JOHNSTON v. MCNEIL

Filing 123

ORDER adopting in part and rejecting in part 112 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, granting 98 Motion for Summary Judgment and directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants; signed by SENIOR JUDGE MAURICE M PAUL on 3/28/14. (tss)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
GEORGE RAYMOND JOHNSTON, III,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:11-cv-00021-MP-CAS

GLENN E. YOUNG,
and OFFICER BOZEMAN,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
ORDER
This cause comes on for consideration upon the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation dated September 5, 2013. (Doc. 112). The parties have been furnished a copy
of the Report and Recommendation and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections
pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). I have made a de novo
determination of any timely filed objections. Having considered the Report and
Recommendation, and any objections thereto timely filed, I have determined that the Report and
Recommendation should be adopted in part and rejected in part.
On May 2, 2011, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint alleging, inter alia,
claims against Defendants Glenn Young and Officer Bozeman for violations of the Eighth
Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishment in prison conditions, as well as
claims for First Amendment retaliation. (Doc. 23).1 He specifically alleges that Defendants,

1

As the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation notes, these are the only claims
remaining in this litigation. See Doc. 112 at 1 n.1. This Court previously dismissed all of
Plaintiff’s additional claims. See Docs. 75, 87.

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officers of Madison Correctional Institution, routinely issued and required Plaintiff, an inmate, to
wear boots that were either too small or too large, despite medical recommendations to the
contrary. Id. at 5-7. As a result, Plaintiff developed serious injuries to his feet. Id. Plaintiff
filed numerous grievances about the boots, both formal and informal. Defendants allegedly
retaliated against these grievances by changing Plaintiff’s employment status and taking away
Plaintiff’s boots altogether. Id. at 6-7.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to both the Eighth and First
Amendment claims. (Doc. 98). After an exhaustive and comprehensive examination of the
evidence, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation found that Plaintiff had not
objectively shown that he suffered a “sufficiently serious” injury so as to constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation. See Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2010). The
Report, therefore, recommended granting Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims. See Doc. 112 at 31-33, 37. It also recommended granting summary
judgment of Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Bozeman, finding
that Plaintiff had failed to present any evidence demonstrating a causal relationship between
Plaintiff’s grievances and Bozeman’s alleged retaliatory actions. Id. at 36. However, the Report
found that Plaintiff had created a genuine issue of material fact as to his First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Young. Id.
A. Summary of Facts
The Court adopts the factual findings of the Report and Recommendation; however, for
purposes of this Order, the following facts are restated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. As
of January 6, 2009, Plaintiff was an inmate at the Madison Correctional Institution. On that date,
Plaintiff underwent a consultation with a nurse who noted in Plaintiff’s medical records that
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Plaintiff was wearing a pair of size 15 boots. See Doc. 98, Ex. C at 2, 9. On January 26, 2009,
Physicians Assistant (P.A.) Mosley examined Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff had blisters on his
feet as well as decreased sensation in his big toes. Id. at 2, 11. P.A. Mosley wrote a Health
Slip/Pass for Plaintiff to obtain a pair of size 16 regular width boots from the prison’s laundry.
Id. at 2, 51.
At that time, Defendant Bozeman was assigned as the laundry officer at Madison C.I.
See Doc. 98, Ex. D at 1. When Plaintiff reported to laundry with his Health Slip/Pass, the largest
boot size, according to Bozeman, was a 15 regular. Id. at 2. Bozeman contacted Shoe Repair to
obtain the larger size. Id. He issued Plaintiff a pair of refurbished boots, although he does not
indicate the size of the boots issued. Id.
Subsequently, on July 29, 2009, P.A. Mosely examined Plaintiff again and noted that
Plaintiff had good sensation in his feet, thick toenails, and toenail fungus. See Doc. 98, Ex. C at
2, 16. P.A. Mosley saw Plaintiff next on October 28, 2009, and noted that a thick, dark toenail
was growing out and Plaintiff’s fungus was improving. Id. at 2, 20. On December 17, 2009,
Plaintiff consulted with Nurse Denson for eye irritation and black toes. Id. at 2, 21. Denson
noted that Plaintiff was suffering from black toes from boots that were too small and that
Plaintiff’s great toes were severely hardened from the boots. Id. P.A. Mosley examined Plaintiff
again on December 30, 2009, and noted only that Plaintiff was suffering from calluses on the tips
of his toes, caused by his boots being too small. Id. at 2, 22. The record from December 30th
indicates that Plaintiff was wearing a pair of size 16 boots at that time, in accordance with P.A.
