Simon v. National Passenger Corporation et al
Filing
21
ORDER: "Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or in the Alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Case" (Doc. 12) is granted to the ext ent the Court finds that Amtrak may enforce the arbitration agreement in this case. Plaintiff's claim against Amtrak is stayed pending the completion of arbitration, and the parties are directed to notify the Court within 14 days of the resolut ion of the arbitration proceedings. Counts I, II, III, and IV are dismissed without prejudice, with leave to with leave to file the claims in a Florida state court as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and thereafter close this case. See Order for details. Signed by Judge Thomas P. Barber on 1/29/2025.. Signed by Judge Thomas P. Barber on 1/29/2025. (ANL)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SABRINA SIMON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 8:24-cv-2586-TPB-CPT
NATIONAL PASSENGER
CORPORATION d/b/a AMTRAK, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART “DEFENDANT NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION D/B/A AMTRAK’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CASE;” and
ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE COUNTS I, II, III, AND IV
This matter is before the Court on “Defendant National Railroad Passenger
Corporation d/b/a Amtrak’s Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
or in the Alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Case,” filed on
December 19, 2024. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff Sabrina Simon filed a response in
opposition on January 10, 2025. (Doc. 20). After reviewing the motion, response,
court file, and record, the Court finds as follows:
Background
This case arises from a train collision that occurred on July 14, 2023, between
Amtrak Passenger Train 17 and a commercial truck operated by Defendant
Walberto Carrazana Bermudez. Plaintiff Sabrina Simon, who was injured in the
accident, was a passenger on the train operated by Defendant National Railroad
Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak. The 2005 Peterbilt commercial truck was
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owed by Defendant Lastre Auto and was hauling a commercial auto trailer owned
by Defendant M & L Auto at the time of the collision – the trailer was loaded with
multiple automobiles. While Bermudez was navigating the railroad crossing, the
commercial auto trailer became stuck on the train tracks. Around that time,
Amtrack Train 17 was traveling from Lakeland, Florida, heading east to northeast.
In her five-count complaint, Plaintiff asserts several causes of action
sounding in negligence against Defendants. Amtrak has moved to compel
arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims, relying on the arbitration provision in the terms
and conditions agreed to by Plaintiff when she purchased her train ticket. Plaintiff,
however, argues that this arbitration agreement is unenforceable.
Legal Standard
When addressing a motion to compel arbitration, a reviewing court treats the
motion similarly to a motion for summary judgment. See Bazemore v. Jefferson
Cap. Sys. LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). To that end, “a district court
may conclude as a matter of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration
agreement only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ concerning
the formation of such an agreement.” Id. A genuine dispute must be supported by
evidence, and the Eleventh Circuit “‘has consistently held that conclusory
allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value’ for a party
resisting summary judgment.” Id.
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., “embodies a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace
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Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). In fact,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “recognized that the FAA creates a
presumption of arbitrability such that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital
Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). In
addition, “Florida public policy favors arbitration, and any doubts concerning the
scope of an arbitration agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Dye v.
Tamko Bldg. Prods., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (quoting
BKD Twenty-One Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Delsordo, 127 So. 3d 527, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA
2012)), aff’d, 908 F.3d 675 (11th Cir. 2018).
“Under the FAA, a party seeking to compel arbitration must demonstrate
that (a) the plaintiff entered into a written arbitration agreement that is
enforceable under ordinary state-law contract principles and (b) the claims before
the court fall within the scope of that agreement.” Garcia v. Church of Scientology
Flag Serv. Org., Inc., No. 8:13-cv-220-T-27TBM, 2015 WL 10844160, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Mar. 13, 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
Analysis
Compliance with Local Rules
Amtrak originally filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2024. On
December 19, 2024, Amtrak filed a supplemental motion to clarify Plaintiff’s
opposition to the motion through a Local Rule 3.01(g) certification. In the interest
of judicial economy, and to avoid confusion, the Court denied as moot the initial
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motion. The Court declines to deny the supplemental motion on a hyper
technicality (failure to include exhibits) when the exhibits were included with the
original motion. Such an argument violates Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts, except as stated in Rule 81. They should be
construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”)
In addition, the Court acknowledges that the motion does not include a
memorandum of law, another technical violation of Local Rule 3.01. Although a
memorandum of law may have been helpful, the Court will suspend the rule that
requires a legal memorandum because the Court is versed in the general law
related to arbitration agreements. See Local Rule 3.01(a) (requiring legal
memorandum); 1.01(b) (“If reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose of these
rules, a judge an temporarily modify or suspend the application of any rule, except
Local Rule 1.05(a)); 1.01(a) (“These rules advance efficiency, consistency,
convenience, and other interests of justice.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (The rules
“should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”).
