POLNITZ v. COLVIN
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER. It is ORDERED that, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Order. The clerk is directed to close the file. Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE ELIZABETH M TIMOTHY on 06/22/2015. (MB)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
TONIA RENA POLNITZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
______________________________/
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for disposition pursuant to
the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, based on the parties’ consent to
magistrate judge jurisdiction (see docs. 4, 5). It is now before the court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), for review of a final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“the Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s applications for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–34, and
supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–83.
Upon review of the record before this court, it is the opinion of the undersigned that certain
determinations of the Commissioner are not supported by substantial evidence or do not comport
with proper legal principles. Thus, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
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I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 30, 2011, Plaintiff protectively filed applications for DIB and SSI alleging disability
beginning December 31, 2007 (tr. 14).1
Her applications were denied initially and on
reconsideration, and thereafter she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).
A hearing was held on February 5, 2013, and on March 28, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision in which
he found Plaintiff “not disabled,” as defined under the Act, at any time through the date of his
decision (tr. 14–26). The Appeals Council subsequently denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Thus,
the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner, subject to review in this
court. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2007). This appeal
followed.
II.
FINDINGS OF THE ALJ
The ALJ made the following findings in his March 28, 2013, decision (see tr. 14–26):
(a)
Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31,
2
2013 ;
(b)
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 31, 2007, her
alleged disability onset date;
(c)
Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: obesity, osteoarthritis, essential
hypertension, diabetes mellitus, depression, and anxiety;
(d)
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1;
1
All references to “tr.” refer to the transcript of Social Security Administration record filed on October 27,
2014 (docs. 7, 8, 9). Moreover, the page numbers refer to those found on the lower right-hand corner of each page of
the transcript, as opposed to those assigned by the court’s electronic docketing system or any other page numbers that
may appear.
2
The time frame relevant to Plaintiff’s claim for DIB therefore is December 31, 2007 (the date of alleged onset
of disability), through March 28, 2013 (the date of the ALJ’s decision), even though Plaintiff was insured for DIB
purposes through December 31, 2013. The time frame relevant to her claim for SSI is June 30, 2011 (the date Plaintiff
applied for SSI) through March 28, 2013 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211
(11th Cir. 2005) (indicating that SSI claimant becomes eligible to receive benefits in the first month in which she is both
disabled and has an SSI application on file).
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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(e)
Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of
sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a). She can perform the simple,
repetitive, one and two-step tasks required to carry out unskilled work.
(f)
Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work;
(g)
Plaintiff was born on June 25, 1970, and thus on the alleged disability onset date was
thirty-seven years old, which is defined as a “younger individual, age 18–44” in 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1563 and 416.963;
(h)
Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English;
(i)
Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because
application of the Medical-Vocational Rules (“the Grids”) directly supports a finding of “not
disabled,” whether or not Plaintiff has transferable job skills;
(j)
In light of Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. Nothing in the record
indicates that Plaintiff’s obesity would alter this conclusion.
(k)
Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from December 31,
2007, through the date of the decision.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining whether the decision
is supported by substantial evidence from the record and was a result of the application of proper
legal standards. Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]his Court may
reverse the decision of the [Commissioner] only when convinced that it is not supported by
substantial evidence or that proper legal standards were not applied.”); see also Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). “A
determination that is supported by substantial evidence may be meaningless . . . if it is coupled with
or derived from faulty legal principles.” Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1983),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Elam v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 921 F.2d 1210, 1214
(11th Cir. 1991). As long as proper legal standards were applied, the Commissioner’s decision will
not be disturbed if in light of the record as a whole the decision appears to be supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998);
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439; Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence
is more than a scintilla, but not a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person
would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91
S. Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S.
197, 59 S. Ct. 206, 217, 83 L. Ed. 126 (1938)); Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1439. The court may not decide
the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed if supported by
substantial evidence. Sewell v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 1065, 1067 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Act defines a disability as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result
in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To qualify as a disability the physical or mental impairment
must be so severe that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work, “but cannot,
considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)–(g),3 the Commissioner analyzes a disability claim in five steps:
1.
If the claimant is performing substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled.
2.
If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, her impairments must
be severe before she can be found disabled.
3.
If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity and she has severe
impairments that have lasted or are expected to last for a continuous period of at least twelve
months, and if her impairments meet or medically equal the criteria of any impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4.
If the claimant’s impairments do not prevent her from doing her past relevant work,
she is not disabled.
3
In general, the legal standards applied are the same regardless of whether a claimant seeks DIB or SSI, but
separate, parallel statutes and regulations exist for DIB and SSI claims (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404, 416). Therefore, citations
in this Order should be considered to refer to the appropriate parallel provision. The same applies to citations of statutes
or regulations found in quoted court decisions.
