KING v. CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA INC

Filing 67

ORDER - Defendant's First 43 Motion in Limine is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to renew at trial; Defendant's Second 44 Motion in Limine is DENIED; Defendant's Third 45 Motion in Limine is DENIED; Plaintiff' ;s First 56 Motion in Limine is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with this Order; Plaintiff's 57 Motion in Limine is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with this Order; Plaintiff's 58 Motion in Limine is DENIED. Signed by JUDGE M CASEY RODGERS on 08/12/2018. (Jacobs, Tevenia)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
SANDRA KING,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 3:16cv191/MCR/EMT

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF
NORTHWEST FLORIDA, INC.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
The parties’ motions in limine are presently before the Court. For the
following reasons, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.
1.

Defendant’s First Motion in Limine, ECF No. 43
Defendant moves to exclude damages evidence arising from Plaintiff’s

termination. Defendant argues that this evidence relates only to Plaintiff’s original
claim for wrongful termination, on which summary judgment was granted in its
favor, and thus is not relevant to the failure to accommodate claim that remains
pending in the case. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff initially alleged two separate
theories of disability discrimination arising from the same common nucleus of
operative facts—one claim for intentional discrimination by wrongful termination,
and one claim for failure to accommodate. See ECF No. 1. The Court’s resolution

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of Plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim on summary judgment did not
establish anything, as a matter of law or fact, about whether she is entitled to recover
damages on her failure to accommodate claim based on the same operative facts.
Based on the summary judgment record, there may be sufficient evidence
presented at trial from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant’s failure to
accommodate Plaintiff’s disability caused her termination and the emotional
damages resulting therefrom. See Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247,
1263 n.17 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that in the context of a failure to accommodate
claim involving a termination, a plaintiff must show that his employer failed to
accommodate his disability and that “but for [the] failure to accommodate . . . he
would not have been terminated”). In that scenario, evidence of damages arising
from Plaintiff’s termination would be relevant to the damages determination on her
failure to accommodate claim. Of course, the trial record may differ from the
summary judgment record and those differences may impact the admissibility of this
damages evidence. However, on the unique facts of this case, in which Plaintiff’s
termination appears inextricably intertwined with the alleged failure to
accommodate, Defendant’s first motion in limine, ECF No. 43, will be denied
without prejudice to renew at trial, in the event the trial record does not support the
admission of this evidence.

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2.

Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine, ECF No. 44
Defendant moves to exclude from evidence the Diocese of Pensacola-

Tallahassee Employee Handbook, on grounds that it is irrelevant and would confuse
the issues in this case, particularly since the Diocese of Pensacola-Tallahassee is not
a party to this case. This argument fails. Defendant’s leave policies (including
vacation, sick and FMLA leave), as described in its employee handbook, are relevant
contextually and also bear on the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested
accommodation. The Court finds no “potential for confusion” arising from the
reference to the Diocese of Pensacola-Tallahassee in the title of the employee
handbook. Defendant uses this handbook and gives the handbook to its employees,
as titled, therefore it is admissible as titled. The Court will give an appropriate
limiting instruction, if requested. Defendant’s second motion in limine, ECF No.
44, is due to be denied.
3.

Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine, ECF No. 45
Defendant moves to exclude evidence regarding Plaintiff’s duration of

employment with Defendant as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. This argument
fails. Plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate requires proof that she was a
“qualified” individual, meaning able to perform the “essential functions” of her
job. See Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001). Her
experiential knowledge of the essential functions of the job and whether she could

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perform them, as well as the basis for that knowledge (i.e., having performed the job
for many years), are probative of whether she was “qualified” under the
ADA. Moreover, Plaintiff is seeking compensatory damages for emotional distress,
which involves consideration of factors such as the degree of emotional distress, if
any, she suffered, the context of events surrounding her distress, and any evidence
tending to corroborate her testimony regarding the distress. See Akouri v. State of
Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005). Evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s length of employment bears on these issues. Under these circumstances,
the probative value of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Therefore, the evidence is admissible and Defendant’s third
motion in limine, ECF No. 45, is due to be denied.
4.

Plaintiff’s First Motion in Limine, ECF No. 56
Plaintiff moves to exclude any evidence related to her medical condition after

December 1, 2014 or a reasonable period of time thereafter—including medical
records from 2015 and 2016, as well as documents from the Social Security
Administration regarding her application for and receipt of disability benefits—and
any argument that such evidence proves she could not have returned to work on
December 1, 2014. Plaintiff argues that this evidence is irrelevant under Rule 401
and unduly prejudicial under Rule 403.