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(B)
The Court must determine whether, considering these particular facts, there
is a valid agreement to arbitrate. See Adams v. Lashify, Inc., No. 6:23-cv-243-PGB-
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DCI, 2023 WL 5573822, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2023) (“The existence of a valid
arbitration agreement is a threshold issue for determining the propriety of a motion
to compel arbitration.”). When analyzing this issue, a federal court must “‘apply
ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts’ to determine
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate under the FAA.” Id. (quoting First
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). “In Florida, an
enforceable contract requires offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficient
specification of essential terms.” Id. (citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375,
381 (Fla. 2004)). For a contract to be formed, there must be “mutual assent to
certain and definite contractual terms. Without a meeting of the minds on all
essential terms, no enforceable contract arises.” Id. (quoting Matter of T&B Gen.
Contracting, Inc., 833 F.2d 1455, 1459 (11th Cir. 1987)).
In this case, Plaintiff opposes arbitration by arguing that her electronic
acknowledgement of the arbitration agreement does not meet several rules and
requirements for her purported electronic signature to be valid under the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”) and the Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act (“E-Sign”). 1 Specifically, she appears to claim that
Amtrack inhibited the ability of Plaintiff to store or print an electronic record, so the
electronic record is not enforceable against her. 2
1 Florida has enacted the UETA, which facilitates electronic transactions consistently with
other law. See § 668.50, F.S.; BrewFab, LLC v. 3 Delta, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1209
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2022). By adopting the UETA, “the Florida Legislature has expressed its
intent to treat electronic and traditional agreements equally under the law.” Id. at 1210.
2 The portion of the statute that Plaintiff cites to applies only to the use of electronic records
when “a statute, regulation, or other rule of law requires that information relating to a
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Florida law specifically provides that “[w]hether the parties agree to conduct
a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding
circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.” § 668.50(5)(b), F.S. Considering the
context and circumstances, Amtrak has provided sufficient evidence that Plaintiff
consented to the use of electronic signature for the purposes of the UETA through
the “click to accept” box and that the signature is attributable to Plaintiff. See
Williams v. Kemper Corp., 608 F. Supp. 3d 708, 713 (S.D. Ill. 2022) (explaining that
courts frequently find “click-to-accept” agreements sufficient to demonstrate
acceptance); Kamath v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 23-cv-03533-CRB, 2024 WL 950163, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2024) (holding that a plaintiff affirmatively clicking a “click to
accept” box is sufficient to form a contract, including under the UETA); Taylor v.
Dolgencorp, No. 1:19-cv-132-SNLJ, 2019 WL 6135440, at *3 (E.D. Miss. Nov. 19,
2019) (same).
Plaintiff’s conclusory argument that Amtrak “inhibited” her from accessing or
retaining the terms and conditions, thereby rendering the entire agreement
unenforceable, is unpersuasive. She simply argues that Amtrak did not provide
evidence that Plaintiff received a record of the terms and conditions or was afforded
the opportunity to select, access, or download the terms and conditions. But
Plaintiff does not put forth any affirmative evidence that could create a factual
issue as to whether she was inhibited from receiving electronic records. See
transaction . . . be provided or made available in writing.” 15 U.S.C. § 7001(c)(1)(B).
Plaintiff does not provide any authority to suggest this statute is relevant in the instant
case, or that a technical violation of a portion of § 7001(c)(1)(B) would invalidate an
otherwise valid arbitration agreement.
