NELMS v. HATCHER et al
Filing
111
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re 106 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by PAULA BRYSON, TIMOTHY TIDWELL, and BERT HATCHER be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:(a) the motion be GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's dam ages claims against defendants in their official capacities, (b) the motion be GRANTED with respect to plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendant Nurse Bryson, and (c) the motion be DENIED in all other respects. and Th at this matter be referred to the undersigned for further proceedings on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Hatcher and Tidwell in their individual capacities. Signed by MAGISTRATE JUDGE MILES DAVIS on 12/17/08. Internal deadline for referral to district judge if objections are not filed earlier: 1/14/2009 (lcu)
Page 1 of 21
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA PANAMA CITY DIVISION TYRIE L. NELMS, Plaintiff, vs. SERGEANT BERT HATCHER, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION This case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of an incident occurring at Jackson Correctional Institution ("Jackson CI") on July 30, 2006. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,1 claims that Sergeant Bert Hatcher and Sergeant Timothy Tidwell violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they used excessive force on him. Plaintiff claims Nurse Paula Bryson violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when she failed to provide medical care for his pain and injuries, and falsified medical forms to cover up Hatcher's and Tidwell's misconduct. As relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Pending before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 106;2 see also Docs. 63, 64). Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion. (Docs. 107, 109, 110). 3 Upon review of the summary judgment record, it is the
C o u r t records reflect as of Dec e m b e r 16, 2008 the plaintiff has paid $321.92 toward the $ 3 5 0 . 0 0 filing fee; therefo r e , as of that da t e he still owe d $28.08 to the cou r t . D e f e n d a n t s ' motion for summary judgment app e a r s o n the doc k e t as doc . 1 0 6 . How e v e r , the a c t u a l do c u m e n t image ap p e a r s a t do c . 63. Hereafte r all citations to the m o t i o n w i l l be to its d o c u m e n t image. P l a i n t i f f ' s initial response to the motion for summary judgment appears on the docket as doc. 1 0 7 . Ho w e v e r , the ac t u a l document image ap p e a r s a t do c . 83. Hereafter, all cita t i o n s to plain t i f f ' s i n i ti a l response will be to its documen t image.
3 2
1
Page 2 of 21
opinion of the undersigned that defendants' motion should be denied in part and granted in part.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND July 30, 2006 Incident In his verified second amended complaint (doc. 27), plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2006 he and his cellmate Dwayne Brookes approached defendant Sgt. Hatcher to discuss why plaintiff and Brookes had been "locked-down" in their cell the night before. (Doc. 27, p. 6). During the discussion, Sgt. Hatcher repeatedly attempted to provoke an angry response from plaintiff by calling him profane names. He then ordered Brookes inside the dormitory, and became belligerent with plaintiff. Hatcher "g[ot] in plaintiff's face" and, when plaintiff asked why he was treating him that way, Hatcher responded "I'll do more than that," and knocked plaintiff to the ground with a punch to the mouth. (Id.). Scared, plaintiff tried to get up and run, but Sgt. Tidwell knocked him back down. Tidwell and Hatcher then repeatedly kicked and punched plaintiff while he was lying on the ground. Plaintiff was taken to the medical department where he complained to defendant Nurse Bryson of pain in his ribs, back, legs and head. Plaintiff states that despite his complaints and the fact that "it was obvious from just looking at Plaintiff that he was in severe pain," Bryson provided no medical treatment or pain medication, falsified medical forms to make it appear as though plaintiff had not been injured, and refused to refer plaintiff to a physician. (Id., p. 7).4 Plaintiff asserts that after the examination while he was waiting in the medical department, he "suffered a pulled muscle in his shoulder and back. This cause[d] Plaintiff['s] muscle in his shoulder to heal improperly." (Id.). Following the incident, Sgt. Hatcher charged plaintiff with unarmed assault, alleging that plaintiff had attempted to strike him in the face. Plaintiff states he never
S p e c i f i c a l ly , p la in tif f a ss er t s : "Defendant [B ry s on ] filled out a DC 4 - 7 69 form intentionally i n c o r r e c t . She stated that th e r e w e r e no injuries co m p l a i n e d of. She d i d no t fill out a D C 4 - 7 0 1 C form a s required so Plain t i f f can be se e n by a doctor. Nor d i d the Defe n d a n t fill ou t a DC 4 - 7 0 8 form d [ e ] s c r i b i n g the injuries w i t h a diagram form." (D o c . 24, p. 7).
