JONES v. SUBURBAN PROPANE INC

Filing 37

ORDER GRANTING 18 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - The clerk must enter judgment stating, "The claims of the plaintiff Roosevelt Jones against the defendant Suburban Propane, Inc. are dismissed with prejudice." Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 1/17/2014. (dlt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

ROOSEVELT JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:13cv115-RH/CAS

SUBURBAN PROPANE, INC.,
Defendant.
________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an employment-discrimination case. The plaintiff asserts that he was
fired because of his race or in retaliation for complaining about racial
discrimination. The defendant says the plaintiff was fired for insubordination. The
defendant has moved for summary judgment. This order grants the motion.
I
A party who moves for summary judgment must show “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322 (1986). Disputes in the evidence must be resolved, and all reasonable

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inferences from the evidence must be drawn, in favor of the nonmoving party.
This order sets out the facts that way.
II
In 1977, the plaintiff Roosevelt Jones, who is African American, began work
as a delivery driver for the defendant Suburban Propane, Inc.
In 2006, Suburban Propane hired Mack Hacker. Mr. Hacker’s duties
included hiring and firing employees.
In 2010, Mr. Jones and another employee filed a charge of racial
discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. The charge was
resolved about two months later through a confidential settlement agreement.
On June 23, 2012, the Suburban Propane answering service received a call
from a person who identified himself as Mr. Jones’s nephew. The caller alleged
that Mr. Jones was driving a company truck while intoxicated, selling drugs from
the truck, and transporting a nonemployee in the truck. The answering service
reported this to Mr. Hacker.
Mr. Hacker called Mr. Jones to discuss the allegations. In a series of
telephone calls, Mr. Jones repeatedly told Mr. Hacker that this was a family
problem and that Mr. Hacker should stay out of Mr. Jones’s business. Mr. Hacker
says Mr. Jones cursed at Mr. Hacker, but Mr. Jones, while acknowledging that he
might have said “some choice things” to Mr. Hacker, denies cursing at Mr. Hacker
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directly. ECF No. 20-3 at 32. For summary-judgment purposes, Mr. Jones’s
account of this must be accepted as true.
In any event, Mr. Hacker thought Mr. Jones’s speech was slurred. Mr.
Hacker did not want Mr. Jones to drive. Mr. Hacker told Mr. Jones he would send
someone to get the truck. Mr. Hacker asked Mr. Jones for his location. Mr. Jones,
who had the truck at his home, repeatedly refused to provide the address.
Mr. Hacker told Mr. Jones that if he did not tell Mr. Hacker the truck’s
location, Mr. Jones’s job would be in jeopardy. Mr. Jones still refused to give the
address and said he would call a wrecker to have the truck towed. Mr. Hacker told
Mr. Jones not to do that and said that if Mr. Jones did call a wrecker, he would be
responsible for the towing fee. Mr. Jones never told Mr. Hacker the truck’s
location. Mr. Hacker learned later that the truck had been towed to Suburban
Propane’s lot.
On June 26, 2012, Mr. Hacker, accompanied by another manager, met with
Mr. Jones. Mr. Jones offered no reasonable explanation for refusing to tell Mr.
Hacker the truck’s location or for calling a tow truck contrary to Mr. Hacker’s
instruction.
Mr. Hacker decided to terminate Mr. Jones for insubordination and based on
Mr. Jones’s attitude in the June 23 telephone calls and June 26 meeting. Mr.

