WATTS v. ARIAS et al
Filing
22
ORDER denying 17 18 Motions to Dismiss. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 10/13/15. (RH)
Page 1 of 7
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
TROOPER DONNA JANE WATTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
RICHARD J. ARIAS et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________/
ORDER DENYING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
In this action the plaintiff, a Florida Highway Patrol trooper, alleges that 16
defendants—all employees of the Florida Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles—unlawfully obtained and used the plaintiff’s personal driver’s
license information, as part of a campaign to harass her. The plaintiff alleges that
the defendants did this to retaliate against her for issuing a citation to a law
enforcement officer who recklessly drove 120 miles per hour without a lawenforcement purpose. The plaintiff asserts a claim under the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act (“the Act”). The defendants have moved to dismiss, asserting the
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 2 of 7
Act does not circumscribe even plainly indefensible acts of troopers and other
DHSMV personnel. And one defendant has moved to dismiss for improper venue.
I
The Act prohibits a state motor-vehicle department or its personnel from
disclosing personal information—a defined term—from driver’s license records,
except for any one of 14 listed purposes. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). The Act creates a
private right of action against a “person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses
personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted”
under the Act. Id. § 2724.
The plaintiff alleges that the 16 defendants willfully obtained her personal
information from the DHSMV driver’s license records, used the information, and
did so without a purpose permitted under the Act—indeed, only for the plainly
indefensible purpose of using the plaintiff’s home address and telephone
information to harass her.
The defendants say the Act does not restrict disclosures of information
within the DHSMV and that no violation occurred when records were disclosed to
the defendants. In effect, the defendants say the Act allows anyone who works for
a state motor-vehicle agency to obtain and use personal information for any
purpose, no matter how divorced from official duties and no matter how plainly
improper. On this view, motor-vehicle employees could use a driver’s personal
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 3 of 7
information to locate and stalk the driver. But a celebrated stalking case is what
led Congress to adopt the Act in the first place. It would be extraordinary if indeed
the Act provided a stalking loophole for motor-vehicle employees.
The Act does not do this. The Act explicitly says, in terms that could
scarcely be more clear, that a civil action lies against a person who “knowingly
obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a
purpose not permitted” under the Act. That is precisely what the plaintiff alleges
the defendants did.
In arguing that the Act does not apply to them, the defendants rely on the
Act’s statement that “‘person’ means an individual, organization or entity, but does
not include a State or agency thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(2). If the defendants
were state agencies, this would make a difference. But they are not. The
defendants are individuals. To be sure, the defendants are employed by a state
agency. But even if, when acting within the scope of their employment, state
employees could somehow be called “agencies”—a novel construction at best—
this would not help the defendants. When they obtained records for use in
harassing the plaintiff—if that is what occurred—the defendants were not acting as
state employees.
The Act means what it says. If, as the plaintiff alleges, the defendants
intentionally obtained and used the plaintiff’s personal information for a purpose
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 4 of 7
not permitted under the Act, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover the relief
specified in the Act. Whether that happened as alleged of course cannot be
determined on a motion to dismiss.
II
One of the defendants, Edlyn Rozsa, also asserts the case should be
dismissed for improper venue. She says she resides in the Southern District of
Florida. She seems to suggest that what matters is only where she resides or where
she committed any violation, but that is not correct. So long as a defendant is
properly joined, the issue of venue is determined for a claim as a whole, not
separately for each defendant.
A defendant may move to dismiss for improper venue with or without
submitting evidence in support of the motion. On such a motion, “[t]he facts as
alleged in the complaint are taken as true, to the extent they are uncontroverted by
defendants’ affidavits.” Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840
F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681,
683 n. 3 (5th Cir.1977)). Ms. Rozsa has submitted no evidence in support of her
motion to dismiss, so the complaint’s factual allegations must be taken as true.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is proper in this district if (1) any
defendant resides in this district and all defendants reside in this state, or (2) a
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. The
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 5 of 7
complaint alleges that venue is proper because a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the action occurred in this district. The complaint also alleges venue
is proper because the defendants were served in this district in a prior case, but that
might indicate nothing more than that the defendants’ employing agency accepted
service to protect the confidentiality of the officers’ individual addresses. Perhaps
for the same reason, the summonses in this case apparently were issued to the
defendants at agency addresses in this district. The complaint is silent on where
the defendants actually reside.
The issue is whether the allegation that a substantial part of the events giving
rise to this action occurred in this district is sufficient without further detail. For
purposes of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, the Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff must allege facts, not
just legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569 n.14 (2007). But there are
substantial differences in what must be pleaded to state a claim, on the one hand,
and what must be alleged to establish venue, on the other hand.
Thus Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to include
allegations “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” but the rule imposes no
corresponding requirement for venue. There are good grounds for the distinction.
Substantive allegations control the case as it goes forward, while venue allegations
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 6 of 7
are usually routine and, in most cases, inconsequential. Further, allegations that
are sufficient to state a claim ordinarily provide the plaintiff a ticket to discovery; a
defendant may challenge the factual allegations only by moving for summary
judgment. A defendant who challenges venue is not so constrained; the defendant
may submit evidence in support of a motion to dismiss. It is neither surprising nor
undesirable that a plaintiff often makes only conclusory or cursory venue
allegations—allegations that ordinarily are unchallenged and of no consequence as
the case proceeds.
Ms. Rozsa could have but did not assert in her motion that no defendant
resides in this district. She could have but did not deny that a substantial part of
the events giving rise to the claim occurred in this district. Instead, Ms. Rozsa
focused only on a single defendant—herself. That she resides in the Southern
District of Florida or that her alleged acts occurred there does not defeat venue. If
it turns out that the complaint’s venue allegation is true—that a substantial part of
the events giving rise to this action occurred in this district—venue will be proper
here. Ms. Rozsa’s motion is insufficient to support dismissal for lack of venue.
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Page 7 of 7
III
For these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED:
The motions to dismiss, ECF No. 17 and 18, are denied.
SO ORDERED on October 13, 2015.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge
Case No. 4:15cv275-RH/CAS
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?