GOLDEN v. DIXON et al

Filing 32

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART 30 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION signed by JUDGE ALLEN C WINSOR on 9/26/24. The 23 motion to quash service of process is GRANTED, and Golden will have an additional 60 days to effect service on Feldman and P ickens. The 26 motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims against Dixon and Inch are dismissed with leave to amend. Golden will have fourteen days to file an amended complaint.The magistrate judge will conduct further appropriate proceedings. (tss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
SAMUEL CHRISTOPHER GOLDEN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 4:23-cv-396-AW-MAF

RICKY DIXON, MARK INCH, ERROL
FELDMAN, and ROBERT PICKENS,
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Samuel Golden, a pro se prisoner, sued four prison officials,
including Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) Secretary Ricky Dixon in his
official capacity. ECF No. 1. Golden alleges that Defendants devised a plan to
deprive prisoners of their property. Id. ¶ 5. To implement their plan, Golden alleges,
Defendants had the FDC instruct prisoners to turn in their current tablets for new
ones, after which the prison retained the old tablets for financial reasons. Id. ¶¶ 1621. Golden asserts a conspiracy claim against all Defendants (except Dixon) and
asserts a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim and a Due Process claim against
Dixon. Id. at 7-8.
Defendants Feldman and Pickens moved to quash service of process, alleging
they were never properly served. ECF No. 23. Dixon and Inch moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. ECF No. 26. The magistrate judge issued a report and

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recommendation concluding the court should grant both motions. ECF No. 30.
Having carefully considered the matter, and having considered de novo the issues
raised in Golden’s objections (ECF No. 31), I now adopt the report and
recommendation in part, and I grant both motions.
I.
I adopt the report and recommendation as to the motion to quash and
incorporate its discussion of that motion (on pages 3-9) into this order.
II.
Turning to the motion to dismiss, I agree with the magistrate judge that
dismissal is appropriate.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by
attorneys. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 967 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972)). Still, they must provide the factual grounds
of entitlement to relief, not mere “labels and conclusions.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). They must “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
There are not sufficient factual allegations here because, as Defendants Dixon
and Inch point out, Golden never alleges that his tablet was taken. ECF No. 26 at 5.
Golden pleaded that (1) a policy to turn in tablets was created, (2) that policy was

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later rescinded, and (3) any tablets turned in pursuant to the policy were not returned.
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16-18. But his complaint never alleged his tablet was taken. Quite the
opposite: he says the policy was “rescinded altogether, allowing plaintiff to possess
his purchased JP5 tablet.” Id. ¶ 17.
Golden apparently acknowledges this error in his pleading, stating “it appears
that plaintiff’s complaint was inadequately pled.” ECF No. 31 ¶ 14. Indeed, with his
still possessing his tablet, he cannot assert a Takings Clause claim, a Due Process
violation, or any harm stemming from any alleged conspiracy. All these depend on
some lost property interest, which Golden has not alleged.
Dixon and Inch also argued that if Golden’s tablet had been taken, his claim
would still fail because he “does not allege that the tablet was seized for public use.”
ECF No. 26 at 4-5. That gets the law backward. The Takings Clause precludes taking
property for public use without just compensation. But that does not mean the
government can freely take property for other than public use. See Kelo v. City of
New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005) (“[I]t has long been accepted that the
sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to
another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation.”); see also id.
(“[T]he City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the
purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party.”). This court’s
decision in Support Working Animals, Inc. v. DeSantis, 457 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1215

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(N.D. Fla. 2020)—which Defendants cite to support their position, ECF No. 26 at
4—does not hold otherwise. Although the case refers to “public use,” it still only
holds that the government may use its police power to outlaw certain uses of
property. Support Working Animals, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (“It is well-settled that
there is no taking for ‘public use’ where the government acts pursuant to its police
power.”). The bottom line is that a Takings Clause claim does not require a showing
that the property taken was taken for public use—as opposed to some other use.
CONCLUSION
The motion to quash service of process (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED, and
Golden will have an additional 60 days to effect service on Feldman and Pickens.
The motion to dismiss (ECF No. 26) is GRANTED, and the claims against Dixon
and Inch are dismissed with leave to amend. Golden will have fourteen days to file
an amended complaint.
The magistrate judge will conduct further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED on September 25, 2024.
s/ Allen Winsor
United States District Judge

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