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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5.
Even if the claimant’s impairments prevent her from performing her past relevant
work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates her
RFC and vocational factors, she is not disabled.
The claimant bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that keeps her from
performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512. If the claimant establishes such an impairment,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show the existence of other jobs in the national
economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the claimant can perform. MacGregor v. Bowen,
786 F.2d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 1986). If the Commissioner carries this burden, the claimant must
then prove she cannot perform the work suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d
1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987).
IV.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Plaintiff argues that “[b]ecause [she] suffers from limitations which would likely erode the
full range of work at the sedentary level” and “because [she] suffers from severe uncontrolled
diabetes mellitus” which “significantly limit[s] [her] ability to perform basic work skills,”4 the ALJ
was not entitled to rely exclusively on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, or the “Grids,”5 to find
her “not disabled” (doc. 11 at 9–10). Plaintiff therefore asks the court to remand this case “for
further proceedings with instructions to the ALJ to determine if Plaintiff is unable to perform a full
range of work at a given residual functional level or has non-exertional impairments that
significantly limit her basic work skills, [and to] propound a hypothetical to a vocational expert that
clearly sets out all of Plaintiff’s limitations” (id. at 10). The Commissioner responds that “Plaintiff
failed to prove she could not perform the full range of work at the sedentary exertional level, and
she failed to prove that her nonexertional limitations prevented her from performing a wide range
4
In this case, Plaintiff complains that she suffers limitations, apparently both exertional and non-exertional,
due to “the inability to sit or stand for prolonged periods of time,” “subjective complaints of dizziness and numbness,”
“social and occupational functioning impairments,” and diabetes that causes severe dizziness, vision problems, and pain
and numbness (doc. 11 at 9).
5
The Grids, which consist of a matrix based on exertional levels and vocational factors, may be used to direct
a conclusion of disabled or not disabled or they may be used as a framework for making that determination. See
generally 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(a). The matrix results constitute “administrative notice” as to
the number of unskilled jobs that exist in the national economy at the various exertional levels. Thus, when all the
claimant’s vocational factors coincide with the criteria in the matrix, “the existence of jobs is established.” 20 C.F.R.
Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 200.00(b).
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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of work at the sedentary exertional level. The ALJ, therefore, properly used Grid Rule 201.28 to
find Plaintiff could perform other work and was not disabled.” (doc. 12 at 6). According to the
Commissioner, Plaintiff “fails to cite one shred of medical evidence that she contends supports her
position” (id. at 7). In contrast, the ALJ’s decision reflects that he thoroughly reviewed the
evidence, including as it pertained to Plaintiff’s hypertension, diabetes, joint problems, and mental
health conditions (id. at 8–9), before properly concluding under the Grids that Plaintiff was “not
disabled.”
V.
DISCUSSION
The court’s October 28, 2014, Scheduling Order in part requires the parties to file
memoranda in support of their respective positions which specifically cite the record by page
number for all factual contentions (doc. 10). The Scheduling Order warns that the failure to do so
“will result in the contention(s) being disregarded for lack of proper development” (id. at 2). In this
case, in outlining the evidence in her memorandum Plaintiff frequently, although not exclusively,
cites large groups of pages from the 979-page transcript rather than provide pinpoint citations.
Specifically, in summarizing the evidence that was before the ALJ and the Appeals Council,
Plaintiff cites seven groups of pages having from 5 to 25 pages each, and nine groups of pages
having from 26 to 305 pages each (see doc. 11 at 2–6), or a total of generalized references to 670
pages (including some duplicated or overlapping citations). Moreover, and of even greater
consequence, in the “Analysis” section of her memorandum, Plaintiff does not cite a single page of
the medical evidence for factual contentions that support her argument for reversal and remand. As
the Scheduling Order cautions, the court therefore disregards the factual contentions presented in
the “Analysis” section of Plaintiff’s memorandum due to lack of proper development. Nevertheless,
the court considers the basic premise of Plaintiff’s legal argument for reversal: that the ALJ erred
by relying exclusively on the Grids to find her “not disabled” and failing to consult a VE. So doing,
the court cannot conclude that the ALJ’s reliance on the Grids to find Plaintiff “not disabled” should
be affirmed.
The ALJ may not rely on the Grids exclusively when a “claimant is unable to perform a full
range of work at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has non-exertional impairments
that significantly limit basic work skills.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1242 (11th Cir.
