BEHA v. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES

Filing 35

ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 10/24/12. (RH)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

MICHAEL BEHA,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:11cv587-RH/CAS

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT
OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR
VEHICLES,
Defendant.
__________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an employment-discrimination case. The plaintiff Michael Beha was
a supervisory employee of the defendant Florida Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles. He had a contentious relationship with his own supervisor,
with his employees, and with others. He missed deadlines, occasionally made
errors in emails or presentations, talked loudly in meetings, interrupted others,
rolled his eyes, and engaged in other odd behavior, such as standing silently behind
an employee while the employee spoke with coworkers in the hallway until the
conversation ended. Two employees complained to Mr. Beha’s supervisor about
Mr. Beha’s treatment of the employees; one alleged sexual harassment. In due

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course Mr. Beha was fired for poor performance consisting of these and other
shortcomings.
Mr. Beha filed this action alleging that the firing was based on gender in
violation of Title VII, age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, and disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Mr. Beha
also asserted claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act. In relevant respects the
Florida act is governed by the same principles as the federal acts.
The Department has moved for summary judgment. In response, Mr. Beha
has abandoned his age and disability claims; he now asserts only that the firing was
based on gender. This order grants the Department’s summary-judgment motion.
I
Mr. Beha has proffered no direct evidence of gender discrimination. When
an employee relies only on circumstantial evidence in support of a genderdiscrimination claim, the employee may proceed under the familiar burden-shifting
framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and later cases. Under that framework, an employee first must present a prima
facie case. The employer then must proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for its decision. The employee then must show that the proffered reason was not
the real reason for the decision and that instead a reason was discrimination.
Alternatively, the employee may present other evidence from which a reasonable

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factfinder could infer prohibited discrimination. See, e.g., Smith v. LockheedMartin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
II
Among the elements of a fired employee’s prima facie case of gender
discrimination is that either (1) the plaintiff was replaced with a person of the other
gender or (2) a person of the other gender was not fired in comparable
circumstances. See, e.g., Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t
of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Mr. Beha says he has met both of
these requirements. But he has not met the second, and he may not have met the
first.
Mr. Beha has not met the second requirement because the record includes no
evidence that any comparably situated employee performed as poorly as Mr. Beha.
He points to other supervisors who made mistakes and missed deadlines, but none
made as many mistakes or missed as many deadlines as Mr. Beha, and none did
some of the other things Mr. Beha did. None had complaints from employees
comparable to those against Mr. Beha.
Whether Mr. Beha has met the first requirement is less clear. When he was
fired, his position was split. Some of the duties were assigned to a newly hired
man. Other duties were assigned to a woman. Firing one man and hiring another
ordinarily is not consistent with gender discrimination; that is why this

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circumstance, without more, does not establish a prima facie case. This order
assumes, though, that the assignment of some of Mr. Beha’s duties to a woman is
enough to meet this requirement. The order assumes that Mr. Beha has established
a prima facie case.
III
An employer’s burden to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
an action is “exceedingly light.” Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d 1138,
1142 (11th Cir. 1983). The Department has easily met its burden, offering proof
that Mr. Beha was fired for poor performance, and giving specific examples.
IV
That brings the case to the critical stage. Mr. Beha bears the burden of
showing that the proffered reason for his firing—poor performance—was not the
real reason, and that instead a reason was gender discrimination. Alternatively,
Mr. Beha could prevail by presenting other evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could infer prohibited discrimination. Mr. Beha has not met this burden.
The record includes documentation that Mr. Beha’s performance was
deficient in a number of respects. Some he denies, but others he does not. Thus,
for example, he does not assert—and on this record he could not reasonably
assert—that he met all his deadlines. He does not assert—and on this record he
could not reasonably assert—that his work did not include errors. He does not

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assert—and on this record he could not reasonably assert—that he did not speak
loudly in meetings or interrupt others. He does not assert—and on this record he
could not reasonably assert—that he was not the subject of complaints to his
supervisor from his employees. Indeed, Mr. Beha has explicitly admitted much of
this.
Mr. Beha says that others did similar things and that none of this should
have led to his firing. But the record includes no evidence that anyone else did all
the things Mr. Beha did, or that anyone else did them as frequently. And the
decision whether performance at this level, on this many occasions, warrants
dismissal is a decision not for a federal court or jury but for the Department. As
the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized time and again, Title VII prohibits gender
discrimination, but it does not authorize a federal court to sit as a super-personnel
board to oversee an employer’s management of its employees, so long as gender
(or another prohibited characteristic) does not play a role. See, e.g., Chapman v. Al
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000).
This record includes not a shred of evidence of gender discrimination. The
case presents instead a classic disagreement between an employer and employee
over (1) how well the employee in fact has performed, and (2) whether to retain an
employee who has performed as the employer believes the employee has
performed. The Department may or may not have accurately assessed Mr. Beha’s

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performance. The Department may or may not have made a wise decision when it
concluded that a supervisor performing at this level should not be retained. But so
long as the Department did not act based on gender—and the record includes no
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that gender had anything to
do with it—Mr. Beha’s gender-discrimination claim fails.
V
Finally, a word is in order about Mr. Beha’s memorandum in opposition to
the Department’s summary-judgment motion. Adjectives are no substitute for
facts. Accusations are no substitute for analysis. An unfounded conclusion is still
an unfounded conclusion no matter how many times it is repeated and no matter
how shrill the language in which it is expressed. Calling an adverse party’s
assertion “ludicrous” is unprofessional and serves no purpose. And the court’s
rules require a memorandum to be double spaced; putting bullet points before long,
single-spaced paragraphs that run page after page does not make single spacing
proper. A party makes its best case by presenting a memorandum that sets out the
facts and applicable law in a professional tone and within the page limit. The tone
of this filing made no difference in the outcome, but it did make it harder to sort
through the issues and complete the required thorough analysis of the facts and
law.

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VI
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
The Department’s summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED.
The clerk must enter a judgment stating, “The plaintiff Michael Beha’s claims
against the defendant Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles
are dismissed with prejudice.” The clerk must close the file.
SO ORDERED on October 24, 2012.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge

Case No. 4:11cv587-RH/CAS