WATKINS v. SCOTT, et al.,

Filing 91

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT - The report and recommendation, ECF No. 88 , is accepted in part. The summary-judgment motions, ECF Nos. 76 and 84 , are granted in part and denied in part. Any other claims are dismissed with prejudice. The clerk must enter judgment and close the file. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 9/15/2015. (tdl)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JOHN E. WATKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:12cv215-RH/CAS

JULIE JONES,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiff John E. Watkins is an inmate in the Florida Department of
Corrections. When Mr. Watkins filed this case, the Department had policies that
allegedly prevented him from exercising his Sunni Muslim religion in four specific
respects. He could not grow a quarter-inch beard. The Department did not provide
kosher food or other food that Mr. Watkins found religiously acceptable. Mr.
Watkins says he could not obtain required food (even food brought in from
outside) during specific religious observances. And the Department did not allow
separate Sunni Muslim religious services; instead, the Department made available
combined services for Sunni Muslims and adherents of other Islamic faiths.

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Mr. Watkins seeks an injunction against the defendant Secretary of the
Department of Corrections ending these policies, which Mr. Watkins contends
violate the United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. For convenience,
this order draws no distinction between acts of the Department and the Secretary,
generally attributing to “the Department” not only the Department’s policies but
also the Secretary’s litigating positions.
The case is before the court on the Department’s and Mr. Watkins’s crossmotions for summary judgment, the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and the Department’s objections. I have reviewed de novo the
issues raised by the objections.
The report and recommendation correctly sets out the background,
summarizes the record evidence, and analyzes the applicable law. This order
adopts the report and recommendation as the court’s opinion in relevant respects,
with one different conclusion.
The Department has changed its beard and food policies. The Department
says Mr. Watkins’s challenges to these policies are moot. The report and
recommendation concludes the challenges are not moot.
Whether a government’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct renders a
case moot is not always clear. The Eleventh Circuit has said that it

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has consistently held that a challenge to a government policy that
has been unambiguously terminated will be moot in the absence of
some reasonable basis to believe that the policy will be reinstated
if the suit is terminated. In the absence of any such evidence, there
is simply no point in allowing the suit to continue and we lack
[the] power to allow it to do so.
Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cty., Fla., 382 F.3d 1276, 1285
(11th Cir. 2004).
Even so, a government cannot establish mootness just by promising to sin no
more. A case is moot only when “it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful
behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d
1241, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000); Doe v. Wooten, 747 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th
Cir. 2014); Rich v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 531 (11th Cir. 2013).
For beards, the Department’s change of policy was almost surely not a result
of its own change of heart. Quite the contrary. At the outset of this case, the
Department asserted with vigor that security concerns justified the ban on beards.
The assertion was weak at best, but the assertion did show just how resistant the
Department was to good-faith religious claims. The Department changed its
position only in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.
Ct. 853 (2015). There the Court struck down an Arkansas policy that prohibited a
Muslim from growing a half-inch beard.

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In light of Holt, any attempt by the Department to adhere to its ban on
beards would have gone nowhere; an injunction would have ended the practice.
To its credit, the Department recognized the force of Holt and changed its policy.
There is no reason to believe the Department will take any other course in the
future. In the words of Troiano, the Department has “unambiguously terminated”
its no-beards policy, and there is no “reasonable basis to believe that the policy will
be reinstated if” an injunction is not entered. Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1285. The
beards claim is moot.
The result is different for the food claim. The Department has adopted a
“religious diet program” under which inmates may obtain kosher meals. Kosher
meals are acceptable to Mr. Watkins; he asks nothing more. The religious diet
program is now apparently available throughout the state. See ECF No. 90 at 3.
But the Department continues to assert with vigor that it can discontinue the
program and go back to its old policy whenever it wishes—including when it
decides its budget will no longer support the new program.
The Department says it has exceeded its budget for several years running. It
can hardly be said that the Department has unambiguously terminated its nokosher-meals policy when it continues to insist that it is not obligated to adhere to
the new program, that the program is expensive, and that the program will be
discontinued if the budget gets too tight—seemingly a perennial condition.

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It is true, as the Department says, that the Department can legitimately
consider cost in deciding how to accommodate the free exercise of religion. The
issue is whether the additional cost of the religious diet program is worth the
candle. And that is an issue that must be approached with a healthy respect for the
free exercise of religion. Here the cost does not justify denying Mr. Watkins a
religiously acceptable diet. That is so even when due regard is afforded the
Department’s considerable discretion in operating its facilities and addressing
security concerns.
This order thus enters an injunction upholding Mr. Watkins’s right to kosher
or other religiously acceptable meals. This renders unnecessary any further order
requiring the Department to provide (or to allow Mr. Watkins to bring in)
acceptable food during specific religious observances.
As required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A), I find that the injunction is (1) narrowly drawn, (2) extends no
further than necessary to correct the violation of Mr. Watkins’s federal rights, and
(3) is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation. The requirement
for an injunction to meet these standards applies even to cases arising under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. See United States v. Sec.,
Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2015).

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In reaching this result, I have not overlooked the requirement to give
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety and the operation of the
Florida correctional system. But so long as the Department runs its facilities
responsibly and with due regard to the Eighth Amendment, any adverse impact
will be insubstantial.
Finally, this order accepts without further discussion the portion of the report
and recommendation that upholds the Department’s policy allowing combined
services for Sunni Muslims and adherents of other Islamic faiths.
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The report and recommendation, ECF No. 88, is accepted in part.

2.

The summary-judgment motions, ECF Nos. 76 and 84, are granted in

part and denied in part.
3.

The defendant Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections

must continue to make available to the plaintiff John E. Watkins on a routine basis
kosher or other religiously acceptable meals. This injunction binds the Secretary
and her officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—and others in active
concert or participation with any of them—who receive actual notice of this
injunction by personal service or otherwise.

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4.

Mr. Watkins’s claim challenging the Secretary’s beard policy is

dismissed as moot.
5.

Mr. Watkins’s claim challenging the Secretary’s policy of making

available combined services for Sunni Muslims and adherents of other Islamic
faiths is dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Any other claims are dismissed with prejudice.

7.

The clerk must enter judgment and close the file.

SO ORDERED on September 15, 2015.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge

Case No. 4:12cv215-RH/CAS