AUSTIN v. FL HUD ROSEWOOD LLC

Filing 72

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 62 Motion in Limine. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE M CASEY RODGERS on 05/10/2017. (Jacobs, Tevenia)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
HENRIETTA AUSTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:15cv40/MCR/CJK

FL HUD ROSEWOOD, LLC,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
Defendant FL HUD Rosewood, LLC’s motion in limine, ECF No. 62, is now
before the Court. As set forth below, the Court finds that Defendant’s motion is due
to be granted in part and denied in part.
Defendant first moves, on relevance grounds, to exclude any evidence,
testimony, or argument that Plaintiff was subjected to a “suspension” or “minisuspension” before she resigned on August 12, 2013. Defendant also seeks to
preclude Plaintiff from offering any evidence at trial concerning her alleged
constructive discharge. Defendant contends that such evidence relates only to
Plaintiff’s original claims for age discrimination, on which summary judgment was
granted in its favor, and that it is not relevant to the retaliation claims that remain
pending in this case. Defendant argues that any “infinitesimal” probative value this

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evidence may have to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is far outweighed by the unfair
prejudice it will have on Defendant.
The Court finds that Defendant’s motion is due to be denied with respect to
evidence that Plaintiff was briefly suspended before her resignation and to evidence
of the factual circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s resignation, including her
reasons for resigning.

A retaliation claim under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (ADEA) requires proof that the plaintiff engaged in protected
conduct, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is a causal
relationship between the two events. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307,
1311 (11th Cir. 2002). In this case, Plaintiff alleges that she engaged in protected
conduct when she reported perceived age discrimination to management and that, as
a result, she suffered adverse employment actions in the form of regular increased
workloads. Plaintiff’s final encounter with management, which she claims prompted
her resignation, allegedly involved one such retaliatory imposition of extra duties
and, when Plaintiff attempted to make another complaint, she was allegedly directed
to clock out, accused of insubordination and told she would be reprimanded. This
evidence provides relevant contextual information and also is probative of whether
or not management’s conduct toward Plaintiff in increasing her workload amounted

Case No. 3:15cv040/MCR/CJK

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to “adverse employment action” under the ADEA.1 Evidence of Plaintiff’s reaction
to the challenged employment actions, including her ultimate decision to resign, is
probative of whether she actually and reasonably believed that management’s
conduct was motivated by retaliatory animus. This evidence does not pose an
unreasonably high risk of confusing the issues or misleading the jury, nor will its
probative value substantially outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice such that it
should be excluded under Rule 403.
The Court finds, however, that Defendant’s motion should be granted with
respect to the specific terms “constructive discharge” and “forced to resign” because
their use, in any variation, would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial under Rule
403. This language has a specific, highly prejudicial meaning both legally and in
lay usage. As Plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim did not survive summary
judgment, there is no longer a basis in either the facts or the law for permitting the

1

Regarding the “mini-suspension,” the Court finds that this employment action may be
considered “adverse” for purposes of a retaliation claim under the ADEA. See ECF No. 52 at 10
n.5. An “adverse employment action” in the retaliation context does not carry the restrictive
definition that it does in the discrimination context. In particular, the anti-retaliation provision [of
the ADEA], unlike the substantive portion, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the
terms and conditions of employment.” Barnett v. Athens Regional Medical Center Inc., 550 F.
App’x 711, 714 (11th Cir. 2013) quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. V. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64
(2006). Instead, the test is whether “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged
action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. Further, “the significance of
any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.”
Id. In this case, a reasonable jury could conclude from the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s
unpaid mini-suspension that management’s actions might have deterred a reasonable employee
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Therefore, evidence regarding the minisuspension is relevant to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and admissible at trial.
Case No. 3:15cv040/MCR/CJK

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use these terms to describe any aspect of this case.

The Court thus grants

Defendant’s motion with respect to the terms “constructive discharge” and “forced
to resign,” or any variation thereof.
Defendant also moves to exclude any evidence, testimony, or argument that
Plaintiff is entitled to back pay damages. In an age discrimination suit, a successful
plaintiff may recover back wages from the date of her termination to the date of trial.
Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1347 (11th Cir. 2000). As has
already been noted, Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim was terminated at summary
judgment; therefore, it may not support a damages award in this case and evidence
of lost wages related to that claim are inadmissible at trial. Likewise, evidence of
lost wages from the time Plaintiff’s employment ended are not admissible, given the
Court’s ruling on summary judgment that Plaintiff cannot prove a constructive
discharge. However, Plaintiff may offer evidence in support of a claim for back
wages with respect to the time period, however brief, that she was not paid during
the so-called mini-suspension on her last day of work.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s motion in limine, ECF No.
62, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
1.

Defendant’s motion is denied as to evidence that Plaintiff was briefly
suspended before she resigned on August 12, 2013.

2.

Defendant’s motion is denied as to evidence of the factual
circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s resignation and her reasons for
resigning.

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3.

Defendant’s motion is granted with respect to the terms “constructive
discharge” and “forced to resign,” or any variation thereof.

4.

Defendant’s motion is granted as to evidence that Plaintiff is entitled to
back pay arising out of her original age discrimination claim and denied
as to evidence regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to back pay as a result
of her unpaid suspension on August 12, 2013.

SO ORDERED, on this 10th day of May, 2017.

M. Casey Rodgers
M. CASEY RODGERS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case No. 3:15cv040/MCR/CJK