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Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1333.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that she was not on inquiry notice of the
arbitration provision due to the font size and coloring of the box, her argument is
similarly unpersuasive. Case law has held that even browse wrap agreements or
hybrid agreements are enforceable where the hyperlinks to a terms of use
agreement are sufficiently conspicuous. 3 Temple v. Best Rate Holdings LLC, 360 F.
Supp. 3d 1289, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2018). In this case, the agreement – which Plaintiff
was required to click a box to continue with her transaction – included blue
hyperlinks to the terms and conditions and specified that the “binding arbitration
agreement” was a term and condition of the ticket agreement. Users of the website
– such as Plaintiff – therefore had sufficient inquiry notice that they were agreeing
to the terms and conditions, including the binding arbitration provision, by
proceeding with their ticket purchase.
3 Clickwrap agreements “require a user to affirmatively click a box on a website
acknowledging awareness of and agreement to the terms of service before he or she is
allowed to proceed with further utilization of the website.” Temple v. Best Rate Holdings
LLC, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (quoting Berkson v. Gogo LLC, 97 F.
Supp. 3d 359, 397 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). In contrast, a browsewrap agreement “consists of a
notice on a website stating that the user is agreeing to and is bound by the website’s terms
of service by merely using the website.” Id. (citing Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 395). This
notice contains hyperlinks that, when clicked, bring the user to a separate browser or
window containing the full terms of the agreement. See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763
F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014). Some courts, such as those in this District, also recognize
“hybrid browsewrap agreements,” described as “browsewrap agreements that resemble
clickwrap agreements in that they require the user ‘to affirmatively acknowledge the
agreement before proceeding with the use of the website,” often by clicking a button to
create an account, sign up for a subscription, or complete an order. Temple, 360 F. Supp.
3d. at 1303-04. These hybrid agreements “weigh[] in favor of valid notice” because a user
must “affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use of the website.”
Id. at 1303 (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176-77).
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Other Arguments
Plaintiff attempts to argue that Amtrak has failed to sufficiently establish
that she was the person who signed the arbitration agreement rather than another
unidentified person who could have done so on her behalf.
“A defendant may meet its ‘initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate’
merely ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the
[plaintiff’s] signature’ to the motion to compel arbitration.” Tercero v. Sacramento
Logistics, No. 2:24-cv-00953-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 43125, at *3 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 7, 2025).
When a plaintiff challenges the validity of that signature, “a defendant is ‘then
required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature [is]
authentic.’” Id. “To raise a genuine issue concerning the validity of the arbitration
agreement, Plaintiff must: (1) make an unequivocal denial that there was an
agreement, and (2) produce evidence to substantiate the denial.” Schoendorf v.
Toyota of Orlando, No. 6:08-cv-767-Orl-19DAB, 2009 WL 1075991, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Apr. 21, 2009). Although the plaintiff does not need to prove that his or her
purported signature is not authentic, the plaintiff must submit sufficient evidence
to create a factual dispute. See id.
Here, Plaintiff again merely challenges Amtrak’s evidence. Plaintiff does not
actually deny that she signed the agreement, nor does she submit any affirmative
evidence, such as an affidavit, to create a factual dispute. See id.; Gregorius v. Npc
International, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-593-FtM-99MRM, 2016 WL 6996116, at *4 (M.D. Fa.
Nov. 30, 2016) (finding existence of an arbitration agreement after the plaintiff did
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not provide any evidentiary support that could establish he did not enter into the
agreement, such as an affidavit); see also Beckman v. Zuffa LLC, No. CV 21-5570MWF (AGRx), 2021 WL 5445464, at *3-4 (C.D. Ca. Nov. 15, 2021) (“Plaintiff
challenges the sufficiency of Defendant’s evidence, but she does not directly dispute
that she signed the Arbitration Agreement, either by affirmatively stating that she
did not sign the Arbitration Agreement or that she did not recall signing the
Arbitration Agreement. […] Plaintiff created no disputes of fact as to whether or
not she signed the Arbitration Agreement.”). Plaintiff therefore fails to meet her
burden.