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The Court finds that evidence regarding Plaintiff’s claim for disability
benefits is relevant to the factual issue of whether Plaintiff is a qualified individual,
able to perform the essential functions of the job she held with the
Defendant.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s sworn statements to the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) about her inability to work during the time period that she
alleges Defendant discriminated against her may “negate [this] essential element of
her ADA [claim], at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation.” See
Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999); see also Soliday v.
7-Eleven, Inc., No. 2:09cv807, 2011 WL 1519670 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2011)
(same). Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff’s statements to the SSA are inconsistent
with her ADA claim, the statements may also tend to impeach her credibility.
Other evidence related to Plaintiff’s medical condition after December 1, 2014
presents a closer call. The Court agrees that representations and admissions in
Plaintiff’s medical records after December 1, 2014 which indicate that she continued
to suffer from the same medical issues that necessitated her request for additional
leave would tend to call into question Plaintiff’s position that she was able to perform
the essential functions of her job during the time period relevant to this case. That
said, medical records too temporally removed from Defendant’s alleged failure to
accommodate have marginal, if any, probative value, and, moreover, introduce the
potential for significant confusion and misleading of the jury with respect to

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Plaintiff’s medical condition during the relevant time period. On consideration, the
Court finds that an appropriate balance can be achieved by allowing evidence related
to Plaintiff’s medical condition between December 1, 2014 and May 30, 2015, which
encompasses a reasonable period of time (i.e., six months) after Plaintiff’s request
for additional leave. Medical evidence beyond that time period is excluded under
Rule 403, unless Plaintiff opens the door. Accordingly, consistent with this ruling,
Plaintiff’s first motion in limine, ECF No. 56, is due to be granted in part, and denied
in part.
5.

Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine, ECF No. 57
Plaintiff moves to exclude as irrelevant, confusing to the jury, and unduly

prejudicial any evidence or argument related to the fact that her wrongful termination
claim was dismissed or that she was otherwise unsuccessful in establishing that
claim. Defendant responds that excluding this evidence would be unfairly
prejudicial.

The

Court

agrees

with

Defendant

insofar

as

the

underlying facts surrounding Defendant’s termination of Plaintiff’s employment,
including Defendant’s reason for doing so, are relevant because those same facts
also form the basis for her failure to accommodate claim. Thus, they are admissible
at trial, most likely with a limiting instruction. However, evidence or argument
related to Plaintiff’s alternative theory of Defendant’s liability (i.e., the wrongful
termination claim) and the Court’s summary judgment ruling have no probative

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value on the remaining claim in this case. That legal theory is no longer at issue and
referencing it at trial will likely confuse the jury, waste time, and risk unfair
prejudice to Plaintiff. See Anderson v. Brown Indus., No. 4:11cv225, 2014 WL
12521732 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 2014) (“Generally, evidence concerning previously
dismissed claims is not relevant and, consequently, is not admissible.”); Bryce v.
Trace, Inc., No. 5:06cv775, 2008 WL 906142 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2008) (granting
motion in limine to exclude reference to claims resolved by summary judgment or
dismissed because “shielding such matters from the jury is common
practice”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second motion in limine, ECF No. 57, is due to
be granted regarding references to the wrongful termination claim that was resolved
by summary judgment, but denied with respect to the underlying facts surrounding
her termination.
6.

Plaintiff’s Third Motion in Limine, ECF No. 58
Plaintiff moves to exclude any testimony, reference to, or argument that

Defendant “accommodated” Plaintiff by granting her leave under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) or by permitting her to use other accrued leave, on
grounds that such information is irrelevant and would confuse the issues, mislead
the jury, and unduly prejudice Plaintiff. This argument fails. The reasonableness of
a past or proposed accommodation is a material question of fact to be resolved by
the jury. See Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 283 (11th Cir.

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1994). Plaintiff will have the burden of proving that she was qualified to perform
her job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and Defendant is entitled to
rebut Plaintiff’s claims with evidence and argument that it reasonably
accommodated her disability. This evidence is central to an essential element of
Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim; therefore, its admission would not confuse
the issues, mislead the jury, or unduly prejudice Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
third motion in limine, ECF No. 58, is due to be denied.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1.

Defendant’s First Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding
Plaintiff’s Damages, ECF No. 43, is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to renew at trial, as discussed above.

2.

Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine to Exclude from Evidence the
Diocese of Pensacola-Tallahassee Employee Handbook, ECF No. 44,
is DENIED.

3.

Defendant’s Third Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding
Plaintiff’s Duration of Employment with Defendant, ECF No. 45, is
DENIED.

4.

Plaintiff’s First Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Regarding
Plaintiff’s Medical Condition or Treatment After December 1, 2014
and to Prohibit Speculative Argument that Plaintiff Could Not Have
Returned to Work on December 1, 2014, ECF No. 56, is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, as discussed above.

5.

Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence or Argument
Regarding Plaintiff’s Dismissed Wrongful Termination Claim, ECF
No. 57, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as discussed above.

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6.

Plaintiff’s Third Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference or Argument
that Defendant “Accommodated” Plaintiff by Granting Her FMLA
Leave or by Permitting Her to Use Other Accumulated Leave, ECF No.
58, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED, on this 12th day of August, 2018.

M. Casey Rodgers
M. CASEY RODGERS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case No. 3:16cv191/MCR/EMT