ESCAMBIA COUNTY FLORIDA v. ALLIED WASTE SERVICES OF NORTH AMERICA LLC

Filing 69

ORDER - DENIED, 51 Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Counterclaim. Signed by SENIOR JUDGE LACEY A COLLIER on November 20, 2008. (cbj)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE N O R T H E R N DISTRICT OF FLORIDA P E N S A C O L A DIVISION ES CA M BIA COUNTY, FLORIDA, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. A L L IE D WASTE SERVICES OF N O R T H AMERICA, LLC, D e f e n d a n t / C o u n t er - P l ai n t if f . _______________________________/ Case No. 3:08cv88/LAC/EMT

ORDER T H IS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant Escambia C ou nt y, Florida's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Counterclaim (Doc. 51), p u r s u a n t to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant/CounterP l a i n ti f f Allied Waste Services of North America, LLC [Allied Waste], has filed a response (Doc. 52). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is designed to eliminate causes of action w h i c h fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In considering the motion, the Cou rt must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and construe those allegations in t h e light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Fla., 129

F . 3 d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997). A complaint may not be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. See id. Since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that t h e pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 9 9 , 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), the complaint does not need finely detailed factual allegations. How ever, more is required than simply "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actio n." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). There must be e n o u g h in the way of factual allegations to show that the cause of action is based on more t h a n speculation or suspicion. See id. "It is sufficient if the complaint succeeds in

` i d e n ti f yi n g facts that are suggestive enough to render [the element] plausible.'" Watts v. F l o r i d a Intern. University, 495 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 127 S .Ct. at 1965). This entails providing "enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that disc ove ry will reveal evidence of the necessary element. Id. at 1295-1296. T h e gist of the instant cause of action is that a "flow control" ordinance passed by Esca mb ia County designates one particular landfill as the sole disposal site for certain waste m a t e r ia l within the County. Allied Waste asserts that the ordinance impairs its rights or o b l i g a ti o n s under contracts it entered into with the County and other municipalities in which

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it is able to dispose of waste at other selected sites. Allied Waste therefore claims a violation o f its rights under the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. T h e County appears to assert that Allied Waste's counterclaim in Count II should not b e characterized as under the Contracts Clause but as a more generalized claim of substantive d u e process. Then, in seemingly circular reasoning, it argues that Allied Waste cannot p r o c e e d under the Substantive Due Process Clause because there exists a more particularized claim of a violation of a specific constitutional right (this being, one would presume, the Co ntracts Clause). Regardless, the Court finds Allied Waste to have sufficiently stated a valid claim under the Contracts Clause. "Three factors are considered when evaluating a claim that the Contract Clause has b e e n violated: (1) whether the law substantially impairs a contractual relationship; (2) w h e t h e r there is a significant and legitimate public purpose for the law; and (3) whether the adju stmen ts of rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties are based upon reasonable c o n d i t io n s and are of an appropriate nature." Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. State of Fla., 141 F.3d 142 7, 1433 (11th Cir. 1998). Citing to a couple of cases with similar factual backgrounds, the County broadly a s s er t s that ordinances of its kind by their nature do not substantially impair contracts for wa ste disposal. However, the cited cases do not support this argument since they show that a pronounced weighing of the facts is necessary to determine whether a substantial i m p a i r m e n t actually exists. In response to the County's assertion, Allied Waste contends that

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a sufficient claim for relief is stated simply by alleging the ultimate fact that the County's a c t io n s amounted to a substantial impairment. As the standards for motions to dismiss under Ru le 12(b)(6) set out above indicate, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of a c t io n " is not sufficient to establish a claim. Nonetheless, the Court finds the Counterclaim to allege enough underlying facts to support a plausible claim that the contracts in question h a v e been substantially impaired. Ac cor din gly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1 . The Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Counterclaim (Doc. 51) is D E N I ED . O R D E R E D on this 20th day of November, 2008.

s/L.A. Collier Lacey A. Collier S e n i o r United States District Judge

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