Plaintiff’s due process and “burdensome complexity” arguments border on
being frivolous. Requiring Plaintiff to arbitrate pursuant to an arbitration
agreement does not violate her due process rights or make her case unduly
burdensome, even if she is not required to arbitrate against all parties. See Kaplan
v. Kimball Hill Homes Florida, Inc., 915 So. 2d 755, 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
(Canady, J.) (explaining that compelled arbitration does not violate due process
rights when the parties agree generally to arbitrate controversies and claims and
specifically waive rights of access to courts and trial by jury); Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (“Arbitration Act requires district courts to
compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a
motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient
maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s
concerns about potentially inconsistent results may be a natural occurrence of
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multi-defendant cases regardless of whether arbitration is required or not.
State Law Claims Against Other Defendants
Plaintiff’s claim against Amtrak has been stayed. The only remaining claims
are Florida state claims brought against Defendants Walberto Carrazana
Bermudez, M & L Auto Transport, LLC, and Lastre Auto Transport, Inc.
These claims were originally before this Court pursuant to the Court’s
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 4 The Court has discretion to
continue to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims or dismiss the claims with
leave to proceed in state court. See Collins v. Merakai Installers, LLC, No.
1:23cv285-MW/MAF, 2024 WL 2701958, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2024); Alvarado v.
Robo Enterprises, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-1420-Orl040KRS, 2016 WL 11566331, at *5
(M.D. Fla. June 2, 2016) (granting motion to compel arbitration and staying federal
claims while declining to exercise jurisdiction over state claims).
“The Eleventh Circuit has recently emphasized that, ‘[a]lthough the district
court has discretion, concerns of federalism—namely, of federal courts of limited
jurisdiction weighing in on state law—counsel in favor of dismissing state-law
claims are the federal claims are dismissed.’” Collins, 2024 WL 2701958, at *1
(quoting Silas v. Sheriff of Broward Cty., 55 F.4th 863, 865 (11th Cir. 2022)).
Consequently, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to exercise
Although Plaintiff appears to also invoke the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, the Court
concludes that diversity jurisdiction does not exist because Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida and
Defendants Walberto Carrazana Bermudez and Lastre Auto Transport are alleged to be
citizens of Florida. The allegations concerning M & L Auto Transport, a limited liability
company, are insufficient to determine citizenship.
4
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supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Counts I, II,
III, and IV are dismissed without prejudice, with leave to file her claims in a Florida
state court as permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s conduct with respect to the arbitration agreement communicated
assent to its terms. Because Plaintiff agreed to the arbitration provision at the time
she purchased a train ticket, Amtrak’s motion to compel arbitration is granted.
However, Amtrak is not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against it. In
accordance with Eleventh Circuit precedent, these claims must be stayed rather
than dismissed. See, e.g., Milestone v. Citrus Specialty Grp., Inc., No. 8:19-cv-2341T-02JSS, 2019 WL 5887179, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2019) (citing Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992); 9 U.S.C. § 3; Giraud v.
Woof Gang Bakery, No. 8:17-cv-2442-T-26AEP, 2018 WL 2057814 (M.D. Fla. May 3,
2018)).
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims. Therefore, Counts I, II, III, and IV are dismissed
without prejudice, with leave to file in a Florida state court.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) “Defendant National Railroad Passenger Corporation d/b/a Amtrak’s
Supplemental Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint or in the
Alternative Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Case” (Doc. 12) is
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GRANTED to the extent the Court finds that Amtrak may enforce the
arbitration agreement in this case.
(2) Plaintiff’s claim against Amtrak is STAYED pending the completion of
arbitration, and the parties are directed to notify the Court within 14 days
of the resolution of the arbitration proceedings.
(3) Counts I, II, III, and IV are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, with
leave to with leave to file the claims in a Florida state court as permitted
by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).
(4) The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines,
and thereafter close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 29th day of
January, 2025.
__________________________________________
TOM BARBER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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