DEES v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Filing
41
ORDER Granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter summary final judgment in favor of the defendant, consistent with this order, and tax costs against the plaintiff. Signed by CHIEF JUDGE M CASEY RODGERS on February 28, 2012. (pmc)
Page 1 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
SCHONE DEES,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/WCS
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER
The plaintiff, Schone Dees, filed this lawsuit against the State of Florida, Department
of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), asserting claims for age, race, and disability discrimination and
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), et seq., and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), Fla.
Stat. § 760.01, et seq. Pending before the court is DJJ’s motion for summary judgment
(doc. 27), which the plaintiff opposes.1 Having considered the motion and response, the
court finds there is no genuine issue of material fact and DJJ is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.
1
In response to DJJ’s m otion, the plaintiff indicated that she intends to pursue only her race
discrim ination and retaliation claim s. The court thus considers her rem aining claim s abandoned. See
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that “grounds alleged in
the com plaint but not relied upon in sum m ary judgm ent are deem ed abandoned”); see also Dehaan v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 4:09cv35, 2011 W L 672246, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2011).
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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BACKGROUND2
The plaintiff is a forty-two year old black female. In July 2009, she applied for two
positions as a juvenile detention officer at the Okaloosa Regional Juvenile Detention
Center (“ORJDC”) in Crestview, Florida.3
Although the plaintiff interviewed for the
positions, she was not hired.4 Having previously applied numerous times with DJJ and
never been offered a position, the plaintiff contacted DJJ to find out why she was not hired.
When the plaintiff called, she spoke with Elsie Beck, whom she identifies as a white
2
For the lim ited purposes of this sum m ary judgm ent proceeding, the court views “the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light m ost favorable to the nonm oving party," which in this case
is the plaintiff. Martin v. Brevard Cnty Pub. Sch., 543 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal m arks
om itted). The court is m indful, however, that “what is considered to be the ‘facts’ at the sum m ary judgm ent
stage m ay not turn out to be the actual facts if the case goes to trial . . . .” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1486 (11th Cir. 1996).
3
The plaintiff asserts in her am ended com plaint that she applied for the positions in August 2008.
In response to DJJ’s m otion, however, she states that she applied for the positions in July 2009 and that the
discrepancy is due to a clerical error.
4
According to Robert Sm ith, the superintendent of the Crestview facility, two Juvenile Detention
Officer I positions were available in June/July 2009. The only qualifications for the positions were that the
applicant be over the age of 18, have no crim inal record, and possess a Florida driver’s license. Pursuant to
DJJ’s procedure, once the application deadline passed, the applications were reviewed for com pleteness and
to determ ine whether the applicants were qualified for the positions, willing to work all shifts, had a crim inal
record, sought pay above that allowed for the positions, or lived too far from the facility to be considered
eligible. From the pool of eligible applicants, Sm ith selected fourteen to be interviewed. In order to “prom ote
a system of checks and balances” and ensure fairness in the selection process, Sm ith did not interview the
applicants him self; instead, he assigned two supervisors, Captain Victoria Lenintine and Lt. J.G. Roten, to
conduct the interviews. During the interviews, the applicants were each asked the sam e six questions
previously approved by DJJ. Lenintine and Roten recorded the applicants’ responses on a form and rated
them on a scale of one to seven, with seven being the highest. The scores were based on the quality of the
responses given, the applicant’s ability to think on his or her feet, and the m anner in which the applicant
responded to the questions – i.e., the applicant’s dem eanor.
