HANSON v. GREENFIELD et al
Filing
26
ORDER OF DISMISSAL - The report and recommendation, ECF No. 22 , is ACCEPTED. The motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6 , is GRANTED. The clerk must enter judgment stating, "The plaintiff Cliff O. Hanson's claims are dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted." The clerk must close the file. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 4/22/2014. (tdl)
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
CLIFF O. HANSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
LEE GREENFIELD and
CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
A City of Tallahassee police officer arrested the plaintiff for knowingly
driving with a suspended license. The plaintiff went to trial and was acquitted.
The plaintiff now has sued the City and the officer. The defendants have moved to
dismiss. This order grants the motion because there was probable cause for the
arrest. And the order notes an alternative ground for dismissing the claims against
the officer: under case law as it existed at the time (and still exists), a reasonable
officer would have believed there was probable cause—even if there was not—
thus providing qualified immunity under federal law and eliminating any
individual liability under state law.
Case No. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
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I
Florida law makes it a misdemeanor to drive while knowing that one’s
license is suspended. The plaintiff Cliff O. Hanson was driving with a suspended
license. City of Tallahassee police officer Lee Greenfield stopped Mr. Hanson’s
car because the tail lights were out. A routine license check disclosed the
suspended license. Officer Greenfield arrested Mr. Hanson for knowingly driving
with a suspended license.
Officer Greenfield says Mr. Hanson admitted that he knew his license was
suspended. But Mr. Hanson denies that he knew of the suspension or admitted that
he knew. For purposes of this order, I accept as true Mr. Hanson’s allegation that
the officer had no basis for believing Mr. Hanson knew his license was suspended,
other than the fact that the license was suspended.
Mr. Hanson ultimately was acquitted of knowingly driving with a suspended
license. He brought this action against Officer Greenfield, the Tallahassee Police
Department, and the City of Tallahassee, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Florida law.
II
An earlier order dismissed the claims against the Tallahassee Police
Department because the Department is not a suable entity. The motion to dismiss
filed by the remaining defendants, Officer Greenfield and the City of Tallahassee,
Case No. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
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is before the court on the magistrate judge’s second report and recommendation,
ECF No. 22, and the objections, ECF No. 23. I have reviewed de novo the issues
raised by the objections.
III
An officer may arrest a person based on probable cause to believe the person
has committed even a “very minor criminal offense.” Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Knowingly driving with a suspended license
qualifies.
Officer Greenfield had solid evidence that Mr. Hanson was in fact driving
with a suspended license. But on Mr. Hanson’s version of events, Officer
Greenfield had no other evidence that Mr. Hanson knew his license was suspended.
The question is whether an officer has probable cause to arrest a driver whose
license is suspended even when there is no other evidence that the driver knows the
license is suspended.
The weight of authority indicates the answer is yes. In United States v.
Everett, 719 F.2d 1119, 1120 (11th Cir.1983), the court said, “While intent is an
element of the crime [of passing counterfeit currency], it is not necessary in order
to establish probable cause to arrest.” In McGuire v. City of New York, 142 F.
App’x 1, 3 (2d Cir.2005) (unpublished), the court said, “[W]hen an officer has
evidence that a defendant has engaged in conduct proscribed by law—whether
Case No. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
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transporting a quantity of drugs, possessing a stolen item, or driving with a
suspended license—he has probable cause to arrest the person even without
specific evidence on the elements of knowledge and intent that will have to be
proved to secure a conviction at trial.” And in United States v. Quintana, 594 F.
Supp. 2d 1291, 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2009), the court addressed a Florida arrest on all
fours with the arrest at issue here. The court held that an officer had probable
cause to arrest a person who was driving with a suspended license, even in the
absence of any other evidence that the person knew his license was suspended.
Probable cause is a complete defense to Mr. Hanson’s federal and state
claims. His claims thus must be dismissed.
IV
An alternative basis for dismissing Mr. Hanson’s federal claims against
Officer Greenfield individually is qualified immunity. Qualified immunity applies
to federal damages claims against public officers and protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335, 341 (1986). See generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Thus a public officer may be held individually
liable only if the officer’s conduct violates clearly established law.
No clearly established law indicated that an officer could not make an arrest
in these circumstances. Quite the contrary. As set out above, the weight of
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authority indicated that an arrest was proper. Officer Greenfield has qualified
immunity.
V
An alternative basis for dismissal of Mr. Hanson’s state claims against
Officer Greenfield is the Florida statutory limitation on claims against public
employees. Under Florida law, a public employer is vicariously liable for an
employee’s tortious conduct, and the employee is not liable, unless the employee
acted outside the scope of the employee’s duties or acted in bad faith—that is, “in
bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). When,
as here, the weight of authority indicates the officer’s actions are lawful, it cannot
be said that the officer acted in bad faith. Mr. Hanson has not alleged a basis for
holding Officer Greenfield individually liable under state law.
VI
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
The report and recommendation, ECF No. 22, is ACCEPTED.
2.
The motion to dismiss, ECF No. 6, is GRANTED.
Case No. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
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3.
The clerk must enter judgment stating, “The plaintiff Cliff O.
Hanson’s claims are dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.”
4.
The clerk must close the file.
SO ORDERED on April 22, 2014.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge
Case No. 4:13cv514-RH/CAS
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