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
4
Page 3 of 21
attempted to strike Hatcher, and that Hatcher fabricated the disciplinary report "to explain away the beating." (Id., p. 6). Plaintiff was convicted of the DR. According to plaintiff, this DR has caused him to serve time in close management. Two Disciplinary Reports On August 2, 2006, plaintiff was served with two separate disciplinary reports ("DR"). One DR was for unarmed assault written by defendant Hatcher, who stated as follows: At approximately 6:30 a.m., on July 30, 2006, while standing outside "H" housing counting my inmates, who were returning from chow, Inmate Nelms, Tyrie L., DC#072494, walked past me into the dorm and suddenly came back out of the dorm just as the last of my inmates entered. Inmate Nelms approached me and began slinging his arms in the air with his fists clinched, while stating, "Sergeant Hatcher why did you lock my fucking door last night? I been down twenty something years and you ain't gonna treat me like that fuck boy!" Inmate Nelms suddenly attempted to strike me in the face with his right fist. At that time, it became necessary to use force to protect myself from injury. Shift OIC, Captain T. Matautia was notified of this incident. Inmate Nelms was checked by medical and placed in administrative confinement pending resolution of this report. (Doc. 63, Ex. J, p. 2). As mentioned earlier, plaintiff denied attempting to strike Hatcher in his amended complaint, asserting that Hatcher fabricated the DR to protect himself and make it appear that it was necessary to use force. (Doc. 27, p. 7). The other DR was for inciting riots written by defendant Tidwell, who described the incident as follows: On Sunday, July 30, 2006, at approximately 6:30 a.m., while attempting to restrain Inmate Nelms, Tyrie L, DC#072494, outside of Wing 3 of "H" housing unit, Inmate Nelms began screaming into the window of the dorm stating, "They are killing me boys. They are fucking killing me!" I gave Inmate Nelms a direct order to stop resisting and to be quiet, to which he did not comply. When the inmates started to yell out the windows, I again gave Inmate Nelms another direct order to stop resisting and to be quiet. At which time, Inmate Nelms stated, "Fuck that, I want them to see this shit!" I then gave Inmate Nelms another direct order to stop resisting and to be quiet, to which he complied. Inmate Nelms was placed in administrative confinement
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
Page 4 of 21
pending resolution of this report. Shift OIC, Captain T. Matautia was notified and advised me to submit this report. (Id., Ex. I, p. 31). After a disciplinary hearing, plaintiff was found guilty on both DRs. (Id., Ex. J, p. 8; Ex. I, p. 35). Plaintiff received sixty days of disciplinary confinement for the unarmed assault DR and sixty days of disciplinary confinement for the inciting riots DR. Plaintiff's appeals to the warden were denied. (Id., Ex. J, pp. 9-11; Ex. I, pp. 3637). Plaintiff's appeals to the Secretary of the DOC were also denied. (Id., Ex. J, pp. 12-14; Ex. I, pp. 38-39). Plaintiff filed a mandamus petition in state court challenging the two DRs. (Id., Ex. K). The petition was dismissed as untimely. (Id.). Plaintiff then sought certiorari review in the Florida First District Court of Appeal. (Id.). Plaintiff grieved the alleged use of excessive force and lack of medical care through the inmate grievance procedure. Plaintiff's complaint was referred to the inve sti gative section of the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"). (Id., Ex. J, pp. 15-19). The OIG found insufficient evidence to support plaintiff's allegations. (Id., Ex. L).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiff initiated this action on March 19, 2007. (Doc. 1). On September 7, 2007, he filed a second amended complaint raising Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Hatcher and Tidwell, and Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against defendant Bryson. (Doc. 27, pp. 7-8). On April 24, 2008, defendants filed a special report and supporting documents, (docs. 63, 64), to which plaintiff responded (doc. 83). After a period of discovery, the court issued an order on October 2, 2008 advising the parties that as of that date the special report would be construed as a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 105). The parties were advised of the importance and ramifications of Rule 56 summary judgment consideration, were notified that the summary judgment motion would be taken under advisement on October 31, 2008, and were provided until that date to submit additional Rule 56
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
Page 5 of 21
materials. (Doc. 105). In response, plaintiff filed additional argument and affidavits. (Docs. 109, 110).5 Defendants, in their motion for summary judgment, assert the following defenses: (1) that plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) because a finding in plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his two disciplinary convictions; (2) that this action is barred by the Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) because plaintiff is currently challenging his disciplinary proceedings in the state courts; (3) that plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; and (4) that defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiff's official capacity claims for damages. (Doc. 63).
