BRISSON v. COLVIN

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM ORDER. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits is DENIED. The clerk is directed to close the file. Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE CHARLES J KAHN, JR on 03/05/2015. (MB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
BOB BRISSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________/
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case is before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a
final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”)
denying Bob Brisson’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34. The parties have
consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 73 for all proceedings in this case, including
entry of final judgment. Upon review of the record before this court, I conclude that
the findings of fact and determinations of the Commissioner are supported by
substantial evidence. The decision of the Commissioner, therefore, will be affirmed.
ISSUE ON REVIEW
Plaintiff, who will be referred to as claimant, plaintiff, or by name, alleges a
single issue on appeal - that the ALJ failed to give good cause for her decision to
discount the opinion of plaintiff’s treating physician.
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 2 of 15

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Claimant applied for DIB on April 14, 2011, alleging disability beginning on
June 14, 2009.1 T. 137-47.2 His application initially was denied, and the denial was
upheld on reconsideration. T. 66-75. Claimant filed a request for a hearing on
August 4, 2011. T. 76-77. His request was granted, and a hearing was conducted on
September 14, 2012. T. 35-57. On October 24, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) issued a decision, finding plaintiff not disabled as defined by the Act. T.
16-34. On November 2, 2012, plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council,
which denied his request. T. 1-6, 13-15, 209-214. The ALJ’s decision thus became
the final determination of the Commissioner.
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ
In her written decision, the ALJ made a number of findings relative to the
issue raised in this appeal:
•

“The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act on June 30, 2011.” T. 21.
•

“The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the

period from his alleged onset date of June 14, 2009 through his date last insured of
June 30, 2011 (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq.).” T. 21.

1

Plaintiff initially alleged an onset date of December 14, 2004, T. 139, but later amended it
to June 14, 2009. T. 146. Plaintiff’s date last insured, or the date by which his disability much have
commenced to receive DIB, is June 30, 2011. T. 21
2

The administrative record, as filed by the Commissioner, consists of eleven volumes (docs.
7-1 through 7-11) and has 459 consecutively numbered pages. References to the record will be by
“T.,” for transcript, followed by the page number.
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 3 of 15

•

“Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following severe

impairments: history of lumbar fusion; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome with surgery
on left; status post left shoulder rotator cuff repair; left toe pin placement; arthritis;
neuropathy, status post ulnar nerve repair left arm; anxiety; depression; and
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine. (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” T. 21.
•

“Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an impairment

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” T. 22.
•

“[T]hrough the date last insured, the claimant had the residual functional

capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with lifting and
carrying 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; sitting for a total of 6
hours during an 8-hour workday; standing and walking for a total of 4 hours each
during an 8-hour workday; occasionally using the left upper and lower extremities to
push and pull; frequently using the right upper and lower extremities to push and pull;
frequently balancing; occasionally stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and
climbing ramps and stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds; occasionally
reaching overhead with the left upper extremity; frequently reaching overhead with
the right upper extremity; frequently handling, fingering and feeling; precluded from
exposure to extreme heat and cold; no work around unprotected heights or dangerous
machinery; able to perform simple, routine tasks involving no more than simple, short
instructions and simple work-related decisions with few work place changes; and able
to sustain concentration and attention for 2 hours.” T. 22-23.

Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 4 of 15

•

“Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to perform any

past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565).” T. 28.
•

“Through the date last insured, considering the claimant’s age,

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that
existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could have
performed (20 CFR 404.1569 and 404.1569(a)).” T. 29.
•

“The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social

Security Act, at any time from June 14, 2009, the alleged onset date, through June 30,
2011, the date last insured (20 CFR 404.1520(g)).” T. 29.
FACT BACKGROUND AND MEDICAL HISTORY3
At the time of the hearing, claimant was forty-seven years old, had completed
high school and one year of college, and had past relevant work as a watch salesman,
pipe layer, assistant manager at a pawn shop, and house carpenter. T. 39-40, 51-52.
With the exception of a brief two-week period in 2010, plaintiff last worked in June
2009. T. 39-40. Plaintiff testified that he was able to mow his lawn with the help of
his eighteen-year-old child, although it took him two to three hours to complete the
task because of his need for frequent rest breaks. T. 46, 48. Plaintiff attended three
or four baseball games during the Wahoos’ 2012 season; he spent the majority of the
time walking around. T. 49. He also went to the beach two or three times that year.
T. 49. He was able to prepare breakfast and grocery shop with the help of his wife
and child and pay bills. T. 47-48. Approximately once every three weeks, claimant
3