Mosley’s prior recommendation. Id. She changed the prior recommendation, issuing a new
Health Slip/Pass for a pair of size 17 regular width boots. Id. at 2, 22, 51.
Plaintiff then reported to Defendant Bozeman to obtain the larger pair of boots.
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Defendant Bozeman claims that he “attempted to accommodate [Plaintiff] with the types of
boots available through Shoe Repair.” Doc. 98, Ex. D at 2. However, according to Plaintiff,
Defendant Bozeman provided him with a pair of size 18 EEE boots that were “way too large.”
See Doc. 98, Ex. I at 1.
Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that on January 29, 2010, he had good sensation in his
feet. See Doc. 98, Ex. C at 3, 23. However, on February 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed an informal
grievance indicating that he was suffering from blisters from his size 18 EEE boots. See Doc.
98, Ex. I at 1. He asked to have a medical pass re-issued for size 17 regular width boots. Id.
The informal grievance was denied. The denial noted that Plaintiff did not need medical shoes,
only a larger size. It also advised Plaintiff to direct his request for a larger size to security. Id.
On February 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed a formal grievance with the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC). Id. at 2. Therein, Plaintiff again complained about his improperly fitting
boots. Defendant Young responded to the grievance, returning it without action as Plaintiff had
failed to follow grievance rules. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 4; Ex. J at 2.
During this time, Plaintiff was working for Prison Rehabilitative Industries and
Diversified Enterprises (PRIDE). See Doc. 98, Ex. F at 1; Ex. G. At some point between
January and March of 2010, Lieutenant Seago conducted a routine search of the PRIDE
warehouse and discovered that Plaintiff was in possession of two pairs of boots. Doc. 98, Ex. D
at 3; Ex. E at 6, 7. Defendant Bozeman confronted Plaintiff and found that Plaintiff “had in his
possession one pair of state issued refurbished boots and a second pair of smaller boots that he
was wearing.” Doc. 98, Ex. D at 3. One pair was allegedly size 17 regular width, issued by
PRIDE. Doc. 98, Ex. E at p.6-8.
Defendant Bozeman allowed Plaintiff to choose which pair of boots he wanted to keep.
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Doc. 98, Ex. D at 3; Ex. E at 7. Bozeman could have issued Plaintiff “a disciplinary report for
possession of a contraband second pair of boots.” Doc. 98, Ex. D at 3; see also Doc. 98, Ex. E at
7. According to Defendant Bozeman, as well as PRIDE employees Ron Parker and Eric Byrd,
PRIDE does not have the authority to issue clothing, such as boots, to inmates. See Doc. 98, Ex.
D at 2; Ex. G; Ex. H. Only the Department of Corrections has the authority to issue clothing,
and clothing obtained by other means is considered contraband. See id. Further, “an inmate may
only possess one pair of state issued footwear, either a pair of canvas shoes or a pair of boots.”
Doc. 98, Ex. D at 2; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 33-602.201(4)(a) app. 1 (noting that inmates
are allowed to possess only one pair of state issued footwear).
Subsequently, on March 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed a second formal grievance. See Doc. 98,
Ex. I at 5-6. Defendant Young issued a formal response on March 30, 2010. Id. at 7. According
to the response, prison staff conducted an investigation into the grievance and found that
Plaintiff had been issued “five different pairs of state boots” since his transfer to Madison C.I.,
each of which Plaintiff “complained about.” Id. These boots were issued in “multiple attempts
to provide [Plaintiff] with boots that he would be satisfied with.” Doc. 98, Ex. J at 2. The
response also noted the aforementioned incident at PRIDE and that Plaintiff was given the
opportunity to choose which pair he wanted. Despite this, Plaintiff still brought his second
formal grievance. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7.
The response concluded that in light of the many unsuccessful attempts to accommodate
Plaintiff, the prison would take away Plaintiff’s boots, issue him a pair of size 17 canvas shoes,
and change Plaintiff’s job assignment to one that did not require boots. Id. The response also
acknowledged Plaintiff’s right to appeal these decisions and instructed Plaintiff on how to pursue
such an appeal. Id.
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Defendant Young avers that the decision to issue canvas shoes and change Plaintiff’s job
assignment was not his and was made by other staff. Doc. 98, Ex. J at 2-3. However, he admits
that had it been his decision, he “would have considered changing the job assignment for
additional reasons,” including the fact that Plaintiff “improperly obtained” a second pair of boots
while working for PRIDE. Id. at 3.
Consequently, in early April 2010, Defendant Bozeman was informed that Plaintiff was
to be issued canvas shoes “in order to accommodate his large foot size.” Doc. 98, Ex. D at 3.
PRIDE provided a pair of size 17 canvas shoes to laundry. Id. Defendant Bozeman then issued
those shoes to Plaintiff and took away Plaintiff’s boots. Id.
Plaintiff then filed three grievance appeals with the FDOC concerning his alleged illfitting boots. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 8-34. He also submitted two inmate requests on June 8th and
14th to be re-assigned to PRIDE. Doc. 104, Exs. L, M.

