McGHEE v. HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP INC. et al
Filing
101
ORDER denying 67 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 69 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 11/2/2011. (jcw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
KENNETH McGHEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 5:10-cv-279-RS-EMT
HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP,
INC., SOVEREIGN HEALTHCARE
OF BONIFAY LLC d/b/a BONIFAY
NURSING AND REHAB CENTER, and
NANCY HALL,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER
Before me are Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs. 67 & 69)
and Plaintiff’s responses (Docs. 83 & 85).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the
court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in
1
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).
Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank
& Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However,
a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
II. BACKGROUND
I accept the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Galvez v.
Bruce, 552 F.3d 1238, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1343 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002)). “ ‘All reasonable doubts about the facts should
be resolved in favor of the non-movant.’ ” Id. (quoting Burton v. City of Belle
Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir. 1999); Clemons v. Dougherty County, 684
F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982).
Plaintiff was hired as an account manager with Defendant Healthcare
Services Group, Inc. (“Healthcare”) around November 2008 by Bill Simpkins.
Healthcare was contracted by Defendant Sovereign Healthcare of Bonifay, LLC, a
2
nursing and rehab facility (“Sovereign”), to maintain its laundry and housekeeping.
Healthcare was responsible for the “hiring, firing, discipline, wages, benefits and
tax withholdings” of the laundry and housekeeping employees at Sovereign. (Doc.
67, p. 3). As Account Manager, Plaintiff had the duty to oversee the cleanliness of
Sovereign and supervised approximately eighteen employees.
Defendant Nancy Hall was the Administrator for Sovereign and was
responsible for overseeing the facility’s maintenance. Hall was not involved in
human resources or personnel decisions at Healthcare and “never had the authority
to hire, promote, demote, or terminate Plaintiff or any other employee of
Healthcare.” (Doc. 69, p. 5).
Around February 24, 2009, Plaintiff’s wife, Wendy McGhee, attempted
suicide while she was employed as the Director of Admissions and Marketing for
Defendant Sovereign. After her suicide attempt, Mrs. McGhee took medical leave
and returned to work around March 16, 2009. She was terminated on or about
April 21, 2009. After her termination, Mrs. McGhee filed a discrimination claim.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Sovereign and Hall retaliated against him
after his wife filed the discrimination claim. According to Plaintiff, Hall contacted
Mr. Simpkins and told him she wanted Plaintiff fired and “began demanding that
Plaintiff’s superiors evaluate Plaintiff’s work at the Bonifay facility to try and
establish deficiencies in Plaintiff’s performance.” (Doc. 1, p. 4). Plaintiff was
3
eventually terminated around September 18, 2009, by Tammy Stephenson,
Plaintiff’s supervisor.
Mr. Simpkins supports Plaintiff’s allegations; however, Ms. Stephenson and
Mr. Banyansky, Healthcare’s Regional Manager, contend that they were never
approached by Hall about terminating Plaintiff. Ms. Stephenson testified that
“Plaintiff never completed projects as directed. She repeatedly counseled Plaintiff,
he would apologize and make promises, but did not improve his performance.”
(Doc. 69, p. 5). Mr. Banyanksy was unsatisfied with Plaintiff’s performance,
stating some deficiencies such as “systems not being followed, not doing
inspections on his staff, not following up on projects that need to be done, and just
a bunch of excuses.” (Id.).
In response to his termination, Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint alleging
two alternative counts of tortious interference with a business relationship,
retaliation by Defendant Sovereign, and retaliation by Defendant Healthcare.
III. ANALYSIS
Counts One & Two
Counts One and Two allege that Sovereign, through Hall, tortiously
interfered with the business relationship between Plaintiff and Healthcare. Count
One alleges that the interference occurred within the scope of her employment, and
Count Two alleges that it occurred outside the scope of her employment. To
4
successfully prove Defendant tortiously interfered with a business relationship,
Plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a business relationship, (2) Hall’s
knowledge of the relationship, (3) Hall’s intentional and unjustified interference
with the relationship, and (4) damages as a result of the interference. Castelli v.
Select Auto Management, Inc., 63 So.3d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
Prongs one, two, and four are clearly met; therefore, the issue is whether
Hall interfered with Plaintiff’s employment and if so, whether the interference was
intentional and unjustified. “A third party interferes with a contract or business
relationship by influencing, inducing or coercing one of the parties to the
relationship to abandon the relationship or breach the contract, thereby causing
injury to the other party.” West v. Troelstrup, 367 So.2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1979). There are conflicting witness accounts of Hall’s requests and
involvement in Plaintiff’s termination from Mr. Simpkins, Mr. Banyansky, and
Ms. Stephenson. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the
intentional and unjustified interference by Sovereign through the acts of Hall.
Counts Three & Four
Counts Three and Four are against Sovereign and Healthcare for retaliation
after Plaintiff’s wife filed a discrimination claim against it. Plaintiff claims he is
entitled to Title VII protection because of the familial association with his wife.
To establish a case for retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show (1) that he
5
engaged in statutorily protected conduct, (2) that he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) that there is a causal link between the conduct and the
action. Howard v. Walgreen, Co., 605 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2010).
Previously, there was a split in the circuits on third-party association claims, and
the issue had yet to be addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. However, the Supreme
Court recently addressed this issue in Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131
S.Ct. 863 (2011). In Thompson, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule that
third-party associations do not violate Title VII and held that an employer’s alleged
act of firing an employee in retaliation because that employee’s fiancée who
engaged in protected activity, if proven, constituted unlawful retaliation.
Thompson, at 867-68.
Defendants contend that Thompson is not applicable to this case because
Plaintiff was employed by Healthcare and his wife was employed by Sovereign. In
the Order denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 26), this Court concluded
that:
Although Plaintiff and his wife were employed by different entities,
Thompson gives no indication that this prohibits recovery. Plaintiff’s
employer was a subcontractor of Bonifay, and Plaintiff’s physical workplace
was at the Bonifay facility. The two employers and their employees are
clearly intertwined, and under Plaintiff’s version of the facts Bonifay used
its relationship with Healthcare to retaliate against Plaintiff’s wife for her
protected activity. Allowing employers to induce their subcontractors to fire
the subcontractor’s employees in retaliation for the protected activity of a
spouse would clearly contravene the purpose of Title VII. It is easy to
conclude that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in
6
protected activity if she knew that her husband would be fired by his
employer. See Thompson, at 868. Therefore, under the test set forth in
Thompson Plaintiff’s interests fall within the “zone of interests” of those
intended to be protected by Title VII.
(Doc. 26). Standing by that conclusion, Defendants’ argument that Thompson does
not apply in this case fails.
Healthcare argues that even if Plaintiff can meet the prima facie case for
retaliation, Healthcare terminated Plaintiff for legitimate non-retaliatory reasons.
Healthcare claims that Plaintiff was not meeting his job requirements; however,
Mr. Simpkins deposition testimony stated that “And [Hall] brought me into her
office, and she told me that she didn’t care what it took, that she want [sic]
[Plaintiff] fired. And I told her that I could not do that. That in my opinion
[Plaintiff] was doing a good job and that I could just not walk out in the hall and
fire him.” (Doc. 88, #3, p. 12). Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists
whether Plaintiff was meeting his job requirements or was fired for legitimate
reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 67 & 69) are DENIED.
ORDERED on November 2, 2011.
/s/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?