The recitation of medical and historical facts of this case, as set out below, is based on the
court’s independent review of the record. Although intended to be thorough and to provide an
overview of the claimant’s history of care and treatment, the synopsis of medical evidence will be
supplemented as necessary in the Analysis section.
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 5 of 15

visited his mother-in-law, who lived half a block from his home. T. 48-49. Claimant
testified he could lift approximately ten pounds and could walk, sit, and stand for less
than an hour at a time each. T. 50. When asked by the ALJ to rate his average pain
on a scale of one to ten, claimant said it typically was a six or seven. T. 46. Claimant
considered himself disabled because he has “too many physical problems with [his]
body,” including his back, arms, feet, and legs, as well as “a lot of forgetfulness,” and
“can’t stay on task any longer due to [his] injuries in the past.” T. 41.
Plaintiff had at least five surgeries prior to his date last insured, including a left
shoulder rotator cuff repair in the 1980s; left carpal tunnel release in 2007; back
surgery in 2004 and 2007; ligament repair on the second toe of his left foot in 2010,
and left ulnar nerve surgery on an unknown date in the distant past. T. 24, 219, 367,
448, 457. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff’s primary care physician was Anju
Garg, M.D., at Affordable Medical Clinic, who treated plaintiff for lumbar back pain,
left shoulder pain, neck pain, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, left ulnar neuropathy,
left foot pain, rheumatoid arthritis, depression, anxiety, and right inguinal hernia. T.
45, 429, 453-54. Dr. Garg prescribed plaintiff pain medication and muscle relaxers,
and administered trigger point injections. T. 45, 429, 453-54. On August 21, 2012,
Dr. Garg completed an Assessment of Physical Residual Functional Capacity,
indicating that, in an eight-hour work day, plaintiff could sit and stand for one to two
hours and walk for less than one hour. T. 451. Dr. Garg opined plaintiff could
occasionally lift less than five pounds and could not bend or climb stairs or ladders.
T. 451. According to the assessment, claimant suffered from depression and anxiety
as a result of chronic pain syndrome. T. 452. Plaintiff required at least a thirty
minute rest period every three to four hours and would experience drowsiness and
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 6 of 15

inattentiveness as a result of his medications. T. 452. Dr. Garg concluded plaintiff
was disabled from full-time continuous employment and his conditions were expected
to last for more than a year. T. 452.
Michael Kasabian, D.O., performed a consultative examination of plaintiff on
July7, 2011. T. 360-69. Dr. Kasabian found that plaintiff had a “probable history of
hypertension” and pain in various areas, including his low back, hips, shoulders, and
left foot. T. 364. Dr. Kasabian completed a Range of Motion Report Form on July
7, 2011, indicating plaintiff had considerably restricted motion in his cervical and
lumbar spine, right and left shoulder, and hip. T. 361-62.
Sue Berthaume, a vocational expert, testified at the hearing. T. 51-56. The
ALJ posed the following hypothetical to Ms. Berthaume:
Hypothetical number one, let’s assume an individual the
claimant’s age, education, and vocational experience who
would be able to lift and carry 10 pounds frequently, 20
pounds occasionally, sit for a total of six hours throughout
the eight-hour workday, stand and walk for a total of four
hours each throughout the eight-hour workday. With
regard to the left upper extremity able to occasionally push
and pull, the right upper extremity able to frequently push
and pull, the left lower extremity occasionally push and
pull, the right lower extremity frequently push and pull. So
the left upper and lower are both occasional. The right
upper and lower are both frequent. Okay? Frequently able
to balance, occasionally able to stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,
and climb ramps and stairs, precluded from climbing
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Reaching overhead on the
left would be occasional and the right would be frequent,
able to frequently handle, finger, and feel. No exposure to
extreme heat or cold or vibration, no exposure to
unprotected heights or dangerous machinery, who
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 7 of 15

performed unskilled work, simple, routine tasks involving
no more than simple, short instructions, simple work
related decisions, few workplace changes, the same
concentration and attention for two hour periods.
T. 52-53. When asked whether an individual with those limitations would be able to
perform any of claimant’s past work, the vocational expert responded “[n]o, ma’am.”
T. 53. When asked whether there would be other jobs in the national or regional
economy that such an individual could perform, the vocational expert responded in
the affirmative, testifying that such an individual could work as a production
assembler, cashier, and information clerk. T. 53-54.
The ALJ posed a second hypothetical to the vocational expert, incorporating
a sit/stand option every forty-five minutes at will. T. 54. When asked whether that
changed or modified the vocational expert’s testimony regarding hypothetical number
one, the vocational expert responded that the individual could still work as an
information clerk but not as a cashier. T. 54. According to the vocational expert, the
individual could perform the production assembler job with the numbers reduced by
approximately fifty percent and work as a microfilm processor and surveillance
system monitor.4 T. 54.
The ALJ posed a third hypothetical, incorporating plaintiff’s testimony and Dr.
Garg’s opinion. T. 55. The vocational expert testified that such an individual would
not be able to perform any of claimant’s past work or other work in the national or