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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2004).6 In Phillips, the court “interpreted ‘significantly limit basic work skills’ as limitations that
prohibit a claimant from performing ‘a wide range’ of work at a given work level.” Id. at 1243; see
also Foote, 67 F.3d at 1559 (indicating that the ALJ must determine “whether the non-exertional
limitations are severe enough to preclude a wide range of employment at the given work capacity
level”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the ALJ may not rely exclusively on
the Grids but rather should consult a VE if the ALJ determines 1) that the claimant is unable to
perform a full range of work at a given RFC exertional level, or 2) that the claimant’s non-exertional
limitations prevent a wide range of work at the stated RFC. Id. at 1243; see also Wilson v. Barnhart,
284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If nonexertional impairments exist, the ALJ may use
Medical–Vocational Guidelines as a framework to evaluate vocational factors, but must also
introduce independent evidence, preferably through a vocational expert’s testimony, of existence
of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.”) (citing Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d
1072, 1077–78 (11th Cir. 1996)).
In this case, the first part of the Phillips inquiry (i.e., whether the claimant is able to perform
a full range of work at a given RFC exertional level) is satisfied, because the ALJ found—and, as
noted above, Plaintiff has failed to properly dispute—that Plaintiff retains the exertional capacity
to perform the full range of sedentary work. Next, as to the second part of the Phillips inquiry (i.e.,
6
Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96–4p in part provides:
Exertional limitations or restrictions affect an individual’s ability to meet the seven strength demands
of jobs (sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling), while nonexertional
limitations or restrictions affect an individual’s ability to meet the nonstrength demands of jobs (all
physical limitations and restrictions that are not reflected in the seven strength demands, and mental
limitations and restrictions). . . .
[S]ymptoms in themselves are neither exertional nor nonexertional. An individual’s symptoms,
however, can cause limitations or restrictions that are classified as exertional, nonexertional, or a
combination of both. For example, pain can result in an exertional limitation if it limits the ability to
perform one of the strength activities (e.g., lifting), or a nonexertional limitation if it limits the ability
to perform a nonstrength activity (e.g., fingering or concentrating).
SSR 96–4p, TITLES II AND XVI: SYMPTOMS, MEDICALLY DETERMINABLE PHYSICAL AND MENTAL
IMPAIRMENTS, AND EXERTIONAL AND NONEXERTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 61 Fed.Reg. 34488–01, 34489,
1996 WL 362210 (SSA July 2, 1996).
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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whether the claimant’s non-exertional limitations prevent a wide range of work at the stated RFC),
the court did not locate an explicit finding by the ALJ that Plaintiff’s non-exertional limitations do
not prevent a wide range of sedentary work. Even if the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could “perform
[the] simple, repetitive, one and two-step tasks required to carry out unskilled work” should be
considered sufficient to implicitly satisfy this inquiry, the court must still consider whether the
finding is supported by substantial evidence.
The court first notes that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could “perform [the] simple,
repetitive, one and two-step tasks required to carry out unskilled work” does not clearly limit
Plaintiff to unskilled work; rather, the finding appears to define unskilled work as work which
requires the ability to perform simple, repetitive, one and two-step tasks and then conclude that
Plaintiff is able to perform such work. The pertinent regulations in fact define unskilled work as
“work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short
period of time.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(a).
As an initial matter, the court is satisfied that the ability to execute “one and two-step tasks”
falls within this definition. See Clifton v. Astrue, 298 F.App’s 855, 857 (11th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished)7 (finding that a limitation of “unskilled work” adequately accounted for mild
limitations posed by plaintiff’s mental impairments). As to a limitation to simple and repetitive
tasks with respect to unskilled work, the court looks for guidance to Vuxta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
194 F. App’x 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). In Vuxta, the Eleventh Circuit remanded for
further proceedings after finding that although “a limitation to simple tasks is already contained
within the unskilled limitation, and is not a limitation above and beyond that classification,” “a
limitation to repetitive tasks [ ] is not contained within the definition of unskilled.” Id. Following
Vuxta, several cases from the Middle District of Florida—and one from this District—have similarly
held that limitations to repetitive, as well as routine, tasks “are not within the definition of
unskilled.” See Justiniano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:11-cv-1576-Orl-GJK, 2013 WL 625545,
at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s additional limitations
had little or no effect on the occupational base was not supported by substantial evidence because
the ALJ “failed to provide any explanation or analysis regarding Claimant’s limitation to routine and
7
In the Eleventh Circuit, unpublished cases are not considered binding precedent but may be cited as
persuasive authority. See U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
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repetitive tasks”); Welcz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:12-cv-106-Orl-22GJK, 2013 WL 436166
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2013) (same) (adopting report and recommendation in Welcz v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 6:12-CV-106-Orl-22, 2012 WL 7006308, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Dec 17, 2012)); Dever v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:11–cv–203–Orl–KRS, 2012 WL 3537072, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15,
2012) (indicating that limitation to repetitive tasks not included in the definition of unskilled work);
Coffin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:09–cv–2061–Orl-DAB, 2011 WL 806674, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 2, 2011) (indicating that limitation to repetitive and routine tasks not included in the definition
of unskilled work); Sanders v. Colvin, No. 5:14cv161/WS/EMT, 2015 WL 3466122 (N.D. Fla. June
1, 2015) (citing and relying on Vuxta, Justiniano, Welcz, Dever, and Coffin). But see Narlock v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:07–cv–524–Orl–31KRS, 2008 WL 3364690, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8,
2008) (reversing on other grounds but finding that limitations to simple, routine instructions are
sufficiently accounted for by unskilled work); Anderson v. Astrue, No. 2:11-00046N, 2011 WL
3843683, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 30, 2011) (limitations to simple and routine tasks are consistent with
the regulatory definition of unskilled work). See also Allison v. Apfel, No. 99-4090, 2000 WL
1276950, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2000) (unpublished) (stating that ALJ’s limitation to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks means unskilled light work).