Defendant was then transferred to

Avon Park Correctional Institution on July 29, 2010. Doc. 98, Ex. C at 30. Plaintiff had
previously requested this transfer on October 21, 2009, well before the issuance of either the
Health Slip/Pass for size 17 boots or Defendant Young’s grievance response. See Doc. 98, Ex.
F.
B. Summary Judgment Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate only
where the court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In its analysis, the court must
“draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, [but] not all possible
inferences.” Horn v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 433 F. App’x 788, 796 (11th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a
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triable issue of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If successful, the
burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce “sufficient evidence of every element that
he or she must prove.” Rollins v. Techsouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).
C. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claims
Turning first to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Bozeman and
Young, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that these claims be
dismissed by summary judgment. To establish a violation under the Eighth Amendment for
either specific conditions of confinement, excessive use of force, and/or deliberate indifference
to a prisoner’s medical needs, Plaintiff must make a two-prong showing. First, he must make
“an objective showing of a deprivation or injury that is ‘sufficiently serious’ to constitute a
denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.”’ Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d
1288, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
Second, he must make a “subjective showing that the official had a ‘sufficiently culpable state of
mind.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Concerning the objective showing, the Supreme Court has found that “routine discomfort
is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.’” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
Relatively minor injuries or conditions suffered by prisoners are, therefore, not actionable under
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 9. Concerning the subjective showing, Plaintiff must show that
Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
The Report and Recommendation found that although Plaintiff had satisfied the
subjective showing under the second prong, he had failed to create a genuine issue of material
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fact as to the objective prong. It found that the relevant time period for examining the objective
standard would fall between those dates during which Defendants did not comply with the two
Health Slip/Passes. Looking at the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, on January 26,
2009, Plaintiff was issued a Health Slip/Pass for a pair of size 16 regular width boots. See Doc.
98, Ex. C at 2, 51. Defendants must have complied with this Pass as on December 30, 2009,
P.A. Mosley noted that Plaintiff was wearing size 16 boots. Id. at 2, 22. Further, none of
Plaintiff’s other medical records in the interim indicate that Plaintiff had failed to obtain size 16
boots. Id. at 2, 16, 20-22.
Thus, the relevant time period would fall between the date of the issuance of a Health
Slip/Pass for size 17 boots, December 30, 2009, and the date of Plaintiff’s transfer, July 29,
2010. Id. at 2, 22, 30, 51. During this time, including his visit with P.A. Mosley on December
30, 2009, Plaintiff’s records indicate that he suffered only from calluses on the tips of his toes
and blisters. Id. at 2, 22; Doc. 98, Ex. I at 1. As the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded,
blisters are not a sufficiently serious injury for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Blisters are
not the type of injury that would ‘“require a free world person to visit an emergency room, or
have a doctor attend to, give an opinion, diagnosis and/or medical treatment for the injury.’”
Wineston v. Pack, No. 4:06-CV-438-RH-AK, 2009 WL 3126252, at *1, *9 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 24,
2009) (quoting Luong v. Hatt, 979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997)). Instead, they are a form
of routine discomfort that, alone, does not qualify as a sufficiently serious injury under the
Eighth Amendment. See Harvey v. Hercule, No. 4:11-CV-637-SPM-CAS, 2013 WL 1703439,
at *6 (N.D. Fla. March 18, 2013).
In his objection to the Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff alleges that he has indeed
suffered a sufficiently serious injury and permanent harm as a result of his ill fitting boots at
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Madison C.I. See Doc. 115. Specifically, he alleges that his “medical records from June 2011 to
present clearly indicate the substantially ill-effects of the foot circulation impairment caused by
Defendants.” Id. at 8. He alleges that he now suffers from “life-long lasting numbness” and
“permanent loss of sensation in his toes.” Id. at 9, 11. However, Plaintiff fails to support these
allegations with any objective and/or verifiable evidence. Most if not all of Plaintiff’s evidence
concerning these permanent injuries consists of his own subjective medical complaints, inmate