4

Presumably, in testifying that the hypothetical individual could work as a production
assembler with the numbers reduced by approximately fifty percent, the vocational expert meant
there would be approximately only half as many production assembler jobs available to the
hypothetical employee.
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 8 of 15

regional economy. T. 55.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court reviews a Social Security disability case to determine whether
the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439
(11th Cir. 1997); see also Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“[T]his Court may reverse the decision of the [Commissioner] only when convinced
that it is not supported by substantial evidence or that proper legal standards were not
applied.”). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)).
With reference to other standards of review, the Eleventh Circuit has said that
“‘[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla . . . .’” Somogy v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 366 F. App’x 56, 62 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at1439).
Although the ALJ’s decision need not be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence, therefore, “it cannot stand with a ‘mere scintilla’ of support.” See Hillsman
v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986). Even if the evidence preponderates
against the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence. See Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).
When reviewing a Social Security disability case, the court “‘may not decide
the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
[Commissioner] . . . .’” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)). A
reviewing court also may not look “only to those parts of the record which support
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 9 of 15

the ALJ[,]” but instead “must view the entire record and take account of evidence in
the record which detracts from the evidence relied on by the ALJ.” See Tieniber v.
Heckler, 720 F.2d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 1983). Review is deferential to a point, but
the reviewing court conducts what has been referred to as “an independent review of
the record.” See Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d. 1273, 1273 (11th Cir. 1985); see also
Getty ex rel. Shea v. Astrue, No. 2:10–cv–725–FtM–29SPC, 2011 WL 4836220
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2011); Salisbury v. Astrue, No. 8:09-cv-2334-T-17TGW, 2011
WL 861785 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011).5
The Social Security Act defines a disability as an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability, the physical or mental impairment must be
so severe that the plaintiff not only is unable to do his previous work, “but cannot,
considering [his] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g), the Commissioner analyzes a
disability claim in five steps:
1. If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
2.

If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, his

impairments must be severe before he can be found disabled.
5

The Eleventh Circuit not only speaks of an independent review of the administrative record,
but it also reminds us that it conducts a de novo review of the district court’s decision on whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496
F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002).
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 10 of 15

3. If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and he has
severe impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months, and if his impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of
any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is
presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If the claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from doing his past
relevant work, he is not disabled.6
5. Even if the claimant’s impairments prevent him from performing his past
relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy
that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is not
disabled.
“[R]esidual functional capacity is the most [claimant] can still do despite
[claimant’s] limitations.”7 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(1). The ALJ establishes residual
6

Claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps him from
performing his past work. See Chester v. Bowen, 792 F. 2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
7

In addition to this rather terse definition of residual functional capacity, the Regulations
describe how the Commissioner makes the assessment:
(3) Evidence we use to assess your residual functional capacity. We will assess your
residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.
In general, you are responsible for providing the evidence we will use to make a
finding about your residual functional capacity. (See § 404.1512(c).) However,
before we make a determination that you are not disabled, we are responsible for
developing your complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative
examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help you get
medical reports from your own medical sources. (See §§ 404.1512(d) through (f).)
We will consider any statements about what you can still do that have been provided
by medical sources, whether or not they are based on formal medical examinations.
(See § 404.1513.) We will also consider descriptions and observations of your
limitations from your impairment(s), including limitations that result from your
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 11 of 15

functional capacity, utilizing the impairments identified at step two, by interpretation
of (1) the medical evidence, and (2) the claimant’s subjective complaints (generally
complaints of pain). Residual functional capacity is then used by the ALJ to make
the ultimate vocational determination required by step five.8 Often, both the medical
evidence and the accuracy of a claimant’s subjective complaints are subject to a
degree of conflict and that conflict leads, as in this case, to the points raised on
judicial review by the disappointed claimant.
ANALYSIS
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in giving “no weight” to Dr. Garg’s
opinions and in failing to give good cause for her decision in that regard. Absent
good cause, the opinion of a claimant’s treating physician must be accorded
considerable or substantial weight by the Commissioner. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357
F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1997); Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 960-61 (11th Cir. 1985); Jones v.
Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986). “Good cause” exists when: (1) the
treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence
supported a contrary finding; or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory
or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241; see

symptoms, such as pain, provided by you, your family, neighbors, friends, or other
persons. (See paragraph (e) of this section and § 404.1529.)[.]
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).
8