In this case, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s “depression and anxiety have not been
documented to persist at greater than a moderate level, and she is clearly capable of performing the
simple, repetitive, one and two-step tasks required to carry out unskilled work” (tr. 25). The ALJ
did not, however, explain why Plaintiff’s limitation to unskilled work, as he defined it to include
repetitive tasks, fully took into account her moderate psychiatric symptoms or how it correlated with
his findings that has “mild restrictions on her activities of daily living,” “mild estimated difficulties
in maintaining social functioning,” and “moderate deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or
pace” (id.; see also tr. 18–19). Although, as stated, some district courts within the Eleventh Circuit
(and one Circuit Court of Appeals from another circuit, in an unpublished decision) have concluded
that a limitation to repetitive (and/or routine) tasks is encompassed within (or consistent with) the
definition of unskilled work, the undersigned finds the positions taken in Vuxta, Justiniano, Welcz,
Dever, and Coffin—which rely on the SSA’s definitions of “unskilled”—to be more persuasive. The
court therefore concludes that the ALJ should have provided a more thorough explanation or
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analysis concerning his finding that Plaintiff is able to perform unskilled work that includes
repetitive tasks, even though such tasks are not within the definition of “unskilled.” Reversal and
remand for further proceedings is therefore warranted for the ALJ to do so and, if necessary, elicit
the testimony of a VE.
Even if reversal is not warranted based on the foregoing, another basis for reversal and
remand exists. As noted, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has “mild restrictions on her activities of daily
living,” “mild estimated difficulties in maintaining social functioning,” and “moderate deficiencies
of concentration, persistence, or pace” (tr. 25; see also tr. 18–19). Although the ALJ found Plaintiff
was “not disabled” under the Grids without consulting a vocational expert (“VE”), numerous courts
have concluded that such limitations warrant expert vocational testimony. See Sorrow v. Colvin,
No. 1:13-cv-02883-AJB, 2015 WL 630429, at *14–15 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2015) (stating that ALJ’s
findings of mild difficulties with social functioning and moderate difficulties with concentration,
persistence, or pace should require testimony of VE to determine whether non-exertional limitations
significantly compromise claimant’s work skills or preclude her from performing a wide range of
work); Frizzo v. Astrue, No. 6:11-cv-1318-Orl-31TEM, 2012 WL 3668049, at *13 (M.D. Fla. Aug.
7, 2012) (indicating that, in light of ALJ’s findings that claimant had mild difficulties in maintaining
social functioning, moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and
could not meet quotas or similar production requirements, it was “conceivable” that such limitations
would have more than a minimal effect on the vocational base); see also Bonds v. Astrue, No.
07–1135, 2008 WL 2952446, at *11–12 (D.S.C. July 29, 2008) (indicating that whether Plaintiff’s
moderate impairment in the area of concentration, persistence and pace eroded the occupational base
and to what degree it was eroded was a determination for a VE); Chapa v. Astrue, No. 05–253, 2008
WL 952947, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2008) (reversing because ALJ applied Grids instead of
obtaining VE testimony where claimant had moderate impairment in the area of concentration,
persistence and pace). Accordingly, on remand the ALJ should reexamine whether Plaintiff’s “mild
restrictions on her activities of daily living,” “mild estimated difficulties in maintaining social
functioning,” and “moderate deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace” require testimony
from a VE to determine whether Plaintiff is precluded from performing a wide range of sedentary
work.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned concludes that the Commissioner’s decision
should not be affirmed and that this matter should be reversed and remanded for additional
proceedings.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Foote, 67 F.3d at1556 (remanding for additional
administrative proceedings).
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the
decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with this Order. The clerk is directed to close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida this 22nd day of June 2015.
/s/ Elizabeth M. Timothy
ELIZABETH M. TIMOTHY
CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case No.: 3:14cv398/EMT
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