After all the applicants were interviewed, the scores were tallied and sum m arized on the interview
roster and the m aterials were provided to Sm ith so that he could review them and m ake a final decision. The
four highest ranking applicants were Tony Bailey, Joshua Peters, Tabitha McLeod, and the plaintiff, who
received scores of 46, 41, 31, and 30, respectively. Sm ith hired the two highest ranking applicants, both of
whom are white m ales. Sm ith testified by affidavit that, in addition to the fact that the plaintiff rank fourth on
her interview, he was concerned about the plaintiff’s em ploym ent history, which included a four-m onth tenure
as a correctional officer with the Florida Departm ent of Corrections, from which the plaintiff resigned, followed
by eleven m onths of unem ploym ent, three m onths working at W al-Mart, another four m onths of
unem ploym ent, a part-tim e job at another W al-Mart for five m onths, and then four m onths of unem ploym ent
im m ediately preceding her application. In Sm ith’s experience, such a “spotty work history” can indicate a lack
of quality and/or reliability.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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secretarial aide at ORJDC. According to the plaintiff, Beck informed her that the positions
for which she applied were cancelled and thus were never filled. Doubting Beck’s
explanation, the plaintiff contacted DJJ’s headquarters to make further inquiry into DJJ’s
failure to hire her. The plaintiff was told that her complaint would be forwarded to the
human resources department and that David Peoples, a human resources representative,
would get back to her. After Peoples failed to promptly return her call, the plaintiff
contacted Margo Rogers, the head of DJJ’s human resources department. Rogers
informed the plaintiff that she would have Peoples investigate her claim and determine who
was hired for the positions for which she applied. Shortly after her conversation with
Rogers, Peoples contacted the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that Peoples informed her that
DJJ sometimes gives preference to people with military backgrounds, suggesting that fact
as a reason the plaintiff was not hired, and then offered her a job at the Escambia Regional
Juvenile Detention Center (“ERJDC”).5 The plaintiff requested to be placed at ORJDC,
rather than ERJDC, but was told that no position was available.6 The plaintiff thus
accepted the position at ERJDC and began her employment with DJJ on September 18,
2009.
The plaintiff claims to have been apprehensive about going to work at ERJDC
because she feared that the other employees were aware she had been rejected by
ORJDC. According to Napier, ERJDC’s superintendent, however, he was not aware of the
circumstances under which the plaintiff was hired and, to the best of his knowledge, no one
at ERJDC was aware of the reasons the plaintiff was placed at ERJDC unless the plaintiff
conveyed such information to them. In any event, the plaintiff claims that she was
immediately singled out by her supervisors and treated differently than other employees
for a number of reasons, including her race and in retaliation for having questioned DJJ’s
5
According to Paul Napier, the Superintendent of ERJDC, there was an opening in late August 2009
for a Juvenile Detention Officer I position. Peoples contacted him and said that he wanted to hire the plaintiff
for the position. Because the plaintiff was qualified for the position, Napier agreed to the placem ent, which
allowed him to avoid expending tim e, effort, and resources on the application/interview process.
6
The plaintiff wanted to work at ORJDC because she had relatives in the area who could care for her
child in the event of illness.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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failure to hire her.7 The plaintiff ultimately was terminated on March 5, 2010, upon Jordan’s
recommendation, after having worked only four months.8
The day she received her termination letter, the plaintiff completed an intake
questionnaire at the Mobile office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”).9 In response to a question regarding the alleged discriminatory action, the
plaintiff stated that, in August 2009, she “applied for a job in Okaloosa and they denied my
[sic] a position and later called me for Escambia after I complained.” The plaintiff also
indicated that, on December 31, 2009, she “applied for a position and was denied an
interview. They told me they weren’t hiring and hired two people.” When asked why she
believed the alleged acts were discriminatory, the plaintiff replied “[b]ecause I had asked
repeatedly to transfer and they stated they didn’t have any positions.” When asked the
reasons given for the alleged acts, the plaintiff responded “[t]hey stated they were not
hiring, and they hired two people.” The plaintiff was asked several questions eliciting
information about the manner in which other similarly situated employees were treated and
she failed to respond. Moreover, despite the fact that she checked a box indicating that
she had been discriminated or retaliated against based on an alleged disability, the plaintiff
failed to respond to any questions regarding her disability claim. Finally, the plaintiff
checked a box on the form indicating that she wanted to speak to an EEOC representative
before deciding whether to file a charge and that she understood that, by checking that
box, she had not filed a charge of discrimination and would lose her rights in the event she
failed to timely file a charge. The plaintiff did not check the box indicating that she wanted
to file a charge of discrimination and authorizing the EEOC to investigate her claims.
7
Although the plaintiff alleges differential treatm ent, the bulk of her com plaint addresses alleged
instances of harassm ent, a claim which she has not asserted in this lawsuit. The court also would note that
one of the plaintiff’s two supervisors, Ada Jordan, is a black fem ale.
8
Jordan recom m ended the plaintiff’s term ination because of the plaintiff’s poor attitude, tardiness,
willful failure to follow DJJ’s procedures and her supervisor’s instructions, and failure to follow worker’s
com pensation reporting requirem ents.
