KUHNE v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al

Filing 33

AMENDED ORDER denying 13 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 1/30/2012. (jcw)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JEFFREY KUHNE,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO. 5:11-cv-209-RS-CJK

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________/
AMENDED ORDER
Before me is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Doc. 8). On July 28, 2011, the motion was denied (Doc. 13); however,
I granted Defendants’ Motion for Amended Order (Doc. 16) to explain my
reasoning for denying the motion to dismiss based on the qualified immunity of
Defendant McIntosh.
In order to overcome a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege sufficient
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Granting a motion to dismiss is appropriate if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven
consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984). I must construe all allegations in the

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complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shands Teaching
Hosp. and Clinics, Inc. v. Beech Street Corp., 208 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir.
2000)(citing Lowell v. American Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1229 (11th Cir.
1999)).
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil
damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citation omitted). This doctrine is intended
to balance "the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Id.
In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001), the
Supreme Court mandated a two-step process for lower courts to follow in resolving
qualified immunity claims. First, the court had to decide whether the facts that the
plaintiff alleged showed a violation of a constitutional right. Id. Second, if the
plaintiff satisfied the first step, the court had to determine whether "the right at
issue was 'clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct."
Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 816 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
The Supreme Court revisited Saucier's mandatory two-step inquiry in
Pearson. Id., 129 S. Ct. at 815-18. The Court held that while the Saucier process is

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often appropriate, “it should no longer be regarded as mandatory.” Rather, “[t]he
judges of the district courts and the court of appeals should be permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the
particular case at hand.” Id. at 818.
Applying this two-step analysis, the courts have recognized that “deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth
Amendment. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2198 (2007)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292(1976)). This is
true whether the “indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to
the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id.
To sustain such a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that satisfy both an
objective and a subjective requirement. There must be an "objectively serious
deprivation" of medical care, which requires (1) "an objectively serious medical
need . . . that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm," and (2)
that the state actor's response "was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain, and not merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in
diagnosis or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law."

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Granda v. Schulman, 372 Fed. Appx. 79, 82-83 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff also must allege the state actor's subjective intent to punish by
pleading facts that would show that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
Deliberate indifference is shown by: (1) the actor's "subjective knowledge of a risk
of serious harm," (2) the actor's "disregard of that risk," and (3) "conduct that is
more than mere negligence." Id. Deliberate indifference includes: (1) "grossly
inadequate care," (2) "a decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of
treatment," and (3) medical care that is "so cursory as to amount to no treatment at
all." Id.
Turning to the facts of the case, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the Plaintiff, Defendant McIntosh is not entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant
argues that she had no subjective knowledge of a risk to serious harm to Plaintiff,
and therefore, does not meet the subjective requirement of Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint states, “On January 29, 2009, Defendant,
MCINTOSH, acknowledged KUHNE’s pleas for urgent medical attention, denied
his request, told him it was a ‘medical’ issue, and did absolutely nothing to help
him obtain badly needed care for his extremely serious medical condition.” (Doc.
6). Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendant McIntosh intentionally refused
to aid Plaintiff for an urgent medical condition. The Eleventh Circuit has

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“consistently held that knowledge of the need for medical care and an intentional
refusal to provide that care constitutes deliberate indifference.” Adams v. Poag, 61
F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff told Defendant McIntosh that he needed urgent medical attention,
and Defendant McIntosh intentionally refused to help Plaintiff seek treatment.
This meets the subjective requirement of Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate
indifference. Therefore, Defendant McIntosh is not entitled to qualified immunity,
and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

ORDERED on January 27, 2012.

/s/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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