requests, sick call requests, and letters. See, e.g., Doc. 104, Exs. D1, E, Q2. Such evidence is
conclusory in nature and is not sufficient to overcome summary judgment. See West v. Higgins,
346 F. App’x 423, 425-26 (11th Cir. 2009).
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff objectively established the existence of these alleged
permanent injuries, he must still show that he suffered these injuries as a result of Defendant’s
actions. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence regarding this causation issue. To the
contrary, Plaintiff’s medical records from January 29, 2010, at Madison C.I. actually indicate
that Plaintiff was experiencing “good sensation in his feet.” See Doc. 98, Ex. C at 3, 23. As this
record was issued after Plaintiff obtained the Health Slip/Pass for size 17 boots, the evidence
actually suggests a lack of the requisite causal relationship. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims must be denied on summary judgment.
D. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Turning to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the Court also agrees with the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation that Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence showing
that Officer Bozeman’s actions were done in retaliation to any grievances filed by Plaintiff. As
such, Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer Bozeman must be dismissed.
However, the Court disagrees as to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff has created a
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genuine issue of material fact as to his retaliation claim against Defendant Young.
In the prison context, an inmate may engage in protected First Amendment speech by
filing grievances concerning the conditions of his imprisonment. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d
1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003). Where a prison official’s actions are the result of the inmate’s
having filed such a grievance, the inmate may be able to establish a retaliation claim. Id. The
inmate must establish the following three elements to prevail on such a claim: “(1) his speech
was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the [official’s]
allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between the retaliatory action and the
protected speech.” Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008).
Concerning the second element, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that the “ordinary
firmness” standard is an objective test that “allows for a ‘weeding out’ function when the injuries
complained of are trivial or amount to no more than de minimis inconvenience in the exercise of
First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005). As an
objective test, a showing of an actual chilling effect on the inmate’s speech is not necessary. Id.
at 1254. However, ‘“how [the inmate] acted might be evidence of what a reasonable person
would have done.’” Id. at 1255 (quoting Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir.
2003)).
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff’s filing of these informal and formal grievances
constitutes protected speech. See Doc. 98 at 19. However, as to the second element, Plaintiff
has failed to show that Defendant Young’s conduct resulted in even a de minimis inconvenience
to the exercise of First Amendment rights. The facts viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff
show that over the course of his time at Madison C.I., Plaintiff made a series of informal and
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formal grievances concerning the size of his boots and was issued five different pair of boots in
multiple attempts to accommodate him. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 1, 2, 5-7; Ex. J at 2. Plaintiff filed his
second formal grievance on March 12, 2010. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 5-6. In response, Defendant
Young indicated that because of the many unsuccessful attempts to accommodate Plaintiff,
Plaintiff would be issued a pair of canvas shoes, his boots would be taken away, and his job
assignment would be changed to one that did not require boots. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7; Ex. J at 2.
Young’s response also instructed Plaintiff on how to appeal these decisions.2 Id.
The Report and Recommendation determined that because these outcomes constitute
“adverse consequences to Plaintiff,” Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to
his retaliation claim against Defendant Young. Doc. 112 at 36. However, while such outcomes
may constitute adverse consequences, it is unclear how they would likely deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in subsequent grievances. Typically, deterrence under the
second element is accomplished through a threat, be it a threat of “something drastic,” physical
violence, or other consequence. See, e.g., Woods v. Valentino, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1283
(M.D. Fla. 2007); Pittman v. Tucker, 213 F. App’x 867, 871 (M.D. Fla. 2007). Generalized
negative statements alone are not sufficient to satisfy this element. Cranford v. Hammock, No.
1:09-CV-00070-MP-AK, 2010 WL 916031, at *7 (N.D. Fla. March 11, 2010).
In this case, the Defendant Young’s response did not include a threat of something
drastic or even a negative statement implicating potential future grievances. To the contrary, the