9
The term ination letter was hand-delivered to the plaintiff’s hom e in Brewton, Alabam a, while the
plaintiff was at the EEOC’s office in Mobile.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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On March 17, 2010, the EEOC forwarded DJJ a Notice of Charge of Discrimination,
which referenced claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The EEOC did not forward a charge of discrimination
filed by the plaintiff, as was its usual practice, and instead indicated that DJJ did not need
to take any action at that time. The EEOC also sent the plaintiff a letter enclosing a charge
form and requesting that it be signed and returned and advising, in all capital letters, that
if it did not receive a signed charge of discrimination or otherwise hear from the plaintiff
within thirty days, it would assume she had decided not to file a charge of discrimination
against DJJ.10 On March 31, 2010, the EEOC sent the plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of
Rights to sue, indicating that it was unable to conclude that she had been discriminated or
retaliated against and that she had ninety days in which to file suit. This lawsuit ensued.
DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(a) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary
judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is “material” if it might
affect the outcome of the case under the governing law, and it is “genuine” if the record
taken as a whole could lead a rational fact finder to find for the non-moving party. Id.
Summary judgment is not appropriate “if a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence
10
That letter was not dated.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a
genuine issue of material fact.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th
Cir. 1995). As stated, when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view
all the evidence, and all factual inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913,
918 (11th Cir. 1993). Whenever the nonmoving party has presented “sufficient, competent
evidence . . . to support [her] version of the disputed facts,” the court will resolve disputes
in her favor. Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). A mere scintilla
of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position, however, will not suffice to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact and thereby preclude summary judgment.
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990).
B.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In order to maintain a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must first exhaust her administrative
remedies by timely filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.11 See Rizo v. Alabama
Dept. of Human Resources, 228 Fed. Appx. 832, 835 (11th Cir. 2007);12 Maynard v.
Pneumatic Products Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001). Ordinarily, the charge
must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).13 “The purpose of th[e] exhaustion requirement is that the [EEOC]
should have the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices to
permit it to perform its role in obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliation
efforts.” Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal marks omitted). “Failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC results in a bar of
11
The FCRA is patterned after Title VII; thus, Title VII case law is applicable to claim s brought under
the FCRA and the court need not analyze the claim s separately. See Smith v. Naples Commun. Hosp., Inc.,
433 Fed. Appx. 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2011).
12
W hile unpublished opinions are not considered binding, they m ay be considered as persuasive
authority. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2; see also United States v. Futrell, 209 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000).
13
The period for filing a charge with the EEOC m ay be extended to 300 days in deferral states, such
as Florida, if the plaintiff first files a tim ely charge of discrim ination with a state or local agency. Id. There is
no indication in this case, however, that the plaintiff filed a charge with the state agency, the Florida
Com m ission on Hum an Relations.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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the claims contained in the untimely charge.” Rizo, 228 Fed. Appx. at 835.
Not only must a plaintiff timely file a charge of discrimination in order to maintain a
Title VII claim, but the charge must satisfy certain requirements. “Under Title VII . . . , [the]
charge must be ‘in writing under oath or affirmation’ and ‘contain such information and be
in such form as the [EEOC] requires.’” Id. at 836 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a)). “The EEOC requires that a charge be ‘in writing and signed and ...
verified.’” Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9). A charge is verified when it is “sworn to or
affirmed before a notary public, designated representative of the Commission, or other
person duly authorized by law to administer oaths and take acknowledgments, or
supported by an unsworn declaration in writing under penalty of perjury.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.3(a). “The verification requirement is mandatory.”14 Rizo, 228 Fed. Appx. at 836.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff submitted an intake questionnaire to the EEOC but
never filed a charge of discrimination. The plaintiff, however, urges the court to construe
the intake questionnaire as a charge, insisting that it satisfies all of the requirements for a
valid charge of discrimination. As the plaintiff points out, in certain circumstances, the
Eleventh Circuit has “deemed the EEOC’s intake questionnaire to be tantamount to a
charge for the purposes of timely filing.” Id. In such cases, the court has “considered a
number of factors, including what the questionnaire forms says and how the EEOC
responded to it.” Id. “At a minimum, however, an intake questionnaire must meet the
requirements for a validly filed charge in order to be considered a charge for timeliness
purposes.” Id. In this case, the intake questionnaire was not verified. The absence of a
verification renders the intake questionnaire insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a
valid charge of discrimination. Moreover, it is clear from intake questionnaire that the
14
According to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), “[a] charge m ay be am ended to cure technical defects or
om issions, including failure to verify the charge” and any such an am endm ent “will relate back to the date the
charge was first received.” Once a charge has been dism issed, however, it can no longer be am ended. See,
e.g., Butler v. Greif, Inc., 325 Fed. Appx. 748, 749 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In certain situations, the EEOC
regulations perm it an otherwise tim ely charge to be verified or am ended after the tim e for filing has expired,
but the deadline to verify is the tim e the em ployer is obliged to respond to the EEOC charge. W here a right
to sue letter has issued, the plaintiff has brought suit, and the EEOC had closed its file, there is no longer a
charge pending before the EEOC that is capable of being verified.”) (internal citations om itted).