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Hacker says Mr. Jones was not terminated based on the allegations of alcohol use
and drug sales because the allegations were not proven.
III
When, as here, an employee relies on circumstantial evidence in support of a
claim of racial discrimination or retaliation, the employee may proceed under the
familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later cases. Under that framework, an employee first
must present a prima facie case. The employer then must proffer a legitimate
nondiscriminatory, nonretaliatory reason for its decision. The employee then must
show that the proffered reason was not the real reason for the decision and that
instead a reason was discrimination or retaliation. Alternatively, the employee
may present other evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer
prohibited discrimination or retaliation. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.,
644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
IV
In a termination case, a prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) the
plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the
position the plaintiff held, (3) the plaintiff was terminated, and (4) the plaintiff was
replaced by a person outside of the protected class or that a similarly-situated
employee outside the protected class was not terminated. See, e.g., Maynard v. Bd.
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of Regents of the Div. of Univs. of the Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802); see also Smith, 644
F.3d 1321 at 1325.
Suburban Propane says Mr. Jones has not established a prima facie case
because he was not replaced at all—an existing employee took over his route—and
nobody else engaged in conduct similar to his. But the existing employee who
took over Mr. Jones’s route was white. There is at least some authority that this
suffices. See Lawson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp., L.P., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1284
(S.D. Fla. 2010); Miller v. Aramark Corp., No. 1:03cv1546, 2004 WL 1781103, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2004). As was done in Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins.
Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 334 (1st Cir.1997), I assume without deciding that
Mr. Jones has established a prima facie case.
Suburban Propane has offered Mr. Jones’s insubordination and attitude on
June 23 and 26 as the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Mr. Jones’s
termination. It is undisputed that Mr. Jones engaged in conduct that a reasonable
employer could deem insubordinate. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any
employer not deeming Mr. Jones’s conduct insubordinate. Mr. Jones has pointed
to no Suburban Propane employee who engaged in conduct remotely similar to this
but was not terminated.

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Mr. Jones’s burden is to “meet [Suburban Propane’s explanation] head on
and rebut it.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir.2000) (en
banc). Mr. Jones has not done so.
To be sure, Mr. Jones offers explanations for his conduct, including that he
could not remember his address because of stress and high blood pressure. But the
critical issue is not whether Mr. Jones had an excuse for his insubordinate conduct,
nor even whether he was in fact insubordinate (as he clearly was). The critical
issue is whether Mr. Hacker believed Mr. Jones was insubordinate and fired him
for that reason. See Dent v. Ga. Power Co., 522 F. App’x 560, 564 (11th Cir.
2013); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004).
This record includes no evidence casting the slightest doubt on Mr. Hacker’s
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing Mr. Jones: Mr. Hacker’s belief that
Mr. Jones was insubordinate. Suburban Propane is entitled to summary judgment
on this claim.
In reaching this conclusion, I have not overlooked Mr. Jones’s testimony
that a now-deceased supervisor told Mr. Jones in 2011 to “be careful” because Mr.
Hacker was “going to get rid of you.” ECF No. 20-3 at 43. The supervisor said
nothing about race. And even if Mr. Jones’s testimony about what the supervisor
said could somehow be deemed admissible evidence of Mr. Hatcher’s intent to fire
Mr. Jones for an unfounded reason—an unlikely proposition—the record
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establishes that Mr. Hatcher did not do so. Instead, Mr. Jones was insubordinate to
an extent that many and probably most employers would find grounds for
termination. Mr. Jones was fired based on that insubordination.
V
In a retaliation case, a prima facie case consists of a showing that (1) the
plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) the protected activity and adverse action were causally
related. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1454 (11th
Cir.1998).
The last element—a causal relationship—requires a showing only that the
protected activity and adverse action were not “completely unrelated.” Id. A close
temporal relationship suffices, without more, but only if the temporal relationship
must be very close. See, e.g., Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1182
(11th Cir. 2010) (finding three months too long, standing alone, to support an
inference of causation); Wascura v. City of S. Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th
Cir.2001) (finding three and a half months too long, standing alone, to support an
inference of causation).
Mr. Jones has not established a prima facie case of retaliation. The gap
between the protected activity and the termination was more than two years. And

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the record includes no other evidence suggesting any connection between the two
events.
Moreover, even if Mr. Jones could establish a prima facie case of retaliation,
Suburban Propane would be entitled to summary judgment based on its legitimate
nonretaliatory reason for the termination, as set out in Section IV above.
VI
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Suburban Propane’s summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 18, is

GRANTED.
2.

The clerk must enter judgment stating, “The claims of the plaintiff

Roosevelt Jones against the defendant Suburban Propane, Inc. are dismissed with
prejudice.”
3.

The clerk must close the file.

SO ORDERED on January 17, 2014.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge

Case No. 4:13cv115-RH/CAS