LEGAL STANDARDS Summary Judgment Standard In order to prevail on their motion for summary judgment, defendants must show that plaintiff has no evidence to support his case or present affirmative evidence that plaintiff will be unable to prove his case at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If defendants successfully negate an essential element of plaintiff's case, the burden shifts to plaintiff to come forward with evidentiary material demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. The "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit
T h e argument and OIG witness statements submitted in Doc. 109 have not been considered b e c a u s e they d o no t me e t the requ i r e m e n t s for affidavits. Only the August 28, 2006 affidavit of D w a y n e Brookes, (doc. 109, Bro o k e s Aff.), the Oc t o b e r 16 , 2008 affidav i t of Michael Rease, (doc. 110, R e a s e Aff.), and the October 17, 2008 affidavit of Anthony Bass, (doc. 110, Bass Aff.), have been co ns ider ed .
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
5
Page 6 of 21
under the governing law." Id., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. A dispute is "genuine" if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id., 477 U.S. at 248. Plaintiff must show more than the existence of a "metaphysical doubt" regarding the material facts, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), and a "scintilla" of evidence or conclusory allegations is insufficient. Celotex Corp., 477 U. S. at 324 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)). Plaintiff must either point to evidence in the record or present additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary defici ency. Celotex Corp., supra; Owen v. Wille, 117 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 1997) ("Rule 56(e) . . . requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleading and by h[is] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'"), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1126 (1998) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e))); Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 1994). Evidence presented by plaintiff in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and all reasonable factual inferences arising from it, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still bears the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence of every element that he must prove. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317 (1986). A motion for summary judgment should be granted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. Whether Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Heck In Heck v. Humphrey, supra, the United States Supreme Court held: [I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
Page 7 of 21
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into ques tion by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . . A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed. . . . Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 (internal citation and footnote omitted). The Heck rule has its origins in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In Preiser, an inmate brought a § 1983 suit seeking injunctive relief to compel restoration of good-time credits. The Court concluded that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." 411 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. at 1841. The principles established in Heck and Preiser, also known as the "implicit habeas exception" to § 1983's coverage, has been extended to prison disciplinary proceedings. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), the Court applied the exception to a prisoner's § 1983 suit challenging the procedures used to obtain a disciplinary conviction which resulted in the loss of good-time credits. The Balisok Court concluded that the prisoner's claim for
declaratory relief and money damages necessarily implied the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-time credits. Therefore, because a judgment in the
prisoner's favor would necessarily be at odds with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the prisoner's underlying sentence, the Court held that the § 1983 suit could not be pursued unless the prisoner had successfully invalidated the revocation penalty. Id., at 646-48, 117 S.Ct. at 1588-89. The Court has rejected, however, "the mistaken view . . . that Heck applies categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary proceedings." Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 754, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004). In
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
Page 8 of 21
Muhammad, the Court declined to apply Heck to a prisoner's § 1983 suit claiming that a prison official charged and subjected him to pre-hearing lockup in retaliation for his having earlier filed lawsuits and grievances. The Court concluded that the claim did not necessarily affect the computation of good-time credits. Id., at 753, 124 S.Ct. at 1305. Therefore, because the prisoner's suit "could not . . . be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence," id., at 754-55, 124 S.Ct. at 1306, Heck was inapplicable. Id. at 755, 124 S.Ct. at 1306; accord Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005) (holding that § 1983 claims for declaratory and injuncive relief by state prisoners challenging the validity of the procedures for determining parole eligibility that had been used to deny them parole were cognizable in a § 1983 proceeding). 6 In the instant case, the parties do not dispute that the penalty imposed in plaintiff's disciplinary proceedings involved only disciplinary confinement. No gain time was revoked or eliminated. (Doc. 63, pp. 6, 9). This suit cannot therefore be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with plaintiff's conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with plaintiff's underlying sentence. Thus, plaintiff's claims are not barred by Heck. See Muhammad, supra; see also e.g., Smith v. Villapando, 286 Fed. Apx. 682 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that prisoner's due process challenge to disorderly conduct disciplinary report for which he received 30 days in disciplinary confinement as punishment, did not seek restoration of gain time; therefore, his § 1983 claim was not barred on the ground that it would necessarily imply the invalidity or the duration of his confinement); Pittman v. Tucker, 213 Fed. Appx. 867, 869 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that prisoner's § 1983 claims were not Heck-barred because there was no indication that a judgment in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; although prisoner claimed that officers retaliated against him by filing a false disciplinary report and placing him in confined management, there was no indication
T h e Wilkinson Co u r t reas o n e d that a jud g m e n t in th e prison e r s ' fa v o r w o u l d not neces s a r i l y i m p l y the inva l i d i t y of their confinement or its duration. Id., at 82, 125 S.Ct. at 1248. Thus, the p r i s o n e r s ' § 198 3 su i t did no t fall w i t h i n the "im p l i c i t h a b e a s exc e p t i o n . Id.