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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plaintiff did not intend to file a charge of discrimination at that time or to set in motion the
EEOC’s investigatory or conciliatory mechanisms. Indeed, the plaintiff indicated that she
wanted only to speak to an EEOC representative about the possibility of filing a charge and
she failed to mark the box indicating that she wanted to file a charge of discrimination and
authorizing the EEOC to investigate her claims. The court thus finds that the plaintiff failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Francois v. Miami Dade Cnty., Port of Miami,
432 Fed. Appx. 819, 822 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “as a general matter an intake
questionnaire is not intended to function as a charge” and that, even if there are
circumstances in which a questionnaire can be considered as having satisfied the
requirements of a charge, such circumstances are not present where the questionnaire
was not verified, the language in questionnaire did not indicate it would be considered a
charge, and the facts suggest that the plaintiff did not intend for the questionnaire to
function as a charge); see also Federal Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008)
(rejecting the position that a charge need contain only an allegation of discrimination and
the employer’s name and holding that, in order for a filing to be deemed a charge, “it must
be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the
employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee”);
Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) (“To determine whether
the intake questionnaire in this case can function as a charge, we must ask the following
question: Would the circumstances of this case convince a reasonable person that [the
plaintiff] manifested her intent to activate the machinery of Title VII by lodging her intake
questionnaire with the EEOC?”); Pijnenburg v. West Ga. Health System, Inc., 255 F.3d
1304, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “an intake questionnaire does not constitute
a valid charge under Title VII for purposes of the statute of limitations” where the
questionnaire does not contain the requested information or otherwise satisfy the
requirements for a validly filed charge).15
15
The fact that the intake questionnaire cannot be construed as reflecting the plaintiff’s intent to file
a charge in this case is underscored by the fact that the EEOC did not investigate the plaintiff’s allegations
based on the intake questionnaire or engage in conciliation efforts.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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Having determined that the plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her administrative
remedies, the court must now consider whether the plaintiff nevertheless should be allowed
to proceed on her claims. The plaintiff argues that, in the event the court finds that she
failed to submit a valid charge of discrimination, the court should dispense with the
verification requirement under the theory of equitable modification or waiver, as recognized
by the Eleventh Circuit in Butler v. Grief, 325 Fed. Appx. 748 (11th Cir. 2009), and find that
the EEOC’s issuance of the right to sue letter cured any deficiency in her charge. Contrary
to the plaintiff’s assertions, Butler does not support a finding of equitable modification or
waiver in this case. In Butler, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “[a]t least one Circuit,
the Third Circuit in Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256 (3d Cir.2006), has held
that the verification requirement should be subject to waiver ‘when equity so requires,’ such
as when, as in that case, the employer responded to the EEOC charge on the merits,
declined to challenge the sufficiency of the charge before the EEOC, and later attempted
to move to dismiss the suit for lack of verification.” Butler, 325 Fed. Appx. at 749 (quoting
Buck, 452 F.3d at 362-65).
The Eleventh Circuit did not find that the verification
requirement had been waived in Butler, instead holding that the “plaintiff’s failure to
cooperate with the EEOC disentitle[d her] to equitable relief,” or even that the verification
requirement can be waived under any circumstances. Id. at 750. Even if the Eleventh
Circuit had held that the verification requirement can be waived, the plaintiff has not alleged
any acts by DJJ that reasonably could be construed as a waiver.16 And the Eleventh
16
Although the Third Circuit found a waiver of the verification requirem ent in Buck, it recognized that
litigants typically are precluded from m aintaining Title VII actions when their charges are not verified prior to
the issuance of a right to sue letter and lim ited its holding to the facts of that case – specifically, the fact that
the em ployer responded to the EEOC charge without addressing the lack of verification and then m oved to
dism iss the plaintiff’s claim s because her charge was not verified. Buck, 452 F.2d at 261. The court also
m ade it clear that “the cases in which this rule applies [will] be few and far between” because, “generally
speaking, the EEOC looks out for the em ployer’s interest by refusing to call for any response to an otherwise
sufficient com plaint until the verification has been supplied.” Id. at 265 (internal m arks om itted). Moreover,
the facts in Buck clearly are distinguishable from the facts in this case. As the Third Circuit explained,
instead of raising [the plaintiff’s] failure to verify her charge as a defense
before the EEOC, the [defendant] responded to her claim s on the m erits.
