WILSON v. JONES et al

Filing 77

ORDER OF DISMISSAL. The report and recommendation 75 is accepted and adopted as the court's opinion to the extent consistent with this order. Corizon's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 68 , is granted. The clerk must enter judgment stating, "This action was resolved on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. It is ordered that the plaintiff Demesio E. Wilson recover nothing on his claims against the defendants Corizon Health, Inc.; V. Cruse; A. Kirkland; and Mark S. Inch in his capacity as Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections. The claims are dismissed on the merits." The clerk must close the file. Signed by JUDGE ROBERT L HINKLE on 8/8/19. (blb)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

DEMESIO E. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 4:17cv253-RH-MJF

MARK S. INCH, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections;
CORIZON HEALTH, INC.;
V. CRUSE; and
A. KIRKLAND,
Defendants.
_________________________________/

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

The plaintiff Demesio E. Wilson, a prisoner in the Florida Department of
Corrections, asserts he suffered head and neck injuries, including neurological
injuries, in a fall from an upper bunk. He asserts he received constitutionally
deficient care for those injuries. He originally named four defendants. An earlier
order dismissed the claims against three but did not direct the entry of judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The fourth defendant, Corizon
Health, Inc., now has moved for summary judgment. The motion is before the
Case No. 4:17cv253-RH-MJF

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court on the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, ECF No. 75, which
concludes the motion should be granted. No objections have been filed.
A prison medical provider violates the Eighth Amendment when the
provider is deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical need. See, e.g.,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (so holding for a correctional official). An
employing corporation like Corizon can be held liable if the refusal to provide
appropriate treatment stems from a corporate policy, as Mr. Wilson alleges here.
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that an
employing entity is liable under § 1983 for an official’s constitutional violation
only if the violation was based on the entity’s policy or custom or if the official is
one whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy). To be
deliberately indifferent, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also
Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013).
The record establishes that Corizon’s employees were at most negligent in
responding to Mr. Wilson’s injuries, not that they were deliberately indifferent.
This without more would not exonerate Corizon. Corizon could still be liable if a
deliberately indifferent policy—that is, an unconstitutional policy—was a cause of

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its employee’s negligence and in turn of damage to Mr. Wilson. But as the report
and recommendation correctly concludes, the record does not support such a claim.
Mr. Wilson says Corizon had a policy prohibiting its front-line personnel
from referring a prisoner to an outside provider unless the prisoner had submitted
three sick-call requests. But the record is to the contrary. Under Corizon’s policy,
its personnel could refer a prisoner sooner but were required to refer a prisoner if,
as shown by a third sick-call request, the problem had not been resolved.
Mr. Wilson also says he was told Corizon had a policy under which slipand-fall injuries were not treated as medical emergencies. A policy automatically
prohibiting referral to an outside provider for a slip-and-fall injury would indeed
show deliberate indifference. Many falls, probably most, do not require specialized
treatment, but some do. Even so, the record does not indicate that Corizon in fact
has such a policy or, more importantly, that any such policy affected Mr. Wilson’s
treatment in this case.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The report and recommendation is accepted and adopted as the court’s
opinion to the extent consistent with this order.
2. Corizon’s summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 68, is granted.
3. The clerk must enter judgment stating, “This action was resolved on
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. It is ordered that the plaintiff

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Demesio E. Wilson recover nothing on his claims against the defendants Corizon
Health, Inc.; V. Cruse; A. Kirkland; and Mark S. Inch in his capacity as Secretary
of the Florida Department of Corrections. The claims are dismissed on the merits.”
4. The clerk must close the file.
SO ORDERED on August 8, 2019.
s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge

Case No. 4:17cv253-RH-MJF