“Before we go from step three to step four, we assess your residual functional capacity.
(See paragraph (e) of this section.) We use this residual functional capacity assessment at both step
four and step five when we evaluate your claim at these steps.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 12 of 15

also Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440 (citing cases). If a treating physician’s opinion as to the
nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is well-supported by medically
acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, and is not inconsistent with
other substantial evidence in the record, the ALJ is to give it controlling weight. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Where a treating physician has merely made conclusory
statements, however, the ALJ may afford them such weight as is supported by clinical
or laboratory findings and other consistent evidence of a claimant’s impairments. See
Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Schnorr v.
Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987). In any event,“the ALJ must state with
particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor.”
Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 518 F. App’x. 875, 877 (11th Cir. 2013).
The law concerning conclusory statements is particularly applied where a
doctor, even one who has treated the claimant, expresses opinions on a preprinted or
“check-off” form. Such opinion evidence will not bind the Commissioner. Indeed,
courts have found that such preprinted forms do not provide persuasive evidence of
the validity of the opinions expressed therein. See Hammersley v. Astrue, No. 5:08cv-245-Oc-10GRJ, 2009 WL 3053707, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Check-off
forms . . . have limited probative value because they are conclusory and provide little
narrative or insight into the reasons behind the conclusions.” (citing Spencer ex rel.
Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1094 (11th Cir. 1985); Mason v. Shalala, 994
F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993))). Although such forms are admissible, “they are
entitled to little weight and do not constitute ‘substantial evidence’ on the record as
a whole.” O’Leary v. Schweiker, 710 F. 2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir. 1983).

Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 13 of 15

Here, the ALJ gave no weight to the opinions of Dr. Garg, finding them
unsupported by his treatment records and inconsistent with plaintiff’s reported
activities of daily living. T. 26. According to the ALJ,
[w]hile Dr. Garg’s treatment notes do show some loss of
motion of the back and neck, positive tenderness of the
neck, back, and left shoulder, loss of motion of the left
shoulder and positive tenderness of the left toe, he also
noted that the claimant had no neurological deficits, i.e., he
had normal motor strength and sensation in the upper and
lower extremities. Dr. Garg also provided no updated
radiology reports to support his findings. In addition, his
opinion is inconsistent with the claimant’s own reports that
he attends professional baseball games (3 to 4 this year
already), grocery shops, cuts his grass using a push mower,
which takes 2 to 3 hours with breaks, and walks to visit
family. It is also significant to note that Dr. Garg is not an
orthopedic specialist, but rather just a family doctor, and he
had not referred the claimant to an orthopedic specialist.
He has also not recommended pain treatment to date.
T. 26-27.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ plainly stated with particularity the
weight assigned to Dr. Garg’s opinions and the reasons therefor. Moreover, the
ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Notably, Dr. Garg never treated
plaintiff before plaintiff’s date last insured. T. 427-30, 453-59. Dr. Garg’s opinions
thus shed little light on plaintiff’s status or condition during the relevant time period.
Moreover, Dr. Garg’s opinions were expressed on a Residual Functional Capacity
assessment, which is a pre-printed, check-off form. As a result, they are entitled to
little weight. In addition, as the ALJ found, Dr. Garg’s own treatment notes
undermine the opinions Dr. Garg expressed in the Physical Residual Functional
Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 14 of 15

Capacity assessment. In June 2012, after plaintiff’s date last insured, Dr. Garg
indicated plaintiff had no joint swelling, normal range of motion, and normal motor
and sensory exams. T. 427, 429. Although Dr. Garg noted tenderness and decreased
range of motion in July, August, and September 2012, he also noted plaintiff had a
normal neurological exam, including motor, sensory, and reflexes. T. 453, 455, 457,
459. Those findings were consistent with those of Manuel Abendan, M.D., another
treating physician, who recorded normal neurological exams in July and August 2011,
including normal motor, sensory, gait, and nerve exams.9 T. 403, 405. They likewise
were consistent with the opinions of Michael E. Kasabian, D.O., a consultative
examiner, who found claimant had normal grip dexterity, 5/5 muscle strength, could
stand on his heels and toes, and had a negative straight leg raise test in the supine
position.10 T. 364. Furthermore, the state agency physician, who is considered an
expert in the field, opined on July 29, 2011, that plaintiff could perform a full range
of light work. T. 380-81. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f)(2)(I); SSR 96-6p. Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living, as discussed above, also belie his claim of disability.
Finally, to the extent claimant proposes that the AL should have accepted Dr. Garg's
opinion on the ultimate issue of disability, claimant is mistaken, as that decision is for
the Commissioner alone to make. See Denomme, 518 F. App'x. 875, 877-78; 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1).

9

Dr. Abendan observed some decreased motion of the spine with pain and advised plaintiff
to seek treatment from a pain specialist. T. 403, 405. There is no indication plaintiff sought such
treatment.
10

Dr. Kasabian also noted reduced range of motion in Plaintiff’s back. Tr. 361.

Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK

Page 15 of 15

ACCORDINGLY, it is ORDERED:
1. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and plaintiff’s application
for Disability Insurance Benefits is DENIED.
2. The clerk is directed to close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2015.

/s/

Charles J. Kahn, Jr.

CHARLES J. KAHN, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case No. 3:14cv6/CJK