It waited until the right to sue letter had issued, and [the plaintiff’s] right to
am end her charge had been cut off, to raise her failure to verify as a bar to
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Circuit has repeatedly held that a plaintiff’s failure to verify her charge is fatal to her claims
even if the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. See, e.g., Vason v. City of Montgomery, Ala.,
240 F.3d 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding the verification requirement mandatory and
rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the EEOC should have informed her that there was
a problem with her charge and thus effectively waived the verification requirement when
it processed her charge and issued a right to sue letter); see also Davis v. Valley
Hospitality Servs., LLC, 214 Fed. Appx. 877, 879 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s
grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss class-wide discrimination claims because counsel’s
letter to EEOC was not verified and thus did not constitute a valid charge); Fry v.
Muscogee Cnty. Sch. Dist., 150 Fed. Appx. 980, 982 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit has “rejected the argument that the EEOC is obligated to inform a plaintiff
of deficiencies in her charge”). The plaintiff’s argument for equitable modification thus also
is unavailing.17 See Dates v. Phelps Dodge Magnet Wire Co., 604 F. Supp. 22, 27 (N.D.
further proceedings. W ere we to rigidly apply the verification requirem ent
to bar [the plaintiff] under these circum stances, we would deprive her of her
right to sue without any assurance that the purpose for the verification
requirem ent is m et, i.e., that her claim is frivolous. In a case where the
em ployer had the opportunity to point out the plaintiff’s failure to verify the
charge, and thus challenge its sufficiency, at the EEOC investigation stage,
but declined to do so, such a result is inequitable at best. At worst, it gives
em ployers an incentive not to raise a plaintiff’s failure to verify her charge
before the EEOC, in the hope that plaintiff will not discover the “technical”
error until it is too late, and that the em ployer will be able to secure dism issal
of any subsequent federal suit on that basis. It neither furthers the
verification requirem ent’s purpose of protecting em ployers from having to
respond to frivolous claim s nor com ports with the Suprem e Court’s Title VII
guidance.
Id. at 264.
17
The court would note that dispensing with the verification requirem ent under the facts of this case
based on the doctrine of equitable m odification would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirem ent, which
is to allow the EEOC “the first opportunity to investigate the alleged discrim inatory practices to perm it it to
perform its role in obtaining voluntary com pliance and prom oting conciliation efforts.” Burnett v. City of
Jacksonville, Fla., 376 Fed. Appx. 905, 906 (11th Cir. 2010). Indeed, because a charge was never filed, the
EEOC never investigated or attem pted to conciliate the plaintiff’s claim s and DJJ was never afforded an
opportunity to respond. Moreover, the court is not aware of – and the plaintiff has not cited – a single instance
in which the Eleventh Circuit has allowed a plaintiff to proceed with a Title VII claim despite the fact that she
failed to file a valid charge of discrim ination.
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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Ind. 1984) (finding that where the plaintiff “is at fault for depriving the EEOC of its
opportunity to investigate and conciliate her charge, the plaintiff cannot invoke the court’s
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the fact that she has received notice of her right to sue”);
Williams v. City of Belvedere, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 658, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting “rule,
long applied in California, that the timely filing of an administrative claim is a prerequisite
to filing a civil suit” and rejecting the argument that the plaintiff’s failure to timely file an
administrative claim was excused by the issuance of a right to sue letter).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, DJJ’s motion for summary judgment (doc. 27) is GRANTED. The Clerk
of Court is directed to enter summary final judgment in favor of the defendant, consistent
with this order, and tax costs against the plaintiff.
DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of February, 2012.
s/
M. Casey Rodgers
M. CASEY RODGERS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case No. 4:10cv305/MCR/W CS
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