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
6
Page 9 of 21
that these disciplinary actions affected his sentence; moreover, defendants did not assert that the disciplinary actions affected the length of plaintiff's sentence); Nelson v. Jimenez, 178 Fed. Appx. 983, 985 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that prisoner's § 1983 action against disciplinary hearing officer, alleging that officer violated due process rights during disciplinary proceeding that upheld charge for possession of marijuana and abuse of mail system, was not barred by Heck because plaintiff's complaint "did not seek to challenge the validity of his underlying conviction, and did not seek to affect the time he would serve related to that conviction").7 Whether Younger Abstention is Appropriate It is well settled that "[f]ederal courts should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if doing so would `disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.'" Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1526, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987)). While abstention "remains `the exception, not the rule' to the federal courts' `virtually unflagging' duty `to adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction,'" Wexler at 1339 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 2513, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989)), it "espouses a strong federal policy," Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); see also 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) ("While non-abstention remains the rule, the Younger exception is an important one."). In determining whether abstention under Younger is warranted, a court must consider three factors: (1) whether there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, (2) whether the proceeding implicates important state interests, and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521; see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975). The defendants assert this court should abstain from proceeding with this case because plaintiff is currently challenging his two disciplinary proceedings in
T h e undersigned cites Smith, Pittman and Nelson only as persuasive authority and r e c o g n i z e s that the s e o p i n i o n s are no t considered binding prece d e n t . See 11 th Cir. R . 36-2 .
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
7
Page 10 of 21
the state courts and litigating the same claim he raises here, "that both of the disciplinary reports were falsified. . . ." (Doc. 63, p. 15). Defendants' statement of plaintiff's claims is only partially correct. It is true that plaintiff claimed in the state mandamus proceeding that the DRs violated due process because they were false. (Ex. K, p. 26 in ECF). However, the claim plaintiff raises in this § 1983 suit, at least with regard to defendants Hatcher and Tidwell, is that they violated the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when they used exc ess ive force on him. He is not claiming that they deprived him of due process by fabricating the DRs.8 Furthermore, as the state mandamus court emphasized, the state mandamus proceeding "was . . . as an appellate remedy to review quasi-judicial action of the administrative agency," in other words, to review the prison disciplinary proceeding. See Woullard v. Bishop, 734 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding that mandamus "is the appropriate remedy for seeking review of a prison disciplinary proceeding allegedly conducted in violation of constitutional requirements or the rules of the Department of Corrections."). The mandamus court's review of the DOC's "(1) whether
disciplinary decision was limited to determining the following:
procedural due process was accorded; (2) whether the essential requirements of law were observed; and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment [were] supported by competent substantial evidence." Plymel v. Moore, 770 So.2d 242, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (citing Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995)). Thus, even if plaintiff attempted to raise his Eighth Amendment claim in the mandamus proceeding, the court did not, and could not, address it given the court's limited jurisdiction.
