that the state-court record contained “all the evidence we can
consider” under Martinez because petitioner “ha[d] not satisfied § 2254(e)(2)”); Apolonio
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 21-12297, 2022 WL 17411282, at *5 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2022)
(“We cannot consider [petitioner’s] new factual allegation as evidence supporting [his]
ineffective-assistance claim because [he] has not satisfied the requirements for a federal
evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).”); Grace v. Sec’y, No. 8:21-cv-621MSS-AEP, 2024 WL 492991, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2024) (holding that, because
19

petitioner failed to “meet his heavy burden under [§] 2254(e)(2),” he “must demonstrate
deficient performance and prejudice . . . based on the state-court record”). Mr. Ivery cannot
make this showing because his claim finds no support in the state-court record. Therefore,
Martinez does not excuse the default, and Ground Four is barred from federal habeas
review. 4
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:
1. Mr. Ivery’s petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
2. The CLERK is directed to enter judgment against Mr. Ivery and to CLOSE this
case.
3. Mr. Ivery is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ
of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To obtain a certificate of appealability, Mr. Ivery
must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the
underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Mr. Ivery has not made the requisite showing.
Because Mr. Ivery is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled
to appeal in forma pauperis.

4

Mr. Ivery does not contend that he qualifies for the actual-innocence exception.

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DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on January 7, 2025.

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