Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

ORDER granting 26 the request for an attorney's fee under the EAJA; awarding Moore $6,164.42 as an attorney's fee; and directing the clerk to enter judgment in favor of William Moore and against the Commissioner of Social Security for $6,164.42 as an attorney's fee. Signed by Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale on 8/29/2024. (KG)

United States District Court
Middle District of Florida
Tampa Division
WILLIAM MOORE,
Plaintiff,
NO. 8:23-cv-2850-PDB

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

Order
The Court reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying William Moore’s application for benefits and, under sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), remanded for further proceedings. Docs. 23, 24. He now
requests, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, an
award of $6,164.42 as an attorney’s fee. Doc. 26. The Commissioner has no
opposition. Id. at 2.
In ruling on an EAJA request, a court must decide if the requesting party
is eligible and the requested attorney’s fee is reasonable. Comm’r, I.N.S. v.
Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 160–61 (1990). A party is eligible if (1) he prevailed in a
case against the United States, (2) he timely requested a fee, (3) his net worth
did not exceed $2 million when he filed the case, (4) the United States’ position
was not substantially justified, and (5) no special circumstance would make
the award unjust. Id. at 158; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), (2).
The first three conditions are satisfied here. See Docs. 23, 26. As to the
fourth condition, the Commissioner has not tried to satisfy his burden of

showing his position was substantially justified. As to the fifth condition, no
equitable consideration is apparent or presented that would make an EAJA
award unjust.
For the attorney’s fee, the applicant must show the requested rates and
claimed hours are reasonable. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984);
accord Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299, 1303 (11th
Cir. 1988). A fee award under the EAJA “shall be based upon prevailing market
rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished,” but it must not exceed
$125 an hour “unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living
[since 1996, the date of the last amendment to the amount,] or a special factor,
such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings
involved, justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A).
“The EAJA … establishes a two-step analysis for determining the
appropriate hourly rate to be applied in calculating attorney’s fees under the
Act.” Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992). “The first
step … is to determine the market rate for similar services provided by lawyers
of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The second step, which is needed only if the market
rate is greater than [$125] per hour, is to determine whether the court should
adjust the hourly fee upward from [$125] to take into account an increase in
the cost of living [since 1996], or a special factor.” Id. at 1033–34.
Here, the fee requested is based on 25.2 hours of work in 2023 and 2024
by Moore’s lawyer, Jeanette A. Kelley. Doc. 26-1. Moore requests an hourly
rate of $244.62 for Kelley. Doc. 26 at 2. The hours multiplied by the rate equals
$6,164.42. Id.

The requested rate and claimed hours are reasonable. Based on the
Court’s own knowledge, the rate is within the prevailing market rates for
services provided by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and
reputation as Kelley. The increased cost of living from 1996 to when Kelley
worked on the case justifies an upward adjustment from $125. See U.S. Dep’t
of

Labor,

Bureau

of

Labor

Statistics,

https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUUR0000SA0 (last visited Aug. 28, 2024).
None of the work appears clerical, secretarial, unnecessary, or otherwise
excludable. See Doc. 26-1.
The Court leaves to the Commissioner’s discretion whether to accept
Moore’s assignment of the EAJA fee, see Doc. 26 at 3; Doc. 26-2, after
determining whether Moore owes a federal debt.
Because Moore is eligible and the requested attorney’s fee is reasonable,
the Court grants the motion, Doc. 26; awards Moore $6,164.42 as an
attorney’s fee; and directs the clerk to enter judgment in favor of William
Moore and against the Commissioner of Social Security for $6,164.42 as an
attorney’s fee.
Ordered in Jacksonville, Florida, on August 29, 2024.