T h i s distinction is ob s e r v e d in plaintiff's ex h a u s t i o n of the administrative grievance p r o c e d u r e . Plain t i f f utiliz e d the griev a n c e p r o c e s s in appealing the disciplinary hearing teams' d e c i s io n s . (Ex. I, pp. 36-43 ; Ex. J, pp. 9-14). He th e n utilized a se p a r a t e grievance proceeding to raise h i s exc e s s i v e force/as s a u l t claim . (Ex. J, pp. 15-19). The priso n treated th e two issues se p a r a t e l y . I n the DR appeals, the institution and Central Office addressed plaintiff's due process concerns. (Exs. I , pp. 36-43; Ex. J, pp. 9-14). They handled plaintiff's grievances alleging excessive force by referring t h e m to th e O I G . (E x . J, pp. 15 - 1 9 ; Ex. L ) .
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
8
Page 11 of 21
Furthermore the mandamus court, acting in its appellate capacity, was "`not empowered to make findings of fact.'" (Ex. K, p. 26 in ECF (citing Farneth v. State, 945 So.2d 614, 617 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). Thus, the court could not make findings of fact concerning the underlying incident, including the amount of force used, the extent of plaintiff's injuries, the need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; or the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates. Nor could the state court make conclusions of law concerning whether the force Hatcher and Tidwell used was excessive and violative of the Eighth Amendment. Based on the foregoing, abstention under Younger v. Harris is not warranted in this case. Permitting plaintiff to raise his Eighth Amendment claims against Hatcher and Tidwell in this court would not result in this court interfering in a pending state judicial proceeding, because the pending state proceeding does not provide an adequate opportunity for plaintiff to raise his Eighth Amendment claims. The same is true of plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Nurse Bryson.9 Eleventh Amendment Immunity It is well settled that a plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 action for monetary damages against a state, state agency, or state officials in their official capacities, because neither a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 LED.2d 45 (1989). Furthermore, absent waiver or
D e f e n d a n t s re ly , in pa rt , o n a Report and Recom m e n d a t io n issued by Magistrate Judge S h e r r i l l in Muhammad v. Crosby, Case Num b e r 4:05cv193/WS / W C S , Doc. 117. There, plaintiff sought t o am e n d h i s com p l a i n t to add a civil rights claim co n c e r n i n g bein g sub j e c t e d to a "forced sha v e . " T h e d ef e nd an ts ob je ct e d to am e nd m en t , arguing that tha t claim w a s curren t l y pending in the state c o u r t (the Circuit Court of Leon County, Florida). Judge Sherrill found that the plaintiff's pending s t a t e court case challenged the DOC's forced shave policies. How e v e r , that case is disting u i s h a b l e f ro m the instant cas e , be c a u s e th e claims pla i n t i f f is raisin g here a r e not p e n d i n g in the state court. A due process challenge to the disciplinary convictions, not E ig h t h Am e nd m en t claim s against the o f f i c e r s involved, is pending in the state courts. Even if plaintiff had raised (or attem p t e d to raise ) his E i g h t h Amendm e n t claim s in the state mandamus and certiorari proceedings, the state co u r t w o u l d n o t have had jurisd i c t i o n to dec i d e them.
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
9
Page 12 of 21
express congressional abrogation, neither of which is present in this case, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a damages suit brought by a private individual against a state in federal court. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Gamble v. Florida Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1986). In light of the foregoing, plaintiff's § 1983 claim for damages against defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed. Eighth Amendment Standard with Regard to Use of Force "Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial setting as long as it is applied `in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.'" Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). To determine whether force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, a court considers a number of factors: "(1) the extent of the injury; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response; and (5) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of facts known to them." Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992)). From consideration of these factors, "inferences may be drawn as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2 nd Cir. 1973)). The Court in Whitley narrowed the precise inquiry applicable when deciding whether officials are entitled to judgment as a matter of law: courts must determine whether the evidence goes beyond a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives. Unless it appears that the
Case No: 5:07cv62/RS/MD
Page 13 of 21
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain under the standard we have described, the case should not go to the jury. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (emphasis added). Eighth Amendment Standard with Regard to Inadequate Medical Care Claims To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim challenging the conditions of his con fineme nt, plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry. The first requirement, the objective component, requires: conduct by public officials "sufficiently serious" to constitute a cruel or unusual deprivation one "denying
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?