MENA VILLA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
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ORDER granting 30 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The Clerk is directed to close the case. Signed by JUDGE RICHARD SMOAK on 9/12/2012. (jcw)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JORGE MENA VILLA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE NO. 5:11-cv-329-RS-GRJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/
ORDER
Before me are Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, or in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) and Plaintiff’s Response in
Opposition (Doc. 31). The Court will construe the motion as a motion for
summary judgment.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a
jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986).
The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to
any material fact, and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden, the
court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in
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the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993).
Thus, if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts, then a court should deny summary judgment. Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Mercantile Bank
& Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841 (11th Cir. 1985)). However,
a mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's position will not
suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for
that party. Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was an inmate at the Marianna Federal Correctional Center (“FCI”)
beginning in May 2012. Two opposing gangs, the Paisa and the Surenos, had
members imprisoned at FCI. On June 30, 2010, members of the Paisa gang
attacked Plaintiff, a former member of the Surenos gang. On June 30, 2010,
members of the Surenos and Paisas gangs were in the recreation yard at FCI
Marianna when a fight broke out. Plaintiff was voluntarily in the yard at this time.
Recreational Specialists Barkley and Milton were on duty in the recreation
yard that evening. Around 6:15 p.m., members of both gangs started to congregate
in different areas of the recreation yard. (Doc. 30-4). Officer Barkley called the
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two leaders of the gangs into his office and tried to disperse any tension. The two
leaders shook hands before leaving his office. Id. Officer Barkley then called a
lieutenant and suggested that the yard be recalled. Id. A recall is a mandatory
order to the inmates to immediately return to their residential areas. (Doc. 30-1).
Around 6:55 p.m., there was a recreation “move,” which is a time when
inmates and enter or leave the recreation yard. Id. Lieutenant Evans noticed that
no Hispanics were leaving the yard, so he and Officer Cassady walked around the
yard to make their presence known to the inmates. Id. Lieutenant Evans saw the
two leaders talking and sensed the tension, so he decided to recall the recreation
yard. Id. When the recall announcement came over the intercome, the Paisas
started to attack the Surenos. Id. Lieutenant Evans ordered the inmates to stop
fighting and lie on the ground, but the inmates continued fighting before they
eventually complied with his order. Id.
Plaintiff claims that employees of FCI had knowledge of a possible attack
and failed to separate the gangs before and during the attack. Plaintiff claims there
was a mandatory duty to conduct searches of the inmates, and the recreation
specialists failed to conduct the searches. (Doc. 32).
Defendant brought its motion for summary judgment claiming that there was
no mandatory directive that officers were required to follow and that Plaintiff’s
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allegations fall within the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (“FTCA”) waiver of immunity.
III. ANALYSIS
Under the FTCA, the government waives its immunity to tortious actions by
its employees committed within the scope of their employment. Nguyen v. United
States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2009). However, there is a
“discretionary function exception” to this rule. This exception precludes
government liability for “[a]ny claim based upon … the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion
involved be abused.” 12 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2011). “When the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA applies, no federal subject matter jurisdiction
exists.” United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 562 F.3d 1297,
1299 (11th Cir. 2009).
The Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine if the
discretionary function exception applies. First, courts must determine whether an
act “involv[es] an element of judgment or choice.” United States v. Gaubert, 499
U.S. 315, 322 (1991). If the court decides the act did involve an element of
judgment or choice, then courts have to determine “whether that judgment is of the
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Id.
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Plaintiff argues there was a mandatory requirement that Recreational
Specialists had to shake down and search inmates on the recreation yard. The
position description of a Recreational Specialist states that “[t]he incumbent is
required to shake down inmates, conduct visual searches of inmate work and living
area for contraband, and is responsible for immediately responding to any
institutional emergencies.” (Doc. 31-2).
However, Plaintiff fails to prove, and what the affidavits provided by
Defendant refute, that the Recreation Specialists were required to search all
inmates as they entered the recreation yard every day. In fact, the evidence shows
that Recreational Specialists had discretion in this area: “Neither my position
description nor any Bureau of Prisons policy, regulation, directive, or FCI
Marianna order directs when or how often I must engage in these measures
[referring to searching inmates] as this is left to my discretion as recreation
specialist.” (Doc. 30-3). This is also supported by Officer’s Barkley’s Declaration
(Doc. 30-4), Officer Milton’s Declaration (Doc. 30-5), and Officer Henson’s
Declaration (Doc. 30-6). Therefore, the first part of the discretionary function test
is met.
The discretionary function exception was enacted to “prevent judicial
‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social,
economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.” United
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States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991). This, “when properly construed,
the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on
considerations of public policy.” Id. at 323. The Eleventh Circuit has concluded
that decisions related to how inmates are supervised are susceptible to policy
analysis. Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 1998). In this
case, the supervision of inmates on the recreation yard falls into the category of
“inmate supervision” that is susceptible to a policy analysis. Therefore, the second
part of the discretionary function test is met.
IV. CONCLUSION
1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 30) is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
ORDERED on September 12, 2012.
/s/ Richard Smoak
RICHARD SMOAK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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