REYNOLDS et al v. HALL

Filing 69

ORDER GRANTING 7 Motion for Class Certification. Within 30 days of the date of this order, the pla shall submit to the court for approval a proposed notice to the class members in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.P. 23(c)(2)(B). Signed by District Judge M CASEY RODGERS on May 26, 2011. (Miscellaneous Deadline - by 6/27/2011.) (kvg)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION

MARCIE HAMILTON and JAMIE
BROJANAC, all on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly
situated;
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No.: 3:10cv355/MCR/EMT

WENDELL HALL, in his official
capacity as Sheriff for Santa Rosa
County, Florida,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
ORDER
Plaintiff, Marcie Hamilton, who is currently housed in the Santa Rosa County Jail
(“Jail”),1 has filed a Third Amended Complaint on behalf of herself and all others similarly
situated against Wendell Hall, the Sheriff of Santa Rosa County, Florida (“Sheriff”) (doc. 43),
challenging a recently implemented policy requiring all outgoing mail, except legal and other
privileged correspondence, to be in postcard form.2 Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’
Motion & Memorandum of Law for Class Certification (doc. 7), in which the plaintiff requests

1

Although Jam ie Brojanac’s nam e appears in the caption, she has voluntarily dism issed her claim s
(see doc. 50).
2

The policy has been in effect since August 14, 2010. According to the plaintiff, only m ail to or from
courts, attorneys, governm ent agencies and officials, and news m edia is considered legal or privileged. The
plaintiff further alleges that inm ates m ay obtain postcards from Jail officials, but that indigent inm ates are
allotted only two postcards per week, which are 4.5 by 6 inches in size. The front of the postcard m ay contain
only postage and the nam e and address of the inm ate and recipient. Inm ates m ay write substantive
m essages on the back of the postcard, but they m ust leave a blank area m easuring 1 inch by 2 inches so that
Jail officials m ay stam p a m essage indicating the source of the correspondence. Inm ates also are prohibited
from drawing or otherwise unnecessarily m arking on non-privileged m ail.
Case No: 3:10cv355/MCR/EMT

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that the court certify a class of “all current and future detainees in the Santa Rosa County,
Florida, Jail who are subject to or affected by the Postcard-Only Mail Policy.” The Sheriff
has responded in opposition to the motion.

Having considered the motion and the

response, the court finds that the plaintiff’s motion should be granted and that the proposed
class action should be certified.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The decision to grant or deny class certification lies within the sound discretion of the
district court. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004); Walker v. Jim
Dandy Co., 747 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984). A trial court should not determine the
merits of the claims at the class certification stage but may consider the merits “to the
degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be satisfied.”
Heffner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 443 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court “must define, redefine,
subclass, and decertify as appropriate in response to the progression of the case from
assertion to facts.” Shin v. Cobb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 2001).
“Even after a certification order is entered, the judge remains free to modify it in the light of
subsequent developments in the litigation.” General Teleph. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); see also In re Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233
(11th Cir. 2006) (noting that “Rule 23(c)(1) specifically empowers district courts to alter or
amend class certification orders at any time prior to a decision on the merits”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). “[P]articularly during the period before any
notice is sent to members of the class, [a class certification order] is inherently tentative.”
Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
DISCUSSION
“For a district court to certify a class action, the named plaintiffs must have standing,
and the putative class must meet each of the requirements specified in Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 23(a),3 as well as at least one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b).”4 Klay,
382 F.3d at 1250. The Sheriff does not dispute that the named plaintiff has standing or that

3

According to Rule 23(a),
[o]ne or m ore m em bers of a class m ay sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so num erous that joinder of all
m em bers is im practicable, (2) there are questions of law or fact com m on to
the class, (3) the claim s or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claim s or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
4

Rule 23(b) sets forth the following three requirem ents:
1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual m em bers of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual m em bers
of the class which would establish incom patible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual m em bers of the class which
would as a practical m atter be dispositive of the interests of the other
m em bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially im pair or im pede
their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby m aking appropriate final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact com m on to the m em bers
of the class predom inate over any questions affecting only individual
m em bers, and that a class action is superior to other available m ethods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The m atters pertinent
to the findings include:
(A) the interest of m em bers of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
com m enced by or against m em bers of the class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claim s in the particular forum ;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the m anagem ent of a class
action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).

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the requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b) have been satisfied in this case.5 Rather,
the Sheriff argues that class certification is unnecessary in this case and will constitute a
waste of his resources, as well as those of the court, because the plaintiff has requested
declaratory and injunctive relief that, if granted, will benefit all members of the proposed
class regardless of whether a class action is certified. While the court recognizes that a
class action may not be necessary where the relief requested otherwise can be obtained,
this case does not present such a circumstance. Indeed, considering the transitory nature
of incarceration in a county jail, the claims of the named plaintiff could become moot at any
time upon her release, as demonstrated by the fact that a number of individuals originally
named as plaintiffs in this action have already dismissed their claims because of their
release. Thus, in the event the relief requested is warranted, there is no guarantee that any
of the proposed class members will receive such relief in the absence of a class action. The
court therefore finds that the proposed class action should be certified. See Johnson v. City
of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1070 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that “[c]ertification of a class
under Rule 23(b)(2) is especially appropriate where, as here, the claims of the members of
the class may become moot as the case progresses” and certifying class action because
“risk of mootness [was] great” and “the issue raised [was] important not only [to the named
plaintiff], but [also to] other similarly situated”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the court finds that the plaintiff has met her burden
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(2) and that the motion for class certification should
therefore be granted at this time. As the court noted above, however, this determination
may be revisited should subsequent developments in the case so require. It is therefore
ORDERED as follows:

5

The Sheriff explicitly acknowledges that the requirem ents of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied but does
not address Rule 23(b). For the reasons set forth in the plaintiff’s m otion and the sheriff’s response, however,
the court finds that the plaintiff has standing to assert the claim s in her com plaint, see Prado-Steiman ex rel.
Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2000), and also has satisfied the requirem ents of Rule 23(a)
and Rule 23(b)(2).
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1. Plaintiff’s motion for class certification (doc. 7) is GRANTED.
2. In accordance with the requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), the
court certifies a class defined as follows: All current and future detainees in the Santa Rosa
County, Florida, Jail who are subject to or affected by the Postcard-Only Mail Policy.
3. Also in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(B), the court defines the following
class issue: Whether the Postcard-Only Mail Policy in effect at the Santa Rosa County,
Florida, Jail violates the plaintiff’s and proposed class members’ rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
4. The named plaintiff, Marcie Hamilton, shall act as the representative party. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
5. Attorneys from the ACLU Foundation of Florida and the Florida Institute of Justice
shall serve as class counsel. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g).
6. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, the plaintiff shall submit to the
court for approval a proposed notice to the class members in accordance with Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(c)(2)(B). Prior to filing this proposed notice, plaintiff shall confer with defendant in an
effort to agree on the language of the class notice.
DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 2011.

s/

M. Casey Rodgers

M. CASEY RODGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case No. 3:10cv355/MCR/EMT