2

Specifically, Defendant Young’s denial indicated that the Plaintiff could “obtain further
administrative review of [Plaintiff’s] complaint by obtaining form DC1-303, Request for
Administrative Remedy or Appeal, completing the form and providing attachments as required
by 33-103.007(3)(a) and (b), and forwarding [Plaintiff’s] complaint to the Bureau of Inmate
Grievance Appeals at Central Office in Tallahassee.” See Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7.
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response included language that both anticipated future grievances and actually instructed
Plaintiff on how to pursue such grievances. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7. Plaintiff subsequently acted on
these instructions by filing three grievance appeals with the FDOC. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 8-34. He
also filed two inmate requests to be re-assigned to PRIDE. Doc. 104, Exs. L, M. Although not
dispositive on the deterrence issue, Plaintiff’s failure to be deterred by Defendant Young’s
actions suggests that a person of ordinary firmness would not likely be deterred. See Bennett v.
Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005); Cranford, 2010 WL 916031, at *7.
Further, Plaintiff has also failed to satisfy his burden under the third element of his
retaliation claim. Under this element, Plaintiff must produce affirmative evidence establishing
that but-for his filing of the grievances, Defendant Young would not have engaged in the alleged
retaliatory actions. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006); Cranford, 2010 WL 916031,
at *8. Mere “conclusory allegations” or “general attacks” upon Defendant Young’s motivations
are not sufficient. Cranford, 2010 WL 916031, at *8. As this Court has previously recognized,
“it does not follow that every time an inmate files a grievance the act of doing so renders the
exercise of prison authority suspect.” Id. Prison officials “may appropriately respond to the
content of an inmate’s grievance without violating the inmate’s constitutional rights.” Glenn v.
Gillis, No. 5:12-CV-260-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 4096206, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2013). As such,
‘“[c]ourts should approach prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care due
to the near inevitability that prisoners will take exception with the decisions of prison officials
and the ease with which claims of retaliation may be fabricated.’” Id. (quoting Cranford, 2010
WL 916031, at *8); see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995).
Once Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of retaliatory harm, “the burden shifts to
[Defendant Young] to demonstrate that even without the impetus to retaliate he would have
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taken the action complained of.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006). If Defendant
Young shows ‘“that he would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected activity,
he . . . prevail[s] on . . . summary judgment.’” Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir.
2011) (quoting Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Here, Defendant Young has established legitimate and compelling reasons for his actions
that do not involve a retaliatory motive. The denial itself indicates that since Plaintiff’s arrival at
Madison C.I., Plaintiff had been issued five different pairs of state boots in multiple attempts to
accommodate Plaintiff. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7; Ex. J at 2. By taking away the boots and issuing
canvas shoes, Defendant Young simply pursued an alternative avenue by which to accommodate
Plaintiff. Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7; Ex. J at 2; Doc. 113 at 8, 13. Further, regardless of whether
Defendant Young was responsible for Plaintiff’s change in job status, Defendant Young would
have still considered the change due to Plaintiff’s improperly obtaining a second pair of boots
through PRIDE. Doc. 98, Ex. J at 2-3; Doc. 113 at 7, 8, 13. Each of these explanations is a
legitimate reason for pursuing the course of action taken in Defendant Young’s grievance
response.
This lack of a retaliatory motive is also bolstered by the fact that the grievance response
both acknowledged Plaintiff’s right to appeal the response and instructed him on how to pursue
such an appeal. See Doc. 98, Ex. I at 7. Inclusion of such language would be counterintuitive to
a prison official bent on silencing a prison’s grievances through retaliatory means. Further,
Plaintiff’s grievances, both formal and informal, concern only his alleged improper boot size.
Plaintiff filed no complaints about or grievances against either Defendant Young or any other
particular prison official. As the Eleventh Circuit has previously found, “[t]he lack of
complaints about or grievances filed against a particular defendant undermines a claim of
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retaliatory motive.” Glenn v. Gillis, 5:12-CV-260-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 4096206 (N.D. Fla. Aug.
13, 2013) (citing Thomas v. Lawrence, 421 F. App’x 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2011)).
Since Defendant Young has established legitimate and compelling reasons for his actions
that do not involve a retaliatory motive, the burden is on Plaintiff to provide affirmative evidence
showing such a motive. However, Plaintiff has “neither rebutted nor discredited the explanation
given by” Defendant Young. Glenn, 2013 WL 4096206, at *5. Absent evidence to the contrary,
the record demonstrates that the taking away of Plaintiff’s boots and the issuance of canvas
shoes simply constitute a legitimate, alternative means of solving what Defendant Young had
found to be an ongoing problem. Although Plaintiff may take exception with Defendant
Young’s decision, such dissatisfaction does not alone transform a prison official’s grievance
response into unconstitutional retaliation. See Glenn, 2013 WL 4096206, at *6. As such,
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden and his First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendant Young cannot survive summary judgment.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

The factual findings of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc.
112) are adopted and incorporated herein. The recommendations therein are
adopted in part and rejected in part.

2.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 98) is GRANTED and the
Clerk is directed to enter judgment for the Defendants on all claims.

DONE AND ORDERED this

28th day of March, 2014

s/Maurice M. Paul
Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case No: 4:11-cv-00021-MP-CAS